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Abstract 
This thesis sets out to examine how the EU develops its foreign policy towards the Palestinians, with 
what objectives, through what mechanisms and with what impact. The thesis draws principally from 
realist understandings of the EU and its foreign-policy making, arguing that this remains essentially 
an intergovernmentalist collaboration of self-interested rational nation-states. However, the process of 
building collective foreign policy making institutions, and socialising within them, and the 
functioning of those institutions themselves, generates functionalist dynamics as well which results in 
supranationalist institutions and ―moments‖ when they are predominant over the general 
intergovernmentalism of the process. 
 As a consequence, decision-making and implementation within the current CFSP, even in the post-
Lisbon era, is diffused across different actors and institutions, creating a complex and at times 
contradictory mechanism which is dominated in the end by intergovernmentalism and the (differences 
between) member states‘ interests.The thesis shows that when it comes to EU policy towards the 
Middle East, since the 1970s there have been some  very clear shared interests of member states 
belonging to the EU. These have been grounded in security concerns, albeit promoted through liberal 
normative and institutionalist means. Precisely because these are shared interests, which are in each 
national case are only a part of a larger ―bundle‖ of interests, they have been sufficient to drive inter-
governmental collaboration but not sufficient to promote sustained supranationalist tendencies. 
 Each member state has to balance the security interests they may share with partner countries, with 
other, sometimes conflicting interests. In order to manage this, national governments have retained a 
preference for inter-governmentalist foreign policy decision-making in the EU. The evolution of EU 
foreign policy towards the Middle East (via the Mediterranean global policy [GMP], Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership [EMP], European Neighbourhood Policy [ENP], and the Union for the 
Mediterranean [UfM]) supports realist arguments that these largely security-based interests have 
guided states in their intergovernmental contributions to the EU policy-making process.  
 Ultimately he EU uses the tools of liberal theory, mainly those of economic liberalisation, such as 
trade, aid, democracy promotion, human rights and sanctions, to achieve security and stability in the 
region. The EU‘s support for the MEPP can also be understood within this context. When there is a 
contradiction between these liberal values and the security interests of the member states, security 
interests take priority.  In other words, the EU is a realist actor in liberal clothes.  
The thesis demonstrates how EU policy towards the Palestinians ultimately reflects this pre-
occupation with the EU‘s own security, despite its normative commitments to Palestinian 
democratisation and its declared support for Palestinian economic development through financial and 
 xvi 
 
technical assistance. Whilst EU member states largely share a common vision for the political 
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and one which is embedded within the supranationalist 
institutions like the Commission, their ability to advance their own collective role in that process is 
restricted by differing relations with third parties and varying priorities, which are advanced through 
the dominant intergovernmentalist institutions (like the Council). The ultimate result has been to make 
policy towards the Palestinians a victim of the failing Peace Process, and to limit the implementation 
and effectiveness of declared EU policy. 
 1 
 
Introduction 
The Arab World, the Middle East and the Israel-Arab conflict have occupied prominent positions on 
the agenda of Europe and its institutions for as long as the latter have existed.  Due to the proximity of 
the two regions, their historical- particularly colonial- ties, and their cultural linkage, Europe has 
always prided itself on a ‗special relationship‘, considering itself to have a better understanding of 
Arab and Middle Eastern issues than others
1
. In reality, of course, the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region raises significant concerns for Europe regarding security, combating terrorism, 
securing energy and trade interests and the migration of peoples.
2
 For Europe, the on-going Israeli- 
Arab  conflict acts as a constant impediment to the stability and security of its interests in the Middle 
East, and over the years it has consequently developed a deep concern with, and involvement in, the 
Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) which it aims to resolve. Together, these concerns provide a 
context for the development of European policy towards, and relations with, the Palestinians in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) 
This thesis aims to establish the processes by which the European Union devises its policies towards 
the Palestinians, the substance of those policies, and their impact. It asks the following research 
questions: 
1- How does the EU ―make‖ its foreign policy, through what institutions and mechanisms and to 
what ends? 
2- How is EU policy towards the Middle East, its conflict, its Peace Process and towards the 
OPTs, in particular, formulated, with what objectives, under what constraints and with what 
impact? 
3- What does the making of EU policy towards the Middle East, its conflict, its Peace Process 
and towards the OPTs tell us about the mechanisms, instruments, and processes of EU foreign 
policy-making in general?       
Despit many scholars have addressed elements of this topic through the lens of EU policy towards the 
MEPP, EU democratisation efforts in the OPTs and European aid and technical assistance for 
example - none have so far set out to systematically examine how the EU devises policy towards the 
Palestinians in general, or with what objectives and policy goals in mind. Similarly, the many studies 
of EU foreign policy-making have failed to provide adequate explanations for the specificity of policy 
toward the Palestinians. This research, therefore, will utilise theories of International Relations (IR) 
and integration and bring together an examination of the processes, instruments and institutions of EU 
                                                          
1 D'alan on, F. (1994). The EC Looks to a New Middle East. Journal of Palestine Studies. 23, 41-51.p.16. 
2
 Ibid.p.16 
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foreign policy-making in general, with an analysis of how these combine to formulate particular 
policies towards the Palestinians, or which directly affect the Palestinians through the MEPP. The 
thesis also examines the issues which arise from the implementation of those policies, both in terms of 
the institutional and process-related constraints and, uniquely, through an examination of how the 
recipients of policy perceive and respond to it.  
The thesis focuses inevitably, but not exclusively, on the EUs main foreign policy structure – the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The main argument fits comfortably within the large 
body of existing research which suggests that the CFSP is ―conflict-prone, disaggregated, and 
unbalanced‖, and that its mechanism and ―ill structured decision–making process‖3 are emblematic of 
the intergovernmental approach of the Union towards foreign policy making. 
The thesis will demonstrate that, despite efforts over both the previous EPC and the present CFSP to 
speak with a single voice to the outside world (in recognition of some shared interests at the level of 
strategic and security issues), the member states of the EU still lack sufficiently comprehensive shared 
interests, common vision of a foreign policy role, or political will to overcome the temptations of self-
serving intergovernmentalist structures and tactics. Responsibilities for foreign policy-making and 
implementation are consequently split between the intergovernmentalist European Council on the one 
hand and the supranationalist institutions of the European Community (notably the European 
Commission and European Parliament) on the other. In the end, intergovernmentalism trumps 
internationalism and, even when EC institutions are able to over-ride the interests of individual states‘ 
through functionalist mechanisms, and so arrive at a common foreign policy objective, subsequent 
policies can still be subverted by the the Council of the European Union and the member states within 
it. The result is confusion, complexity and contradiction in EU foreign policies, as well as a 
propensity to fail at the stage of implementation.  
The thesis will show that, when it comes to EU policy towards the Palestinians, these problems are all 
too evident.  The thesis locates EU policy towards the Palestinians within the two broad frames of 
reference of the EU; that is the MEPP on the one hand, and the EU efforts to engage with its regional 
neighbourhood through the Mediterranean global policy (GMP), Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP)/European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and the Union for the Mediterranean 
(UfM), on the other.  In both foreign policy arenas, the divergent national interests of member states 
within the Middle East are apparent, as are their differing visions for the role which the EU should be 
playing and, consequently, the nature of the foreign policy which it should be pursuing. National 
perceptions of the role of the EU relative to the U.S differ too, and the potential for EU policy is 
circumscribed by the policies of both the U.S and - when it comes to the Palestinians - Israel. Whilst 
                                                          
3
 Zielonka, J. (1998). Explaining Euro-paralysis: Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, p.177. 
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developments in the Peace Process in the 1990s and early 2000s offered greater scope for a proactive 
foreign policy on the part of the EU, these divergences stymied the efforts of the EU to fully exploit 
the new opportunities, ultimately leaving the efforts at Mediterranean regional cooperation and 
integration hostage to a crumbling peace process. 
Through a series of case studies of specific EU foreign policy areas towards the Palestinians and the 
OPTs, (the MEPP, democratisation and political reform, and aid and technical assistance) the thesis 
demonstrates how the levels of tension within and between component parts of the EU subsequently 
led to contradictions and implementation failures. Finally through a fieldwork-based examination of 
Palestinian perceptions of EU policies in these areas, the thesis shows how recipients of EU foreign 
policy are not simply passive agents, but can identify the flaws in EU foreign policy making 
instruments and processes and exploit them accordingly, further subverting the original objectives of 
the policies. 
Overall, the thesis argues that the CFSP has not resolved the inter-governmentalism of the previous 
EPC, but - despite its more complex institutional arrangements - has reproduced it with significant 
negative consequences for EU foreign policy making. For the Palestinians, this has meant that the EU 
has failed to live up to its potential, or to translate its economic power into political leverage in a 
manner that can fulfil its own stated objectives in the region. Consequently, their expectations of the 
EU do not match the EU‘s ambitions, whilst EU policy fails to meet Palestinian needs. 
The thesis thus contributes to the research literature which seeks to analyse the EU foreign policy 
making institutions and structures themselves, as much as to our empirical understanding of EU 
policy towards the Palestinians.   
Surveying the Literature 
There is no shortage of relevant literature on the EU itself, (which will be examined in detail in 
Chapters One and Two of this thesis).  The achievements of the EEC in the realms of economic 
integration, the creation of a single European market, a single currency, liberalized trade, harmonized 
macroeconomic strategy, and centralized regulatory decision-making have prompted many theorists 
and scholars of IR to study the integration process of the EU. It has been, according to Moravcsik, 
―the most ambitious and most successful example of peaceful international cooperation in world 
history ―…yet there is little agreement about the proper explanation for its evolution.‖ 4 
The growing international presence of the EU in the Middle East has triggered an interesting 
academic debate about the EU Policies towards the Middle East in general, and OPTs in particular. 
                                                          
4 
Moravcsik, A., & Siedento P. L. (2001). Despotism in Brussels? Misreading the European Union. Foreign 
Affairs 80, p.114. 
 4 
 
The region still occupies a significant position on researchers, scholars and European decision-makers 
agendas. This importance stems first from the dynamic nature of the EU as a global actor, and second, 
a result of the variety of its policies; either its direct involvement in the region which dates back to the 
1960s, or to its multiple initiatives towards the region.  
As this research will demonstrate in the next chapters, the Middle East and the conflict in the region 
has been one of the most widely debated among member states in the past thirty years. For example, 
the conflict was the first subject on the EPC in its first meeting in the 1970.
5
 As a result, many 
scholars consider the European role and efforts in the Middle East as a mirror which reflects the 
capabilities of the EU and its members to push for more integration and harmonise their policy, 
divergent interests, and identities in order to speak in a unified single European voice.
6
 
As the first chapter will demonstrate (in substantially more detail than is provided here), the theorising 
of the external relation of the EU is not an easy task. Therefore, most of the European studies scholars 
struggle to define and explain the nature and motivations of the EU integration process, and the 
developments and the impact of these, on decision-making in the realm of foreign policy. However, 
since the inception of the EPC mechanism in the 1970s and then the CFSP mechanism, there are 
plenty of studies dealing with theories, actions, and presence of the EU in general and its foreign 
policy in particular. Thus, there have been several attempts from European scholars to understand to 
rationale behind the creation of EPC and CFSP and to study its role as an international actor. This 
attempt to answer several questions, such as what is the nature of the European integration process, 
and why the EU failed to integrate the foreign affairs in the integration process of the EU; in other 
words, why the external relations of the EU are kept outside of the European integration process. 
(such as, Haas
7
, Tatlor,
 8
 Baylis & Smith
9
, Moravcsik,
10
Cram,
11
Puchala,
12
 Pollack
13
,White
14
; Hill,
15
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 Musu, C. (2010). European Union Policy Towards The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The Quicksands of 
Politics. New York:Palgrave Macmillan, p.6. 
6
 Ibid. p.6. 
7
 Haas, E. B. (1964). Beyond the nation-state: functionalism and international organization. Stanford, Calif, 
Stanford University Press 
8 Tatlor, P. (Eds.), Functionalism Theory and Practice in International Relations. London: University of London 
Press Ltd 
9 
Baylis, J., & Smith, S. (2005). The globalization of world politics: an introduction to international Relations. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
10
 Moravcsik, A. (2001). Despotism in Brussels-Misreading the European Union.  Journal of Foreign Affairs, 
80/3 
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 Cram, Laura (1997). Policy Making in the European Union: Conceptual Lenses and the Integration Process. 
Routledge, London.  
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 Puchala, D.J. (1999). Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism and European Integration: A Review Article. 
Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS), 37/2, pp.317-331. 
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 Wallace, H and Wallace, W. (Eds.) Policy-Making in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
14
 White, B. (2001). Understanding European foreign policy. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave 
15
 Hill, C. (2003). The changing politics of foreign policy. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave 
MacMillan.  
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Nugent
16
). Moreover there are several scholars who have built links between the formulation of the 
EPC/CFSP and the identities of the EU members. (Such as, Johansson-Nogué,
17
Holsti,
18
 Calleo,
19
 
Hyde-Price,
20
 Müller,
21
Behr,
22
and Whitman
23
) 
 In addition to this, there have been attempts to shed light on the challenges that EPC and the CFSP 
face, and their limitations, constraints, and their impact on the European Union‘s ability to conduct 
the CFSP coherently and consistently towards international events and crises. (Zielonka
24
, Monar
25
, 
Hill
26
, Allen and Pijpers,
27
 Smith, Peterson and Shackleton, White
28
). This literature and their 
contributions are discussed at length in Chapter One. At this point, however, we may ask what has 
been written thus far specifically on Europe, the Middle East and Palestine, which can help us with 
our study. 
 The Middle East and its chronic conflict have been on the European agenda for a long time, and there 
is no shortage of literature in this regard. The academic community has been trying to analysis and 
address the European role and policies since the 1970s and 1980s, when several researchers studied 
the role of the EEC/EU in the Middle East and the impact of its mechanisms- either the EPC or CFSP- 
on the EU‘s presence in the region (such as, Garfinkle,29 Allen and Pijpers,30Mustafa,31 Greilsammer 
                                                          
16 Nugent, N. (1994). The government and politics of the European Union. Durham, NC, Duke University Press 
17 Johansson-Nogués, E. (2009).  Is The EU‘s Foreign Policy Identity an Obstacle?  The European  Union, the 
Northern Dimension and the Union for the Mediterranean. European Political Economy Review 9, 24-48. 
18 Holsti, K.J. (1970). National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy. International Studies 
Quarterly, 14/3, pp.233-309. 
19 Calleo, D. P. (1978). The German problem reconsidered: Germany and the world order, 1870 to the present. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
20 Hyde-Price, A., 2004. Interests, institutions and identities in the study of European foreign 
policy. In:Christiansen, T. and Tonra, B., eds. Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, pp. 99-113. 
21 Müller, P. (2007). Germany‘s Contribution to Europe‘s Common Foreign Policy (EFP) in the Middle East - 
from Brakeman to Key Supporter of a Strong European Role in Middle East Peacemaking. Paper for the Sixth 
Pan-European International Relations Conference. Retrieved from http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/Mueller-
Patrick_Mueller_Conference_Paper.pdf. 
22 Behr, T. (2008). Enduring Differences? France, Germany and Europe‘s Middle East Dilemma. Journal of 
European Integration, 30/1, pp.79 - 96. 
23 Whitman, R  (2008). Foreign, Security and Defence Policy and the Lisbon treaty: Significant or Cosmetic 
Reforms?  CFSP Forum 6 (2) 
24 Zielonka, J. (1998). Explaining Euro-paralysis: Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics. New 
York: St. Martin's Press. 
25 Monar, J. (1998). Institutional Constraints of the European Union's Mediterranean Policy. Mediterranean 
Politics, 3 (2), p.39-60. 
26
 Hill, C. (1993). The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role. Journal of 
Common Market studies. 31, 305 
27  Allen, D and Pijpers, A. (1984). European Foreign Policy-making and the Arab –Israeli Conflict. The 
Hague, Boston and Hingham: M. Nijhoff.  
28
 White, B. (2001). Understanding European foreign policy. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave 
29  Garfinkle, A. M. (1983). Western Europe's Middle East diplomacy and the United States. Philadelphia: 
Mason Crest Publishers.  
30 Allen, D and Pijpers, A. (1984). op cit. 
31 Mustafa, N. (1986). Orupa wa al Alam al Arabi [AR] (Europe and the Arab World). Beirut: Centre For the 
Study of Arab Unity. 
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and Weiler;
32
 Coffey and Bonvicini;
33
 Jawad ;
34
 Jünemann;
35
and Bicchi) as mentioned before the  
variety of the European involvement in the region has contributed to enrich the European studies and 
research. Most of the literature and studies related to the European policies towards the Middle East 
and North African Region (MENA) can be divided into two sections. First, study and analysis of the 
political role of the European EPC/CFSP diplomatic role, Declarations, Joint Position and Joint 
Action as a result of direct involvement in the region and the MEPP. Second, studying the regional 
initiatives to the region such as The Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) in 1970s, the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995, The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003, and 
recently the Union for the Mediterranean (UFM) in 2008. The European initiatives mentioned above, 
its multiple dimensions and the European Union‘s stances on a number of central issues such regional 
cooperation and economic cooperation, security, immigration, relations between Islam and the West 
democracy promotion and human rights, rule of law, reforms, and financial aid, technical assistance, 
have been widely analysed and examined by the academic community. (Such as, Bicchi,
36
 Youngs,
37
 
Brauch et al, Joffé,
38
 Gomez, Jünemann
39
, Del Sarto and Schumacher
40
) 
The vast majority of the researchers that have covered the European policies towards the region 
during the 1970s focus on two aspects.  First, the economic and trade relations with the MENA 
region. Second, the development of the EEC stances towards the conflict which are expressed through 
the EPC‘s declarations (1970-1992). 
There are several scholars who analyse the EU‘s policies towards this region, and study the 
motivations and interests of the EU, and additionally the limitations and restrictions that are imposed 
on the CFSP towards the region, such the divergent interest of the EU members and the American and 
the Israeli challenges to the European role in the MENA (such as, Laipson
41
, Robins
42
, Alpher
43
, 
                                                          
32 Greilsammer, I. and Weiler, J. (1987). Europe's Middle East Dilemma: The Quest for a Unified Stance. 
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(2&3), pp.1 - 20. 
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Gillespie, Olson
44
, Jünemann). The most significant of these literatures are outlined below. 
Thorough their research, Allen and Pijpers explain the national foreign policy positions of the 
European Community vis-à-vis the Middle East conflict, demonstrating by examples that the joining 
the European Community and participating in the EPC has contributed to ―Europeanising‖ the 
national policy of the big four European members mainly Britain, Italy, Germany, and  France. They 
argue that participation in the EPC provides EEC members a new window to play roles in the Middle 
East, and leads the EEC‘s members to alter the national foreign policy to be more balanced towards 
the conflicting parties.
45
  
Jawad, in her comprehensive and engaging overview of European involvement in the Middle East 
since 1950s Euro-Arab Relation: A Study in Collective Diplomacy adopted a historical analytical 
approach to understanding and analysing the nature of economic, trade and political relationships 
between both sides, and the development of the political stances of the European Community towards 
the conflict. Through a detailed study, Jawad analyses the obstacles that faced the Euro-Arab relations 
and the impact of the oil crisis in 1973 on the dialogue. In her explanation, the lack of European 
political initiatives towards the MENA region the 1970s and 1980s, except its declarations, added to 
the desire of the EEC to achieve economic and political integration among its member states.
46
 Up to 
the 1970s, the community‘s attention was directed inwards rather than outwards (e.g. by moving the 
trade barriers among the member states, building up its agricultural policy and achieving ever-
improving standards of living for its members.
47
) Jawad argues also that the political stances of the 
EEC towards the MENA region were motivated by realist concerns, mainly their economic interests: 
―The reactions toward the oil crisis were based on the degree of oil vulnerability and dependence, 
hardly surprising since ―sixty percent of the European total energy requirement during the 1970s came 
from the Arab world.‖48  
In another impressive study of the European Union‘s involvement in the Middle East, Richard 
Youngs analyses the European policies towards Iraq, Turkey, OPTs and Iran since 9/11, providing 
through six case studies an assessment of how mechanisms of the European policies work in practice. 
He explains how EU member states attempt to build a balance between their commitments to political 
reform and democracy promotion and their strategic interests in counter-terrorist and containment-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
43
 Alpher, J. (1998). The political role of the European Union in the Arab-Israel peace process: an Israeli 
perspective. New York, American Jewish Committee 
44
 Olson, R. K. (1997). Partners in the Peace Process: The United States and Europe. Journal of Palestine 
Studies, 26/4, pp.78-89. 
45
 Allen, D and Pijpers, A. (1984). European Foreign Policy-making and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The Hague, 
Boston and Hingham: M. Nijhoff.  
46
 Jawad, H. op.cit., p.1. 
47
 Ibid. p.1. 
48
 Ibid. p.2 
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oriented cooperation.  He argues that European strategies in different parts of the Middle East shed 
light on the impact of 9/11 suggesting that ―post-9/11 challenges associated within international 
terrorism triggered important changes in EU polices, but not an overreaching paradigm shift.‖49 
However, according to Youngs much of the European policy in the wake of 9/11 ―appeared to have 
little to do with the replication of democratic norms and values, but rather more traditional power-
protection security. Cooperation on counterterrorism deepened between European and Middle Eastern 
security and intelligence service.‖ 50In addition, Youngs argues that, although the EU utilises cultural 
exchanges and economic liberalisation as tools to encourage reform and democracy promotion, these 
policies ―rarely activate real political transform nor did they reinforce the egalitarian movements 
within the area.‖51  
Costanza Musu‘s book European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The 
Quicksands of Politics, is a significant contribution to the literature on EU policy towards the Middle 
East. By conducting an extensive analysis of European policy towards the MEPP.  Musu identifies the 
factors and interests underlying the formulation of the Union‘s policy.52 Her research is an attempt to 
answer several questions relating to the European role in the Middle East, such as what are the main 
achievements, limits and failures of the EU involvements in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and why 
has the EU been unable to develop an autonomous and effective policy towards the conflict, despite 
its efforts and the inordinate amount of time and resources it has committed over the years? She 
argues that, although the EU policy towards the Middle East witnessed signs of convergence as a 
result of compatibility between the EU‘s members, ―the consolidation of this convergence into a ‗truly 
collective policy‘ has been hampered by persistent differences.‖53 
Thus Jawaad, Youngs and Musu all identify failures to develop a consistent European policy towards 
the region and all identify the underlying self-interested and security related concerns of member 
states which locates them within a realist perspective, despite attention to normative aspects. 
By contrast, in her analysis of the decision-making of the EU and the Mediterranean, Federica Bicchi 
adopts a constructivist and liberal intergovernmental approach to understand the nature of the 
European decision- making towards the region. She claims that ―cognitive uncertainty‖ gives a great 
insight to understand how societal factors represented in institutional level and stresses the difficulties 
                                                          
49
  Youngs, R. (2006). Europe and the Middle East in the Shadow of September 11. Boulder, Colo. & London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers,  p.222. 
50
  Ibid. p.223. 
51
  Ibid. p.222. 
52
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Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p.6. 
53
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to produce the common knowledge,
54
 and sees that ―cognitive uncertainty‖ and lack of knowledge and 
resources are the main motivations that make the EU members tackle these new threats at the 
European level. She considered these factors as a window of opportunity that allows EEC/EU 
members to initiate policy.  She argues that fears of terrorism after the Munich attack in 1972, where a 
group of Palestinians killed members of the Israeli Olympic team, and the oil crisis of 1973, were the 
motivation of the German government at that time to tackle the issues at the European level with their 
European counterparts. In addition, she argues that the fears of migration and fundamental Islam 
which considered as a high security continuum across Europe were the main Spanish motivation to 
address these issues on the European level, by proposing the Barcelona Process in 1995 as a 
comprehensive and multilateral and regional solution to these challenges, creating cooperative 
security arrangements. 
55
 
In addition to the research that looks at the regional EU policies toward the MENA, there is also a 
large literature dealing specifically with European policy towards Palestine. There are several scholars 
who have focused on the specific aspects of the policy, such as the EU‘s economic involvement in the 
peace process, European democracy promotion and reform policy, and European aid and technical 
assistance. (Such as, Musu, Bicchi, Pace, Le More, Roy, Al-Fattal, Youngs). 
Good governance and democratization, reform and human rights have become the main issues of 
concern in the literature covering EU-OPTs relations. In fact, these policies are considered as the 
second pillar of the EU policies towards OPTs after its political role and its aid and technical 
assistance.  As with the rest of the EU policy, the academic community paid enormous attention to 
this branch of the EU policy since it been injected in the treaty of the EU as part of the CFSP, and 
become one of the main elements of the EU Association Agreements and action plans with EU‘s 
neighbours, mainly the Mediterranean. Scholars such as Youngs, Gillespie, Pace,
56
 Keohane,
57
 
Brown,
58
 and Jünemann are among others who have devoted more attention to the good 
governance/democratization dimension of EU-Palestinian relations.  
Despite it‘s special character as non- state actor under the Israeli occupation, the interest in  the OPTs 
is overlapped by the broader study area of the Mediterranean region, where promoting peace, 
democracy and prosperity in the Middle East and North Africa have been the guiding ideas of the 
Barcelona Process, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Union for the Mediterranean.  
                                                          
54
  Bicchi, F. (2007). European Foreign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
55
  Ibid. p.30. 
56
 Pace, M. (2009). Paradoxes and Contradictions in EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: the Limits 
of EU Normative Power. Democratization 16/1, pp.39-58. 
57
 Keohane, D. (2008). The Absent Friend: EU Foreign Policy and Counter-Terrorism. Journal of Common 
Market Studies. 46, 125-146 
58
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The main aims of the literature relating to the EU‘s good governance, democracy promotion, reform 
and human rights programmes in  OPTs are, first, to explain EU motivations, and second, to measure 
to what extend that the EU has been successful in its aims to export its values to its partners in the 
region; mainly the Palestinians and the Israelis. 
 There is a consensus among the researchers that the European democracy promotion and reform 
directed to the MENA region were ―temporary outburst of idealistic enthusiasm of the post-Cold War 
years, but now the EU and its members moves ‗back to normal‘ retuning to ―stability-oriented 
alliance-building with authoritarian governments.‖59 This accordingly has created deficiencies in the 
objectives of EU policy, as well as incoherence between aims and political implementation.
60
 This gap 
has widened since 9/11, where the EU policies in this regard towards the region have become, 
according to Jünemann, markedly ‗securitised‘, and a variety of strands of EU external action policy 
of the EU from counter-terrorism to migration, energy to trade, ―are now seen through an increasingly 
narrow security lens.‖61 This literature endorses then the realist perspective of EU foreign policy 
making. 
International aid and technical assistance to the Palestinians has played an important and multifaceted 
role in the OPTs. As with the rest of the EU policy towards OPTs, European aid and technical 
assistant to the MEPP, the PA, and the Palestinians has attracted the attention of the academic 
community. The importance of the subject derives from several reasons.  First, the EU aid and 
technical assistance is considered the third pillar of the EU policy towards Palestine, after its political 
involvement and its democracy promotion and reform programmes. Second, by providing 
approximately €500 million per year, the EU and its Members states became undoubtedly the biggest 
donors to the Palestinian.
62
  
There are several important studies that shed light on the impact of the international aid on the 
Palestinians and the Peace Process. These studies addressed several issues relating to the international 
aid to MENA region in general, such as the political and ideological determinants of aid, the role of 
aid in fostering development, the complex political effects of humanitarian aid, the impact of aid on 
the peace process and conflict, and the effect of aid on civil society.(such as,  the UN Economic and 
Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA),
63
Le More,
64
 United Nations Conference on Trade 
                                                          
59
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61
  Jünemann, A. (2003). op cit. 
62
Bertrand-Sanz,  A.  (2010). The Conflict and the EU‘s Assistance to the Palestinians in European Involvement. 
In Bulut Aymat E. (Ed.), The Arab-Israeli Conflict Chaillot Papers. Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), p.44. 
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and Development (suxh as, UNCTAD
65
, Crisis Group,
66
Taghdisi-Rad, S.,
67
Sharp,
68
 
ESCWA,
69
Weber,
70
 World Bank).
71
  
These studies demonstrate how the international aid has been utilised to support the Peace Process and 
encourage both the Palestinians and the Israelis to adopt a peaceful solution for the conflict. With 
regards to the EU aid and technical assistances, this subject has been in the centre of the academic 
debate since the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid. For example, Le More; Catholic 
International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity (CIDSE,
72
Wake,
73
Al-Fattal,
74
 
CIDSE,
75
Youngs,
76
 Emerson, Tocci, and Youngs
77
) all examine the nature of donor engagement and 
motivations behind the EU aid, the internal and external challenges facing the EU aid, and finally the 
impact of aid on the MEPP itself, and on fostering sustainable economic growth and development. 
Researchers in this regard have some disagreement among them regarding the impact of the EU. 
While some argue that European aid has had helped the Palestinian economic growth and human 
development (ESCWA
78
, CIDSE), others, which are the majority, (Le More; Wake
79
; Weber, 
Emerson et al 2009, Youngs), think that EU‘s aid impact on economic growth and living standards 
has been limited.   
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Studying the impact of the international assistance to the Palestinians after the Oslo process, Le More 
found that supporting the two states solution through the Peace Process, fostering economic and social 
development and, finally, institution-building, are the main reasons for the provision of international 
aid to the Palestinians. However, according to Le More, despite the huge amount of aid that the 
international community poured into OPTs and the Peace Process, the Palestinian are poorer than 
before the MEPP. She argues that since the main aim of the international community is to support the 
peace process, this goal has ―dominated‖ their aid policy and shifted their attention from ending the 
occupation to managing it.
80
 
In his assessment of the EU aid to Palestine, Youngs criticised the realist approach of the EU in this 
regard, considering that avoiding dealing with Hamas government and channelling the European aid 
through Fatah in the West Bank has contributed to widening the division within the Palestinian 
society, increasing divisions between Palestinian factions.
81
 He believes that this policy has ―turned 
the wheel‖ of reform and transparency that the EU is promoting back. 82 
Roy is aware of the importance of the international aid to help the Palestinians, however she sees that 
assistance ―cannot be a kind of compensation for the lack of, or deficiencies in, the political 
process‖.83 Roy added; ―economic growth and development cannot occur under Israel occupation.‖84 
The literature tells us then, that the EU in its dealings with the Middle East and the Palestinians in 
particular, has been motivated principally by its self-interest and security, which might best be 
explained within a realist understanding of IR. It also tells the researcher that it is necessary to look at 
where initiatives come from, how they are progressed within the EU itself, and the mechanisms by 
which they are implemented. Bicchi‘c work gives us a final clue by showing how constructivist 
attention to how the interests of individual member states are constructed (and can alter) impact upon 
the sum total of EU policy-making. 
Methodology and Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis attempts therefore, to map out the processes, mechanisms and instruments of EU foreign 
policy making in general. To this, it must first establish the nature of the EU as an actor in 
international relations. A survey of the EU in international relations theory in Chapter One establishes 
that, whilst neo-realism offers the most convincing explanation of the EU as an international 
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organisation and actor, we can nonetheless draw usefully on constructivist understandings of how the 
national interests of member states and of the organisation as a whole are constantly constructed and 
reformulated through the processes of interaction with one another and with the wider world. 
Similarly liberal institutional explanations shed light on the normative dimensions of the EU, and on 
the trajectory of its supranational ambitions. Thus the thesis, whilst working largely within a neo-
realist theoretical framework, is careful throughout to high-light where alternative theoretical schools 
can offer additional insights and explanations.  
Theoretical discussions also lead to a framework which juxtaposes inter-governmentalism and 
supranationalism. Neo-realism highlights the key role played by member states as they advance their 
own interests through membership of the EU. Whilst this suggests an inter-governmentalist dynamic 
(which is proved to be predominant in foreign policy making through the course of the thesis), the 
institutions of the EU itself embody functionalist overspills which develop supranationalist dynamics 
of their own. The thesis thus examines the processes, mechanisms and instruments of collective 
foreign policy-making through the distributions and balances of power between the national 
governments and the supranational institutions. It does so by examining the evolution of collective 
foreign policy-making, from the early EPC to the current day, in Chapter Two.  
 This high-lights the importance of the structures of foreign policy making, rather than just the stated 
objectives. These structures – which privilege intergovernmentalist bodies over supranationalist 
institutions within the EU, such that the former largely make the policy while the latter implement it, 
mean that realist objectives of national and collective security (broadly defined), preservation of 
sovereignty, and maximising power within the EU, play a greater role in determining collective 
foreign policy than the liberal normative ambitions of the institutions themselves. The thesis therefore 
focuses on the process of foreign policy-making as it a consequence of the distribution of powers and 
competences between the parts of the structure of the EU, specifically between and among the 
member states and the EU institutions.  
To locate EU policy towards the Palestinians, the thesis first has to provide the context for that policy 
which it does through study of the EU‘s Mediterranean regional initiatives and the MEPP (Chapter 
Three and Four). Both chapters provide a chronological account of the evolution of these policy areas, 
mirroring the chronological presentation of the evolution of EU foreign policy making in general 
offered in Chapter Two. This enables the researcher to present the dynamic nature of the policy 
formulation process, and specifically to identify how the relative roles or influence of the member 
states (via the inter-governmentalist institutions) and the supranationalist institutions of the EU can 
fluctuate in response to wider international contexts or internal developments.  
Chapter Three traces the main European initiatives towards the MENA region; it shows how Europe 
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gradually upgraded its relations with the Mediterranean region from the Global Mediterranean Policy 
in the 1970s, to the Union For the Mediterranean policy in 2009. It does so for two reasons: to 
elaborate on the intra-regional context within which European policy towards the OPTs and the 
Palestinians was formulated and to demonstrate how context itself was fundamentally the product of 
realist international relations as previously outlined. Within this, the chapter aims to illustrate EU 
decision-making process and mechanisms towards the region by exploring three main questions. 
Firstly, how does the EU ―formulate‖ its foreign policy towards the region, i.e. through which 
institutions and mechanisms and to what ends? Secondly, how are EEC/EU policies towards the 
Mediterranean region formulated, i.e. with what objectives, under what constraints and with what 
impact? Third, what does the EU policy formulation towards the Mediterranean suggest about the 
context of the EU–Palestinian relationship? 
The thesis progresses to examine how specific areas of policy towards the Palestinians have been 
developed and with what impact. The three case study areas chosen were first, the political stance and 
policy of Europe under the EPC and the CFSP. Second, the financial and technical aid assistance to 
the OPTs, and finally, the EU democracy promotion, reform and human rights programes direct to the 
OPTs. The last two cases studies were chosen because they constitute the largest areas in which the 
EU has been directly engaged with the Palestinians. Moreover, they both represent normative 
dimensions of EU foreign policy-making, offering an opportunity to test the realist argument that the 
security interests of member states ultimately trump the liberal ambitions of the EU. 
 In Chapter Four the thesis traces the evolution of the European policies and stances towards the 
conflict and the MEPP under the EPC and the CFSP.  It shows how the European policy towards the 
conflict has developed in parallel with the development of the European decision making in foreign 
affairs and the change in the political landscape of the Middle East especially after the lunch of the 
MEPP in the 1990s.  
The chapter shows  how the EEC/EU have managed through their declaratory policy to establish a 
European vision and principles on which European policy makers believe that solution of the conflict 
between the Israelis and the Arabs should be based. In addition, it concluded that the EU member 
states may largely share the same view about the conflict, but they are differing on the ―proper‖ policy 
towards the parties/countries involved in the conflict. This due to difference in their perceptions of 
current self-interest, and partly as a result of differing visions of the correct nature of any European 
role. As a consequence, there is a gap between European ambitions and performance. The chapter un-
picks and identifies the main determinants of the European role and policies towards the conflicting 
parties and the MEPP. It concluded the European policy towards the conflict and the MEPP are victim 
of the intergovernmental, the lowest common dominator which can be reached through bargaining.  
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The chapter found that the member states‘ foreign policies have themselves been affected by 
membership of and participation in the EU.  The chapter demonstrates that, despite the EEC/EU 
members coming to the negotiation table of the EPC/CFSP with their own pre-defined interests and 
political stances towards the conflicting parties and the MEPP, the processes of socialising and 
interacting with other members states on the European level, do have an impact on the perceptions of 
these interests and can alter them. In addition, the thesis shows that there are also cases where the 
members go-it- alone and conduct national policy against, and in contradiction with, the common 
foreign policy of the EU. Finally, tracing the EEC/CFSP policy towards the MEPP   shows that 
despite the intergovernmentalism of the CFSP, there is an element of neofunctionalism, which 
advocates supranationalism in the CFSP. The increasing roles of the HR, the EU special envoys in the 
MEPP, the European Commission in implanting the European aid and technical assistances, and the 
important role of the EP in advocating the human rights issues are examples supports the argument 
that the CFSP contains some supranationalistic elements.  
Chapters Five and Six look at European aid and democracy promotion towards the OPTs. The 
chapters first locate the specific policy areas within broader EU objectives. For example, Chapter Five 
introduces the record and objectives of EU economic aid in general, setting out both the normative 
dimensions and the more direct interests which aid-giving serves. The chapter then examine the stated 
objectives of EU policy towards the Palestinians in each field, the form in which EU policy has been 
manifest, and assesses the outcomes of the policies in terms of both whether they have met stated 
objectives but also the impact they have made on the ground. The chapters demonstrate how the EU‘s 
inherent imbalance of power and the intergovernmental approach to the CFSP have limited the EU‘s 
ability to achieve the overarching goals in the OPTs.  
Chapter Five shows how the EU utilises liberal values and principles in order to achieve its political 
aims, mainly stabilising the region through its financical support to the PA and the MEPP. Through 
tracing the allocation of the European aid on the ground, the chapter shows the EU invested heavily in 
building a strong Palestinian police force and reforming its institutions at the expense of other 
economic sectors. The EU supported the MEPP partners in the region despite the corruption in the PA 
and despite the Israeli systematic destruction of the Palestinian infrastructure. The facts support the 
realists‘ understanding of European policy towards the MEPP. In Chapter Six the thesis  asseses the 
EU democracy promotion efforts in the OPTs by asking to what extent European democracy 
promotion, reforms and human rights programmes have served its stated objectives of building 
democratic, transparent Palestinian institutions  that respect human rights and principles.  The chapter 
concludes that despite the liberal discourse that the EU is adopting in its democratisation programmes, 
its policy in this regards has been driven by security ends.  
EU democracy promotion in the OPTs builds on the strategy that reforming the PA and its institution 
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would increase international and even Israeli confidence in the PA and enhance its ability to negotiate 
authoritatively on behalf of the Palestinians. Second creating a democratic, viable and peaceful 
sovereign Palestinian state would be the best guarantee for Israel‘s security and Israel‘s acceptance as 
an equal partner in the region. Therefore, the intergovernmental approach and dualism in the decision-
making has led first to realist politics triumphing over liberal principles and values. Second, the 
democratisation process and reform policy of the EU has become victim to the member states‘ 
interests. As a result of the priority given to short term considerations, the member states prefer to 
support the partners of the MEPP at the expense of longer-term democracy and reform.  
The final chapter introduces a new dimension to EU foreign policy studies, by examining how the 
recipients of the EU policy understand it and even exploit its flaws. This offers an additional 
component to our essentially neo-realist understanding of EU foreign policy-making by viewing it as 
an interactive process between policy-maker and policy-recipient, the latter also acting as ―realist‖ 
agendas pursuing their own self-interest and broadly-defined security needs. It should be stated that 
this is not conceptually fully developed – the Palestinian leadership are not a unified government of a 
sovereign nation state. However, the chapter does provide some useful insights on how the structural 
flaws of EU foreign policy making are recognised by, and  leave it vulnerable to exploitation or 
manipulation by,  those whom its policy targets.  
Sources, Fieldwork and Issues of Objectivity 
The thesis draws on case studies of policy areas, with data being drawn from statistics and figures 
from the EU and the Palestinian Authority, EU and PA official documents, political and development 
journals, books, public speeches made by the European and Palestinian leaders, articles published in 
the newspapers, and interviews given to the media by European and Middle–Eastern diplomats.  
The researcher spent four months as an intern with the EU where he gained practical experience of the 
EU.  During that time the researcher was able to establish a network which included members of the 
EP and the European Commission.  Through interviews and informal meetings with the EP members 
who showed an interest in the Middle East and the conflict the researcher gained alternative views and 
an understanding of European policy towards the Middle East.  In addition, this established a forum 
where academia and actual policy on the ground met and were bridged.  However, there were several 
issues that challenged the research. Some of these constraints are related to the ability of the 
researcher to gain access to the information that the research is looking at, while others concern the 
nature of the research. Despite the researcher having spent four months in the European Parliament, 
he was unable to access the EU database since he is not a citizen of the EU.  
The Palestinian Delegation does not have embassy status and this limits its influence in assisting 
Palestinian researchers. The researcher was unable to gain access to the European Commission where 
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most of the decisions have been made regarding aid and, democracy promotion and reform 
programmes. This factor limited the researcher‘s ability to conduct face-to-face interviews with EU 
decision- makers. Therefore, the researcher has relied heavily on public statements made by EU 
diplomats.  
In some parts of the research, mainly in Chapter Five, the researcher depended on the statistics and 
figures provided by the EU and the PA especially in the field of aid allocation. The research utilised 
the EU data in order to draw a wide picture of the development of the European aid towards the OPTs 
while the statistics of the Ministry of Planning in the PA gave the researcher the opportunity to trace 
the allocation of the European aid and technical assistance on the ground and gain an idea of the 
direction of the European priorities and agendas in the OPTs.  Finally the last chapter draws upon a 
significant number of face-to-face interviews.  
The research spent two months in OPTs conducting his field work and interviewing the Palestinian 
leadership in the West Bank and Jerusalem who have links to the EU and European policies in the 
OPTs. The research aimed to utilize the comparison between the voices of the EU projected from its 
own material with the voices of the Palestinians as expressed in these interviews, to highlight any 
disparities between stated EU objectives and how the policy is actually manifested on the ground.  
The precise methodology of the interviews in this chapter is provided in Chapter Seven. 
During the research process, the researcher was aware of the need to offer an objective insight into an 
environment that he had grown up in and been shaped by, socially, economically and politically. I 
would argue however, that neutrality and objectivity are related concepts which are difficult to attain 
without borrowing from any researcher‘s accumulated knowledge and experiences. Thus it is 
impossible to offer an entirely neutral analysis and such an analysis might not be meaningful if it fails 
to adequately analyse the reality which it studies. For example, in some places, where the analysis is 
critical of Israeli actions or policies, it has not been deemed necessary to provide counter-arguments 
which provide an Israeli perspective. The objective has been to present and discuss EU policy and 
policy-making, and offer the researchers‘ assessment of it, not the responses of all parties involved. 
Throughout, the researcher has limited criticism of Israel to areas which have been identified by the 
EU itself as problematic, and has reflected their criticism, and that of the Palestinians to whom the 
policy is directed, rather than the researcher‘s own opinions. Similarly, the researcher has sought to 
fairly reflect EU and other analysts‘ criticisms of the Palestinian Authority when appropriate. 
In order to be as objective as possible, the researcher began with consideration of specific 
terminologies. Although some of the EUliterature utilised the term ―Palestine‖, the researcher decided 
to utilise instead the term Palestinian Territories, which has more often been used by the UN and The 
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Quartet on the Middle East.
85
 The research covers the Palestinians who live in the West Bank, the 
Gaza Strip and Jerusalem but this is because the inclusion of Jerusalem has been an issue for the 
subjects of the research (the Palestinians) and is not a political choice on the part of the researcher. 
The Palestinian Territories are referred to in some instances as occupied – borrowing from the 
terminology of the UN where it is relevant to do so. The author has sought to avoid making political 
statements.  
For all the efforts at objectivity, the researcher accepts that – as a Palestinian – his research might 
ultimately look different from a similar project undertaken by an Israel, although he has tried to limit 
such differences as much as possible, whilst staying true to his subject.  
Overall, the thesis argues that the CFSP has not resolved the inter-governmentalism of the previous 
EPC, but – despite its more complex institutional arrangements - has reproduced it with significant 
negative consequences for EU foreign policy making. For the Palestinians, this has meant that the EU 
has failed to live up to its potential, to translate its economic power into political leverage in a manner 
that can fulfil its own stated objectives in the region. Consequently their expectations of the EU do not 
match the EU‘s ambitions whilst EU policy fails to meet Palestinian needs. 
The thesis thus contributes to the research literatures which seek to analyse the EU foreign policy 
making institutions and structures themselves, as much as to our empirical understanding of EU 
policy towards the Palestinians.   
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Chapter One:  Theorising the European Union’s Foreign Policy 
1.1. Introduction 
The drive towards integration is fundamental to the EU‘s continued existence: the complex and 
uncertain process by which the organisation‘s twenty-seven member states come together.  In 
‗unpacking‘ this process, we can examine how and why it approaches collective foreign policy-
making the way it does. The main aim of this chapter is to present the different theoretical 
explanations for the political behaviour of the EU. By shedding light on the driving force behind the 
transfer of sovereignty, from national governments to a new centre of authority, and how these 
mechanisms and processes of integration subsequently shape collective decisions and policy-making. 
The author believes that the evolution of certain European policy can be better explained, particularly 
when considering the case of the OPTs and the Palestinians. As Brown says, there is a difficulty in 
trying to understand foreign policy making if we have no ―clear sense of what it is that states are 
motivated by, what their function is, or how they work.‖86 
The chapter begins by setting out the contributions made to our understanding of the EU by 
international relations theory, specifically realist, neo-realist, constructivist and neo-liberalist 
theoretical propositions, which are those most frequently and most usefully drawn upon for this 
purpose. It shall then focus further on the two key frames through which European integration efforts 
have been understood: functionalism and inter-governmentalism. Finally, it elaborates upon the multi-
level governance model. 
This shall demonstrate that, despite the European Economic Community (EEC), and later the EU, 
being the most successful example of an institutionalised inter-governmental organisation to exist in 
international society since the late 1950s, there is little agreement about the proper explanation for its 
evolution.
87
 However, there is evidence, in important clues and indicators, which can guide the 
subsequent study and provide us with a ‗road map‘ to understanding both the EU‘s foreign policy and 
the means by which it is formulated and implemented.  
This is not, however, a simple task. Difficulties arise in theorising EEC/ EU foreign policy for several 
reasons. First, there are a multitude of actors and levels of activity within the EU, including member 
states, the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. 
The simultaneous hierarchical and horizontal settings, in which foreign affairs have subsequently been 
considered, have confused scholars. Second, the unique nature of the EU is a challenge in itself, 
which makes it difficult for international relations theories to evaluate it and its foreign policy. 
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According to Christopher Hill and William Wallace, it represents a different order in the international 
system.
88
 The EU is not a state, so it lacks many of the characteristics of statehood such as exclusive 
territory, a centralized hierarchical structure, authoritative decision-making or external sovereignty.
89
 
Third, the EU has a well-developed and complex institutional structure that goes far beyond the 
permanent secretariats and attached delegations of other international organizations, with a far wider 
range of policy responsibilities than other international organizations.
90
 Finally, the EU and its foreign 
affairs are dynamic, and still the object of evolutionary process.
91
 Thus, as the chapter will illustrate, 
no one theoretical position seems to fully capture the EU and its foreign-policy making process. 
Indeed, this unique complexity and multidimensionality poses particular problems for foreign policy 
political analysts who have been conventionally ―wedded to [a] comparative cross-country 
methodology‖. 92 
Before detailing the theories behind European integration, it is important to define the term integration 
itself. The researcher will adopt Haas‘ definition  
―The process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new 
centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing 
national states.‖93 
This might be contrasted with Galtung‘s simpler definition, that ―political integration can be defined 
very generally as the process whereby two or more actors form a new actor‖94, or Karl Kaiser‘s 
definition as: 
―Forming parts into a whole or creating interdependence the concept denotes a 
relationship of community or strong cohesiveness among peoples in political entity; it 
involves mutual ties and sense of group identity and self –awareness.‖95   
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1.2. The EEC/EU in International Relations Theory 
1.2.1. Realism- Neo-realism 
As a result of the EU‘s unique facets, some IR scholars believe that the EU integration process has 
never fitted easily within the rationalist approaches that have dominated international relations 
theories.
96
 Realists, Neorealists and Neo-Liberals have, on the other hand, maintained that the EU can 
still be explained from the perspective of inter-state cooperation.
97
 
Realism as a rational construct has dominated the study of international relations and has consistently 
provided the most reliable direction for statecraft. According to advocates of the theory, realism and 
its advanced branches have ―consistently offered the most convincing justification of state 
behaviour.‖98 It explains the state of war and the motivations of states, essentially through the lens of 
the effort to maximize power. 
99
 
The first contribution in realist literature was by Thucydides (C460-406 BC). His ‗Peloponnesian 
War‟ is main classic of IR theory, explaining the struggle for power as the main feature of human 
nature. Key texts which have developed this include Hans J. Morgenthau‘s Politics among Nations, 
which re-evaluated the nature of human power struggle.
100
   In addition, historical realist Edmund H. 
Carr wrote The Twenty Years‟ Crisis: 1919-1939, and with Machiavelli‘s The Prince came an 
explanation for the shift in world politics‘ power configuration. 
For realists, there are four key principles to international relations: first, that human nature is selfish, 
self-interested and power-hungry. They are sceptical that universal moral principles exist and 
therefore suggest that political actors will not sacrifice their interests for them. Secondly, politics 
takes place within and between groups, the most important of which in today‘s world are states. 
Thirdly, in the absence of global government, the world exists in a state of anarchy, in which agents 
(states) must engage in self-help to survive. Finally, they perceive politics to be largely concerned 
with power and the effort to maximise power within the group.  
A further important dimension to realist thought was added in the form of structural realism, 
introduced by Kenneth N. Waltz in two seminal books: Man, the State and War and Theory of 
International Politics. Waltz emphasises the importance of the structure of the international system 
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and its role as the primary determinant of states‘ behaviour.101  He explains the international system as 
the main determinant of international politics and state behaviour, which seeks to maximize power 
within the system.  
There are structural distinctions here, classified as the ‗balance of power‘ and the  ‗balance of threat,‘ 
which seek to identify the pattern of opposition and pattern of competition between powers. Waltz 
defines the balance of power as the ‗distribution of power in the international system.‘102  It is an 
effective instrument; by balancing the distribution of power, states may deter war and check the 
ambitions of hegemonic states. On the other hand, Stephen Walt contributes to realist literature by 
conceptualizing the balance of threat.
103
  In his book The Origin of Alliance, he focuses on the 
motivation of states in constructing alliances, in the face of rising threats.  He stresses that weak states 
are likely to join alliances as a form of ‗bandwagoning‘ to ensure their own security.104 
In short, realist and neo-realist theorists have common principles, explaining the behaviour of states 
according to which are main players and have legitimacy. They use their power not only to enforce 
law, but to protect their security - to survive - in an anarchical international system in which they must 
engage in self-help. The objective is to maximise power in order to reduce threat and increase security 
relative to other states. As realists are sceptical about whether universal moral principles exist, leaders 
cannot sacrifice the state‘s interest for their sake. To secure their survival, they may draw on military 
resources of the state, or they may join alliances and collective security organisations to draw on 
collective power. Liberal realist literature, which goes back to Thomas Hobbes‘s Leviathan and 
Hedley Bull‘s seminal work The Anarchical Society, suggests that international anarchy can be 
cushioned by states, if those states have the capability to deter other states from aggression through a 
managed co-existence.
105
 
Waltz‘s theory of international politics does not specify any particular international regime106, but it 
does explain how the interdependent relations impede war and create more co-operation.
107
 If anarchy 
drives states to secure their short-term survival, then an inter-dependent and managed co-existence 
can not only reduced the likelihood, or incentive, to use war as a means of maximising power, but 
enable longer-term objectives to be achieved. 
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1.2.1.1. Realist Rationality and the EU  
 
Realists suggest that European integration is nothing but an outcome of efforts to create a balance of 
power resulting from the anarchic system of states. In this view, the EU is little more than the ‗sum of 
member-state diplomacies.‘108Thus, the extent of cooperation among member states, the creation of 
the European Economic Community, and more recently cooperation in the realm of the EPC/CFSP 
presents a serious challenge for realists. However, realists believe that being involved in a regional 
arrangement or collective security alliance is a means of enhancing and extending national interest, 
mainly national security and ambitions, and should not be seen as pursuing an alternative to a state-
centric approach.
109
 Further, they suggest that EU member states may still fail to co-operate because 
of ―the risk of being exploited since the international system lacks a central authority that would 
monitor and sanction defection, co-operative behaviour may be exploited by other states.‖110 
 
Regionalism simplifies the conflict at the international realm by combining the states together under 
the leadership of one or more dominant powers. Nation-states enhance their security against external 
threats by involving themselves in a regional bloc. The motives behind the formation of regional blocs 
are political, and the success of the integration process depends on the willingness of one or more 
superpowers. The realists look at European integration as exchanging and sharing mutual benefits. 
They recognise the existence of institutions and recognise their roles as tools, or instruments, of 
statecraft. Accordingly, states work to set up these regimes and institutions if they serve their 
interests. In addition, the advocates of realism give credit to the assumption that the institutions can 
shape the direction and content of certain issues, so long as these policies are not central to the 
security interests of given states, and that national security is not threatened.
111
 
 
Waltz‘s understanding of European integration acknowledges that some states might have been 
―seeking goals that they value more highly than survival,‖112 and as such may have preferred 
―amalgamation‖ with other states.113  However, Waltz believes that the kind of integration taking 
place does not mean that the main characteristics of the international system have changed, but rather 
that this integration would simply change the distribution of power among different units. Even if a 
European superpower were to emerge, this would not alter the basic characteristics of the international 
                                                          
108Hill,C. (2002). The EU‘s Common Foreign and Security Policy: Conventions, Constitutions and 
Consequentiality. The International Spectator, XXXVII, p.3. 
109
 Gilpin, R. (2001). The Political Economy of Regional Integration. Global Political Economy Understanding 
the International Economic Order. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.  
110
 Wagner,W..(2003). Why the EU‘s Common Foreign and Security Policy will Remain Intergovernmental 
Journal of European Public Policy. 10:4, p.567-595. 
111
 Lamy, S. op. cit., p.186 
112
 Waltz, K.N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, p.72. 
113
 Ibid. 
 24 
 
system, which would remain dominated by anarchy.
114
  He adds that ―the effective international 
institutions depend on the support of major powers.‖ 115 
Although the integration of nations is often discussed, in actuality it rarely takes place. Nations 
could mutually enrich themselves by further dividing not just the labour that goes into the 
production of goods, but also tasks such as political management and military defence. Why, 
then, does their integration not take place?
116
 
The father of realism theory is suspicious as to the potential of the EU to become a great or super-
power, in the absence of dramatic change and the turning of the union into one state.
117
 
Other scholars have likewise sought to adapt or extend realist theory to account for European 
integration, identifying when and how international cooperation and even integration is possible and 
indeed whether it is a rational choice for states in certain circumstances.
118
 
For example, Gilpin
119
 understands the European integration process as a result of the American rise 
to the status of a superpower.  He argues that during the Cold War era, the U.Swas interested in 
supporting a strong and unified Western Europe, seeking to strengthen the European capabilities to 
stand against the Soviet threat and to therefore increase their collective economic and military 
efficiency through its Economic Aid Marshall Programme and through its military shelter under 
NATO. The U.S reduced the tension between European former enemies, and encouraged them to 
unify their collective economic and trade policies.
120
  He concludes that the cooperation between 
states is possible when a state is capable of ―imposing order in the international system by virtue of its 
superpower status.‖121 He added ―when there is a clear hierarchy of power, there are few or no clashes 
of interests, as the stronger can impose its will and the weaker ones have to conform.‖122This 
argument is echoed by Art, who believes that we should analyse the European integration process 
through the security lenses. As explained above, the states might cooperate with each other as a 
strategic policy, to survive against external or internal threat. To cope and face the potential threat, 
and to survive, is an important factor in realism for the process of integration.  
 In other words, the realist believes that security threats, either internal or external, are the main 
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motive for integration.  When that threat is absent, political unification is unsuccessful.
123
 Examining 
the historical evolution of European integration, they found a relationship between the speed and 
process of European integration and internal and external threat.  The first wave of integration of the 
EEC in the 1950s was as a result of the western European states‘ attempts to contain the Soviet Union 
and stop communism from spreading in Europe. The basic aim of integration was not to forge a 
common power, but to empower individual states through common means.
124
Building on the same 
arguments, the realist believes that the desire to constrain a newly unified Germany and ―to 
Europeanize Germany rather than Germanize Europe‖ was also an important factor in unifying 
Europe. Finally, the realist believes that the desire of the European decision-makers to make Europe a 
cohesive and powerful economic and political player, in the mould of the U.S and Japan, is another 
factor that unified Europe.
125
  
According to realism, alliances are created for two main reasons: ―capability aggregation and the 
control of alliance, and in order to gain on these two fronts, states are willing to limit their autonomy 
and follow the prescriptions of alliance and other international agreements.‖126Gowan has linked 
European integration with the nature of the international system, believing that the agreement and 
cooperation in bipolar systems are stable and durable, since alignment is structurally determined, thus 
allowing for high cooperation and trust. Alignments in multiple systems can be change over time and 
according to the interests of the states due to the multiple options. Therefore, cooperation is limited by 
the risk that ―today‗s friends will become tomorrow‘s adversaries.‖127  
Realists argue that the international role of the EU in fact represents a collection of the policies and 
interests of its two, or three, major member states: those who have the economic and political 
resources to influence other members of the EU.
128
  As mentioned above, although the Neo-realists 
recognise the role of international institutions in developing and implementing policy, for example in 
fields such as human rights and democracy promotion, the commitment of nation states to these is a 
secondary concern, behind their strategic interests and security.  
For realists, then, the importance of the EU lies in the interests of its member states, and how they are 
expressed in high politics and aggregated into a collective position. The power of EU within the 
international system, as an entity in and of itself, is constrained by the limitations on integration which 
are the result of nation states securing their own interests first and foremost. Integration may, and 
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does, take place when nation states find greater reason to surrender sovereignty than to maintain it, 
but until such integration has succeeded to the point of the EU becoming a single sovereign body; it 
cannot take its place as a global superpower. 
1.2.2. Neoliberal Institutionalism  
The second major theoretical school, in considering the EU, is that of Neoliberal institutionalism. This 
is the study of international organisations and regional integrations, and was originally termed regime 
theory.  This was actually located within the broad spectrum of realism, accepting the proposition that 
state behaviour is rooted in interest and power, but beyond that, that states could and did engage 
increasingly in collective institutions, both formal and informal (hence the institutional rebranding) 
which might actually change or improve the world (hence the liberal component). 
Neo-liberal institutionalists understand the world as a global political economy; for example, Francis 
Fukuyama‘s 1989 essay The End of History and later his book The End of History and the Last Man, 
argued that liberal democracy is ―the final form of human government.‖129 Unlike historical 
materialism, another form if global political economy, neo-liberalism understands three processes as 
occurring simultaneously and for the good of humankind: economic liberalisation, political 
democratisation and cultural universalism.
130
 Whilst neo-liberals believe that the nature of 
international economic relations is harmonic, historical materialists see it as a source of conflict. Neo-
liberals encourage distribution of goods for economic process, but historical materialists criticise 
distribution of wealth as unfair, and leading to clashes between classes. Both theoretical approaches to 
the influence of economy are evaluated as a main driving force of politics.  
However, while historical materialists argue that economic processes lead to conflict between 
sovereign nation-states, neo-liberals aim to encourage the collaborations and interdependencies that 
are beneficial.
131
All states have mutual interests and gain from cooperation, as exemplified by issues 
such as human rights and the environment. States will adopt a more flexible approach than realists 
suggest in international politics, giving more of a role to supranational institutions, which address 
these shared interests.
132
  Thus, neo-liberals have a more optimistic vision of cooperation among states 
and international organisations.
133
  They argue that democracies do not go war against each other, as 
democracy creates domestic institutions aimed at cooperation, which in turn helps pave the way for 
international institutions. Economic interdependence promotes transnational relations in general, and 
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creates an incentive for developing international cooperation.
134
    
Neo-realists argue that neo-liberalism is little different in reality from realism: international 
institutions do not exist independently of the international system, or the states that comprise it; they 
are merely the organisers of the rules of the game. By contrast, the so-called English School, 
recognise an international society in which norms are also shared, not just interests, and these may be 
reflected in states signing up to international institutions which then make demands of them, rather 
than simply serving their national self-interest. Game Theory similarly explains international 
institutions as solutions to the self-help dilemmas of states, where states voluntarily cede some of their 
freedom in order to achieve better outcomes than those arrived at in a state of anarchy.  
Neo-liberal institutionalism provides us with important questions to ask of any international 
organisation or institution: not only why does it matter and what difference does membership make to 
members‘ interests, but also in terms of how membership shapes the behaviour of states themselves. 
Why do states comply with the commitments they have made, even if this is not in their short-term 
interest, and what ―added value‖ is there from the institution itself? How did they come into being, 
and was it simply a result of impositions by stronger powers?  How do they organise themselves, their 
institutional design? The link between domestic and international politics, and between high and low 
politics is particularly interesting, not least since international institutions tend to focus more on low 
politics (issues like the environment, or trade) rather than high-politics (security). How and why do 
they grow or die (historical institutionalism)? Neo-liberal institutionalism also widens the focus 
beyond states to include new players in the form of transnational corporations, non-governmental 
organisations and a new pattern of interaction based on interdependence and integration.
135
 It 
acknowledges the complexity of the world and its multiple protagonists, whose complex 
interdependency recognises the multiple channels for interaction, across national boundaries.
136
 
1.2.2.1. Neo-Liberalism and the EU 
The EU is the latest incarnation of European institutionalism which originated with the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC)  and which was only one of a number of post World War II 
international institutions to emerge in the context of the Cold War, with the United Nations, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) being established at the same time.  Haas
137
 and Mitrany
138
 
explain the new co-operation between European countries as contextual, collective problem solving, 
                                                          
134
 Baylis, J and Smith, S. op. cit., p. 171. 
135
 Baylis, J and Smith, S. op. cit., p. 171. 
136
 Keohane, R.O. (1987). International Institution and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory. 
Boulder, Colorado: West view, p. 8. 
137
 Haas, E. (1968). Technology, Pluralism, and the New Europe. In Nye, J.S (Ed.), International Regionalism. 
Boston:  Little Brown, pp.154-8. 
138
 Mittrany, D. (1943). A Working Peace System. London: RIIA.  
 28 
 
while Nye and Keoh-Joanes explain the necessity of interdependent relations between states
139
 leading 
to the integration process of the European Community. The EC started as a regional community for 
encouraging multilateral cooperation after the tragedies of the Second World War.
140
 Over time, as 
cooperation increased, so did the ambitions of the member states for it. Interactions increased both 
between states and between people within them. The EC developed normative dimensions, as well as 
complex institutional arrangements wherein specific institutions developed their own agendas. Over 
time, the community grew in size, broadened its areas of collaboration, and deepened the extent of 
integration. Within the EC itself, liberal economic and political ambitions were predominant, although 
member states have continued to be the principal actors and have only surrendered limited 
sovereignty in certain areas.  
A Neo-liberal model would look at EC/EU foreign policy-making through the lens of absolute gains, 
just as a realist model would. Participating states arrive at the negotiating table with a pre-established 
hierarchy of interests and proceed to bargain over these interests with those of their EU partners on 
the basis of self-interest.
141
 However, as the organisation and its institutions develop, extend and 
deepen, they become the route through which states increasingly seek to resolve shared dilemmas, to 
construct new security regimes, and even promote shared normative concerns. 
1.2.3. Constructivism 
This leads us to a third approach to international relations which can be useful for our study. 
Constructivism is a relatively new theoretical approach in IR, but has quickly become one of its most 
important perspectives.
142
 Constructivism is not itself a theory of IR, but rather a theoretically 
informed approach, which is based on the notion that international relations, and states‘ interests 
within them are socially constructed. While neo-realism and neo-institutionalism have materialist 
approaches to IR (material items like geography, weapons or resources have impacts on outcomes 
unmediated by ideas), constructivism suggests that social and relational meanings and practices can 
mediate or alter impacts.   
In his famous article, ―Anarchy is What States Make of it‖ (1992) and, as he later expounded in his 
book, ―Social Theory of International Politics,‖ Alexander Wendt asserted that ―anarchy is what states 
make of it.‖ Constructivism denies that anarchy is externally given, as realism suggests, instead 
emphasising that there is an intervening variable:  the intersubjectively constituted identities of state 
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actors.
143
 Intersubjectivity refers to ideas that are shared by groups of peoples, rather than held by 
individuals, and refers to things like collective memory, educational systems, government practices 
and social norms. Leading from this, constructivists argue that state interests are then articulations of 
intersubjective ideas and are also socially constructed. Therefore they are not, as realists would have 
us believe, unchanging and fixed, but rather relational; for example, if circumstances and environment 
change, which thus leads to a change in social ideas, so too may be the perceived interests of a state, 
relative to others. This attention to the social construction of identities and interests manifests itself 
more broadly in a concern with relationships between structure and agency. As Ian Hurd puts it: 
―A constructivist approach to co-constitution.. Suggests that the actions of states 
contribute to making the institutions and norms of associational life, and these 
institutions and norms contribute to defining, socialising and influencing states. But 
the institutions and the actors can be defined in the process.‖144 
Finally, since anarchy is also socially constructed, Wendt allows for multiple forms of anarchy, which 
can range from rivalry to community, dependent again on relations between states. Social interaction 
among international actors might lead to comparative, rather than absolute, anarchy among states. As 
ideas, socialization and normative values impact upon regional arrangements; they may change state 
interests and create new ones. Nevertheless, norms do not determine actions.
145
 Constructivists argue 
that we create our own security problems and competitions through our particular interactions with 
one another, so that the outcomes appear to be inevitable.
146
 Accordingly, if we were to perceive one 
another as potential friends rather than enemies, international outcomes could be very different.
147
 
Thus, the nature of international anarchy can be co-operative or competitive.  
State identities are not pre-determined but formed through interaction with other identities and with 
collective social institutions. Hence, the main principles of constructivism, anarchy and self-help take 
place within these social interactions. These social processes constitute institutions and then create a 
superstructure to organize interactions.
148
 Social theory presumes that the identities, norms and 
interests are components of dynamic change in society.  
1.2.3.1. Constructivism and the EU 
Constructivism suggests that membership of the EC/EU, and participation in its institutions, can itself 
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alter the identities and interests of member states, thus creating a dynamic progression. Glarbo says 
this in reference to how the history of integration on foreign and security policies cannot be reduced to 
national concerns/interests, because integration has also been a product of social construction, as a 
result of communication between national diplomacies.
149
 
 
According to constructivism, the dynamic of socialisation between the main actors of the EU, such as 
the high ranking national representatives and European institution players, holds an important  role in 
defined  or  redefined  interests, identities, preference, political stances  and the outcomes of  the EU 
policies.
150
Constructivists believe that identities might change with social interaction that will 
influence the security behaviour of states.
151
They assume that normatively based persuasion is the 
main mode of negotiation between EU players, rather than inter-governmental bargaining over 
preferences. Although the member states arrive at the negotiation table with pre-established interests, 
as a result of socialising, the building of mutual trust, political will, consultation and finally increased 
communication, the foreign policies of members become ―Europeanised‖ and modified.152  
 In addition, according to the constructivists, national representatives of the member states take into 
consideration the views and positions of their counterparts in the EU before introducing any proposal 
at the European level. According to Tonra they are actively seeking to internalise the views of their 
colleagues in order to see that their own positions are at least complimentary in the common and 
shared endeavour of CFSP.
153Tonra borrowed the concept of ―Logic of appropriateness‖ from Olsen 
and March (1998), where the political players  at the EU level consider the context and expectations 
of the decision-making situation in which they find themselves, and base their resulting decisions 
accordingly. He adds: ―the actor‘s identities and options for choice are shaped by the institutional 
structures that she inhabits these self-same institutional structures exit and evolves as a result of 
actors‘ identities and choices.‖154 
According to Tonra, in order to arrive at a common understanding and a common approach, the EU 
players‘ approach will shift to become ―What will the European partners think? Rather than ―What is 
our position on this?‖155 In his attempt to explain the negotiation of EU Foreign Policy, Thomas found 
that the argumentations and persuasions between the EU agents are pursued through the 
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―communication of normative reasons,‖156 and are likely to be exchanged through ―bilateral channels 
between Member States and within various Council formations such as CFSP working groups‖.157  
Questions are raised, such as why particular Member States should reconsider their identities and 
fundamental interests, and thus their views on why particular policies are more desirable or more 
appropriate, particularly with reference to the target‘s identity as an EU member.158   Finally, as a 
result of a socially constructed system, building a sense of unity in coping with the common security 
threats, the conception of European security has changed in three directions: the understanding of 
what constitutes threats to security, the means to address these threats/challenges and the ways for 
conflict resolution.
159
 In sum the Constructivists argue that the socialization progressively leads to a 
convergence of foreign policy actors‘ interests and identities.  
1.3. Theories of International Organisation and Institutionalism 
Neo-liberal institutionalism emerged out of the study of international organisations and institutions, 
one field of which was to study the nature of interactions between member states within such 
organisations.  This approach has been well developed in relation to the EEC/EU and specifically in 
the effort to determine whether the organisation represented a means of integration or simply co-
operation, the reasons why this should be so and the processes through which it occurred. These 
breakdown broadly into two possibilities: functionalism or inter-governmentalism.  
1.3.1. Functionalism, Neo-Functionalism and Externalism 
Functionalism and Neo-functionalism belong to the supranationalist school of thought which 
developed in the 1950s and 1960s, and was one of the first attempts at theorising European 
integration. Developed from the classic text by Ernst Haas, published in 1958, neofunctionalism has 
perhaps become the main theory associated with European integration. The theory assumes that 
modern complex society, especially European society, is dominated by matters of low politics, such as 
the welfare of citizens and economic growth.  
The theory builds on the concept of gradualism, and the bridging of the gap between states through 
the creation of functionally specific organisations. Instead of integrating big and sensitive areas such 
as foreign policy-making and defence, advocates of functionalism believe that they can better achieve 
cooperation and peace through promoting integration in non-controversial sectors like trade, industry 
and services. The fundamental motive for integration would not concern the legal relationships 
between political communities, but would stem from the inability of nation states to provide essential 
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services to their citizens.
160
 Functionalists believe that international regimes are: 
―Created and maintained because they help states to overcome collective action 
problems International regimes reduce transaction costs and, by providing 
information, uncertainty. In particular, international institutions help states to 
overcome the second-order problems of compliance and distribution.‖161 
Mitrany developed a theory of functionalism during WWII. The theory expressed optimism that the 
traditional authority of the state could be reduced through the building of networks linking the 
different territorial communities through economic and cultural activities. He opposed full-scale 
regional integration because it would - in his view - increase the strength of the new regional 
institutional structure and thus increase its ability to use force in international relations, leading to new 
possibilities for war. Functionalism therefore embodies a theory of ‗community-building‘ rather than 
‗institution-building‘- through collective learning and technocratic management. It distinguishes 
between political cooperation and technical/functional cooperation in the advocacy of a new 
international society.  
For Mitrany the task was clear: the aim must be to achieve the greatest opportunities for cooperation, 
while touching as little as possible upon the latent or active points of difference and opposition.
162
 He 
advocated the development of technical international organisations structured on the basis of 
functional principles that would perform collective welfare tasks, reducing internal political conflict 
and ending the interminable debates about the boundaries of national sovereignty.
163
 
In the context of European integration, Mitrany‘s functionalism remains important not least because 
of its influence on two of the key architects of the ECSC: Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. The 
ECSC borrowed key aspects of what might be termed the functionalist methods, without adopting 
Mitrany‘s central goal. Monnet and Schuman employed Mitrany‘s ―focus on technical, sector specific 
integration,‖ and his emphasis on avoiding political debates about the surrender of national 
sovereignty, in order to facilitate the incremental establishment of ―territorially based organisation and 
the creation of a new regional authority structure.‖164 
 
They, and other European policy-makers of the time, such as Hallstein and Spaak, might be termed 
―functional federalists openly working toward a united of Europe by functionalist rather than 
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federalist tactics.‖165  According to functionalists, the EPC and the CFSP can be understood within 
this context. The EPC is a result of the influence of the European Common Market and the European 
Common Agricultural Policy, and the CFSP is a result of pressure from the Single European Market 
(SEM) and the Monetary Union (EMU). Additionally, according to the functionalists‘ philosophy, 
international crises ―cannot be contained by purely economic means,‖ creating the need for a common 
foreign policy to represent and pursue the interests of the Union.
166
 
Functionalism has its critics: it is often accused of being technocratically naive, having a poor record 
of prediction, and lacking scientific rigour. Political scientists argue that the division between 
technical non-controversial economic issues on the one hand and political issues on the other is 
untenable. Economic integration, however defined, must be based on political motives and frequently 
begets political consequences.‖167 Moreover, in the context of Europe, functionalist theory failed to 
accommodate several phases of European integration, especially in the field of political 
cooperation.
168
 
 The unrealistic division between the technical/functional issues and political/constitutional issues 
prompted Ernst Haas and then Leon Lindberg to develop a new theoretical frame explaining the 
European integration process. The new theory proposed the concept of spill over, rejecting the notion 
that technical tasks could be separated from politics and arguing that: 
 
―Power and welfare are far from separable. Indeed, commitment to welfare activities 
arises only within the confines of purely political decisions, which are made largely 
on the basis of power considerations... the distinction between the political and 
technical, between the political and the expert, simply does not hold because issues 
were made technical by a prior political decision.‖169 
What is termed neo-functionalism describes and explains the process of regional integration based on 
empirical data from the ECSC Community experience. Neo-functionalism places special emphasis on 
the importance of institutions in the creation of a new centre. Successful economic integration leads to 
political integration.  Key actors are interest groups who lobby national governments, who themselves 
eventually realise the benefits of integration and consequently relinquish sovereignty.  
For neo-functionalists, institutions are the crucial causal links in the chain of integration. Haas 
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believes that, for integration to occur, it must be perceived by political elites in various groups to be in 
their own self-interest. Haas found that the elites in the European Community, found in organizations 
such as political parties, business groups and trade associations, played a significant role in advancing 
the European integration project and were even a driving force behind European integration. The 
promise of material reward from increased interactions will motivate domestic groups to lobby their 
governments to further integration: 
―The process of community formation is dominated by nationally 
constituted groups with specific interests and aims, willing and able to 
adjust their aspirations by turning to supranational means when this 
course appears profitable.‖170 
This integration will lead to political integration. Haas identified four forms of spill-over: functional, 
political, cultivated, and geographical spill over, or what is now referred to as wadding or expansion.  
In his work The Uniting of Europe, Haas paid a lot of attention to supranational non-governmental 
actors as influential actors in the integration process. He pointed out the importance of the 
interconnected nature of modern economics, which makes it difficult to confine integration to 
particular economic sectors; integration in one sector produces pressure for integration in adjoining 
and related other sectors.
171
  Therefore, businesses and other interest groups will seek to create new 
ways of integrating. In other words, economic integration automatically generates increased 
interaction in other areas at the regional level. Haas‘ neo-functionalism sees the main dynamics of 
European integration as being located within a broad process of modernization, the rise of 
technocracy and what we today would call ‗globalization.‘  Haas considered this functional spill-over 
as an automatic, continuous, and inevitable process leading to a European super-state. The process of 
integration would therefore continue in the European Economic Community: ―Liberalization of trade 
within the customs union would lead to harmonization of general economic policies and eventually 
spill-over into political areas and lead to the creation of some kind of political community.‖172 Haas 
thus saw the EEC as a functional residue of the ECSC.  
Political spill-over results from the learning process which accompanies economic integration, as 
elites perceive that supranational solutions serve their interests better than national ones, leading to 
shifts in expectations and activities which further the integration process.
173
  According to neo-
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functionalism, national elites increasingly turn their attention to the supranational level of activity and 
become progressively more favourably disposed towards the integration process and the upgrading of 
common interests. Over time, nation states and governmental actors become less influential, and the 
increasing importance of integration generates pressure and demands for political control and 
accountability at the supranational level.  According to Haas, ―the values of various interest groups 
compete for dominance and merge and overlap in a new supranational political community.‖174 
As Haas predicted, spill-over has indeed led to a gradual adaptation of integration by political elites.  
Leaders of political parties, trade associations and trade unions increasingly appeal to the new centre, 
shifting their loyalties from national politics in the belief that their interests are better served by 
seeking supranational methods rather than national methods. European institutions themselves foster 
governing; the elite are free of national ties, and become the focus for interest groups and popular 
loyalties.  
The new supranational agents or the new centre (the institutions of the European Community) have a 
mixture of characteristics.  Firstly, supranational institutions are independent sites of authority with 
distinct agendas that often diverge from the national governments preferences.
175
 Secondly, 
supranational agents are themselves political actors interested in enhancing their power via the 
increased authority of the institutions they direct.  
However, their objective is to protect and promote the welfare and security of the transnational 
society that is coming increasingly under their jurisdiction.
176
 Supranational cooperation means that 
rules can be made in the EU which have a direct impact on the member states and thereby also a 
direct effect on the citizens of the member states. EU co-operation relating to the internal market, 
agriculture, fisheries, etc. are examples of areas in which there is supranational co-operation.  
Many scholars argue that, since the signing of the treaty of the EU, elements of functionalism have 
occurred due to the increased utilising of the European Commission instruments, resources and 
capacities to implement the CFSP decisions. This cooperation has reduced the sensitivity between 
high and low politics, and consequently empowered the role of the supranational actors in the 
CFSP.
177
 In addition, they believe that the European Commission can play an important mediating 
role, drafting projects and proposals for the CFSP. They suggest that the power that the EP has over 
the budget can push the EU institutions to adopt certain policies, for example in the realm of human 
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rights.
178
 
Haas‘ neo-functionalist approach introduced an external dimension, recognising that the external 
environment creates strong pressures for common action.
179
 What is termed externalisation theory 
considers the international system, international crisis and international development as important 
factors which shape the integration process and, subsequently, the foreign policy making of 
international organisations. The absence of this element from conventional functionalist  theory was 
viewed as one of its key weaknesses.  
Externalisation theorists believe that international crises put pressure on international organisations to 
coordinate and harmonise their collective responses. Thus, they defined externalisation as a  ―process 
whereby a regional organization achieves the recognition of non-members and of other international 
organizations as having the status of a full and equal participant in the international system, especially 
in shaping the rules which govern that system.‖180 According to the theory, there exists both a 
defensive factor and an offensive component. The achievement of any community, in economic 
integration such as economic cooperation and a common market, cultural integration, or regional 
collective security, would promote the international organisation to agree on certain measures and 
objectives relative to non-member states in order to ―safeguard the benefits reaped‖ from these 
achievements.
181
 This is seen as a defensive policy, which will ultimately extend the integration 
process to other areas. In addition, policies such as commercial and legal discrimination against 
potential rivals in non-member states are viewed as ―offensive" policies, which aim to take ―steps 
extending the grouping or sealing it off more completely from the rest of the world.‖182 
Externalisation can be a good theoretical framework by which to explain EU foreign policy making 
and integration in the EPC and the CFSP as the structure and the mechanism of the EU foreign affairs 
has developed and grown in response to increasing demands made upon it.
183
  
In sum, the main contribution of functionalism for our purposes is that it notes the concept of the 
‗state‘ to be more complex than realists have suggested: the activities of interest groups and 
bureaucratic actors are not confined to the domestic political arena, but extend into the community 
created by inter-state co-operation and functional integrations. Non-state actors are thus important in 
international politics, as are the unintended outcomes or ‗spill-over‘ processes between different areas 
of functional operation. 
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1.3.2. Intergovernmentalism  
In response to neo-functionalism, a counter-argument was put forward by Stanley Hoffmann. 
Contrasting with neo-functionalism, which emphasises the autonomy of supranational officials and 
transnational elites, Hoffmann‘s intergovernmentalism, takes a State-centric governance approach to 
understanding the European integration process.  
Intergovernmentalism drew heavily on realist assumptions about the role of states or, more accurately, 
the governments of states in IR.  Intergovernmentalist approaches criticised the functionalist and neo-
functionalist approach on several grounds: firstly, for neglecting the wider global context since 
regional integration was only one aspect of the development of the global international system. 
Secondly, marginalising the role of governments in the integration process. Intergovernmentalism 
argues that the member states are the most powerful actors in the integration process and they control 
the nature and the speed of integration in order to protect and promote national interests.The 
governments‘ domination of the integration process was due to two reasons according to Hoffmann; 
first because ―the governments possessed legal sovereignty; and second, because they had political 
legitimacy as the only democratically-elected actors in the integration process.‖184  
In this view, where the power of supranational institutions increased, it did so only because 
governments believed it to be in their national interests. Finally, intergovernmentalists criticised the 
neo-functionalist prediction that the spill-over factor would reach high politics, stating that although 
governments might accept closer integration in the technical functional level, the integration process 
would not spread to areas of ‗high politics‘ such as national security and defence.185 
Much in the vein of the realist school of international relations, intergovernmentalism insisted that 
nation-states would not adapt smoothly to social changes which challenged their sovereignty, but that 
their reactions were shaped first and foremost by the competitive dynamics of the anarchical 
international system. 
186
 
Intergovernmentalist theorists also reject the idea that supranational organisations are on an equal 
level, in terms of political influence, as national governments. Their main point is that integration 
depends on bargaining. States negotiate with each other, and the result of bargaining depends on the 
power of the states. This determines the policy outcomes. Moravcsik, a leading neo-liberal proponent 
of intergovernmentalism, explains that ―historic agreements (mainly treaties) are not driven by a 
supranational entrepreneur like the Commission but they are results of bargains struck between key 
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powerful member states, such as Germany and France.‖187 He acknowledges ―a gradual process of 
preference convergence,‖ but he says that European integration is not at its origin, further denying the 
idea of elites‘ socialization.188 National preference formation is shaped by domestic and not European 
pressures. He recognizes that there are other actors than states, but they do not play an important 
role.
189
 
Moravcsik argues that major intergovernmental bargains, such as the Single European Act or the 
Maastricht Treaty, were not driven by supranational entrepreneurs, unintended spill-overs from earlier 
integration, or transnational coalitions of business groups, but rather by a gradual process of 
preference convergence among the most powerful member states, which then struck central bargains 
amongst themselves and offered side-payments to smaller, reluctant member states. Thus 
―Intergovernmentalists see the terms of international co-operation, the accompanying rules that guide 
it and the institutions that frame it, as reflecting the relative bargaining power of different 
governments who, while never abrogating their sovereignty, may be willing to ‗pool‘ or ‗delegate‘ it 
as efficiency and effectiveness require.‖190 
This theoretical approach asserts that integration occurs only when the largest member state 
governments perceive that the benefits of integration outweigh the costs of surrendering sovereignty 
to supranational institutions.
191
 European integration can thus be explained in terms of a convergence 
of state interests within Europe in the context of the Cold War, and the greater shared external threat. 
As a final point, according to the intergovernmental approach, no government has to integrate more 
than it wishes because the bargains rest on the lowest common denominator of the participating 
member states. Consequently, the sovereignty of the state is not damaged. 
Nugent details the criticisms that have been levied against intergovernmental theory: it has been 
accused of being too selective of the evidence which its adherents analyse, putting too much emphasis 
on the ―historic‖ decisions of states and not enough on more commonplace and routine decisions.192 
Intergovernmentalist theory ignores the influence of informal integration and the constraints that such 
integration imposed on the formal decision makers.
193
 Moreover, it neglects entirely the influences of 
ideology, beliefs and symbolism which connect member states and their populations. It sees 
international politics as ―a rational process in which the preferences of states and the result of a 
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bargaining can be calculated and it potentially underestimates totally the importance of supranational 
institutions themselves.‖194 Nonetheless, the EU clearly displays intergovernmentalist attributes. 
Intergovernmental EU cooperation is used in political areas where it might be difficult for countries to 
enter into a form of cooperation as close as supranational cooperation such as policing, legal 
cooperation and - as we will see – the CFSP 
1.3.3. Liberal Intergovernmental  
Building on Hoffmann‘s work, Andrew Moravcsik (1993) developed a subsequent version of the 
intergovernmental explanation of the integration process.  His liberal intergovernmentalist approach 
to the EC/ EU offers a critical analysis of both neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalists approach 
and regards EC/EU policy-making and integration mainly as a consequence of interstate bargaining, 
making the interests and preferences of EC/EU member states the key to understanding the policy 
reform.  Moravcsik‘s approach, like that of Hoffmann, is built on the assumption that states were 
rational actors, however, he developed Hoffmann‘s theory by arguing that that the first political 
process, ―the balance between economic interests‖ within the domestic arena determined the 
definition of the national interests. Moravcsik considers the formulation of national interests as the 
first part of the analysis; after determination and formulation of interests at the domestic level, the 
member states will take them to the second level - which is the European level. 
At this level, Moravcsik divided the negotiation into parts; the first being negotiation through the 
bargaining through ‗positive-sum games‘195 rather than zero sum games as realists propose, to reach 
an agreement and consensus on the problem, and the second the negotiation on the institutional 
arrangement in order to implement the common policy agreed in the first level.
196
 In addition, 
Moravcsik believes that member states play the two- level game in their negotiations tactics which 
Putnam (1988) has explained in his famous article Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of 
Two-Level Games International Organization.
197 According to Putnam, the ―two-level approach 
recognises that central decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives 
simultaneously.‖198 He argues that decision makers in democratic states have to take domestic 
pressures into their consideration during the negotiations process, and make sure that the outcomes of 
the agreements that they are negotiating will not have a negative effect at home.
199
 Finally, he argues 
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that, when domestic and international concerns overlap, agreement is likely.
200
  
Liberal intergovernmentalism believes that bargaining outcomes are shaped by the interests and 
preferences of EC/EU member states, providing room for autonomous supranational institutions 
which influence policy-making.
201
 Second, the location of authority and policy-making influence at 
the state level implies that non-state pressure groups form part of the domestic societal interests that 
shape negotiating positions.
202
 
EU decision-making is not aimed at establishing global governance, and so liberal 
intergovernmentalism provides an opportunity to increase agreement and negations, integral parts of 
the European identity. Studying the negotiations behaviour and the outcomes of the main European 
treaties and agreements such as: the negotiation process and the outcomes of the Treaties of Rome, the 
Common Agriculture Policy, the Single European Act and the negotiation of the Treaty on EU (TEU), 
providing answers as to how EEC/ EU has succeeded so far. Moravcsik found that that the outcomes 
of all these agreements worked in favour of government preferences and interests, rather than the 
interests of the supranational institutions. In addition, he found that the results of these negotiations 
reflected the balance between the interests of the domestic society, interests groups, economic 
interests and the strategic security concerns of the EU members. Finally, the sharing of sovereignty or 
―handing over decision-making authority to supranational institutions reflects the desire of the EU 
governments to ensure that the commitments of these agreements will implements and monitored 
through independent supranational body.‖203 
In his article Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy, Gordon argues that there are several reasons the 
make member states surrender or share their sovereignties with supranational institutions. Firstly, 
when they perceived ―gains of common action through the advantages of scale outweigh the potential 
costs of lost sovereignty or national prestige.‖204 Secondly, when the member states have similar 
interests in common they prefer to act jointly so the concept of sovereignty become like less matter. 
Finally, when the member starts relations with main large states guarantee their interests either 
―through application of strict limits or conditions to the terms of integration or through the ―opting-
out‖ of the state with the particular interests.‖205 
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1.3.4. The Multi-Level Governance Model 
The multi-level governance theory provided another alternative approach to the state-centric 
intergovernmentalist approaches towards EC/EU policy making. The model dealt mainly with the 
complexity of decision-making processes within the EU itself, focusing on the relationships between 
institutionalized, hierarchically structured sets of actors with varying degrees of unity/coherence, 
commitment to EU norms, and power resources.
206
 Its roots are found in earlier neo-functionalist 
theories- Ernst De Haas (1958) Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe are the pioneers of Multi-level 
Governance approach through their article ―European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. 
Multi-level Governance.‖ However, rather differently, it confronted traditional state-centric views, 
arguing that the sovereignty of European states were restricted by the application of collective 
decision-making and by the growing capability of supranational institutions.
207
 These theorists 
believed that the multi- level approach involved the relocation of authority upwards, downwards, and 
sideways from central stats.
208
 However, the multi-level model ―[did] not reject the view that states‘ 
executives and state arenas [were] important or that these remain[ed] the most important pieces of the 
European puzzle.‖209 
The main assumption of multi-level governance was that European integration weakened member 
states, explaining the complexity of actors and institutions involved at different levels of decision-
making. ―The supranational institutions such as the European Commission, the EP and the European 
Court ha[d] independent influence in policy-making that [could] not be derived from their role as 
agents of states executives.‖ Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe believed that ―collective decision-
making among states involve[d] significant loss of control for individual states‘ executives.210  Lowest 
common dominator outcomes [were] available only on a subset of EU decisions, mainly those 
concerning the scope of integration.‖211 
They argued that member states‘ executives ―d[id] not determine the European agenda because they 
[we]re unable to control the supranational institutions they ha[d] created at the European level.‖212 
From a multi-level governance point of view, it seemed that the power of agenda-setting had 
increasingly become a shared and contested competence among the European institutions. 
Additionally, according to the multi-level model ―states [didn‘t] monopolize links between domestic 
and European actors, but [was] one among a variety of actors contesting decisions that [were] made a 
variety of levels‖. The founders of the multi-level governance approach justified the weak role of the 
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states in the EU, arguing that ―policy making in the EU [was] characterized by mutual dependence, 
complementary function and overlapping competencies.‖213They found that evidence from the EU 
decision-making process suggested that: ―the growing diversity of issues on the Council‘s agenda, the 
sheer number of states executive principals and mistrust that exits among them, and the increased 
specialization of policy –making have made the council of minister reliant upon the commission to set 
the agendas forage compromise and supervise compliance.‖214 In addition, according to these authors, 
when the political benefits outweigh the cost of losing control, or when states want to shed 
responsibilities for unpopular decisions, they shifted their sovereignties to supranational institutions. 
They add[ed] that, even though states decision-makers wanted to keep sovereignty, they were often 
not able to do so because state executive could easily be outvoted since most resolutions in the 
Council were under the decision rule of qualified majority voting.
215
 The added supranational actors, 
such as European Commission and Parliament, had influence on policy making independently, not as 
agents of national governments, and should have thus been considered actors in EC/ EU policy 
making
216
, influencing policy making not only through the formation of national preferences, but also 
directly through EU-level institutions as an important part of the integration process. 
Although the decision-making and the legislative power remained in the hands of the Council of 
Ministers according to the European Treaties,  multi-level governance theorists argued that the reality 
on the ground is that the Council depended on the other European bodies and institution for 
knowledge and resources  in order to perform its function in the policy making process. Therefore, 
state representatives‘ authority became eroded in the decision-making process by the legislative 
power of the EP and the efforts of interest groups to influence outcomes in the European arena.
217
 
1.3.4.1. The EU and the Multi-Level Governance 
Applying multi-level governance to EU foreign policy Smith, (2004) found that European foreign 
affairs decision-making displayed several elements of multi-level governance, specifically more so 
under the CFSP that the  EPC.
218
  He argued that, although the EU was clearly still a treaty-based 
polity and its member states reserved ultimate authority to approve all decisions, especially in 
foreign/security policy, and although the European treatises had built a separation wall between three 
EUpillars,  the complexity and the interdependencies between EU pillars made it difficult to separate 
them. This lead to overlap and fuzzy borders between the competencies of the various European 
actors (the Council, the member states, the European Commission,  the European Parliament). It soon 
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became formal EU policy domain with complex linkages, procedural and substantive, to other EU 
policies.
219
 
These strong links between executive power in the first pillar and the legislative power in the second 
pillar of EU institutions eliminated the traditional boundaries between the domestic international 
politics. Agenda setting, decision-making, competencies, implementation, funding, mentoring and 
evaluation of the CFSP were shared by actors at different levels, rather than being monopolized by 
national governments. The structure of CFSP governance came to involve four major elements. 
Firstly, the CFSP involved a much greater ―coherence of the policy sector and rationalization of the 
policy process, far beyond what had existed under EPC Its linkages to the policies, organizations, and 
procedures of the EU‘s first pillar (the EC), and its practical operation.‖ Secondly, according to Smith, 
the ―CFSP legally bind[ed] EU member states, including some limited compliance mechanisms.  
Thirdly, the CFSP included several authoritative decision-making rules, in the form of qualified 
majority voting (QMV), which represented a breach of the long-standing taboo against supranational 
decision-making procedures for EU foreign policy.‖220   
 
Finally, the TEU ―provide[d] a greater degree of autonomy for EC organizational actors in European 
foreign policy during specific phases of the policy process.‖221The distribution of legislative, 
executive and evaluation process among several EU actors encouraged this multi-level model. While 
the European Council of Heads of States and the the Council of the European Union Minsters of 
Foreign Affairs, with participation of the European Commission, was responsible for the agenda-
setting, defining the general political direction and priorities of the Union, the decision making 
relating to specific issues was distributed among several committees and other bodies, such as the 
Council of the EU and the Commission. In turn, these were supported by COREU, the Political and 
Security Committee, the European Correspondents Working Groups and the CFSP Policy Planning 
and Early Warning Unit.  With regard to the implementation of common positions and common 
actions, responsibility was spread between the EU presidency, the High Representative for the CFSP, 
the Commission and special representatives.  Finally, the performance evaluation in terms of policy 
coherence and compliance was also spread between the Council of the EU, the Commission, and the 
Political and Security Committee, while the EP was meant to oversee the funding and had a limited 
role in legitimizing the CFSP.
222
 This multi-level governance approach drew criticism for limiting the 
decision making of the CFSP to circles located in Brussels and this neglecting real integration 
between EU actors, specifically the  member states and the international organisations.  
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1.4. Conclusion and Assessment of IR Theories 
 
As this chapter demonstrates, theorizing about European integration process and understanding its 
behaviour as an international actor has been a difficult matter. Most theories suffered from their 
inability to explain or predict the processes of integration since this appears to have changed more 
rapidly than the majority of theoretical thinking.  
The main aim of integration theory was to explain why the European states integrated, and who led 
the integration process.  Was European integration a result of the member states‘ efforts and 
willingness? Or was European integration a result of the efforts of the European institutions? Or was 
it a tainted mixture of both? Finally, one ought to have considered the integration process of Europe, 
and how it affected its decision-making, and specifically the mechanisms and decisions of the 
EPC/CFSP.  
If the EU is looked at through the lens of International Relations theory, mainly from the perspective 
of neo-realism, which argued that EU members would seek to maximise their absolute gains, the EU 
merely would have become a group of states gathered in order to achieve a beneficial balance of 
power within an anarchical system of states.  International regional institutions, such the EEC/EU, had 
resultantly been established by the states to decrease uncertainty and counter anarchy. 
 Although realism accepted the notion of cooperation between the member states, it further suggested 
that this cooperation would neither alter the nature of international anarchy nor the anarchic 
relationship between the new political unit and those units which did not provide cohesion. In 
addition, neo-realists suggested that regional groupings can never have been able to maximise their 
power unless the states within them actually merged into a single super-state. Thus, for realists and 
neo-realists, the EU remained essentially an intergovernmental institutional framework, depending on 
the sovereign decisions of member states.  
In comparison, liberal and neo-liberal theories had a much more optimistic view of the EU,  believing 
that the member states had mutual and shared interests and that, as  rational  political actors, they were 
aware of the collective benefit to be gained from cooperation.  They believed that EU cooperation at 
the level of economics and ―low politics‖ could have political spill-overs in terms of enhanced 
security cooperation and peace. They lay emphasis on the important role of the international 
institutions in promoting this economic cooperation, (opening markets, promoting democracy and 
developing ideas of collective security). In their vision, new players, such as transnational 
corporations and non-governmental organisations, and new pattern of interaction, presented 
opportunities for interdependence and integration.
223
 The complexity of the world and its multiple 
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actors had become increasingly interdependent in complex ways which demolished differences 
between ―high and low‖ politics.  
This process was understood, to some extent, through the lens of neo-functionalism, which saw this 
process as leading to a gradual transfer of power to a new centre and new central institutions, which 
was not necessarily a straight-forward, inevitable or linear process. While functionalist theories 
dominated explanations of European integration during the heady years of the 1960s, when European 
integration subsequently seemed to stall in the 1970s, this approach went out of fashion.
224
  European 
integration seemed to have become victim to something of an ―empty chair policy‖. But, as Haas 
argued, ―even if a spill-over tendency [would have been] brought to a halt, this by no means implie[d] 
a return to a purely national framework of action; it may signify merely a more or less prolonged  
period of stagnation and integrative plateau.‖225 Events subsequently witnessed a renewed 
commitment to political integration, although it had not been a consistent progression, and nowhere 
more so than in collective foreign policy-making.  
Here, the predicted automatism between functional and political spill-over had not always happened.  
It could not explain how or why the EPC of the 1970s, which lacked all the institutions and diplomatic 
trappings of a supranational foreign policy institution, evolved in the manner that it had. Nor could it 
explain why, despite subsequently increasing economic integration, there did not seem to be a spill-
over to transform the EPC into something more than inter-governmentalism (and since neo-
functionalism  was not clear as to what form the final destination ought to have been – that of a 
supranational state or an alternative arrangement - no relative progress could have been measured).  
In contrast, inter-governmentalist approaches to progress (or the lack of it) in collective foreign-policy 
making saw European integration as a process whereby the governments of states voluntarily entered 
into agreements to work together to solve common problems. Some constraints operated on the 
autonomy of national governments, but they remained in control of the process through the strict 
limits on future transfers of sovereignty.  Whilst this seemed to explain much of the history of the 
EPC, it failed to recognise the degree or extent and complexity of  intergovernmental negotiations and 
co-ordinations, and diverted attention away from the degree to which bureaucratic politics had been 
externalized in negotiating forums. It also ignored the role of non-governmental actors in the policy 
making and implementation process; while it could account for lowest-common-dominator deals and 
the unwillingness of the states to compromise their core national interests.
226
  Nonetheless, it had 
failed to entirely account for the growing role of EU institutions in collective foreign policy-making 
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and the renewed commitment exhibited by the CFSP and subsequent developments.  
Whilst similarly located within realist theory, constructivism did offer us the possibility of 
acknowledging a progressive ―Europeanization‖ of national policy-making, which might have account 
for, along with neo-functionalist spill-over, the revival of efforts to have formed a collective foreign 
policy mechanism, and the ways in which such a mechanism had impacted upon the identities and 
interests of member states. By introducing the constructivist approach to theorising the EU, one was 
subsequently able to move beyond the intergovernmental-supranational dichotomy. Instead, one came 
to recognise the socialising effect of membership of the EU in defining national interests, assisting in 
progressing towards more shared notions of interests, and in redefining the bargaining process 
between member states on the one hand; and, between member states and supranational institutions on 
the other. 
Finally, the multi-level governance model encouraged the populace to consider the ever more 
complex and inter-linked hierarchy and network of institutions, formal and informal, sub-national, 
national and supranational, as an organic whole, rather than a simple collective of discrete and 
autonomous units.  The multi-level governance model never denied the strong role of the states in the 
decision making process; however, it recognised that since the Treaty of the European Union, there 
had been a growing capability of supranational institutions which was leading to the relocation of 
authority in the EU- upwards, downwards, and sideways from the member states.
227
 
In conclusion, there has never been one single international relations theory which could alone fully 
explain European integration or how the nature of the development of the EU had impacted upon its 
will or ability to make or implement foreign policy. Whilst overall the realist assumption of the state 
as the primary unit of international relations underpined much of the research,, in most of the relevant 
schools of thought, a broader acknowledgement of the complexity of determinants, dynamics, 
processes and mechanisms had become necessary. Specifically, the literature discussed here leads one 
to examine how and why EEC/EU foreign policy towards the Palestinians was made by first 
acknowledging the member states as key actors with interests of their own which were represented 
through collective foreign policy making structures and mechanisms. These structures and 
mechanisms have had to be assessed to determine whether foreign policy outputs were a result of 
inter-governmentalist bargaining of interests (albeit interests which may be altered by the process of 
membership itself) or of supra-nationalist, perhaps normative (liberal) ambitions, represented by the 
EEC/EU institutions themselves).   
The next chapter of this thesis offers an analysis of the evolution of EEC/EU external policy, from the 
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EPC to the EEAS. It will seek to demonstrate this complexity, whilst recognising the way in which 
different dynamics have been evident at different points in the trajectory. 
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Chapter Two: The Institutional Evolution of EU External Policy from the EPC to EEAS 
2.1 Introduction   
 
The first chapter of this thesis established the importance of key international relations and integration 
theories, in order to gain an understanding of the international behaviour of the EU. This chapter 
seeks to assess the progress of efforts which were aimed specifically at introducing integration into 
collective European foreign policy-making. It traces the evolution of European foreign affairs from 
the EPC at the end of 1970s through to its successor, the CFSP in 1992, then to the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) in 2009. The chapter will map out the origins, the decision-making processes, 
and the instruments of these mechanisms.  It will further seek to offer an interpretive narrative of the 
development of EEC/EU foreign policy by drawing on the theoretical propositions presented in the 
previous chapter. 
2.2 The EPC: A First Stab at Collective Foreign Policy 
World War II‘s decimation of Europe provides the historical backdrop for the creation of the 
European Community. The post-war era allowed for the rise of ambitious, rival superpowers in the 
U.S and the Soviet Union, creating what Cormick describedas ―a nervous new balance for Europe‖.228 
As the Soviet Union claimed most of Central and Eastern Europe, the U.S found itself locked into 
commitments based on its strategic interests in the west of the continent. Through a strengthening 
alliance with Western Europe, America aimed to use its economic assistance to deter the Soviet Union 
and stave off the looming threat of communist expansion. Europe, in the meantime, sought ―…to keep 
the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down‖229 as emphasised by the then first NATO 
Secretary General, Lord Ismay. 
Fear of the Soviet Union played a key role in pulling Western Europe together into a unified 
economic and military front. In part as a result of the shelter offered by the United States, Western 
European governments managed to set aside their differences and build a bridge of cooperation and 
unity while removing the causes of war between them through the founding of the EEC in 1957. 
Ironically, these achievements would never have been substantiated without the supportive protection 
of the U.S and its own strategic views of a united Europe.   
In 1965 a new European organisation, The European Community, developed out of a coal and steel 
policy co-ordination organisation and was established through the Treaty of Rome. This initially 
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included France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy. The new organisation 
had no defined external relations component. However, it soon became clear that some mechanism 
was needed for determining how to collectively deal with third party countries, with an increasing 
number of challenges requiring collective foreign policy responses in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
The subsequent initiatives to speak with one European voice developed in spite of an absence of any 
legal framework within the Treaty of Rome. While the Treaty did include legal clauses establishing 
how economic issues, such as trade agreements, would be dealt with, the Treaty did not include any 
specific legal text in relation to political relationships. 
Thus, the first collective foreign policy-making effort, the EPC was actually built outside of the legal 
framework of the Community‘s treaties.  European foreign policy experts argued that the EPC 
developed in an ―incremental and often disguised manner.‖230 According to Johansson-Nogués, 
during the 1970s and the 1980s, members of the EEC ―were experimenting with foreign policy 
cooperation, sometimes with a successful outcome, sometimes not;‖231 while Monar suggested that 
the result was foreign policy ―conducted by diplomats for diplomats with diplomatic means in a 
diplomatic manner,‖232 a view supported by Schneider.233  
A decade after the foundation of the European Community, and as it demonstrated an increasing 
solidarity through the foundation of a common internal market, a common European agriculture 
policy, and monetary coordination, there grew an expectation that areas other than economic, such as 
foreign policy-making, would be similarly integrated. This aspiration motivated European leaders to 
attempt to coordinate their stances towards international issues and crises and fed the dreams of those 
European leaders who dreamt of an ultimately united Europe. 
It was believed that the EEC would reap political benefits from their collective economic weight, 
achieved through economic co-ordination and integration. Their combined economic power would 
allow them increased international recognition and status relative to powerful players in the 
international community, such as the U.S, the Soviet Union or the Arab world, which could be 
capitalised upon if they were able to speak with one voice in world affairs. This desire prompted the 
six original Community states to move towards a coordinated foreign policy. Of course, individual 
member states also had their own individual motives for pursuing those ends. The ‗self- image‘ of 
each member state, their domestic policies, military capabilities, and in some cases their colonial 
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histories played a significant role in the proliferation of the EPC. Moreover, the global ambitions of 
some members, most notably France, aspired to a leading international role and served to be important 
factors behind the adoption of the EPC 
West Germany, for example, had initially been motivated to form the ECSC and the EEC by a desire 
to reassure its Western European neighbours of its peaceful intentions and by the need to locate itself 
within the United States‘ sphere of protection - the so-called Westpolitik. In 1969, however, 
Chancellor Willy Brandt sought to normalise West Germany‘s relations with the German Democratic 
Republic - a shift to a new Ostpolitik.  By supporting the EPC, Brandt believed he could both 
continue to reassure Western European partners of his country‘s commitment to the Community, and 
increase his own country‘s political weight in its dealings with the East.   
According to Nuttall, ―Germany was extremely anxious to avoid any suspicion that it was 
encouraging renewed ties with the countries of Eastern Europe at the expense of its commitment to 
west Europe integration.‖234 Meanwhile, Germond and Turk believed that West Germany switched its 
policy from Westpolitik to Ostpolitik because, having been defeated and politically dismembered at 
the end of World War II, it was now seeking to establish a new identity and other directions and 
possibilities for Europe and itself.
235
  This point was echoed by Reinhardt Rummel, who argued that 
in the 1970s and 80s, West Germany could be described as ―an economic giant but a political dwarf‖ 
and that the EPC provided a significant opportunity for Germany to advance its political position on 
the global stage.
236
 France was similarly a key driver of the EPC. In general, its Gaullist doctrine in 
the 1960s ―put the emphasis on sovereignty and independence as the best ways to maintain the French 
position in international politics.‖237 However, Grosser explained that the French under General de 
Gaulle saw the American presence in Europe as a possible factor that might have impelled it towards 
new conflicts.  
Seeking to reduce European dependence on the U.S, the French became the main driving force behind 
the EPC. They viewed it as an opportunity to enhance the profile of French diplomacy, potentially 
raising it to a level that could challenge the primacy of the U.S. in Europe or, at the very least, 
construct a voice that differed from those of the U.S and the Soviet Union. The French government 
thus seemed to have been pursuing two goals: on one hand, to promote within the European 
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framework a foreign policy-making system which mirrored France‘s own constitutional doctrine in 
determining that policy should be made by Heads of States; and on the other, to preserve the unity and 
continuity of French policy itself
238
. Pardalis suggested that the main advantage of the EPC for France 
was that the new coordination mechanism provided France with a framework which allowed her to 
soften or moderate the positions of allies in the European Community.  In sum, the member states 
utilised the EPC as a means of ―deflecting‖ external pressure and as a face for moves in their own 
national policy.
239
  
Wallace concluded that ―the development of the political cooperation machinery served, particularly 
during a rather sticky period for the European integrative enterprise, both the interests of those who 
wished the EEC to devolve rapidly into some sort of EU and those, like the UK, who were 
unenthusiastic about such progress.‖240 For the supporters of Europe, political cooperation proved to 
be an area where at least some progress could be reported despite the stalemate and deadlock within 
the formal community institutions.  As such, it was something of a morale booster.  For the British in 
particular, and perhaps for the French, political cooperation as it developed represented an area of 
European activity that caused no offence to their firmly-held objections for further extensions of the 
principle of super-nationality.  
Before The Hague summit in 1969, several efforts had been made to institutionalise political 
cooperation among the six member states and to incorporate political cooperation within the structure 
of the European Comunity. The 1950s witnessed plans for a European Defence Community and 
European Political Community, which were followed up with the so-called Fouchet Plan in the 1960s.  
Both plans were unsuccessful due to the irreconcilable positions of the member states, the Dutch veto 
proving decisive. Without the participation of Great Britain, the smaller countries feared the 
hegemony of France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) within such a structure of close 
political cooperation.
241
 At the Hague Summit on 2 December 1969, President Pompidou suggested a 
new EPC. At that summit, the heads of the six member states of the EEC instructed their foreign 
ministers to examine the question of how progress could be made in the field of political unification. 
The Hague Suggestion proposed that entry upon the final stage of the common market meant ―paving 
the way for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of 
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making contribution commensurate with its traditions and its mission.‖242 Under the chairmanship of 
Foreign Minister Walter Sheel, the Ministers drew up three Reports as Figure No1. shows the 
Luxembourg Report of 1970, the Copenhagen Report of 1973, and the London Report of 1981. 
Together, the three reports emphasised that the EPC had two objectives: to ensure greater mutual 
understanding with respect to the major issues of international politics, by exchanging information 
and consulting regularly; and, to increase their solidarity by working ―for a harmonization of views, 
concentration of attitudes and joint action when it appeared feasible and desirable‖.243 
 
Figure 1: The Development of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy 
 
 
Social Europe: the Journal of the European Left Volume 3 • Issue 1 Summer/Autumn 2007 
2.2.1  Inter-Governmentalism in the EPC 
At the heart of the inter-governmentalism of the EPC lay two fundamental truths; the European 
Community members might have shared economic interests which favoured integration, but their 
political and foreign interests were frequently profoundly different and they had little inclination to 
surrender these to a common good. The larger and more influential states, like France, Britain and 
West Germany, had little incentive to sacrifice their material interests to those of smaller states, such 
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as the Netherlands, Belgium or Luxembourg.  Secondly, they did not share a vision as to what a 
European political union might have looked like or how it might have situated itself in the greater 
world context.  France, for example, sought to build a greater ‗Europe with a French favour,‘ while 
Britain held competing loyalties to its ‗Special Relationship‘ with the U.S. Detrimentally, West 
Germany was constrained by its position within the American fold but equally innocuous in its desire 
to pursue rapprochement with its eastern neighbour.  
The relationship between the EEC and the U.S., along with the differing national preferences as to 
what it should have looked like, undoubtedly contributed to the ongoing preference for an inter-
governmental approach.  Cold War politics dominated international politics until the end of the 1980s 
and the containment of the spread of communism - specifically in the form of reliance on an 
American security umbrella - served to unify Western European states in an apparently common 
agenda. The U.S for its part supported the EEC integration process which it believed helped solidify 
that containment and might even enable Europe to contribute to its own defence. After World War II, 
the U.S helped rebuild Europe through the Marshall Plan,
244
 and later provided military shelter 
through the NATO agreement. 
The Truman Administration, moreover, was the first third-party country to provide the ECSC with 
formal recognition.
245
 However, ―the early American post-war presence in Western Europe was a 
major structuring feature in the shaping of post-war Europe‖,246 and the Europeans proved disinclined 
to develop a collective military profile, preferring to take advantage of American protection and 
concentrate on their economy development
247
. Indeed, Robert Kagan argued that the presence of 
American forces as a security guarantee in Europe was, as intended, the critical ingredient to having 
begun the process of European integration.
248
 
According to Thompson, the relationship between the U.S and Western Europe was consequently ―a 
pattern of complex interdependence between both sides enabling them to move beyond the limits of a 
traditional military alliance‖249 For the Europeans, this meant building a strategic relationship with the 
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U.S that still allowed them to ―establish themselves as a distinct and original entity.‖250 Just as the U.S 
was ultimately suspicious of Europe as an emerging power, the Europeans were fearful of American 
hegemony over their own continent. Mets argued that the Europeans believed that the U.S 
participation in European affairs was ―vital to both the security of the continent and its economic 
prosperity.‖251 However, they were reluctant to allow that influence to extend to economic, cultural or 
internal matters. According to Musu, the ―US, always supportive of European integration, also 
nurtured a distinct dislike for any European initiative that was not fully consonant with the U.S 
strategies.‖ 252 Bereuter believed that this dilemma created a ―rift that developed within Europe itself 
over the issue of support for the United States. 
253
   
Karimi identified two schools of thought within the European Community: ―Atlanticists,‖ such as 
Britain and Germany, who preferred a close partnership and special status with the U.S. due to an 
historically strong transatlantic-shared value system; and ―Europeans‖ like France, who preferred to 
promote a unified European identity and structures.
254
 This division was exacerbated by the fact that 
US administrations had historically favoured dealing with the individual member states rather than 
with the EC through the EPC mechanisms. According to Pardalis, "European Political Co-operation 
and the United States." the U.S had been being ―reluctant to accept an EPC multilateral perspective, 
preferring to emphasise the importance of bilateral ties‖ 255 Pardalis accused the U.S of using and 
promoting the policy of ―divide and rule‖ among the member states of the EC, especially in crisis 
situations since ―the U.S considers a cohesive position within EPC could be to the detriment of 
Washington‖.256 So, while EC member states all recognised that the European Community was 
becoming an international actor in its own right and therefore needed to develop its political external 
policy-making apparatus, they had been unable to fully agreed on how to do so or to what ends; thus, 
ending up with an EPC which had been designed to do little more than co-ordinate 
intergovernmentalism despite its normative nods to integration. This contradiction was inherent 
within the EPC throughout its existence, but had become more acute as the EEC extended beyond its 
original ambitions. The EPC, a victim of its own success, found that it was expected to play an 
international role for which it was unprepared and ill-equipped, with national member states resisting 
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the substantive reforms which might have enabled it to do more than make declarations which it then 
had little power or capacity to implement. As Smith argued, the EPC was ―initially established as a 
mechanism to privilege member state governments in the decision-making process." As a result, EPC 
rested on informal practices and rules not formally codified by treaty, and not closely involved with 
EC actors; it was generally a decentralized, flexible, secret, non-enforceable policy domain.‖257 In 
sum, the EPC had been developed from unwritten rules into a structure of formal and informal legal 
commitments, but under the intergovernmental framework. 
2.3 The CFSP trying to Move beyond Inter-Governmentalism 
By the end of the 1980s, it was becoming clear that the EPC mechanism needed serious revision in 
order to deal with some substantial new challenges facing the Europeans. A number of key events, 
such as the Arab oil embargo in the 1970s, had already demonstrated the shortcomings of the EPC as 
a means for Europe to respond to international affairs and crises.
258
 By the end of the 1980s the 
international context was rapidly changing; in 1989 the Berlin Wall fell, and by 1991 the Soviet 
Union was dissolving. Even as Germany was re-unified the Yugoslav Federation was falling apart, 
bringing war to European soil once more in 1991.  
In 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait, with European countries becoming heavily involved in both the 
resulting United Nations actions and the military coalition which subsequently expelled Iraq.  By 
1992 the then twelve member states of the European Community had realised that significant further 
enlargement was likely and that it was more important than ever for Europe to speak with a single and 
co-ordinated voice. Koliopoulos adds a further reason by arguing that the collapse of the Soviet Union 
had led to a US withdrawal from its commitment to the defence of Europe. Henceforward, the 
member states would have to take more responsibility for their own collective security.
259
 The 
consequence of these combined developments was the Treaty on European Union, the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992, which established the European Union. 
The Maastricht Treaty represents a new stage in European integration since it explicitly opened the 
way to political integration. It introduced the current ‗three pillars‘ system of the European Union. 
The first pillars of the European Communities which handles several linked areas of responsibility 
such as monetary union, the single market, the customs union, social and environmental policies, 
citizenship, external trade policies, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the Common Fisheries 
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Policy (CFP), competition law, and immigration. 
The (second) Foreign and Security Policy pillar handles several issues starting from the Union‘s 
external affairs to democracy promotion, human rights, foreign aid, and engagement in peace 
processes. In fact, this pillar replaces the provisions of the Single European Act and allows member 
states to take joint action in the field of foreign policy.
260
  The (third) Police and Judicial Co-operation 
in Criminal Matters (PJCC) pillar brought together co-operation in the fight against crime.
261
 While 
the Maastricht Treaty included a number of distinct articles and chapters emphasising the aims and the 
importance of the CFSP, the actual mechanisms and instruments have been defined through a series of 
subsequent treaties. In Article J.1 in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) it was stated that; ―the Union shall 
define and implement a CFSP covering all areas of foreign and security policy.‖262 The Treaty called 
upon the member states to ―support the Union‘s external and security policy actively and unreservedly 
in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity‖.263  In addition the Treaty stated that: ―the Member States 
shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity and refrain from any 
action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive 
force in international relations.‖264 The Nice Treaty (2003) revised the articles of the Maastricht and 
Amsterdam Treaties and enhanced the effectiveness of the CFSP by introducing the position of High 
Representative for the CFSP/Secretary-General of the Council, a post first entrusted to Javier 
Solana.
265
 The new position according to Nice Treaty should ―ensure that the EP and all members of 
the Council are kept fully informed of the implementation of enhanced cooperation in the field of the 
CFSP.‖266 As this piece of research will continue its effort to trace the evolution of the CFSP 
mechanisms in the coming sections the thesis will demonstte how the the Nice Treaty has 
been superseded and amended by 2009 Lisbon Treaty. 
2.3.1  Who Makes European Foreign Policy?  
Despite the apparent clarity of the Three Pillars system, the question of how EU foreign policy had 
actually been made, and by whom, remained extraordinarily complex.  The answer had always 
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differed sharply between the political and economic realms.
267
  
This section will detail the structures of foreign policy-making and the functions and responsibilities 
of the main actors in the decision-making process of the CFSP. In theory, the foreign policy-making 
process can be broken down into six basic stages: agenda setting; decision making; policy 
implementation and external representation; providing resources for the CFSP; evaluation and 
compliance; and democratic oversight and accountability.
268
 However, as a result of the gradual 
development of the EC/EU, there have emerged a number of different actors involved in the 
elaboration and implementation of the CFSP, several of which were previously located under the 
CFSP pillar, and others of which had come under the supervision of the European Community pillar, 
mainly the European Commission.  Under the removed CFSP pillar, the actors politically responsible 
for CFSP diplomacy were the European Council (prime ministers and presidents) and the Council of 
the European Union.Under these two bodies there were several further actors, which included a 
number of senior or lower ranking Council bodies and committees responsible for formulation, 
preparation and setting of the agenda of the CFSP. Specifically, these included the Political and 
Security Committee, the European Correspondents, the CFSP Working Group and the CFSP 
counsellors. To these one may also have added the High Representative for CFSP/Secretary-General 
of the Council of the EU, who assisted the Council in foreign policy matters.  In the European 
Community pillar and within the domain of the European Commission, there existed the Directorate 
Generals for External Relations, the European Neighbourhood, Development and Humanitarian Aid 
within the European Community pillar and the Parliament, all of whom played a substantial role. 
2.3.2  Foreign Policy-Relevant Institutions in the CFSP Pillar   
 
The highest foreign policy decision-making forum was the European Council, which included the 
heads of government of member states and the European Commission's President. The European 
Council met at least four times a year with the main responsibility, according to Article 13 of the TEU 
(Maastricht) Treaty, being to ―set priorities and give broad guidelines for EU policies, including the 
CFSP.‖269 The European Council had become increasingly important in shaping and voicing the EU‘s 
international position since the late 1990s; its importance having stemmed, according to Edwards, 
from the legitimacy it drew by virtue of its comprising of the European political leaders who had the 
final say when decision makers within the EU institutions themselves were unable to reach an 
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agreement due to problems inherent in ―trans-pillar‖ coordination.270 Smith emphasized that the 
European Council may have been the most direct way for national governments to set the EU agenda. 
The second important decision maker was the General Affairs and External Relations Council 
(GAERC) of the EU. The GAERC could easily have been referred to as the ‗Kitchen of Europe‘ since 
it was one of the main theatres for lobbying and it reflected the intricate relationship between the EU‘s 
governing structure and its foreign policy behaviour. It was the main and the most important theatre 
both during the period of EPC and the current CFSP in which the member states and the European 
Commission interacted and negotiated policies.  
It was, in fact, where the majority of the decision-making took place once policy direction and 
guidelines had been set by the European Council.
271
 The GAERC comprised of ministerial 
representatives (Foreign Ministers in the case of CFSP), who scheduled monthly meetings, adjusting 
them more frequently when urgent decisions were required to be made together with the European 
Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative for CFSP.
272
 It was the GAERC, 
more than any other EU body, that set the pace and direction for the CFSP. But, only the Council 
could have taken decisions of any political significance, whether that meant the application of an arms 
embargo to a conflict zone, the appointment of EU special envoys, the determination of the EU‘s 
stance on a UN conference or recommendations that all member-states should ratify various 
international agreements. Therefore, the GAERC was unswervingly considered the most important 
player in CFSP. 
273
 
Of course, the European Council of Heads of Government also played a role in the CFSP – by issuing 
statements on various international issues and by taking decisions on ‗common strategies‘ and The 
Commissioner of External Relations in the European Commission and the High Representative for the 
CFSP participate in the GAERC meeting.  However, the key decision-making body in the CFSP was 
the GAERC, which once it had decided on external relations issues, including the CFSP, their joint 
actions and common positions. 
The structure of the GAERC retained an inter-governmental approach which relied on a requirement 
for unanimity among member states before a proposal could have been adopted, thereby ensuring that 
each member state had its interests taken into account in the fashioning of a consensus.
274
 However, 
member states were able to exercise constructive abstention, i.e. an abstention which did not block the 
adoption of the decision and/or might conflict with the Union's action under that decision. The 
previously amended Title V of the EU Treaty had allowed for adoption by a qualified majority in two 
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cases: for decisions applying a common strategy defined by the European Council or for any decisions 
implementing a joint action or common position already adopted by the Council.
275
  Under the CFSP 
pillar, the member states in the GAERC shared the right of initiative with the European Commission.  
However, the Commission did not have the right to vote in the Council.  Member states enjoyed the 
ultimate rights in the decision-making mechanism with regard to foreign and defence policies, as well 
as having been able to exercise great strength in terms of the proposal. Before CFSP proposals 
reached the GAERC, they were to have first passed the hurdle of numerous actors involved in their 
preparation, including the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC), expert working groups, and the High Representative for the 
CFSP/Secretary-General of the Council.  
The Council‘s work was prepared by a committee consisting of permanent representatives of member 
states, appointed at an ambassadorial level and responsible for assisting the Council with its agenda. 
This committee had immediately become a forum for dialogue between member states and a body 
with partial political control over the agenda. Its job was to ―seek common ground between member 
states and coordinate with the Political Committee and the General Affairs Council.‖276 The 
ambassadors covered the full spectrum of EU business and prepareed the dossiers for all Council 
meetings. 
277
The Political and Security Committee was another body that handled the CFSP proposals 
before they were set to reach their final destination on the GAERC agenda.  It was made up of the 
political directors of the member states‘ foreign ministers and the commissions‘ representative in the 
form of the Director General for External Political Relations.
278
 Its responsibilities included the 
preparation all the CFSP work for the COREPER and the Foreign Ministers, and dealing with routine 
matters such as non-controversial foreign policy declarations.
279
 
Expert working groups in the meantime brought together directors and/or government experts or 
delegates from the member states' permanent representations to the EU to report on, prepare opinions 
for and give proposals to the PSC on CFSP matters. (For example, for the Middle East the CFSP had 
established the Committee and Working Group Ad Hoc Middle East Peace Process (COMEP) which 
dealt with all issues relating to the Middle East Peace Process). This group replaced the Special 
Coordinating Group on the Middle East Peace Process. 
Finally, as a way of keeping EU officials up-to-date with political situations around the globe, the 
High Representative for the CFSP created the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit which 
monitored and analysed developments in areas relevant to the CFSP by providing assessments of the 
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Union's interests in relation to the CFSP.
280
  
In order to improve the effectiveness and profile of the European Union's foreign policy, and in order 
to limit the administrative burden of the rotating Presidency among the Member States, the 
Amsterdam Treaty created the positions of the Secretary-General of the Council and the High 
Representative for the CFSP. This position was to be held by the Secretary General of the Council and 
was meant to assist the Council, especially the Council presidency in all CFSP matters including 
external representation.  
According to the treaty, he or she should ―assist the Council and especially the Council presidency in 
all CFSP matters, including external representation.‖281  In addition, the HR ―assists the Council in 
matters coming within the scope of the Common foreign and security policy in particular through 
contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when 
appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting 
political dialogue with third countries.‖282 
The HR acted as the lubricating oil of the Council machinery and having had considerable influence 
over policy development. The Council may, whenever it deemed it necessary, have appointed other 
special representatives with (temporary) mandates to handle particular policy issues.
283
 The role of the 
Presidency in the CFSP had not changed much from its role in the former EPC. According to the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, every six months a different member state took over the chair of the Council, 
performing several noteworthy functions. For example, the Presidency was the driving force in the 
legislative and political decision-making process. The member state which held the rotating Council 
Presidency had the responsibility for the day-to-day management of the CFSP and the President–in–
Office chairs all of the EU‘s meetings, from the European Council to the Council of Europe down to 
Working Groups, including agenda-setting and the drafting of compromises.
284
 One of the main 
responsibilities of the presidency was setting the political priorities when beginning their terms. The 
member state holding the presidency released a programme outlining their priorities and what they 
aim to achieve. In addition, the president mediated between other member states to resolve 
controversies.  Finally, the president represented the EU internationally and acted as spokesperson for 
the EU in international conferences and international organisations.
285
 The president was also a 
member of the Troika, which included the immediate successor and the previous president of the EU, 
the main objective of which was to smoothly manage the process of the regular transfer of the 
presidency.  
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2.3.3  Foreign Policy-Relevant Institutions in the European Community Pillar 
Whilst the CFSP offered a specific external relations framework, the institutions of the first pillar had 
also developed their role in external relations. As Fiquer No. 2 shows the European Commission (EC) 
gained more power, authority and responsibility with every wave of reform or new treaty signed by 
the member states. With these waves of treaties, it had become one of the most operational actors of 
the CFSP along with the Presidency and the High Representative.  Significantly, its involvement in 
external affairs changed with the launching of the EU Treaty. Under the EPC structure, the European 
Commission was only to ―be consulted if the activities of the European Communities [were] affected 
by the work of the Ministers.‖286 However, under the CFSP mechanism the European Commission 
gained the right to be ‗fully associated‘ with the CFSP, thereby allowing it to participate in Council 
meetings alongside member states.  Importantly, however, and despite this license for membership, it 
did not have the right to vote.
287
 Its responsibilities were spread between the first and the second 
pillar, the CFSP.  
On the CFSP side, the Commission had been given a marginal power in the decision-making process 
but a strong position in the implementation process. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission 
was able to submit CFSP proposals, a privilege hitherto granted only to the member states.  Its role in 
implementation of CFSP policies, specifically CFSP joint actions, was largely a function of its 
funding capacities. Where a joint-action required funds to be made available for implementation, the 
Commission came into its own.
288
  
On the European Community side, specifically its economic aid and development external policies, 
the European Commission was to some extent marginal although the Maastricht Treaty had given the 
EC the ―sole right of initiative‖ though decisions were taken by the Council of Ministers. Economic 
and trade decisions were often taken through Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), in which each 
country had a voting weight related to population.  The role of the Commission was limited to 
proposing initiatives to the Council, sending recommendations to Council, and - when delegated - 
conducting negotiations and drawing up and implementing agreements with third parties, final 
approval for which were still granted by the Council.
289
  
It can be concluded that, in contrast to the European Community‘s supranational approach to internal 
economic policy, its external economic relations were managed very differently, with policies being 
largely determined through mechanisms which privilege the interests of member states.I  In other 
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words, it retained the primacy of inter-governmentalism. It can also be stated that, once policy had 
been made, the European Commission had sole responsibility for Community Actions in the areas of 
humanitarian aid, development assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction and sanctions 
regulations.
290
  
The Commission housed several Directorates General, working under the umbrella of the Presidency 
of the European Commission (currently chaired by President Barroso) each of which was responsible 
for a particular area of activity. Five of these directors dealt with aspects of external relations, 
including: External Relations, Enlargement, Trade, Development and Humanitarian Aid and 
Assistance and Fishery Policies. The Lisbon treaty and the establishment of the EEAS had 
permanently changed the structure and the role of the Directorates General which worked under the 
responsibility of the European Commission. For example, the two Directorates General, namely 
development cooperation and development aid, had merged into one body which was renamed 
‗Europe Aid Development and Co-operation.‘  This new body became integrated as a part of the 
EEAS, which meant that all development cooperation strategies for individual countries and regions 
were under the responsibility of the latter service.
291
 Through the Directorates General, the 
Commission was represented at all levels in the CFSP structure and was able to play a role in shaping 
policy implementation even beyond its direct jurisdiction. For example, one of the main 
responsibilities of the Commission was to coordinate the policies of the European Community and the 
the Council of the European Union on conflict prevention and management in other parts of the 
world. DG Trade was charged with carrying out EU international commercial policy as well as key 
aspects of intellectual property, investment and competition policy and had had little directly to do 
with foreign policy or conflict prevention. However, the systematic inclusion of human rights clauses 
in trade agreements with third parties could have been read as a forward looking conflict prevention 
measure. ―Indeed, DG Trade ha[d] much potential for involvement in conflict prevention issues, not 
least through the units that deal[t] with sustainable development, by including conflict impact 
assessments in trade agreements.‖292 Another example might have been Europe Aid, which was the 
implementing agency for both DG Development and DG RELEX projects. Under its European 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) program, it was also responsible for managing 
the EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) project cycle.
293
 Since Barroso had chaired the 
Commission, he returned Europe Aid to the direct responsibility of the External Relations 
Commissioner, Ferrero-Waldner. 
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The power that came from implementation mechanisms was reinforced by the operational capacity of 
the Commission, which had 100 delegations in 120 countries around the world. These delegations 
played a much greater role in protecting Community interests (such as trade agreements) than in 
promoting wider EU interests such as the CFSP). However, their political reports played a significant 
role in the CFSP by having represented a huge information resource and one which was more 
extensive than that of some member states themselves.
294
 The Commission could rely on its 
administrative structure in Brussels, its extended diplomatic network in a multitude of states (which 
was more than the diplomatic network of most of the smaller member states) and its experience with, 
and knowledge of, the countries concerned to give weight to its own voice in shaping both policy 
agendas and implementation.
295
  In sum, the Amsterdam Treaty made the European Commission 
―fully associated‖ with the CFSP; however the latter was never run solely along inter-governmental 
lines.  
The second major European Community actor was the European Parliament. Under the Rome Treaty, 
the Parliament had few formal powers with respect to external relations by remaining marginal to the 
CFSP process.
296
 With the single European Act, it acquired the right to approve association and 
membership agreements. This was extended under the Maastricht Treaty to all but very simple trade 
agreements.
297
 The EP had to be regularly ―informed‖ by the Presidency and the Commission of the 
development of the Union‘s foreign and security policy of the ―main aspects and the basic choices of 
the CFSP,‖ and its views were to be duly taken into consideration. In addition, the Maastricht Treaty 
gave the Parliament the right to ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it; yet it 
played no formal role in decision-making.
298
 However, the Parliament certainly had various 
committees which considered issues relating to the CFSP, such as the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Committee on Human Rights, and the Common Security and Defence Policy (AFET). 
These committees were the principal EU public debating forum for issues with foreign policy 
implications.  Additionally, the EP had a capacity to influence the CFSP by using its power on 
budgetary issues, including operational spending for the CFSP as part of the Community‘s budget. 
Stetter argued that Parliament had been able to regularly assert its role in the policy- making process 
through its control on budget-setting, including through its relating of aid to the CFSP, although the 
relatively small size of the CFSP budget suggested this was a limited power.
299
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In general, then, the weak role of the Parliament made its voice one without echo. The Parliament‘s 
involvement in the decision making procedure ultimately depended upon the good will of the member 
states and the Commission to keep it informed about decisions which were awaiting adoption in the 
Council.
300
 It can then be seen that when it came to the CFSP, the most relevant decision-making 
actors in both the first and second pillars of the EU remained those in which member states retained 
their influence and where inter-governmentalism regained the dominant paradigm. The Commission 
had admittedly increased its formal role and its informal capacity to influence policy, most 
particularly through implementation, but decision making rested with the European Council and the 
the Council of the European Union which lingered fundamentally beholden to consensus-based 
mechanisms for policy-making and which could then be subverted by differences between the 
member states, whether over their interests or their visions of what Europe was and what it ought to 
have been doing. 
2.3.4  The Instruments of the CFSP 
If the new mechanism offered some, but not sufficient, change to represent genuine integration in 
foreign policy (as opposed to co-ordination), did the new instruments for the CFSP offer the EU the 
chance for its foreign policy to be more effective? The previous section explained how the EPC 
lacked the legal power to implement its policy decisions. However, the European treaties, notably the 
TEU, gave the GAERC three specific legal tools for action to implement its CFSP decisions. Those 
legal tools as Table No. 1 shows consist of Common Positions (statements and declarations), Joint 
Actions (an operational tool) and Common Strategies, which were added to the CFSP by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1997. 
According to Article J.5 of Maastricht Treaty, a Common Position ―define[d] the approach of the 
Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature.‖301 It was the first tool that requested 
EU member states to adjust their attitudes regarding foreign and security policy in accordance with 
the goals and rules of the CFSP.
302
 Common Positions compelled the member states which had no 
alternative but to defend them in international organisations and conferences.  Joint Actions 
―address[ed] specific situations where operational action by the Union [was] deemed to be 
required.‖303The Joint Actions were more important due to a requirement of physical and/or financial 
commitments from the member states.
304
 For instance, in respect to funded projects, election 
observers or peace envoys, Joint Actions must legally have taken into account international laws and 
conventions, as well as UN resolutions, for in the realm of foreign policy even EU decisions must 
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have shown some sensitivity to decisions taken elsewhere, particularly in the UN.
305
 Both Common 
Positions and Joint Actions should have been adopted unanimously to protect the interests of all 
member states.
306
  
The Common Strategy was the main tool for EU policies towards particular regions or countries with 
which member states ―have shared and crucial interests in common.‖307 The GAERC was able to 
recommend Common Strategies to the European Council, to be adopted by a qualified majority.  
Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU adopted several Common Strategies including the 
Mediterranean and Russia Common Strategies. However, these Common Strategies expired and thus 
no common strategies exist at the present time 
Common Strategies were implemented through Common Positions and Joint Actions. With the 
exception of measures taken to implement Common Strategies, all CFSP instruments required 
unanimous decision-making and thus both of the instruments had an intergovernmental nature. Even 
where QMV was permitted, an individual member state could have blocked it if it is argued that the 
policy in question impinged upon important national interests. If a member state undertook such 
actions, the GAERC Council may still have been able to decide, through a qualified majority, to refer 
the matter to the European Council for a unanimous decision taken by heads of state and 
government.
308
 
When it came to the instruments through which the European Commission could implement the CFSP 
policies of the GAERC, these took the form of ―regulations, directives or decisions‖ by Council or 
Commission that were legally binding under EC law.
309
 These subordinate national governments more 
specifically to the European Community, but since they related to implementation rather than 
decision-making, the overall privileging of inter-governmentalism remained. Indeed, the binding 
nature of its directives increased the incentive for member states to seek to exclude the Commission 
from exercising influence over foreign policy decision-making. A fundamental tension arose between 
the institutions of the first and second pillars - between the Council and the GAERC on the one hand 
and the Commission on the other - which not only represented the struggle between inter-
governmentalism and integrationism, but also an opportunity which member states could exploit for 
their own, diverse national interests. 
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Table No 1: The Instruments of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU  
 
Instrument Who proposes Who decides Who implements 
general 
guidelines 
Member States and 
Commission 
the European Council the Presidency 
common 
strategies 
Member States and 
Commission 
the European Council the Presidency  
joint actions Member States and 
Commission 
the Council the Commission  
common 
positions 
Member States and 
Commission 
the Council Member States 
 
2.3.5  Has the CFSP Moved Foreign Policy-Making beyond the EPC? 
How then can the complexities of the CFSP making process be understood? Clearly, as Figure No 3. 
shows, the EU mechanism for making and implementing foreign policy was based on a set of 
complex hierarchical and horizontal institutional forms.  It was ―a multifaceted process of convoluted 
interactions between many actors, whose embedded differences are revealed in a wide range of 
diverse structures, bureaucracies, interests and ambitions.‖310 Baun argued that in ―the EU‘s system of 
complex, multi-level governance, political power has been diffused from the national to the European 
(and in many cases sub-national) level.‖311 He added that the decision making of the EP/CFSP was by 
an extensive and often frustrating practice of ―multi-level bargaining and consensus-building among a 
variety of national and EU institutions and actors.‖ Thus, policy outcomes reflected the lowest 
common denominator, as ―intergovernmental bargaining and horse-trading‖.312 In sum, despite efforts 
attempting to integrate the EU‘s foreign affairs into wider Union activity, the process of policy-
making under the CFSP had not in practice differed dramatically from that under the EPC.
313
 The 
European foreign policy system had maintained its main features which were originally designed to 
protect the interests of the member states and to maintain and preserve respective sovereignties, at the 
expense of, and in tension against, the growing strength of European institutions.  
The three-pillar structure itself clearly reflected the outcome of the tension between those member 
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states who sought to move towards an integrated Europe and those who strove to keep foreign policy 
decision-making strictly in the hands of the national governments.
314
 Like the EPC, it maintained the 
separation between political external policy-making and economic external policy-making. At the 
decision-making level, the intergovernmental and unanimity-based approaches ensured that each 
member state has its own interests taken into account in the fashioning of any particular consensus 
towards the CFSP - something that had not changed since the EPC. The member states were still the 
main players who laid down the major lines of policy and took the political decisions and they were 
using the mechanisms in ways which demonstrate their continuing preference for this. As explained, 
excepting the adoption of the Quality Majority Voting on implementation of the joint actions, 
decisions in the CFSP continued to be made essentially on a consensus basis. Member states had kept 
the right to conduct independent initiatives and policy as long these did not contradict the main trends 
of the CFSP.  
Finally, the role of the European Commission remained effectively marginalised when it came to 
policy-making, although it had increased its responsibilities during implementation. Lodge and Flynn 
argued that the member states‘ attitudes towards the Commission reflected two things: ―first, a desire 
to guard against one or two states dominating outcomes and making the CFSP in the image of their 
own national priorities and interests; and secondly, a desire to preserve national independence and 
deter compromising national sovereignty.‖315 Since the outset of political cooperation in the 1970s, 
there has effectively been a power-struggle between the European Commission and the member states 
with the Commission have been constantly seeking to extend its authority and influence with the 
member states continuous resistance. Where foreign policy making was concerned, Dijkstra claimed 
that ―because the Member States, and in particular France, were afraid of too much European 
Commission involvement in the area of high politics, they decided to continue to keep the latter at 
arm‘s length by delegating various tasks to the Council Secretariat. The Secretariat is thus performing 
the tasks the Commission is not allowed to do.
316
Moreover, Everts argued that although the 
Maastricht Treaty confirmed that the Commission would be ‗fully associated‘ with the CFSP - and the 
Treaty even gave it a right of initiative - ―in practice, the Commission has played only a limited role 
in the CFSP, partly because it recognises the sensitivities of the member-states.‖317  
Despite such sensitivities, the Commission had been disgruntled with the procedures and the 
mechanism of the European CFSP.The Commission argued against the three-pillar system, asserting 
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that the cross-pillar institutional setting was a source of incoherence within the CFSP,
318
 and had 
hence called for the abolition of the cross-pillar institutional setting.
319
 Monar supported the 
suggestion, arguing that the cross-pillar institutional mechanisms for foreign-policy making had led to 
a dualism within the EU‘s foreign affairs system, evident in different legal bases, decision-making 
rules and procedures, institutional setup and, perhaps most importantly, divergent rationales. 
320
The 
role of the EP in the CFSP still had not changed substantively from that which it held under the EPC: 
while there were some developments, its role remained limited to the right to be ―informed‖ about the 
decisions and the directions of the CFSP. In return, the Parliament began to put forth questions and 
recommendations to the Council.
321
 However, the EP enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from 
member states which it used to develop alternative policy agendas in areas where other actors had 
only a limited interest. Pace emphasised that the Parliament ―plays[ed] an important role in 
constructions of normative power of the European Union‖322 (NPEU) focusing, for example, on 
human rights and democracy promotion in the European Union‘s external relations. Here, it had been 
able to use its budgetary powers to promote its agenda, although the weak formal role of the 
Parliament in the CFSP and the decision-making mechanism when it came to imposing sanctions on 
flouting governments made the voice of Parliament ineffective. Nor had the role of the Presidency 
changed much with the CFSP, although the TEU allowed some minor developments.
323
 European 
foreign affairs still suffered from the Rotating Presidency of the EU which affected the direction and 
the agenda of the EU in general. The Presidents‘ potential to have used their position to advance 
personal interests was in reality severely constrained by the brevity of the Presidential term, which 
was a mere only six months, as well as the limited extent to which they could select which issues 
should have been included in the agenda. Furthermore, Presidents were said to have abided by the 
normative principle that they should be ‗neutral brokers‘ by refraining from using this position to 
further their own interests. Violation of this norm could have resulted in criticism and retaliatory 
measures from other member states.
324
 Nonetheless, the limited term suggested an inability to 
                                                          
318
 European Commission, (2002). For the European Union: Peace, Freedom, Solidarity – Communication of the 
Commission on the Institutional Architecture. COM (2002) 728. Luxembourg, p.17. 
319
Jürgen, M. (2002). The Parliamentary Dimension of CFSP/ESDP: Options for the European Convention, 
study submitted for the European Parliament Directorate-General for Research Under Contract No 
IV/2002/01/01 Final report.p26. Available at <http://doc.utwente.nl/44911/1/wessel3.pdf> Accessed on 
20.2.2010.  
320
 Monar, J. (200)‗Institutional constraints on the EU‘s Middle East and North Africa Policy‘, in Sven Behrendt 
& Christian Hanelt (eds.), Bound to Cooperate: Europe  and the Middle East (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann 
Foundation, 2000), 209-43niversity Press.p.25. 
321
 Diedrichs, U. (2004). The European parliament in CFSP: more than a marginal player? International 
Spectator. 39, 31-46. p.32. 
322
  Pace, M. (2007). The Construction of EU Normative Power. Journal of Common Market Studies JCMS, 45 
(5) 1041-1064. 
323
Loriga, J. D. (1996).  CFSP: The View of the Council of the European Union.  In Pappas, S.A., 
Vanhoonacker, S. & Koliopoulos, K. (Eds.), The European Union‟s Common Foreign and Security policy, the 
Challenge of the Future. Maastricht,  p.117. 
324
  Thomson, R. (2008). The Council Presidency in the European Union: Responsibility with Power. Journal of 
Common Market Studies. 46, 593-617, p. 596. 
 69 
 
promote long-term projects through to completion and a lack of incentive to do so. Finally, when it 
came to external representation, there was a growing confusion resulting from the multiplicity of 
actors. 
In theory, the High Representative of the EU represented the Community in all international 
negotiations on matters covered by the EU Treaty. Yet, in the CFSP, it was the member state holding 
the Presidency that represented the Union in all matters of foreign and security policy. This split in the 
external representation of the EU created the danger of mixed or missed messages. One could have 
argued that, contrary to its aspirations, the CFSP not only replicated the inter-governmentalism of the 
EPC which led to lowest-common-denominator policy-making, but actually aggravated it by 
introducing new, or enhancing existing, actors‘ roles, and by making the mechanisms for policy-
making more complex and fraught with internal contradictions. 
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Figure 2: The Institutional Structure of the CFSP from 1993 to 2000 
 
 
Sources: Social Europe: the Journal of the European Left Summer/Autumn 2000 
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Figure 3: The Responsibilities and Functions of the CFSP’s Institutions and Actors  
 
 
 
2.4 The Lisbon Treaty and the Creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS)  
Although this thesis is specifically concerned with European foreign policy making towards the OPTs 
and the Palestinians during the post-1993 period and concluding in early 2009, it is worth examining 
the more recent developments in EU foreign policy making which have been manifested in the Lisbon 
Treaty, which came into force on 1 December 2009. The ―ill structured‖ complex decision-making, 
multiplicity of actors, imbalance of power between legislative power and the executive power of the 
pillar structure of the EU and inability of its CFSP mechanism to tackle in an efficient, effective, 
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coherent and consistent manner the global challenges, such as globalisation, migration and 
demographic changes, security threat, energy, and international economic crisis prompted the member 
states to reform EU institutional structure especially its foreign affairs structure.
325
 These efforts 
culminated in The Treaty of Lisbon (initially known as the Reform Treaty) which was signed by 
the EU member states on 13 December 2007, and entered into force on the first of December 2009. 
The treaty came to complete the reforming process that started by the previous treaties of 
Amsterdam and Nice. The main aim of the treaty was for ―enhancing the efficiency and democratic 
legitimacy of the Union and to improving the coherence of its action.‖ 326 In an attempt to offer 
greater coherence, the Lisbon Treaty introduced some innovations aimed at harmonising and 
increasing the efficiency of the EU‘s institutional architecture and mainly the external action, the 
treaty undyingly dismantled the EU‘s pillars. Instead, it created; (1) The President of the European 
Council (a renewable two and a half-year term which aimed to eliminate the lack of continuity which 
was inherent within the six-month rotating presidency system, and (2) The High Representative (HR) 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (a five-year term). 
The HR also was the Vice-President of the European Commission, conducted the CFSP and was the 
president and chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Council. Their main responsibility was to ensure the 
consistency and coordination of the European Union's external action. In November 2009, the 
European Council agreed that its first president under the Lisbon Treaty would be Herman Van 
Rompuy and in the same month the European Council appointed Catherine Ashton by a qualified 
majority to the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The  
Lisbon Treaty also created the European External Action Service (EEAS) which contained members 
and staff from the General Secretariat of the Council and the Diplomatic Services of EU Member 
States, the European Commission and which acted as the EU‘s ―ministry of foreign affairs‖. 327 
2.4.1  The Responsibilities of the President of the European Council 
The treaty of Lisbon had changed the competences of the Presidency of the European Council. The 
Treaty gave the President of the Council, who was elected by the members of the European Council 
and who served for a maximum of five years, a variety of new duties, including chairing the Council 
meetings and ensuring the preparation and continuity of the Council‘s work in cooperation with the 
President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council.
328
 The 
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President was instructed by the Treaty to ―endeavour to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the 
European Council‖ and to present a report to the EP after each of the Council‘s meetings.329 Finally 
―without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative‖, the treaty emphasised that the 
president‘s role was to ―ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its 
CFSP.‖330This marked a change from the previous system where Member States, holding the six-
month EU Presidency, also chaired the European Council Summits.  For example, these sumits were 
now chaired by the President of the Council, not by the leader of the member state, in the rotating 
presidency. The latter also did not preside over meetings of the European Council, which quarterly 
and was responsible for providing the EU with general political directions and priorities. The aim of 
creating the new President of the European Council was to make the EU‘s actions more visible and 
consistent. 
2.4.2  The Role of the High Representative in the European External Action Service 
 The new position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
combined the previous two posts of the High Representative (previously Javier Solana) and the 
Commissioner for External Action (previously Benita Ferrero Waldner). The new position played a 
key role in the formulation, preparation and implementation of the CFSP.
331
  According to the treaty, 
the job-holder; (1) ―conducts the Union's common foreign and security policy‖ 332; (2) ―contributes by 
her proposals to the development of that policy, which she will carry out as mandated by the Council, 
and ensures implementation of the decisions adopted in this field.‖ The HR shared the right to make 
proposals with the member states.
333
 That meant that this person had a major role in shaping the 
external agenda of the EU and its priorities, as well as in structuring debates and brokering a 
consensus; (3), as one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission, the HR was also meant to ―ensure 
the consistency of the Union's external action‖. Thus, according to the treaty, the HR was to be 
―responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for 
coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action‖; (4) represented the Union on matters 
relating to the CFSP; (5) conducted political dialogue with third parties on the Union's behalf and 
expressed the Union's position in international organisations and at international conferences. Finally, 
the HR ―exercises authority over the European External Action Service and over the Union 
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delegations in third countries and at international organisations.‖334  
2.4.3  European External Action Service (EEAS) 
In order to build coherence and consistency in the CFSP mechanism and the EU‘s external affairs, the 
Lisbon Treaty established the European External Action Service (EEAS) which aimed to assist the 
HR in fulfilling her mandate.
335
 The EEAS is under the authority of the HR and was separated from 
the Commission and the Council Secretariat, having autonomy in terms of its administrative budget 
and the management of staff‖.336 The EEAS included members from Departments of the General 
Secretariat of the Council, of the Commission and of the national diplomatic services of the Member 
States. According to the guidelines for the European External Action Service, adopted by the 
European Council in October 2009, recruitment is based on merit, ―with the objective of securing the 
services of staff of the highest standard of ability, efficiency and integrity, while ensuring adequate 
geographical balance‖.337  
The main responsibility of the EEAS is to work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the 
Member States to ―prepare policy proposals and implement them after their approval by Council‖.338 
It is also designated to help the President of the European Council and the President as well as the 
Members of the Commission in their respective functions in the area of external relations to ensure 
close cooperation with the member states. In addition, as a way to help the HR and the President of 
the European Council, the treaty established crisis management structures as part of the EEAS and 
under the direct authority and responsibility of the High Representative. Finally, according to the 
treaty, the Commission's delegations ―will become Union delegations under the authority of the High 
Representative and will be part of the EEAS structure‖.339 
2.4.4 Differences between the Lisbon Treaty and the Rest of the EU Treaties  
 Giving the EU a ―legal personality‖ was one of the most advanced developments that the Lisbon 
treaty introduced. This would have theoretically allowed the EU to conduct international agreements 
in all area of competence and would enhance the EU‘s external capabilities.340  Nonetheless, in terms 
of the decision-making processes and mechanisms, the Lisbon Treaty had not really changed all that 
much. The formulation of general policy directions and objectives for the CFSP was still in the hands 
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of the European Council - of heads of state or governments of the member states. In addition, both the 
European Council and the Council of Ministers acted largely by unanimity, except where specifically 
provided otherwise, limiting the capacity to over-rule the preferences of individual states.
341
 The 
treaty retained the right and the option of the member states to use "constructive abstention" in respect 
of both unanimous and qualified majority decisions in the CFSP.  It specified the cases in which the 
Council of Ministers may have made  decisions by qualified majority as being only where a decision 
would have: (1) define[d] an action or position on the basis of a European Council decision regarding 
the Union's strategic interests or objectives; (2) define[d] an action or position on the basis of a 
proposal made by the High Representative "following a specific request from the European Council, 
made on its own initiative or that of the High Representative"; (3) implement a decision defining an 
action or position; or appoint an EU special representative.
342
  
Nor had the role of the EP in CFSP matters been substantially modified (and thus the treaty did not 
increase the democratic scrutiny over CFSP). Under the previous CFSP, the EP was to be informed of 
the direction and policy of European foreign policy.  However, the new treaty had given the EP a very 
limited power over the CFSP. Firstly, the High Representative of the CFSP had to inform the EP of 
the processes and direction of the CFSP, a task previously belonging to the European Commission 
and the European Council. In addition, the European Parliament's consent was required in the 
appointment of the HR.
343
 Also; the treaty had increased the frequency of debates within the EP on 
CFSP matters to be bi-annually instead of annually. The communication between the EP and the HR 
was not limited to the direction of the CFSP but also included the administrative and operating 
expenditures of the CFSP which, according to Wolfgang Wessels and Franziska Bopp, gave the EP 
some kind of influence via the budgetary procedure.
344
 However, these were all marginal gains: 
Whitman argued that the CFSP remained ―a distinctive pillar‖ with the roles of the Commission, 
European Court of Justice and the EP remaining very heavily circumscribed‖.345  Although the ECJ in 
particular had no jurisdiction over the CFSP provisions,
346
 it did not have powers to bring rulings 
against member states which may have violated CFSP acts and neither could the Council or the High 
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Representative sanction member states in any formal way.
347
 However, a numbers of scholars 
believed that the veto power over the budget of the new European External Action Service (EEAS), 
and its approval for the personal appointment of the EESA, might have enhanced the European 
parliament‘s role and power to a degree, especially when it pertained to ―denouncing human rights 
violations in the EU‘s neighbourhood.‖348  
By contrast, looking at the balance of power under the under Lisbon Treaty, it could be argued that 
the European Commission‘s role had been weakened in favour of the High Representative. Firstly, 
most of the references to the Commission were removed.  For a start, it had lost its right to be ―fully 
associated‖ with the CFSP.349 In fact, the Lisbon Treaty went further and stripped the European 
Commission of the right of initiative to refer CFSP matters to the Council and to make CFSP-related 
proposals.
 350 
Under the Lisbon Treaty, this right had been passed to member states who retained their 
existing right to submit CFSP proposals and to the new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, who would have been the Commission‘s Vice-President. 
Secondly, the Commission had lost its role as the contact between the Council and the EP, being 
replaced by the High Representative. Finally, although the EEAS had geographical desks dealing with 
the candidate countries, from the overall foreign policy perspective, the European Commission was to 
deal dealing with the enlargement file. Besides, the European Commission would also have retained 
the responsibility of the Commission Trade and the Development Policy as defined by the Treaty, and 
should have remained the responsibility of relevant Commissioners and DGs of the Commission.
351
 
The role of the president of the European Council had been extended to include chairing the meetings 
of the Council, preparing reports for the EP after each European Council meeting, and being the main 
‗spokesperson‘ of the EU in all matters of international interest.  However, the role of the president 
faced several challenges.  Firstly, the President still had to cope with the rotating Council presidency. 
Secondly, there were overlapping responsibilities with other EU personnel, such as the HR and 
especially in right of representing and open dialogue with the European partners.
352
 That meant the 
Union‘s external representation would be ‗shared‘ between these two institutions in everyday practice, 
which meant that the EU would have multi players and representation. This was seen in their 
overlapping responsibilities in relation to the European Parliament, with both the president and the 
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HR being responsible for keeping Parliament informed about developments in the CFSP. 
 
The nature of the  president‘s  mandate was itself problematic: his/her responsibility was to promote 
consensus among the EU leaders while at the same time he /she had to be influential enough to ‗steer‘ 
the Union and ensure member states‘ implementation of their political promises. In their assessments 
of his position,  Wessels and Bopp argued that  this position ―move[d] between two extreme positions: 
one the one hand, a merely coordinating  chairperson with representative functions, and on  the other, 
a kind of strong ‗President of Europe‘ or ‗Mr/Ms Europe‘, seen to represent the Union in its role in 
the international system.‖353  
In sum, the CFSP remained essentially an intergovernmental affair despite the efforts of the Lisbon 
Treaty to create a coherent and unified European voice, with a mechanism to match.
354
 Differences 
between the Lisbon Treaty and the Rest of the EU Treaties  
 Giving the EU a ―legal personality‖ is one of the most advanced developments that the Lisbon treaty 
introduced. This will allow the EU to conduct international agreements in all area of competence and 
will enhance the EU‘s external capabilities.355Nonetheless, in terms of the decision-making processes 
and mechanisms, the Lisbon Treaty has not really changed all that much. The formulation of general 
policy directions and objectives for the CFSP is still in the hands of the European Council - of heads 
of state or governments of the member states. In addition, both the European Council and the Council 
of Ministers act largely by unanimity, except where specifically provided otherwise, limiting the 
capacity to over-rule the preferences of individual states.
356
 The treaty kept the right and the option of 
the member states to use "constructive abstention" in respect of both unanimous and qualified 
majority decisions in the CFSP. It  specifies the cases in which the Council of Ministers may make  
decisions by qualified majority as being only where a decision would; (1) define an action or position 
on the basis of a European Council decision regarding the Union's strategic interests or objectives, (2) 
define an action or position on the basis of a proposal made by the High Representative "following a 
specific request from the European Council, made on its own initiative or that of the High 
Representative", or (3) implement a decision defining an action or position; or appoint an EU special 
representative.
357
  
The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) existed only until 2009 when it also 
split, leaving a Foreign Affairs Council, on the one hand, and the General Affairs Council, on the 
other. The General Affairs Council deals with dossiers that affect more than one of the EU's policies, 
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such as negotiations on EU enlargement, preparation of the EU's multi–annual budgetary 
perspective or institutional and administrative issues. In addition, the General Affairs Council co–
ordinates preparation for and follow-up to meetings of the European Council.
358
 It also exercises a 
role in co–ordinating work on different policy areas carried out by the Councils other configurations, 
and handles any dossier entrusted to it by the European Council. The The Foreign Affairs 
Council meets once a month. Its Meetings bring together the Foreign Ministers of the Member States 
responsible for European Affairs, Defence, Development or Trade also participate depending on the 
items on agenda.  The configuration is unique in that chaired by the High Representative rather than 
the Presidency of the Council of the European Union.
359
 
Nor has the role of the EP in CFSP matters been substantially modified (and thus the treaty did not 
increase the democratic scrutiny over CFSP). Under the previous CFSP the EP was to be informed of 
the direction and policy of European foreign policy However, the new treaty has given the EP a very 
limited power over the CFSP. Firstly, the High Representative of the CFSP has to inform the EP of 
the processes and direction of the CFSP, a task previously belonging to the European Commission 
and the European Council. In addition, the European Parliament's consent is required in the 
appointment of the HR.
360
 Also, the treaty has increased the frequency of debates within the EP on 
CFSP matters; now twice instead of once per year. The communication between the EP and the HR is 
not limited to the direction of the CFSP but also includes the administrative and operating 
expenditures of the CFSP which, according to Wolfgang Wessels and Franziska Bopp, gives the EP 
some kind of influence via the budgetary procedure.
361
 However, these are marginal gains: Whitman 
argues that the CFSP remains ―a distinctive pillar‖ with the roles of the Commission, European Court 
of Justice and the EP remaining very heavily circumscribed‖.362  Although the ECJ in particular has 
no jurisdiction over the CFSP provisions,
363
 it does not have powers to bring rulings against member 
states which may violate CFSP acts and neither can the Council or the High Representative sanction 
member states in any formal way.
364
 However, a numbers of scholars believe that the veto power over 
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the budget of the new European External Action Service (EEAS), and its approval for the personal 
appointment of the EESA, might enhance the European parliament‘s role and power to a degree, 
especially when it comes to ―denouncing human rights violations in the EU‘s neighbourhood.‖365  
By contrast, looking at the balance of power under the under Lisbon Treaty, it could be argued that 
the European Commission‘s role has been weakened in favour of the High Representative. Firstly, 
most of the references to the Commission are removed.  For a start, it has lost its right to be ―fully 
associated‖ with the CFSP.366 In fact the Lisbon Treaty went further and stripped the European 
Commission of the right of initiative to refer CFSP matters to the Council and to make CFSP-related 
proposals.
 367 
Under  the Lisbon Treaty, this right has been passed to member states who retain their 
existing right to submit CFSP proposals and to the new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, who would be Commission‘s Vice-President. 
Secondly, the Commission has lost its role as the contact between the Council and the EP, being 
replaced by the High Representative. Finally, although the EEAS will have geographical desks 
dealing with the candidate countries, from the overall foreign policy perspective, the European 
Commission will be in charge dealing with the enlargement file. Beside, the European Commission 
will retain the responsibility of the Commission Trade and the Development Policy as defined by the 
Treaty, should remain the responsibility of relevant Commissioners and DGs of the Commission.
368
 
 
The role of the president of the European Council has been extended to include chairing the meetings 
of the Council, preparing a report for the EP after each European Council meeting, and being the main 
‗spokesperson‘ of the EU in all matters of international interest. However the role of the president 
faces several challenges.  Firstly, the President still has to cope with the rotating Council presidency. 
Secondly, the overlap responsibilities with other EU personnel such as the HR especially in right of 
representing and open dialogue with the European partners.
369
 That means the Union‘s external 
representation will be ‗shared‘ between these two institutions in everyday practice, which  mean that 
in the EU will have in the same problems as before- i.e. multi players and representation- ―in the 
future the EU might then have at least ‗two telephone numbers.‖370 This is seen in their overlapping 
responsibilities in relation to the European Parliament, with both the president and the HR being 
responsible for keeping Parliament informed about developments in the CFSP. 
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The nature of the  president‘s  mandate is itself problematic: his/her responsibility is to promote 
consensus among the EU leaders while at the same time he /she has to be influential enough to ‗steer‘ 
the Union and ensure member states‘ implementation of their political promises. In their assessments 
of his position,  Wessels and Bopp argue that  this position ―moves between two extreme positions: 
one the one hand, a merely coordinating  chairperson with representative functions, and on  the other, 
a kind of strong ‗President of Europe‘ or ‗Mr/Ms Europe‘, seen to represent the Union in its role in 
the international system.‖371 In sum, the CFSP remains essentially an intergovernmental affair despite 
the efforts of the Lisbon Treaty to create a coherent and unified European voice, with a mechanism to 
match.
372
  
2.5 Conclusion  
The ‗story‘ of the evolution of common foreign policy mechanisms offered above suggests that the 
early effort at constructing a common foreign policy (the EPC) was something of a political ―spill-
over‖ from the economic integration process. However, member states remained fundamentally 
unwilling to surrender meaningful sovereignty to the process so the EPC remained dominated by 
inter-governmentalist processes and mechanisms and outside of the EC itself. Realist propositions that 
member states engage in collective organisations in order to promote their own national self-interest 
on a rational basis seem to best explain this.  
However, the EPC proved to be paralysed by this structure, unable to respond effectively to its 
international environment or to move beyond declaratory policy due to a lack of both tools and 
political will. As the European Community developed, however, and interaction progressed in the 
economic sphere and in terms of the competences of its institutions (specifically the Commission), 
supranationalist efforts were made to overcome these structural weaknesses, leading to the CFSP. 
The CFSP was one of the pillars of the EU, but again separated it from the European Community as 
member states resisted the erosion of their national ―veto‖ power. Whilst the CFSP allowed for some 
development of supranationalist foreign policy-making, not least because it relied on supranationalist 
institutions like the Commission to actually implement its policies,  this was continually constrained 
by the still inter-governmentalist nature of the CFSP mechanisms themselves. The CFSP mechanism 
consequently resulted in a multifaceted process of convoluted interactions between many actors, 
including the member states and the European institutions through a complex of hierarchical and 
horizontal institutional forms. It developed a hybrid institutional structure with an ambiguous 
distribution of roles and instruments. Since the EU decision makers and legislators had managed to 
design the institutional structures and the mechanisms of the CFSP to function in a manner that 
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continued to protect the member states‘ interests, the efforts of the Commission were ultimately able 
to gain sufficient traction to overcome the deficiencies of intergovernmentalism. When member states 
were in agreement over a policy, supranationalist dynamics were stronger, but when member states 
differed significantly on policies, the supranationalist dynamic was impeded.  
The Lisbon Treaty represents the latest effort to improve the institutional coherence of the CFSP and 
to create a single voice for Europe. But whilst the creation of specific foreign policy making 
institutions like the EEAS suggest a revival of the supranationalist dynamic, the Commission has in 
effect once more been subordinated to a set of structures which preserve the fundamental 
intergovernmentalism of policy-making. The EU members are still trying to have their cake and eat it: 
to have collective policy institutions but to retain their sovereignty and self-interests. The mechanisms 
themselves ultimately give the winning hand to the latter.  
This ―realist‖ interpretation needs some qualifying, however. The ―story‖ also shows that the 
institutions of the EU, particularly the Commission and the Parliament, have developed ―lives of their 
own‖ and have sought to exert supranationalist influences which, at times, have had some successes. 
Moreover, there is a ―feedback loop‖ in so far as the interests of member states have become 
progressively redefined over time to take account of what can be gained from proactive membership 
of the EU and from bargaining or negotiating their interests. For example, the extended rotating 
Presidency gives member states a vested interest in making the CFSP a meaningful institution, even 
as they themselves might undermine it when the rotation goes against their own interests. 
Constructivist approaches to international relations can inform our understanding of this process, 
which can be understood in terms of the evolving ―European‖ identities of member states, even as 
they simultaneously exhibit, divergent national or even transatlantic identities. Member states‘ 
interests have therefore to be considered as non-static, as evolutionary and fluid, with membership of 
the collective foreign policy-making community itself shaping their individual understandings of what 
best suits them. 
Nonetheless, as this chapter shows, despite the wave of reforms and calls to strengthen the EU 
institutions, the member states have not given up their sovereign rights to any new supranational 
institution, such as the Commission, that could potentially act above and beyond their own national 
interests. Therefore, although intergovernmentalism and supranationalism are both represented in the 
CFSP, intergovernmentalism ultimately still prevails within the CFSP. Even worse, at times the 
mechanisms have actually contributed to the exacerbation of the differences between the member 
states‘ interests, as the opportunities to exploit the flaws, duplications, and ambiguities of the process 
allow national interests to be advanced at the expense of the CFSP. 
 82 
 
Chapter Three: From the Global Mediterranean Policy to the Union for the Mediterranean: 
The EEC/EU Regional Mediterranean Policies  
3.1 Introduction 
 
The Arab World, the wider Middle East and the Israel-Arab conflict have occupied prominent 
positions on the agenda of Europe and its institutions for as long as the latter has existed. From the 
1970s until the present day, the EEC and its successor, the EU, have been trying to strengthen 
relations with their neighbours in the Mediterranean basin.  In fact, European regional initiatives have 
developed in parallel with the institutional development of the EEC/EU itself. As pointed out in the 
introduction to this thesis, the proximity of the two regions, and their economic, political, security and 
cultural linkages, make this a region that Europe cannot ignore. 
This chapter examines the main European initiatives towards the region, including the Global 
Mediterranean Policy in the 1970s, the Renovated Mediterranean Policy at the end of 1980s, the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership in the 1990s, the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004, and finally the 
Union for the Mediterranean policy in 2009.  It does so for two reasons: to elaborate on the intra-
regional context within which European policy towards OPTs and the Palestinians was formulated, 
and to demonstrate how this context was itself the product of the fundamentally realist international 
relations of the EEC/EU outlined in the previous chapter.  
The main aim is to draw a picture of the EU decision-making process and mechanisms towards the 
region  by answering three questions: how did  the EU ―make‖ its foreign policy towards the region 
(through what institutions and mechanisms and to what ends?); how were EEC/ EU policies towards 
the Mediterranean region formulated  (with what objectives, under what constraints and with what 
impact?); and what did the making of EU policy towards the Mediterranean reveal about the context 
of the EU–Palestinian relationship?  
3.2 The Global Mediterranean Policy (1972-1989) 
In October 1972, the Heads of Government of the EEC at the Paris summit adopted the principle of a 
Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) towards all Mediterranean countries from Spain to Turkey.
373
 
The new initiative was considered by observers to be the first unified attempt by the EEC since it was 
established to develop a comprehensive policy framework for the Mediterranean
 
basin.
374
 It might also 
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be considered as the first sustainable ―economic diplomacy of the EEC towards the region.‖375  
Of course, there already existed several economic agreements between the EEC, and a number of 
Southern Mediterranean states before this project, but most of these agreements were limited, and 
lacked a comprehensive vision and strategy. Thus, the GMP might be considered to be the first 
successful attempt by the EEC at a self-styled foreign policy.
376
  
According to Bicchi, the first phase of the Mediterranean policy of the EEC had, until that point, been 
characterised by a case-by-case approach towards the Southern Mediterranean, resulting in a variety 
of bilateral agreements.
377
 These took a variety of formats, ranging from unlimited association with 
Greece (1961) and Turkey (1963); to limited associations with Tunisia (1969), Morocco (1969), Malta 
(1970), and Cyprus (1972); non-preferential trade agreement with countries like Israel (1946), 
Lebanon (1965), and Yugoslavia (1970); arrangements involving unilateral trade concessions such as 
those with Spain (1970) and Egypt (1972); or reciprocal concessions like the second agreement with 
Israel (1970). Ultimately, most of these agreements looked like temporary, if not extemporaneous, 
responses to local trade problems.
378
 Indeed, while the Community had concluded agreements with 
twelve of the seventeen countries in the area by 1971,
379
 according to Bicchi, the Mediterranean 
region still ―ranked low on the EEC agenda, and the EEC tackled the problems coming from the 
region as they arose.‖380 She added that each problem from this region was ―examined individually 
and was given a different solution.‖ She attributed this to the European preoccupation with Cold War 
tensions and their consequent inability or unwillingness to redefine Europe‘s role in the international 
politics. She argued that the EEC adopted a low profile in the Mediterranean to avoid any threat of 
confrontation, seeking only to ―neutralise Soviet influence in the area and stabilise political regimes 
against possible Soviet infiltrations or take-overs.‖381  
However, by the mid-1960s the international situation was already beginning to change, with a 
reduction in the tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which allowed the EEC members to 
begin defining and subsequently protecting their own economic interests through a second wave of 
preferential association agreements with non-members of the Mediterranean
 
region. Between 1969 
and 1972, the EEC signed several agreements with states such as Morocco, Tunisia, Spain, Israel, 
Malta, Cyprus and Egypt. They were granted free access for their exports of industrial products and 
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some concessions for their agricultural exports.
382
 However, although the European Community 
began to strengthen its relations with its southern neighbours, the Cold War continued to constrain its 
vision and that of its members.
383
  
Moreover, as Bicchi pointed out, the Community lacked ―policy entrepreneurship‖ to initiate a more 
proactive collective approach. The European Commission did not show any interest in playing this 
role and the the Council of the European Union was victim to the exceptional interests of member 
states. In this environment, domestic lobbies within member states were able to exert significant 
influence, an example being the strong Italian opposition - based on the interests of its own domestic 
citrus-producers - to a cut in the common external tariff on all imports of oranges.
384
  
As chapter two demonstrated at the 1969 Hague Summit, EEC leaders agreed to harmonise their 
foreign policy through the EPC mechanism and negotiations for a Global Mediterranean Policy 
(GMP) started shortly thereafter. At the Paris summit in 1972, the EEC leaders instructed the 
European Commission to resolve to ensure an overall and ―balanced handling of the Community‘s 
relations with Mediterranean third countries, and instructed the Commission to review the Association 
Agreements with non-members of the Mediterranean basin‖.385 In September 1972, the European 
Commission responded to the EEC leaders by proposing the Global Mediterranean Policy. It involved 
all the non-EEC member Mediterranean countries except Libya and Albania. 
 The new project was not regional, but bilateral, and the agreements offered within it were quite 
different from each other. However, the EEC offered all its partners in the Mediterranean basin new 
Co-operation Agreements except Greece and Turkey, which maintained their previous Association 
Agreements.
386
 The EEC signed the first GMP agreement with Israel in 1975, then with Morocco, 
Algeria, and Tunisia in 1976 and with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria in 1977. These Co-operation 
Agreements included components dealing with trade relations, financial and economic cooperation, 
and - for the first time - social co-operation such as provisions aiming to improve the standard of 
living of immigrant workers from North Africa and Turkey who were living in the EEC states.
387
  
The main aim of the GMP was to create a ―free trade areas covering the EEC and the Mediterranean 
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littoral.‖388 Through these areas, the EEC partners would be able to overcome the boundaries of their 
internal markets and persuade growth; accordingly the GMP members would have free trade areas for 
their own industrial goods with some notable exceptions such as textiles and concessions in the 
agricultural field in order to avoid interference with the Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC. 
According to GMP provisions the EEC was ―to lower its tariffs to imports of industrial goods and 
then phase them out by January 1977.‖389  
The trade provisions were supported by financial protocols. Under the pressure from the European 
Commission the EEC included several measures to help the GMP partners mainly to the relatively 
less developed countries of the area. Through a various forms: grants, European Investment Bank 
loans ―at lower market interest rates and Commission loans at a 1% interest rate‖.390 In addition, the 
financial protocols of the GMP addressed technological transfers, workers‘ training and financial 
cooperation.
391
 Finally, in order to assess the progress and the evaluations of the GMP, the EEC 
established bilateral cooperation councils and committees with every participating Mediterranean 
country.
392
 
3.2.1  The Global Mediterranean Policy: Economics and/or Security 
How can we explain this apparent shift towards an EEC desire to harmonise foreign policy towards 
the Mediterranean?  
The security dimension, and its relevance in the ongoing, if slightly less immediate, Cold War tussle, 
was evident when Italy circulated a document on the Mediterranean, in which it stressed Soviet 
penetration in the era through non-military means. The Italian document emphasised the way in which 
not only the Arab–Israeli conflict, but also economic underdevelopment, represented avenues for the 
USSR to exploit regional tensions. Italy thus stressed the necessity of trying to ease the social and 
economic problems in a region of undoubted importance to the western camp in the context of the 
Cold War.
393
 
The 1967 Arab-Israeli war had highlighted not only the Cold War significance of the region, but also 
its economic value as a source of oil and other raw materials.
394
 Not only did the Mediterranean 
region include some of the main producers of oil, but also a substantial part of Middle East oil was - 
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and is - transported along its shipping routes.
395
 Statistics show that in 1974, 18.5 per cent of the EEC 
member‘s crude oil imports came from the Mediterranean, of which 64.8 per cent came from Libya 
and another 27.7 per cent from Algeria.
396
 
Moreover, in terms of trade, the Mediterranean countries were becoming increasingly connected to 
the EEC.  In 1960, the Mediterranean non-member states as a group (including Spain and Portugal) 
absorbed over 15 per cent of community exports.  In turn, 60 per cent of exports of Mediterranean 
third countries went to the community, South-North trade being dominated by the agricultural and 
energy sectors.
397
  By 1974, 9.2 per cent of all EEC exports, including intra-Community trade, ended 
up in Mediterranean countries. This was of the same importance as the whole of the North American 
market plus Japan.
398
 Spain, Yugoslavia and Greece absorbed as much as 42.8 per cent of all EEC 
exports to the Mediterranean.
399
 In return, an average of more than 50 per cent of all Mediterranean 
exports was destined for the Community.
400
 Thus, extending associationism to the Mediterranean 
region appeared to be a natural move for the EEC. It would deepen markets for European goods while 
offering markets (and income) for poorer neighbours, enhancing their security and stability and 
reducing any inclination to turn ‗East‘ for inspiration. 
Germany and Belgium openly supported the document.  Italy then proposed the creation of a working 
group within the EPC framework devoted to the problems of the Mediterranean.
401
 Subsequently, in 
February 1971, Andre Rossi wrote a report and presented it to the European Commission and the EEC 
member states suggesting ―formulation of an overall scheme of principles governing relations with 
Mediterranean non-members countries.‖402 However, disagreement among the EP members and 
among the European Commissioners over the best approach contributed to neglect of the report.  
The German Commissioner for External Relations, Ralf Dahrendorf, defended the mosaic 
approach, which prevailed in the 1960s as the best way to address different partners, while the 
Jean-François Deniau Commission for Developing Countries was: ―more favourable to 
holistic solution.‖403 This early set-back in the face of a lack of shared vision could not, 
however, hold back the tide of shared security concerns. 
 In her analysis of the GMP, Bicchi found that the security concerns of members were 
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ultimately sufficient to trigger the EEC into developing a common initiative for the 
Mediterranean. Faced by a number of arising challenges, the members were confronted by 
what she termed ―cognitive uncertainty,‖ a lack of information, knowledge, and experience, 
which forced them into devising new initiatives and in effect to opening a policy window.‖404 
Specific events included the Munich operation in September 1972 when a group of 
Palestinian fighters broke into the Israeli area in the Olympic Village in Munich, killing nine 
Israeli athletes. The Arab-Israeli conflict had now moved onto European soil, with an 
enormous impact on the European perceptions of security and creating a direct connection 
between the domestic arena of western European countries and the Middle East.
405
 
According to Bicchi, over the period 1968-1972, Palestinian attacks on European cities quickly 
―escalated from the private sphere, involving criminal means and policing measure to the security 
area, demanding emergency measures, and passing through an intermediate stage of politicisation.”406 
This was compounded in 1973 with the oil shock crisis. In an environment of sudden and significant 
uncertainty, the EEC was impelled to search for new information about their southern neighbours and 
new policy solutions; they were, as she put it, ―cognitively motivated‖ to explore a window of 
opportunity to rethink relations with the Mediterranean and the Arab world.‖407 For Bicchi, what had 
begun as an economic relationship in the late 1960s had rapidly become a security issue.  
Immigration also played an important role in driving forward the GPM since most of the immigrant 
workers in the Community came from the Mediterranean basin. According to statistics there were 
about 6.5 million foreign workers in the EEC countries in 1974. These labours contributed to the 
economic growth of the European Community, which was facing a labour shortage.
408
 But how to 
deal with the migrants was a contentious question, particularly for those countries which were the 
largest migrant destinations and none more so than France. 
France has had a long colonial history in the Southern Mediterranean, and its on-going legacies 
included not just cultural and linguistic links, but also deep economic ties, particularly with North 
Africa. These were so important to France that it had insisted on including a special protocol in The 
Treaty of Rome allowing it to keep its special relations with its former colonies, Morocco, Tunisia 
and Algeria.  These included special trade ties: during the 1960s France ―accounted for 40 per cent of 
exports to the Maghreb and received around 45 per cent of Maghrebi imports to the community, 
benefiting from its strong commercial presence in the region though a mixture of private and public 
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investment.‖409 Finally, France‘s rapid economic growth in the 1960s meant a growing demand for 
North African labour.
410
 Thus France was particularly eager to drive foreign policy towards the region 
forward.  
French enthusiasm for a GMP further reflected a desire to strengthen its own, and Europe‘s, position 
on the international stage, and to gain the ―international recognition of its big power statutes,‖411 in 
other words, to build policy independent from the two superpowers.  French diplomacy under 
Pompidou utilised the Mediterranean card to consolidate the French self-image after de Gaule‘s 
departure, not just on the international level, but also on the European community level.
412
 Setting 
Franco-Mediterranean relations on a firmer footing was to be the springboard for France‘s quest for 
international recognition.
413
 Supporting the European Community policy towards the Mediterranean 
basin was considered to also be a way to balance the Ostpolitik policy of Germany which aimed to 
develop and reconcile relations between Eastern and Western Europe. 
414
 
France may then be understood to be a ―policy entrepreneur‖ of the GMP, making use of a policy 
window created by the collective need to respond to new, largely security, challenges. But France was 
not the only player. Other EEC members had also tried to take the GMP in directions that served their 
own interests. While states like Belgium, which had relatively few connections to the Southern 
Mediterranean states, were reluctant to endorse the generous financial support proposed for packages 
like that offered to Spain, others like Italy - geographically proximate to the non-members and 
concerned with the political consequences of their underdevelopment - sought to ensure that the costs 
of supporting association packages were evenly spread among EEC members;
 415
   
―The number of trade concessions (by southern European countries) was to be 
equated to the amount of aid provided (by northern European countries), in order to 
distribute the GMP‘s cost among all member states.‖ 416 
The United Kingdom meanwhile expressed objections to free trade with the Mediterranean non-
members, hesitant to accept the idea without first consulting the U.S. During the preparation stage of 
the GMP, the U.S had expressed its fears that the GMP was both an indication of Europe‘s desire to 
create a ―third pole‖ and meant that the EEC would effectively be excluding the U.S‘s own 
products.
417
 Thus, the UK was pushing for pre-consultation with the U.S before the Community took 
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any final decisions.
418
 The Germans and the Dutch, however, supported the French proposals; not 
least, they sought to include Israel in the GMP. 
419
  
The EEC institutions also played an important role in the GMP. The report prepared by French 
member of the EP Andre Rossi, was the foundation of the GMP policy, and June 1972 the EP 
parliament supported the French proposal for a jointly agreed set of rules and policies towards the 
Mediterranean non-members.
420
Notwithstanding the intergovernmental nature of the GMP, the 
European Commission played a role in its design and implementation.  In addition to negotiating the 
agreements with the EEC partners, under the supervision of the Council, the Commission began to set 
the agenda of the GMP. It  insisted that that the free circulation of goods alone would not promote 
development in the region, and that the GMP should also include provisions on capital movements, 
technology transfers, technical cooperation, labour, environmental and financial cooperation.
421
 
It thus endorsed the view that the EEC members should shoulder part of the burden of economic 
development through providing aid to partners.
422
 The Commission managed to lobby the member 
states to expand the scope of goods addressed by the GMP agreements, stressing the importance of 
financial cooperation, ―to spark economic development.‖423 It further promoted the idea that the long 
term aim of the GMP was a ―natural extension of European integration.‖424  
We can therefore conclude that the GMP served as an example of a complex decision-making 
situation, characterized by ongoing relations between multiple stake-holding actors.
425
 The initiative 
was driven by member states, responding to new collective security challenges in diverse ways which 
had to be negotiated through inter-governmental mechanisms. At the same time, however, the 
decision–makers of the European Community relied on their economic instruments to deal with these 
challenges.
426
 What looked at first like a liberal institutionalist trade expansion was in fact motivated 
by self-interested security concerns. 
But whilst this supported a realist interpretation of the logic of the GMP, one also had to recognise the 
non-state actors involved in the process:  the European Parliament, which sparked the debate about 
the Mediterranean, the Commission which then drafted and altered the GMP proposal,  insisting on 
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aid and development to partner states, shifting power towards itself and establishing an agenda which 
went beyond the initial aspirations of the member states, and finally the importance of domestic 
lobbies on shaping brief study of  the collective foreign policy making of the EEC during the GMP 
preparations.  This supports the conclusion of the previous chapter that this was a process that ccannot 
be captured entirely by static models of decision-making processes. The policy process comprised 
several tiers of authority i.e. the European, the national and sub national, albeit that the national 
governments remained the most important sites of authority, and the inter-governmental mechanisms 
predominated in decision-making.  
3.2.2  The Limits of the GMP  
As explained above, the main stated aim of the GMP was to create a free trade area between the EEC 
and the Mediterranean region. In fact, progress was severely limited.  Although it contributed to 
easing economic and even political relations on the ground, the GMP did not manage to boost the 
economic and trade relations between the regions, nor did it achieve its developmental ambitions. In 
fact, Mediterranean exports to the EEC did not increase significantly except in a few cases.
427
 This 
was the case for several reasons. First, the 1970s witnessed a period of ―recession and high inflation in 
Europe corroded the effective value of financial provisions.‖428 Moreover, according to Bicchi, there 
was: 
―A mismatch between the economies of scale approach embedded in the GMP, which 
suggested an export-led process of development and the prevailing approach to 
economic development among Arab Mediterranean countries, which relied on a 
strategy of import-substitution.‖429 
Ultimately, economic development ―lagged far behind rapid population expansion in the Magrherb, 
Mashreq and Turkey,‖ resulting in a significant drop in GDP per capital from 1974-1990.  In the EU 
the GDP per capital stood at 16,500 ECUs, while in the Maghreb and Mashreq countries it stood at 
least 1.500 ECUs.
430
 Second, there was a contradiction between its claims to be a  ―Global policy‖ and 
its actual limitation to trade and aid and to a geographically limited space.
431
 With so much room for 
ambiguity, the GMP soon became a victim of the differences between the member states visions and 
priorities on how to deal with the diverse states envisaged as partners, especially in relation to trade 
concessions, in the course of which the impetus for a Mediterranean-wide policy was lost. While 
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France was interested in a regional approach, Germany preferred a bilateral approach.
432
  
Moreover, as Gomez argues, although the new agreements of the GMP were ―more comprehensive‖ 
than the earlier trade agreements, nevertheless the fundamental guide of EEC‘s relations with the 
member states persisted on ―derogations‖ and ―protective measures when the interests of domestic 
producers where threatened.‖433While the EEC was concerned to assurance continuous supplies of oil 
and gas, it was thus was ―less keen to encourage the development of potentially competitive 
indigenous processing industries in the associate countries.‖434 Excluding the agriculture, petroleum 
and textile products coming from the North Africa and Arab states, the figures  showed that there was 
selectivity in the implanting the GMP which strengthened the argument that the GMP was biased and 
designed to protect European agricultural products.
435
  
The southern enlargement of the EEC to include Greece, Portugal and Spain put further limits on the 
GMP since they threatened to erode the value of preferences held by other Mediterranean countries as 
the EEC improved its own self-sufficiency.
436
 The accession of these countries meant that the EEC 
was first preoccupied with negotiations and then with assuring the development of its (largely 
agricultural) new members through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). EEC self-sufficiency in 
key areas of typical Mediterranean production went up to 100% for products such as tomatoes, 
potatoes and olive oil.
437
 
Finally, the creation of free trade areas implied that Mediterranean countries would do the same, but 
the issue of reciprocity was highly contentious. The U.S. put up fierce opposition to the creation of 
what could be seen as a Euro - Mediterranean trade bloc, while Mediterranean countries agreed in 
principle, and defected as soon as possible after the entry into force of the agreements.
438
 Thus there 
was a latent, and at times not so latent, opposition to the GMP on the part of theU.S.
439
 
3.3 The Renovated Mediterranean Policy (1989-1995) 
The 1980s thus saw declining European interest in the Mediterranean region for two reasons. Not only 
had interest shifted to the challenges of southern enlargement, but the Europeans ―fell back into 
traditional Cold War mindsets and behaviour‖ as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As the 
GMP produced few satisfactory outcomes, the Mediterranean members - Spain, Italy and France - 
were compelled to cooperate themselves in order to put the Mediterranean back on the European 
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agenda. 
440
  Based on a document entitled ―Redirection of the Community‘s Mediterranean Policy,‖ 
prepared and introduced by Spanish Commissioner Able Matutes to the Council and EP in 1989, 
which aimed at narrowing the prosperity gap between the European Community and the 
Mediterranean, the GMP was replaced In December 1990 by the Renovated Mediterranean Policy 
(RMP).  
The Matutes report linked development and prosperity in the MENA region with security in the 
European Community arguing that both are ―inseparable,‖441 an argument taken from Barry Buzan 
that ―economic underdevelopment and poverty were causal factors in the type of social disorder that 
might threaten the stability of failing states.‖442 The member states were forced to acknowledge that 
the poor economic performances of the majority of Mediterranean associates and their failure to meet 
the demand for jobs represented major threat to social stability which could overspill into the 
European mainland.
443
 Thus the resulting the RMP emphasised the problems of population growth, 
migration from the non-EU Mediterranean countries to the EU and the intra-regional income 
differences. Additionally the RMP emphasised the importance of human rights, with a new clause 
enabling the EP to freeze the budget of a financial protocol if serious human rights violations justify 
it.‖444  
According to Köhler, the RMP also added for the first time a ―regional cooperation and civil society 
cooperation dimension to a cooperation paradigm‖.445 The European Commission managed to 
convince the EEC members to increase the RMP budget for financial co-operation with the 
Mediterranean region.
446
Thus, 1.8 billion ECU was allocated for the conclusion of regional 
cooperation, out of which 500 million was designated for environmental protection.
447
 
The RMP represented an upgrade of Euro-Mediterranean relations, first in the increase of the aid 
budget which was three times higher than before.
448
 Second, it embodied several new conceptual 
developments such as, regional cooperation, civil society cooperation and human rights promotion, 
which later featured in the Barcelona process. Third, it promoted multilateral networks, decentralising 
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cooperation and promoting public/private partnerships.
449
 
 
In fact, for all these innovations, the achievements of the RMP were similarly limited. Under the RMP 
the trade agreements with the Mediterranean partners were left untouched.
450
 Moreover, according to 
Bicchi, the final result of the RMP was poor since EC states were reluctant to share their resources. 
EEC aid, she stated, ―represented 3 per cent of all overseas development assistance received by 
Mediterranean non-member countries.‖ She added that, ―aid per capital was 1.2 ECU per year 
compared to eastern European‘s ECU 6.8 and CAP countries‘ ECU 4.7.‖451 Besides historical 
animosities among the states in the region, unending political tensions, combined with the 
unwillingness of the states to share their resources with their neighbours within the framework of 
development assistance programmes, were leading causes for the RMP‗s failure in fulfilling 
expectations. 
The Global Mediterranean Policy and the Renovated Mediterranean Policy were nonetheless the first 
European attempts to approach the Mediterranean non-members in a coherent collective manner after 
the uncoordinated agreements that dominated the EEC‗s relation with region during the 1950s and 
1960s. What they set in motion was to be more fully realised in their successor, the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. 
3.4 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995-2004)  
Europe‘s security interests were similarly to drive the launching of the EMP in November 1995, 
which took a far more comprehensive and long-term approach to security in the Mediterranean. 
Following a European Council decision, a Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Affairs 
Ministers was held in Barcelona. The subsequent European Mediterranean Partnership, also known as 
the Barcelona Process, aimed to build a strategic partnership between by then the fifteen EU members 
and the states in MENA region. 
The 1995 Barcelona Declaration established a number of principles on which the EU predicated its 
new partnership with the Southern Mediterranean. The first was that of its vision for the region: its 
stated aim was to ―turn the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation 
guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity.‖452 As with the GMP and RMP, economic co-operation 
and exchange would provide the route to enhanced security. Secondly, this co-operation was to be 
based on a liberal normative vision which included both economic liberalisation and political 
democratisation within the Southern partner states. European financial and technical support would 
assist an economic liberalisation process, while political dialogue, civil society promotion, promotion 
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of social cohesion, and respect for human rights would enable convergence towards a shared secure 
common area. The latter also entailed cooperation in the areas of disarmament agreements, combating 
terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and arms control.
453
 
To tackle this very wide agenda, the EMP set up three different ―baskets‖ of activity: a political and 
security partnership, an economic and financial partnership and a partnership within cultural and 
human affairs.
454
 
The first basket stressed that: ―the peace, stability and security of the Mediterranean region are a 
common asset.‖455 It therefore promoted an agenda which assumed democratic government would 
best ensure the stability and security of the region, and underpinned collective efforts to deal with 
shared ―hard‖ security concerns. On the one hand, political dialogue at regular intervals would 
promote democratic government in Southern partner states, addressing sensitive subjects like respect 
for human rights, freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of thought. On the other 
hand, the EMP required its partners to strengthen their cooperation in combating terrorism, organized 
crime and drugs smuggling.
456
 Finally, the political basket encouraged partners to ―pursue a mutually 
and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical 
and biological, and their delivery systems.‖457 
The second basket of the EMP emphasised the importance of sustainable and balanced economic and 
social development.  The EMP pledged to create a Free Trade Area by 2010 and to assist Southern 
Partner states to improve their own socio-economic development so as to reduce the development gap 
between North and South shores.
458
 To this end the EU set up a new financial instrument that became 
known as MEDA
459
. The EU agreed to set aside ECU 4.685 million for this financial assistance in the 
form of available Community budget funds for the period 1995-1999. This would be supplemented by 
EIB assistance in the form of increased loans and bilateral financial contributions from the Member 
States. A second phase, MEDA II, was later introduced in 2000 with an increased budget of 5,350 
million EUROS.
460
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The third, cultural, basket of the EMP was designed to establish partnerships in social, cultural and 
human affairs, ―bringing people closer‖ by increasing knowledge of, and understanding between, 
peoples and cultures; fighting racism, xenophobia and intolerance, and increasing exchanges between 
young people across the Mediterranean. 
The Partnership worked on two levels: the bilateral (that is between the EU and the Partner Country), 
and the Regional (between the EU and countries of the region). Bilateral relations were established 
with each country of the Mediterranean through the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
(EMAA) which included commitments to specified economic, political and social policies on the part 
of Partner countries, in return for specified trade openings and financial assistance from Europe.  
Regional relations involved multi-lateral dialogues and agreements covering broad cooperation in 
sectors such as industry, energy, the environment, finance and agriculture, tourism, and youth 
between the South and North shore of the Mediterranean. Regional cooperation was expected to  
support and complement  bilateral actions.
461
 The process appeared to have much appeal and the EU 
quickly signed a series of association agreements with Tunisia (1995), Israel (1995), Jordan (1997), 
the PA (Interim Agreement 1997), Egypt (2001), Algeria (2002), Lebanon (2002), and Syria 
(initialled 2004), while Libya had been given observer status.   
3.4.1  The International Political Environment and the Road to the EMP  
Clearly something momentous had happened to move the EU from the wishful inactivity of the RMP 
to this new, wide-ranging set of collective foreign policy commitments to its Southern neighbours.  
For a start, the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall prompted Europe to reorient its strategic landscape toward the southern Mediterranean.
462
 The 
vacuum left by the withdrawal of a Soviet power offered the EU the opportunity to secure its 
territorial integrity, while making an impact on the international scene by preserving peace and 
prosperity in its southern and eastern peripheries.
463
  
Although the absence of a Soviet threat enabled European member states to cut their own military 
spending,
464
 new threats to regional ―societal‖ security465 were appearing in the form of illegal 
migration, Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism.
466
 The three were not unconnected. In contrast to 
the 1970s, when Europe welcomed immigrants as a vital labour force to fuel its own growth, by the 
1990s economic conditions in Southern Mediterranean states (and beyond) were driving illegal 
immigrants into Europe in numbers so large as to seem unmanageable. Migration became a hot 
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political issue inside member states and collective ―cognitive‖ uncertainty as to how to deal with the 
issue drove member states to seek a collective solution.
467
 As the EU took measures to tighten its 
borders, the issue became ―securitised‖ within the European Commission and European Parliament. 
This was not least due to the linkage between migration and Islamic fundamentalism. The early 1990s 
witnessed a number of terrorist attacks inside the EU, specifically in France, which some linked to the 
Muslim immigrant population living inside its borders. The attacks were attributed to desires to 
punish western support for the Algerian military coup, which had put an end to the democratic 
experience of that state. The outbreak of violence on a huge scale in Algeria following the suspension 
of the electoral process in 1992 was a major concern for Europe in the early 1990s;
468
 the Islamist 
nature of the opposition to authoritarian rule being something unfamiliar and hard to grasp.  
How to combat what was perceived to be an ideological war became a European pre-occupation, and 
the EU directed its energies to securing itself from the Islamist threat from within (European police 
cooperation and the institutionalisation of the EU justice is a result of the result of the efforts to tackle 
this problem),
 469
 but also sought to combat the problem at its source.
470
 Yacoubian, Bicchi and 
Gillespie have all analysed how Europe understood that a declining North Africa would be a ―recipe 
for the rise of Islamist regimes and a major exodus of economic migrants and political refugees to 
Europe.‖471These new security challenges, it was believed, could not be countered by traditional 
power politics and military means, but called instead for a more comprehensive and liberal approach 
to security.
472
 
If the Soviet collapse provided the opportunity for new policy, and the new threats provided the 
reason, the internal developments within the EU made a response of the scale of the Barcelona 
Process possible, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the creation of the CFSP had increased the 
capabilities of the EU to unify its policies and approach the Mediterranean basin with a 
"comprehensive" approach.  
A final catalyst had come at the regional level, with the initiation of a new MEPP in 1992. According 
to Junemann, ―encouragement of Europe‘s aspirations to play a role in the Middle East which came 
from the Madrid and Oslo Peace Processes, gained additional energy and urgency out of self-interest 
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in Europe‘s own security.‖473 Although the Europeans insisted that the Barcelona Process would not 
replace the Madrid or Oslo initiatives, many observers considered the EMP a response to the 
marginalisation of the EEC/EU in the Middle East Peace thus far.
474
  
In sum, as Bicchi concluded, and similar to the motivations behind the GMP in the 1970s, the EMP 
had been a collective response to the cognitive uncertainty in how to respond to these new security 
challenges, and had had little to do with desires for either common market enlargement or wider 
regional and intra-regional economic integration on the one hand, or liberal normative objectives on 
the other. 
3.4.2  Drivers of the EMP: Spain, France, Italy and the Commission 
The Barcelona Process was also, like the GMP, propelled forward by specific, self-interested member 
states. If France had been the prime mover before, during the 1990s Spain took this role, preparing 
and then mobilising the EU institutions, resources and members to put the Mediterranean region on 
the European agenda through the Barcelona Process.  
Why did Spain shift its focus from its previous near-exclusive focus on Morocco to the rest of the 
Mediterranean non-member countries of the Mediterranean? In fact, it had already done so at the start 
of the 1990s, when the developing problems in North Africa were becoming clear, fostering and 
increasing the belief in Spain that there was ―urgency to engineering a rapid improvement in the 
economic situations in all North Africa.‖475 Together with Italy, Spain initiated an intensive 
consultation with other EEC members, the U.S, the USSR and several Arab states regarding 
establishing a Conference of Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) 
476
which could 
mirror the relative success of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). 
477
 The 
Hispano-Italian proposal ultimately floundered due to German, Dutch, British and US opposition. 
478
 
The Northern Europeans were at the time unconvinced that the problems of North Africa were 
European, and ―not merely southern European, problems,‖479 while the U.S rejected the idea since it 
might strengthen the European presence in the Mediterranean at the expense of itself.
480
  
The 1991 Gulf War and unfolding events in Algeria encouraged Spain to intensify its effort to change 
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northern Europe perceptions of Mediterranean co-operation ―as an unnecessary luxury‖.481 They 
argued that the fundamental problems of the Mediterranean were not merely economic problems but 
rather a combination of social and economic challenges which were potential sources of unrest or so-
called soft security threats.
482
  
Spain was also motivated by a desire to consolidate its own transition to democracy. The government 
under Gonzalez saw the Mediterranean basin as a gateway for more involvement in the European 
foreign policies and felt that it could position itself as a key gatekeeper, enhancing its status and role 
within the EU, locating itself among western democracies, and gaining acknowledgement as a middle 
power.
483
 It was a means to change its international identity: from being a ―backward country 
receiving external aid, it becomes an industrialised, donor country. From emigration country, it turned 
into an immigration destination‖.484 
France and Italy, bordering the Mediterranean, shared Spain‘s concerns and were natural allies in the 
project, although Spain played the major role in putting the Mediterranean on the European agenda at 
the time. Enjoying the ―functionalist moment‖ made possible by the creation of the CFSP, the 
European Commission and the EP also played a significant role in advancing and utilising EU 
resources to support the Spanish proposal. Together, led by Spain, they exerted pressure on a number 
of fronts. 
First, Spain courted German support. Not only was the financial support of Northern member states 
crucial,
485
 but Germany specifically was considered ‗the only country which [could] launch a realistic 
attempt to rebalance Europe‘s relations with its neighbours.486 The friendship between Felipe 
González and the German Chancellor played a key role in persuading Germany to drop their 
opposition to the idea
487
 but Gonzales also showed flexibility during negotiations to bring the Norther 
Europeans on board. Under British pressure Spain accepted the extension of the scope of the EMP to 
include the eastern Mediterranean rather than just ‗Euro-Maghreb.‘ Second, under pressure from 
Britain and France, Spain showed readiness to exclude Libya from participation.
488
 On the other hand, 
Spain had threatened its northern partners to block their attempts to moves towards an eastern 
expansion of the EU ―unless a semblance of balance between east and south was introduced into the 
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EU‘s external relations.‖489 
Spain also intensified its diplomatic efforts in the European Commission, the Trade Commissioner of 
which – Manuel Marin – was a Spanish national. He proposed several communications to the Council 
in order to enhance the Euro-Mediterranean policy on their behalf.  
One of the factors in Spain‘s favour was that the three EU presidencies stretching from 1 January 
1995 to 30 June 1996 were in the hands of three Mediterranean members, France, Spain, and Italy, all 
of whom shared concerns over the new security threats.
490
 In fact, during the preparation of the EMP, 
there was a joint policy entrepreneurship of Spain and France as they sent a joint letter from their two 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Juppe and Solana, in October 1994 to the President of the European 
Commission Jacques Doelo, and for EU presidency, in which their asked for more time on the EU 
agenda for consideration of the Mediterranean.
491
  
France and Spain took on the lion‘s share of the task of drafting the Declaration and produced a 
document that reflects both the priorities of the Mediterranean members and the EU‘s interests in 
strengthening its economic grip on the region.
492
Greece, another Mediterranean member state, 
supported the initiative and nominated Barcelona to host the conference. Greece particularly 
welcomed supranational involvement in fighting the immigration problem.
493
 Other members were 
hesitant to accept the original proposal especially with regards to the priorities of the EMP, its budget, 
and the nature of the Association Agreements. Germany, for example, feared that France might use 
the third basket to consolidate its own political influence in the Mediterranean, and further pushed to 
exclude cultural commitments to the region from the framework of the EMP arguing that ―cultural 
politics were not the responsibility of the EU and should therefore be left out.‖ Instead, Germany 
stressed the ―importance of the fight against drug trafficking, terrorism, organised crime and, 
especially, migration.‖494 It was clear that, while the Barcelona Process ultimately gained traction 
because of a growing shared sense of security threat, the EU member states had different priorities in 
terms of how they wanted these to be addressed. The Northern member states encouraged the Euro-
Mediterranean initiative as a response to common security challenges, but were less interested in 
providing extensive economic assistance or engaging in cultural and political dialogues than in 
offering preferential trade concessions and ―emphasizing the role of the private sector in providing 
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investment funds.‖495 They sought economic reform solutions to the MENA region‘s problems and 
succeeded in reducing the EMP‘s funding package from the original ECU 5.5 billion sought by 
Commissioner Manuel Marín to ECU 4,685 million.‖496 
―The predominant domain of northern interest has remained the economic dimension, 
within which the main British contribution at Barcelona was an insistence on the need 
to stimulate trade and investment.‖497 
Southern European member states were more concerned with the wider range of secure solutions and 
with using economic assistance as a tool for closing the development gap as quickly as possible. The 
tension was clear in the negotiations over the Association Agreement with Morocco:  
―While the northern European states wanted to give commercial concessions to 
certain Moroccan food products the southern Europeans maintained that aid should be 
used to help Morocco become self-sufficient in food.‖498 
3.4.3  The Role of the European Commission in the EMP Preparation Process  
As member states lobbied for their own preferences, with Spain and France leading the way as policy 
entrepreneurs, the Commission and the European Parliament, newly empowered by the Maastricht 
Treaty and their roles relating to the CFSP, also contributed, albeit differentially across the baskets of 
the EMP. 
The EMP had been built on reports that were initially prepared by the European Commission and on  
its communications with the rest of the European. In 1992, the Commission proposed a Euro-Maghreb 
partnership, a dialogue on all matters of common interest between the EU, Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia. By 1993, EU participation in the stop-start multilateral track of the Middle East Peace 
Process had convinced, External Relations in the Commission (DG1B) that this partnership concept 
should be extended to Israel and the Mashreq countries.
499
 
As mentioned previously, the Trade Commissioner, Manuel Marin, presented a proposal in October 
1994 for the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, later to be submitted to the European 
Council in Essen in December, and subsequently discussed in more detail at a ministerial conference. 
The main elements of the proposal were (1) the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by 
about 2010; (2) a doubling of the financial assistance drawn on the Community‘s own budgetary 
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resources for the period 1995-99 (about 5.5 billion ECU); and (3) increasing technical cooperation 
(based on the experience drawn from the Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the 
Economy (PHARE) programme with central and eastern European countries.
500
 The European 
Council endorsed the proposals.  
The Commission then participated in all the preparation meetings of the EMP. At the subsequent 
implantation level the Commission were in charge of negotiating the actual Association Agreements 
with the EMP partners. This gave it considerable influence in shaping the operational and technical 
aspects of the EMP, which in turn enhanced its own status and power relative to both member and 
non-member states.. 
3.4.4  Evaluation of the EMP  
Over time, a number of scholars and commentators have examined the achievements and failings of 
the EMP and by all accounts it has fallen short of meeting its declared objectives. All three baskets of 
the EMP have demonstrated significant deficits, failing to meet the lofty objectives enshrined in the 
Barcelona Declaration.
501
 These deficits arose variously from problems with the programmes and 
aims of the EMP itself, the impact of external influences such as the MEPP, and the institutional 
structures of the EMP.   
The first criticisms came from the EU‘s MENA partners. They criticised the EU for its lack of prior 
consultation with the Mediterranean states on what the latter understood to be their real problems and 
needs before the Process was constructed. This is understood to be ―patronising and a form of new 
imperialism.
‖502
 They then pointed to the institutional set-up of the EMP, which favours the European 
side. They argued that agendas were set and meetings chaired either by the EU Presidency or the 
European Commission, giving EU institutions the exclusive right to control the schedule and, to some 
extent, even the outcome of negotiations.
503
 In such an unbalanced context, conditionality becomes a 
tool reinforcing a powerful bias in favour of European values and interests. Some analysts have 
therefore argued that the political conditionality behind the economic and financial partnership 
―exposes the Mediterranean partner countries to the good will of the Europeans, thus offending their 
demand for equal partnership.‖504According to Johansson-Johansson-Nogués, these arrangements 
exacerbated the weakness of SMP states‘ positions as they ―were not kept sufficiently or timely 
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enough informed with regard to the agenda of the Euro-Med Committee.‖505Accordingly, this made it 
difficult for them to ―elaborate alternative options to the EU‘s proposals, had they so desired.‖506 
Correspondingly, Bicchi blamed the partner states for their inability to impress a clear direction to the 
EMP‘s agenda. This, according to Bicchi, was due to the fragmentation of the Arab countries and has 
led to an imbalance in the partnership in which the European participants fixed the EMP agenda 
without taking into consideration the needs and agendas of their partners.
507
 
SMP states also criticised the EMP for its failure to take into account ―intra-regional diversity‖508 - the 
programmes were not sufficiently accommodating of different political, economic and cultural 
environments in partner states.
509
 Finally, they accused the Europeans of paying more attention to 
their own security, whilst ignoring the interests of their partners. Excluding the status of migrant 
workers in the Union from the draft documents and the EU‘s reluctance to make substantial new trade 
concessions to its partners have been cited as examples of this trend.
510
 
Further criticisms were levelled at each of the baskets specifically. The political and security basket 
which aimed to establish regional confidence-building measures and a common area of peace and 
stability came under fire from Spencer, who concluded that the lack of mutual trust among the EMP 
partners, mainly the Israelis and the Arabs, fundamentally undermined the basket‘s ambitions.  Who 
saw the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as being essential to a normalization of their relations 
with Israel.
511
 For the Arabs, resolution of the conflict was a precondition for normalisation with 
Israel, inhibiting progress in any other area.  Secondly, Spencer suggested that basket had suffered 
from the exclusion of the U.S, without whom wider co-ordinations with other initiatives such as the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Western EU (WEU) would not have been 
possible.
512
 
The European Security Strategy
 
stressed the importance of well-governed democratic states as the 
best protection for European security,
513
 and the EMP laid significant emphasis on democracy 
promotion, political reform and human rights. All the Association Agreements included articles 
relating to respect for human rights and EU advocates pointed out that by including specific clauses 
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relating to human rights, reform and democracy promotion issues in the EMAA, the EU managed to 
put the democracy and human rights issues on the negotiation table with its partners in the south. In 
addition, the EMP, through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), had 
initiated and funded several projects aimed at promoting democracy and human rights projects, 
providing electoral assistance, observation missions, and support for gender equality, womens rights, 
the media, and civil society groups.
514
 
However, the evidence suggests that the EU was not truly interested in enforcing compliance on its 
partners in the EMP when this jeopardises its own more direct security interests. Indeed, critics argued 
that it would even support undemocratic, authoritarian regimes when necessary to address more 
immediate concerns such as fighting terrorism, stopping illegal migration, and combating drug 
trafficking. If pushing harder on issues like political reform might have jeopardised the EU‘s security 
cooperation relations with these regimes, then the EU wouldn‘t push. 515 
Tanner argued that European security concerns mentioned above ―have taken precedence over 
institutional reform objectives, such as enhancing respect for human rights, accountability and civilian 
oversight over security forces of southern Mediterranean countries.‖ 516 Tanner went further,  arguing 
that the EU and its members utilised EMP financial resources to support the existing regimes in 
MENA to enhance the efficiency of their security forces, mainly to stop undocumented migration 
across the Mediterranean.
517
 In his study, he found that the EU allocated a 250 million Euro fund for 
supporting third countries in preventing irregular migration towards the EU, and in 2004 a project by 
the European Police College was carried out aimed at training police forces of southern 
Mediterranean countries in fighting terrorism and human trafficking.
518
 Such support could have had 
direct adverse effects on the security of Partner state populations at risk from their own national 
security forces. This tendency has increased as September 11, where the Mediterranean governments 
have become important partners in the fight against terrorism.
519
 
 
 In his evaluation of EMP approaches to human rights and democracy, Aliboni attributed the 
reluctance to impose democracy-related conditionality on the MENA regimes to be an example of the 
absence of political will, pointing out that ―trade and aid benefits have not been withdrawn in 
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response to authoritarian practice,‖520 while Attina argued that conditionality clauses in the EMP were 
written in an ambiguous way where the articles ―do not define in detail when the mechanisms are to 
be activated, how serious the infringement should be before they are activated, nor what is to be 
considered as a severe, a persistent or a continuing violation of human rights‖.521 She adds: ―the 
activation is ambiguous as the agreement provisions do not identify who decides when to do it and 
what institutional procedure should be involved‖.522  
Gillespie argued that European decision-makers have always been more focussed anyway on the 
second basket, which aimed to develop an economic and financial partnership, than on the first 
political and security basket or on the third basket which aimed to promote social cultural and human 
affairs dialogue.
523
 This was built on the assumption that ―economic liberalization was the key to the 
success of the whole Barcelona Process‖.524 There remain divergences here between Northern and 
Southern European states: while the ―Northern European countries have, at times, manifested a 
remarkable interest for the Mediterranean, although they have only seldom turned that interest into 
specific discussion points the interest of Southern Europeans has been deeper and more consistent, 
while at the same time not necessarily affecting the agenda.‖525 As Yacoubian puts it, due to their 
proximity, concerns over illegal migration and instability, the Southern European states ―have been 
less willing than their northern neighbours to rock the boat and push for reform.‖ They were more 
―uncomfortable with the notion of conditionality‖526 while “northern-tier countries such as Britain and 
Germany have pushed for a more stringent interpretation of the human rights clause embedded in the 
association agreements.‖527  
As a result of unwillingness of the EU members to challenge the MENA regimes, the EU shifted its 
attention to focus more towards issues of human rights rather than democracy, since European public 
opinion was more sensitive to this and it was somewhat less controversial for the Mediterranean 
regimes.
528
 The latter has also been able to play on European fears that democracy might have brought 
to power anti-western radical religious forces. These fears dominated the concerns of southern 
European governments more than their northern counterparts.  
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The limited budget resources allocated to democracy promotion and supporting human rights in the 
MENA region, in comparison to that provided to Central and Eastern European partners, was also a 
factor limiting these EMP programmes.
529
 A final point to note is that democracy and human rights 
cannot be imposed without or against the will of local constituencies nor implemented overnight.
530
 
Not only had European attempts failed to take account of the different understanding and perceptions 
of democracy between European and the MENA region,
531
 as Jünemann pointed out, the EMP ―must 
not be based on a dialogue between governments only, but has to include populations, in particular 
their democratic forces.‖532 In sum, she blamed the limited influence of the EMP on ―complex 
structures‖ and the ―lack of political will on both sides to put life into the normative spirit of the 
Barcelona Process.‖533  
Ironically, given the EU‘s determination to separate the two tracks, the main problem for the first 
basket had been in keeping the EMP independent from the MEPP. Since the two areas included the 
same, conflicting parties, the Barcelona Process became a hostage to, and at the mercy of, the MEPP. 
The November 2000 Marseilles meeting and the April 2002 Valencia meeting of Foreign Ministers of 
the EMP were clear examples of the negative impact of the Peace Process on the EMP. The Syrian 
and Lebanese representatives boycotted both meetings, ―in protest at the Israeli reaction to the 
Intifada‖.534 Peters suggested that even considering bringing the Israeli and the Arab foreign ministers 
to discuss areas of future co-operation before the core political issues at the heart of the conflict had 
been resolved was ―idealistic and naïve.‖535 More than this, he argued that the EMP and MEPP 
between them introduced too many competing multilateral regional projects that aimed to promote 
peace in the region. He argued that this led to the ―emergence of competing frameworks and 
approaches and in duplication of resource and activities without any analysis of the effectiveness.‖536  
This is acknowledged by the Commission itself. In an internal evaluation of the EMP, the 
Commission statesd that: ―the difficulties in MEPP have slowed progress and limited the extent to 
which full regional co-operation could develop.‖537 The report added: ―not only are the countries in 
the region very different in terms of political systems and levels of economic development but some 
are much more affected by the evolution of the MEPP than others.‖ 538   
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Finally, bureaucracy and structural complicity was another challenge facing the EMP due to the 
multiple layers of diplomats and bureaucrats from the national governments and the European 
Commission, the multi-budget cycles, cumbersome bureaucracy, and complex and dualist decision 
making which hindered effectiveness and delayed the crucial decision-making process designed to 
improve economic efficiency.
539
 The end result was a widening gap between the European statements 
and policies on the ground. Notably, for example, according to Yacoubian, in the first five years of the 
EMP, ―only 26% of the amount committed in economic aid was ever actually disbursed.‖540  
 
3.4.5 Evaluation of the Economic Basket of the EMP 
According to Yacoubian, conflicting loyalties between the European Council, which represented the 
interests of individual member states, and the European Commission, whose mandate was tied to the 
interests of the EU as a whole, also added to bureaucratic tensions. The Commission often looked to 
enhance the EU structure, while the Council could be constrained by individual members who 
jealously guard their prerogatives.
541
 Moreover, since the EU Presidency rotated between different EU 
member states every six months, the prioritization of different issues tended to differ from one EU 
presidency to another, which clearly had a negative impact on continuity and consistency of the 
agenda of the process.
542
 
The economic basket of the EMP drew its own evaluations. The main aim of the economic and 
financial partnership was to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA), which 
included over 800 million people, 60 per cent of whose total trade was with each other.
543
 This 
tantalising prospect might explain why the EU allocated over ―90 per cent of the funds provided for 
the EMP to the Economic and Financial Partnership (EFP).‖544  The economic basket was itself 
structured via three pillars; first, the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, second, economic 
cooperation among the partners and finally, financial and technical assistance.  The  EMP funded  
projects in each country, from the MEDA financial instrument, based on five criteria;(1) the 
beneficiaries‘ priorities, (2) their evolving needs, (3) their absorption capacity, (4) progress towards 
structural reform and (5), the effectiveness of those measures in achieving the objectives of 
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Community support.
545
 
 
There were two main schools of thought regarding how to assess the impact of the economic basket. 
The first, propagated by the European institutions themselves, argued that despite the economic and 
political challenges that the economic basket has faced, it had managed to achieve the significant goal 
of integrating the Mediterranean economy sufficiently to protect the SMPs from falling into 
international economic isolation in a difficult environment. According to the European Union‘s own 
figures, the EMP managed over the last 15 years to strengthen the relationship between both shores of 
the Mediterranean on several levels.  
The EMP ―created a wave of cooperation among its member in several fields, such as financial 
assistance, trade, agriculture, archaeology, education and the empowerment of women‖.546 It managed 
to bring the Mediterranean partners' regulatory procedures closer to EU rules, and to facilitate access 
to the EU market and remove non-tariff barriers to trade.
547
 Plus, through the Regional Assistance 
Programmes, the EMP managed to promote intra-regional co-operation among the different 
Mediterranean countries.  Several regional agreements had been concluded among the Southern 
Mediterranean countries themselves.  For example, in 2007, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt 
signed the Agadir Free Trade Agreement. Israel and Jordan signed a Free Trade Agreement. 
Additionally Egypt, Israel, Morocco, the PA, Syria, and Tunisia signed bilateral agreements with 
Turkey.
548
 According to EU figures the total trade between the Mediterranean members of the EMP 
and the EU was €127bn in 2007 – some 5% of total EU external trade. The total exports to the EU 
from the Mediterranean region grew by an average of 10% a year since 2000 to reach €67 billion. The 
Mediterranean imports from the EU increased by 4% since 2000 and the Imports from the EU 
increased by 4% between 2000 to reach €60 billion.549 
At the same time, more than €20 billion of EU funding was allocated to bilateral and regional 
projects. For example, the technical and implementation instrument of Barcelona Process (MEDA) 
allocated more than €3.4 billion between 1995 to 1999 while the total amount of funds MEDA II 
spent on the Mediterranean partnership increased between the periods 2000-2006 to reach €5.3 billion 
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in 2006.
550
  
The second school believed that the EMP‘s economic basket had more or less failed. Not only had it 
failed to utilise economic tools to leverage political reforms in partner states, but in spite of the 
marginal economic reforms that the SMPs had adopted, they were unable to attract the kind of foreign 
direct and private investment which would have helped to create new jobs and reduce poverty, which 
were the aims of the programme.
551
 In their assessment to the second basket of the EMP Eberhard 
Kienle and George Joffé found that over the last decade much of the potential domestic investment 
fled the region towards more profitable markets elsewhere. According to Joffé ―the SMPs lack 
comparative advantages outside of the oil and gas industries.‖552 Moreover, failure to progress 
political reform meant economies had become rife with unattractive poor governance, crony 
capitalism and corruption. 
The EU also comes in for criticism for its own structure. It allowed its members to impose 
protectionist policies against the products coming from the SMP states under the Common 
Agricultural Policy. The Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) was de facto limited to trade 
in industrial goods, excluding the agricultural products which were an important source of revenues 
were for and which only accounts for six per cent of the total trade between the Mediterranean non-
members and the EU.
553
 Even the import of industrial goods from its partners into the EU was also not 
by and large free of customs, but was only ―granted if a 60 per cent local content requirement is 
met.‖554 As a result, the SMP partners couldn‘t expand their agricultural products to the European 
markets far beyond the preferential treatment they had already been granted since the 1970s.
555
 
According to Brach, the EMFTA ―establishes a preferential unilateral opening on the side of the 
Mediterranean partners for European exports, rather than reciprocal trade liberalization‖.556 Moreover, 
although the EMP emphasised freedom of movement of people and goods as essential elements of a 
free trade zone, fears of waves of immigration prompted the EU to restrict this in policy terms.
557
  
Finally, we should note that the difficulties of integrating Israel into regional trade were another factor 
that hindered regional economic integration: the vast majority of the Arab stated boycott Israeli 
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products.
558
 
Cultural activities across the Euro-Mediterranean space, the third basket of the EMP,   had increased 
considerably since the launching of the EMP, especially in the wake of the September 11 attacks,   
although they had not drawn the same attention that the first and second baskets had, and remained 
relatively modest overall.
559
  
According to Pace, there were several reasons behind the modesty of the cultural dimension of the 
EMP. First the constraints to mobility and the complexity and rigidity of the European visa 
regulations prevented true cultural dynamism from taking place within and among Euro-
Mediterranean societies.
 560
Secondly, the EMP programmes related to culture, audiovisual and 
educational areas were―elite oriented and remain relatively unknown outside certain 
milieux.‖561Third, the exchange programmes aimed to enhance EU member states‘ knowledge and 
understanding of Mediterranean partner societies‘ culture, outlooks and priorities ―have not been 
sufficiently two-way.‖562 Cultural programmes were largely limited to non-sensitive issues and 
avoided subjects considered uncomfortable for both sides of the EMP such as religion and principles 
of tribal law.
563
  
3.4.6  Analysis of the EMP  
The discussion of the motives of the EMP offered above shows that European policy-makers had 
acknowledged that instability in the Mediterranean was linked to failure of the SMP governments to 
meet the needs of their citizens, both in terms of  economic growth and opportunities, and in terms of 
democracy and basic freedoms. These deficits proved to be a dangerous cocktail that fuels terrorism, 
political extremism and violence, as well as illegal immigration into Europe.
 564
 Thus it was not only 
because of its energy dependence on the MENA region that Europe could not afford to neglect the 
Mediterranean basin. Its own security remained the key factor creating a shared European interest in 
that region.  
The EMP drew upon the philosophy and principles of neo-liberal institutionalism in what amounted to 
a soft power exercise.  Economic tools like trade reform and financial assistance had been used to 
achieve security-oriented and political ends, the assumption being that economic growth in, and co-
                                                          
558
  Weidenfeld, W. Janning, J. and Behrendt, S. (1997). Transformation in the Middle East and North Africa. 
Challenge and Potential for Europe and its Partners. Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers: Guetersloh .p.26. 
559
  Amirah F, H., & Youngs, R. (2005). The Euro-Mediterranean partnership: Assessing the First Decade. 
Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos.p.7. 
560  Pace, M. (2005). EMP Cultural Initiatives: What Political Relevance? In Amirah Fern ndez, H., & Youngs, 
R. (2005). The Euro-Mediterranean partnership: Assessing the First Decade. Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano de 
Estudios Internacionales y Estratégico.p.68. 
561
  Ibid. p. 64. 
562
  Ibid.p. 64. 
563
  Ibid. p. p. 67. 
564
  Malmvig, H, op.cit.  p.4. 
 110 
 
operation (and even integration) with SMPS would bring stability and security not just to them but to 
mainland Europe itself.  
Acknowledging that building a zone of peace and stability needed more than just economic incentives 
and bilateral trade agreements, the EU emphasised in the EMP that economic reform had to be backed 
up by political and social reforms,
565
 and also that cooperation between governments and economies 
required popular engagement and endorsement (co-operation between peoples, culture and civil 
societies),
566
 reflecting the normative liberal dimensions of the EU itself. This approach drew on the 
cumulative European experience in multilateralism and regional co-operative structures,
567
 which 
suggested that economic integration itself promotes, indirectly, political reconciliation, stability, and 
cooperation.
568
 The basic idea was that ―political liberalisation in the Mediterranean area will follow 
automatically from economic liberalisation;‖569 in other words, the EU, by supporting economic 
opening in the SMPs, was exporting the functionalist spill-over effect such that the  political and 
security basket would benefit from the achievements of the economic integration in the second 
basket.
570
  
So the EMP had origins and motivations which were predicated on common rational self-interests of 
member states (the security agenda) whilst the language and tools of the process suggested a more 
normative and liberal agenda. The two were not entirely incompatible: adopting a realist 
understanding of the EMP did not mean denying the role and relevance of liberal principles and 
values, such as multilateralism, human rights and democracy promotion. What realists questioned 
according to Hyde-Price was: 
―…the claim that such idea continues to determine policy when they conflict with 
vital national or common interests. Consequently, concerns about human rights and 
democracy promotion are more likely to influence those who make EU foreign policy 
when Europeans‘ security or vital economic interests are not at stake‖.571 
The evidence lie in EU‘s reluctance to push for democratisation and respect for basic human rights in 
the Mediterranean states when this threatened relations with SMP governments which secured 
Europe‘s borders from migrants, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, organised crime and drug 
trafficking.  
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The EMP did, however, represent an advance on the pure inter-governmentalist self-interest of the 
GMP. The ―policy window‖ created by a convergence of events in the early 1990s, together with the 
new momentum for collective foreign policy-making represented in the CFSP, meant that the member 
states with the most at stake (due principally to geographic proximity) could collaborate with newly 
empowered EU institutions (specifically the Commission when it came to foreign policy-making, but 
also the Parliament) to promote a more normatively directed and generally broader Mediterranean 
policy. 
The EU and its institutions increasingly understood their role to be that of an ‗ethical‘ power, serving 
as the institutional repository of member states‘ shared second-order normative concerns. The EU was 
to be regarded as a ‗force for good‘ in the world, championing values and principles that have 
universal applicability and reflect cosmopolitan norms. 
This meant that there was now a fundamental contradiction at the heart of the EU‘s identity and role 
as an international actor. The member states preserved the basic inter-governmental dominance of EU 
structures in the CFSP and used it to protect a security-first agenda. But the ―moment‖ of supra-
nationalism in foreign policy-making meant that the discourse and instruments extended 
Mediterranean Policy beyond this, raising expectations in ways which were ultimately unfulfilled and 
which undermined the EMP‘s credibility. 
At the same time, however, the role of Spain and France in the drafting and preparation process 
illustrated how membership of the EU, and participation in its institutions and processes, helped the 
governments of EU members‘ states to discover their common interests, redefine their own interests,  
and explore the possibilities for efficient cooperation. Thus it would be wrong to assume that the only 
actors who formulated and decided the outcome of the EMP making were the EU members or that 
their interests and positions were unchanging. In other words, the EMP supported the argument that 
functionalism still had a certain logic, and that functionalist pressures did exist, even if they were not 
always strong enough to provoke deeper changes.  The EMP showed that, although EU members had 
their own pre-determined political stances and agendas that reflected their domestic preferences, the 
outcomes of CFSP were not just a product of the self-interested behaviour of EU members but also as 
a result of fulfilling the obligations of EU membership, the socialising impact of membership of its 
institutions, and the impact of the international system. For example,  the way that Spain managed to 
convince its partners of the importance of the EMP for all the EU members and its threat to block the 
European initiatives to eastern European countries showed that the EU states improved their prospects 
for cooperation by shifting from a bargaining style of cooperation to a problem solving style of 
cooperation.  Finally, the demands of domestic lobbies within member states to protect local 
agriculture through protection from SMP agricultural imports, in defiance of the spirit and purpose of 
the EMP showed that domestic politics within member states could also play a role in shaping policy 
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and contradicting the over-arching security logic of the process.  
So, in sum, we can say that the EMP was a good exemplar of the strengths and flaws of the CFSP 
itself. It operated at multiple levels and through multiple agencies; the dominant logic was a realist 
self-interest on the part of member states which was protected through inter-governmental 
mechanisms which ultimately determined policy. However, it was influenced in form and content by 
supranationalist and normative dynamics which were embedded within the institutions of the EU and 
empowered, albeit temporarily and restrictedly, by the CFSP and which were manifest in operational, 
implementational and budgeting functions of the Union. Moreover, this was a dynamic process, 
influenced both by the socialising effect of membership and by the upward pressures from domestic 
lobbies. In the end, however, alternative agendas were sacrificed to the imperatives of security, 
undermining the EMP‘s efficiency, effectiveness and credibility. 
3.5 The European Neighbourhood Policy (2005-2009) 
Despite its failings, the EMP had not been entirely abandoned but rather reformulated. In 2005, the 
EU formulated a new Neighbourhood Policy, reasserting the same basic goals that the Barcelona 
process had failed to achieve. The factors that led Europe to launch the Barcelona process (security, 
energy dependency, instability, and immigration) remained salient, with EU enlargement demanding 
the EU to rethink its relations with its southern and eastern neighbours. The ENP was a European 
attempt to ―prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its 
neighbours.‖572 In its report the European Commission had stressed the point:  that ―the EU has a vital 
interest in seeing greater economic development and stability and better governance in its 
neighbourhood.‖573 
The idea of the Neighbourhood Policy dated back to March 2003, when External Relations 
Commissioner, Chris Patten, and High Representative, Javier Solana, proposed in a Commission 
communication to the to the Council and the European Parliament, entitled  ―Wider Europe— 
Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours‖,  that 
enhanced EU relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the Southern Mediterranean countries 
should be based on a long term approach promoting reform, sustainable development and trade.
574
 
The Wider Europe proposal was followed by several proposals from the European Commission such 
as ―Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument‖ (July 2003) and The Strategy Paper on the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (May 2004). The latter emphasised that the ENP has several 
objectives, mainly ―to share the benefits of the EU‘s 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in 
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strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned through participating in various EU 
activities.‖575  
In its internal repots to the Council the commission emphasised that the ENP ―will build on a mutual 
commitment to common values‖ and would be with nations that ―share the same values of democracy, 
respect for human rights, and the rule of law‖576. Thus, in the hopes of developing a ―zone of 
prosperity,‖ the EU would offer its new neighbours the prospect of entry into its internal market and, 
ultimately, the four freedoms (freedom of movement of goods, of persons, of services, and of capital) 
of EU membership in exchange for the implementation of significant political, economic, and 
institutional reforms.
577
 
The new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was considered a different type of instrument, based 
on deepening the EU‘s bilateral relations with neighbouring states without the prospect of joining the 
EU in the near future. The initiative was initially designed to target the ex-Soviet states which shared 
direct land or sea borders with the EU. However, after the European Union‘s southern-tier members 
lobbied the EU the Mediterranean states were included in the new policy.
578
 
This extended the geographic area of the ENP to include Jordan, Egypt, Algeria, Belarus, Georgia, 
Lebanon, Israel, Moldova, Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Morocco, the PA, Tunisia, Ukraine and the 
countries of the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan).  
The ENP was similar in a key respect to the preceding EMP. In late 2005, Ferrero-Waldner 
emphasised the importance of the ENP as a tool to serve first and foremost European interests stating 
that the ENP was: 
 
―A virtuous circle, based on the premise that by helping our neighbours we help 
ourselves. By investing in our neighbours and by helping to create prosperous, stable 
and secure conditions around us, we extend the prosperity, stability and security 
of our citizens.‖579 
However, Pace argued that the EMP was mainly ―a region-building exercise while the ENP is a policy 
built on the idea of bilateralism.‖580 ―Tailor-made agreements were regulated with each member of the 
EU neighbours via the Action Plan based on the country‘s needs and capacities. The Action Plan was 
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the ENP Instrument and allowed the Partner countries to pursue a policy of ―self-differentiation.‖581 
The ENP allowed the EU to develop bilateral relations which were suited to each individual partner 
and the progress made by each country was not dependent on progress made by other countries. 
The ENP extended the logic of conditionality, which was perceived as the key mechanism of power 
for inducing reform in the neighbourhood.
582
 The amount of aid and technical assistance provided by 
the EU depended on the degree to which reform policies and democracy were adopted. According to 
Barbé ―utilising the incentives as carrots - and the sanction and isolation as a stick was the major tool 
and instrument of the ENP for promoting ‗stability, security and well-being for all.‖583 This differed 
from the EMP in so far as, as Pace argued, while the EMP was based on the principle of ‗negative 
conditionality‘, where the Association Agreements would be suspended if the Mediterranean partner 
violates the respect for human rights, the ENP was based on the principle of ‗positive 
conditionality.
584
 It was hoped that positive conditionality would prove more effective (and easier to 
implement) than the negative conditionality of the EMP. 
However, the ENP had come in for criticism just as the previous Mediterranean policies did. Some of 
its difficulties were a result of deficits in the European CFSP with others were due to the tension 
between  the European institutions and the member states interests and agendas. These conflicts were 
a result of the flexibility of the EU treaties, which allowed member states to act individually outside 
of the EU as long as their policies and initiatives did not contradict the EU‘s main policies. The result 
had been to multiply European voices, and led to a weakening of European power.  The desire of the 
member states to maintain their sovereignties and their ability to initiate their own policies prompted 
the ENP‘s partners to take advantage of European divisions and to neglect EU policies.  
As explained in the first chapter, the European Commission had been a key player in initiating EU 
polices towards third parties. In addition, the European Commission was responsible for proposing, 
planning, and implementing European policy initiatives such as the EMP and the ENP. Its 
responsibilities also included implementing EU trade, development, and aid programmes under 
MEDA.  However, according to Jones and Clark, the discourse for neighbourhood policy had been 
―shaped fundamentally by the bounded constraints of national interests imposed upon the 
Commission by Member States.‖585 For example, if the Commission wanted to apply some of its 
policies and laws, particularly in the field of human rights, democracy and the imposition of 
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sanctions, it would not be able to do so if the policies were objected to by any members of the EU. 
This might explain the accusation made against the EU of double standards and contradictions in its 
policy regarding human rights issues and reforms.  
In an interview, a senior British diplomat explained the nature of the relations between the member 
states and the European Commission, emphasised that ―Britain doesn‘t have a problem with the 
Commission being the driver of the ENP agenda and the process, but we do try to keep it in check if 
we think it‘s going too far or going too quickly or if we think their tactics are slightly off‖.586 There 
had been cases where the member states distanced themselves from EU policies, mainly those of the 
European Commission. Member states were not interested in compromising their long-standing 
domestic bilateral relations with third countries for the sake of their alliance within the ENP, even 
though this might have been at the expense of the EU policy.  The southern member states in 
particular had habitually been reluctant to be too heavy handed in terms of imposing democracy and 
human rights conditionality to push any foreign policy objectives which could, however slightly, 
upset the political stability of the region.
587
 
As a consequence, the credibility of the EU policy was often undermined in the eyes of its partners. A 
senior official from DG Relex stressed this point stating that: 
―There are some areas where the member states are happy to see us doing the ‗dirty 
jobs‘, for example in the recent meeting with Tunisia. And then when the French talk 
bilaterally to the Tunisians, and this is a good example, they say very flowery things 
about them! We understand that this is part of our role and we are there to deliver the 
tough messages. We do not have the domestic consequences that member states 
have.‖588 
Another diplomat, this time from the UK Foreign Office, also highlighted the contradiction between 
European Commission policies and statements of the member states, arguing that: 
―There have been cases where the Commission has had to deliver strong messages 
which we have endorsed in Whitehall but there have been cases where a member 
state has sided up to a neighbourhood country and said ‗this isn‘t true‘ or that their 
position is different and it‘s x, y, or z. And you normally get all hell breaking loose 
the following morning. It is very frustrating because it means the EU as a whole lacks 
any credibility if we are not really prepared to deliver tough messages to individual 
countries and by certain member states doing this it obviously drives a wedge 
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amongst ourselves. ‖589 
Despite the member states‘ desire for greater foreign policy consistency, they had at the same time 
shown themselves to be reluctant to allow the Commission to freely manage their external relations or 
to endow the Commission with the necessary competences.
590
 The divergent interests of the member 
states were another challenge facing the European Commission and the ENP. As a consequence there 
were different views of the European approach toward the MENA region and the EU‘s general 
agenda. While the Mediterranean states were keen to see the EU tackle uncontrolled immigration 
from their Mediterranean neighbours, other members wanted the EU to deal with potential infiltration 
of their national territories by Islamist terror networks in the wake of 9/11, and the Scandinavians, 
particularly the Swedes and Finns, saw human rights as their key priority.
591
  
In addition, the claims of member states contradicted their actual policies, especially when European 
policy went against their interests or their domestic agendas which were sometimes driven by internal 
lobby groups such as farmers and textile companies. According to senior official, DG Relex; 
―Spain, France, Italy and Greece, are the ones who are most defensive in certain areas 
like agriculture. Those countries press us for certain things and when you come to test 
them as to whether they would be willing to liberalise more in Mediterranean 
agricultural products they don‘t show much interest.‖592 
This indicated an ambivalent foreign policy discourse, whereby on the one hand outsiders were 
encouraged to emulate the EU in order to avoid the trappings of power politics, but at the same time 
the EU member states did not seem content with, or were even suspicious of, the very institution 
which they themselves created to achieve that purpose.
593
 
Although the European decision makers were keen to build an ENP agenda ―in partnership‖594 with 
EU southern partners of the Mediterranean shores through tailor-made action plans, several scholars 
accused the EU of trying to promote its norms, values and interests aiming to encourage its partners to 
―enter the EU‘s orbit‖ 595 without considering the needs of its partners and their political and social 
norms. Javier Solana admitted that the EU was interested in changing the structure of its neighbours. 
In his speech at the College of Europe in 2006, Solana said ―We do want system change, not regime 
change, we do it slowly, in partnership and without military force. Once they enter the EU‘s orbit, 
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countries are changed forever.‖596 Bengtsson, one of the main critics of the ENP approach, argued that 
the EU determines the ENP agenda, and the: 
―EU rhetoric analysed displays EU power superiority vis-à-vis the ENP countries in a 
number of different ways, both in terms of determining the actual setup of interaction 
(institutional arrangements, incentives, requirements etc.) and by outlining the 
meaning and value of core concepts of cooperation (such as security, democracy and 
development.‖597  
He added that the: 
―EU sees itself as the superior power in the relationship, a potent actor possessing 
forceful resources (money, knowledge and normative framing) that can bring about 
change for the EU as well as others. The neighbouring countries, on the other hand, 
are inferior to the EU in need of help and dependent on the EU for their future 
security and prosperity.‖598  
3.6 The Union for the Mediterranean (2008-2011) 
The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean (UFM), launched in 2008, has been the latest 
European initiative towards the Mediterranean region which aims to ―revitalise efforts to transform 
the Mediterranean into an area of peace, democracy, cooperation and prosperity.‖599 In addition, the 
initiative has aimed to address the ―common challenges facing the Euro-Mediterranean region.‖600 
The new project has been an attempt to build on the previous European initiatives while ―avoiding the 
deadlock and inflexibility imposed by the conditionality associated with the ENP, and to revive the 
MEPP through a European initiative.‖601The important aspects of the new project are its calls for a 
new partnership between public and private sectors, especially in funding the UFM‘s new projects.602 
The new European initiative has taken the Euro-Mediterranean relation to new areas of cooperation, 
and at the same time reemphasises old channel of cooperation such as ―economic and social 
development; world food security; protection of the environment, including climate change and 
desertification, promoting sustainable development; energy; migration; terrorism and extremism; as 
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well as promoting dialogue between cultures.‖603  
The UFM has, however, represented a dramatic change from the past in three very important ways: 
first by ―upgrading the political level of the EU's relationship with its Mediterranean partners,‖604 
second, ―providing for further co-ownership to our multilateral relations‖ and finally making these 
relations more concrete and visible through additional regional and sub regional projects, relevant for 
the citizens of the region.
605
  
3.6.1  The Union for Mediterranean: Motives and Aims  
The UFM needs to be understood within the context of how it came into being. After a year and a half 
of preparations and negotiations, French President Nicholas Sarkozy launched it on the 13
th
 of July 
2008 in Paris. The new European project was launched in the presence of representatives of 43 
governments, including the 27 member states of the European and 12 EMP partners on the southern 
Mediterranean rim and 4 new additions, (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Monaco), the 
European Commission and the League of Arab States.
606
 
Sarkozy was aided in his efforts to establish a new initiative by the prevailing situation. Delgado 
highlighted the ―Mediterranean‘s progressive economic marginalisation‖ the ―deteriorating political 
and social situation particularly in the great Middle East‖ and finally the ―worsening of relations 
between Israel and Palestine, acting as an epicentre of regional frustrations‖607 at the European level. 
She argued that the ―stagnation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and its disappointing 
results favoured the window of opportunity.‖608  
It was also a propitious time for France in particular to lead on the new initiative. According to 
Delgado, Sarkozy was ambitious to strengthen French influence in the EU in fear of losing influence 
in a more competitive and interconnected world. She promoted the notion that France‘s 
Mediterranean policy needed strengthening to establish a new world from  the social unrest which had 
marked  Chirac‘s government, making a tacit promise that the new president represented a change, a 
break with the past.
609
 Thirdly, France sought to balance the intensive focus of Germany towards 
Eastern European members after the enlargement.
610 
The new French project surprised most of his 
partners in the EU since the initiator, Sarkozy, had not consulted or communicated with them before 
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he proposed it to the EU members in February 2008. In addition, the French proposed that the 
Mediterranean Union should be limited to the Mediterranean countries only. The new French 
initiative was not in fact all that ―new‖ since it had been mooted during Sarkozy‘s ascent to the 
French Presidency. 
 The French president launched the idea of a re-configuration of trans-Mediterranean relations in the 
form of the so-called ‗Mediterranean Union‘ during his 2007 electoral campaign.611 Whether the UFM 
has been as a result of French state interests or the ambitions of one person, the aims and objectives 
declared in the Paris summit were deeply familiar: they were dominated by security concerns, 
migration, trade, and markets. In other words, the motives behind EU endorsement of the 2009 
initiative have not really changed from those of the 1970s.
612
 Despite the differences between the EU 
members in their approaches to the region, there was a consensus among them that these interests 
were vital for their collective interests. For example, security is mentioned 8 times in the Paris 
Declaration, migration is mentioned 7 times; energy 5 times; and terrorism 6 times. The Declaration 
has stated that ―Europe and the Mediterranean countries are united by a common ambition: to build 
together a future of peace, democracy, prosperity and human, social and cultural understanding.‖613 It 
has aimed ―to build on that consensus to pursue cooperation, political and socioeconomic reform and 
modernisation on the basis of equality and mutual respect for each other‘s sovereignty.‖614 Most 
crucially, it would: 
―promote conditions likely to develop good-neighbourly relations among themselves 
and support processes aimed at stability, security, prosperity and regional and sub-
regional cooperation; consider any confidence and security-building measures that 
could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an "area of peace 
and stability in the Mediterranean", including the long term possibility of establishing 
a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.‖615 
The Union for the Mediterranean will not replace the Barcelona process but rather ―build on the 
acquis and reinforce the achievements and successful elements of the Barcelona Process.‖616 The three 
chapters of cooperation (Political Dialogue, Economic Cooperation and Free Trade, and Human, 
Social and Cultural Dialogue) will continue to remain central,‖617 but the UFM has kept the bilateral 
ENP framework in place for those interested in joining it. While the UFM Paris declaration has 
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underlined the importance of supporting and strengthening democracy, to ―build a common future 
based on the full respect of democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as 
enshrined in international human rights law.‖618 The emphasis is very much more on building co-
operation at the level of (equal) governments rather than on promoting notions of conditionality, 
sanctions, or inequitable power status within the partnership. This is not least since the key security 
challenges identified in the Declaration require co-operative inter-governmental collaboration.  
The European decision makers and their Mediterranean partners were all aware of the importance of 
the Middle East Peace Process. Therefore they stressed that the UFM would support Peace Process, 
recalling that ―peace in the Middle East requires a comprehensive solution.‖619 A second priority was 
countering terrorism, albeit with an emphasis on ensuring respect of the rule of law and human rights, 
particularly through more effective joint counter-terrorism policies and deeper co-operation. Emphasis 
has been given to the ―need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism in all its 
forms and manifestations without qualification, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever 
purposes‖.  In this regard, it became necessary to ―reiterate the complete rejection of attempts to 
associate any religion or culture with terrorism‖.620  
Fighting illegal migration also has occupied a significant place on the UFM agenda. The UFM 
statement stated that ―fostering links between migration and development are issues of common 
interest which should be addressed through a comprehensive, balanced and integrated approach.‖621 
Creating a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, 
and their delivery systems has also been an important element on the UFM priorities.
622
 
 
Finally, the UFM declaration has identified six priority areas for increased co-operation:  focusing on 
these projects reflected the belief that the future of the Euro-Mediterranean region ―lies in improved 
socio-economic development, solidarity, regional integration, sustainable development and 
knowledge.‖623  
(1) De-pollution of the Mediterranean: Maritime and Land Highways, in order to enhance the 
trade and movement of good and people the UFM has introduce De-pollution of the 
Mediterranean. 
(2) Maritime and Land Highways: the project reflects the importance of the Mediterranean Sea 
as high way for commerce and enhancing regional trade. This, according to the UFM, 
―development of motorways of the sea, including the connection of ports, throughout the 
entire Mediterranean basin as well as the creation of coastal motorways and the 
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modernisation of the trans-Maghreb train, will increase the flow and freedom of the 
movement of people and goods.  The deceleration of the UFM high lights the importance of 
―cooperation in the field of maritime security and safety, in a perspective of global 
integration in the Mediterranean region.‖624  
(3) Civil Protection: considered as a main priority for the region thus joint Civil Protection 
programme on prevention, preparation and response to disasters, linking the region more 
closely to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. 
625
 
(4) Alternative Energies: Mediterranean Solar Plan:  as a result of increased demand on oil and 
gas as the main source of energy the UFM strains the need ―to focus on alternative energy 
sources as a major priority in efforts towards assuring sustainable development.‖626 
(5) The Mediterranean Business Development Initiative: is aimed at assisting the existing entities 
in partner countries operating in support of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises by 
assessing the needs of these enterprises 
 (6)  Building links between universities between both sides is considered as important as the rest 
of other areas therefore, the declaration‘s emphasis on enhancing the cooperation in the 
education by creating new university (Euro-Mediterranean University) the UFM partners 
believe that ―the Euro-Mediterranean University will develop postgraduate and research 
programmes and thus contribute to the establishment of the Euro- Mediterranean Higher 
Education, Science and research area‖.627 
3.6.2  The Institutional Structure of the UFM  
The Paris Summit has established new institutional structures to contribute to the political goals of the 
initiative, particularly reinforcing inclusive co-ownership, upgrading the political level of EU-
Mediterranean relations and achieving visibility through projects.
628
 The Co-presidency, Joint 
Permanent Committee and the Secretariat are the main bodies of the UFM.  
These institutions represent the innovative dimension of the UFM.  In order to reinforce inclusive co-
ownership and allow the non EU members to take part in the decision-making, the UFM has created 
the Co-presidency of the UFM which - according to the decelerations - shall apply to summits, all 
ministerial meetings, senior officials‘ meetings, and the Joint Permanent Committee.629The co-
presidencies will submit the agenda to all parties for approval and work to obtain consensus for the 
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common conclusions of summit, ministerial, and other meetings.
630
 
According to the Marseille Declaration, the Co-presidents will include one from the EU and the other 
from the Mediterranean partner countries. From the EU side, the co-presidency must be compatible 
with the external representation of the EU in accordance with the treaty provisions in force, 
631
 while 
from the Mediterranean partners‘ side, the co-president must be chosen by consensus for a non-
renewable period of two years.
632
 In addition, the declaration has declared that the two co-presidencies 
will call and chair the meetings of the UFM and the co-presidencies will submit for approval the 
agenda of the meetings.
633
Consensus is an important element of the new structures: decision-making, 
particularly at the conclusion of summits, ministerial, and other meetings, must be adopted by 
consensus after the co-presidencies conduct the necessary consultations with all partners.
634
 France 
and Egypt assumed the UFM co-Presidency in 2008.  
The second institution that the UFM has created is the Permanent Joint Committee (JPC). The 
Committee will ―convene regularly in order to prepare the Ministerial meeting, and submit project 
proposals to them as well as the annual work programme for adoption.‖635  The JPC composed of 
national representatives is also a new UFM institution to be based in Brussels where its main 
responsibilities are to prepare the meetings of the Senior Officials and ensure the appropriate follow-
up. The JPC may also act as a mechanism to ―react rapidly if an exceptional situation arises in the 
region that requires the consultation of Euro-Mediterranean partners.‖636 
Finally, the UFM has established its Joint Secretariat for the UFM which was launched in July 2010 
and is based in Barcelona.
637
 The Secretariat is an institutional novelty compared to the Barcelona 
Process. It will work on the basis of guidelines to be set by senior officials and will be responsible for 
several issues starting form ―identification, follow-up, promotion of new projects and the search for 
funding and for implementation partners to including by preparing working documents for the 
decision-making bodies.‖638 
According to the UFM, the Joint Secretariat for the UFM will have a separate legal personality with 
an autonomous status. However, the Secretariat will inform the Joint Permanent Committee and report 
to the Senior Officials. Its mandate is of a technical nature, while the political mandate related to all 
aspects of the initiative remains the responsibility of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Senior 
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Officials.
639
 With regards to its costs, the UFM declaration has articulated that these costs will be 
―funded from an operating grant on a shared and balanced basis by the Euro-Mediterranean partners, 
on a voluntary basis and the Community budget.‖640 
The Heads of State and Governments at the Paris Summit came to a consensus that there would be 
one Secretary General and five Deputy Secretaries General, to be selected by consensus by senior 
officials following proposals made by Euro-Mediterranean partners and on the basis of a short-list 
presented by the co-presidency and the Commission, following consultations to be held with all 
partners and for a term of 3 years. Each has a portfolio corresponding to one of the six priority issues 
identified by the Paris Declaration
.641
 Moreover, the work of the secretary-general and the deputies 
will be assisted by seconded officials in an advisory capacity from relevant national ministries and 
from the EEAS. The nomination of Ahmed Masadeh, a Jordanian diplomat, as the first secretary-
general of the Secretariat was confirmed by the foreign ministers of Egypt, France, Jordan, Spain and 
Tunisia in January 2010.
642
  
The funding and implementation of projects will be pursued on a case-by-case basis by the various 
interested partners according to their own procedures and by ad hoc sub-groups, if necessary, 
including the possibility of involvement in contributing capital from the Gulf countries and the 
creation of a new financial instrument, possibly funded by creating a subsidiary of the European 
Investment Bank.
643
  
The founders of the UFM were aware of the important role that parliamentarians, local and non-
governmental actors have played in the Barcelona Process. Therefore both the Paris and Marseille 
Declarations emphasis include these actors in implementing the UFM. For example the Paris 
declaration sought to ―underscore the importance of the active participation of civil society, local and 
regional authorities and the private sector in the implementation of the Barcelona Process: Union for 
the Mediterranean.‖644  
The declaration added that: ―the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly will be the legitimate 
parliamentary expression of the UFM‖ and the ―Heads of State and Government strongly support the 
strengthening of the role of the EMPA in its relations with Mediterranean partners.‖645 The Paris 
declaration further has stated that the ―ultimate success of the initiative also rests in the hands of 
citizens, civil society and the active involvement of the private sector.
646
 The Marseille Declaration 
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also shed the light on the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) as a way to 
―reinforce the democratic legitimacy of the Partnership‖. The declaration stated that the UFM 
―requires a strong parliamentary dimension‖.647 Therefore the Ministers have underlined that the 
position of the EMPA should be further consolidated and its work better articulated with the other 
institutions of the Partnership.
648
  
3.6.3  Analysis of the UFM 
The design of the institutions can be understood as consolidating the sovereignty of member and 
partner states, rather than as surrendering it to political integrationist tendencies. This corrects a major 
flaw of previous proposals (the imbalance between formal status‘ of North and South Mediterranean) 
but, since consensus has been reinvigorated as the principle for decision-making,  also means that 
there is less chance of getting anything substantive done. Like the EMP, the UFM is ―the framework 
of multilateral relations‖ between EU countries and the Mediterranean non-EU countries.649 Although 
it aims at a wider partnership with EU neighbours through the use of a functional methodology, the 
new initiative has similarly become a victim of the intergovernmental approach which was adopted by 
the UM founders in order to support the concept of co-ownership. 
This contrasts with the functionalist approach of the UFM in promoting development and 
regionalization, and in the continuing preference for utilizing the trade liberalization and market 
power as a policy tools.
650
 For example, the six priority areas for projects
651
 which were outlined in 
the Paris Declaration reflected the strategy and philosophy that promote peace and development 
through fixable co-operative projects (involving the public and private sectors) in key socio-economic 
areas.
652
 The areas which have been chosen for cooperation included projects in which all members 
and partners shared an interest, showing a desire to take advantages of existing economic 
interdependencies and tackling the modern and complex challenges which required regional and 
global cooperation. The project places emphasis on visible, tangible development projects that 
directly affect the lives of ordinary people in the hope that successful co-operation in this sphere will 
lead to a popular acceptance of the institutions 
653
 
Functionalism is also reflected in the ‗project-orientated‘ independent Joint Secretariat, based in 
Barcelona, which handles the technical aspects of the relationship.
654
 The new institution is an attempt 
to create specialized technical agencies as well as new political and administrative institutions linking 
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the chain of cooperation and focusing on ‗community-building.‘655 Thus Bicchi has described the 
UFM as ―a union of projects‖ or, ―a project of projects‖ In this respect, she argues that the UFM 
―represents a number of ambitious innovations.‖656 
Meanwhile, the emphasis on the private sectors, NGOs, business groups and trade associations, and 
small to medium sized enterprises, has also reflected a functionalist approach, assuming that the elites 
in such groups can play a significant role in advancing the integration process through spill-over.  
Finally, the UFM has reflected the founders‘ desire to avoid bringing sensitive political issues to the 
UFM table, mainly the conflict in the Middle East, and avoiding political debates about the surrender 
of national sovereignty which have been the main obstacles that faced the previous initiatives such as 
the EMP.  
All these functionalist dimensions are ultimately undermined by the institutional reliance on inter-
governmentalism and on the requirements of consensus. Thus, although the UFM is a new attempt to 
overcome the shortages and challenges that faced the previous Euro-Mediterranean policy, the 
institutional structure and the decision-making of the UFM has weakened these attempt and 
strengthened the intergovernmental approach at the expenses of functional one. To some extent, this 
was evident in the very manner in which the project was composed.  
Sarkozy sketched out the first version of the UFM, which he called the Union Mediterranean for a 
French domestic audience during his presidential election campaign. After the election he continued 
to work on a proposal without any communication or consultation with his partners
657
 in the EU 
which was, according Bicchi, ―a major breach to the CFSP‘s plea for solidarity among member states 
on matters of foreign policy.‖ 658 
Whether the UFM was ultimately a result of ―high domestic politics‖659 reflecting the personal 
ambitious of the dynamic and energetic French president or a result of the ―policy uncertainty‖660 
which resulted from the on-going conflict in the Middle East, the drafting and preparation period of 
the UFM shows that despite the fact some members, mainly Germany, expressed its observations, the 
EU members cooperated with each other to support the French proposal to serve their own interests. 
France acted as the ―policy entrepreneur‖ in the driving seat with support and cooperation from 
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Spain
661
, which was itself willing to compromise and alter its own proposal in order to meet the needs 
of its partners. The process demonstrated a ―Europeanisation‖ of their own policy and interests. 
 Bicchi used the attitude, motivation and amount of resources that member states invested in the UFM 
imitative as a way to identify the role that various actors played in the UFM. She divides the main 
players into ―leaders, laggards, and fence-sitting actors.‖662 She states that ―according to the amount 
of resources invested, leaders playing a central role against an initiative can, however, act as veto-
players, blocking its adoption.‖ With regards to the motivation, she argues the ―motivation of leaders 
helps to distinguish between, on the one hand, strategic leaders and, on the other, genuine 
entrepreneurs that strive to achieve consensus in the name of the common good.‖ Finally, she believes 
that the marginal players might behave as low-profile supporters or unhappy laggards, but they can 
also strategically look for side payments in exchange for their support or collectively block 
developments through lack of enthusiasm.‖663 
According to her analysis, the German role was in the beginning that of ―fence-sitting‖, changing to 
―calling the bluff‖ by acting as a veto-player because Sarkozy appeared set on pursuing his scheme at 
the expense of the EMP.
664
 Therefore, Germany played an important role in bringing about substantial 
changes to the initiative and in establishing a full role for the EU.
665
 Merkel argued that the creation of 
a Union Mediterranean (UM) that included only Mediterranean riparians had the potential to ―set in 
motion gravitational forces within the EU that in turn could generate a process of fragmentation and, 
eventually, disintegration.‖  EU funding for the pursuit of such exclusively national interests could not 
be justiﬁed.666 
 According to Schumacher this strategy was intended to ―portray Merkel as acting in defence of the 
‗common good‘‖ and to ―prevent France from becoming primus inter pares in European foreign 
policy matters and thereby undermining Germany‘s role as the leading actor within the EU, and to 
preclude a resurgence of French colonial ambitions.‖667  By utilising its veto power and financial 
resources, and by mobilising eastern, northern European members who were considered as unhappy 
laggards, Germany managed to pressure France to alter its initiatives and include all the EU members 
instead of only those on the Mediterranean shore.
668
   
According to Bicchi, the central and eastern European members swung between being ―low proﬁle 
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supporters, favour exchangers and unhappy laggards, calling for an eastern equivalent and thus 
supporting the Eastern Partnership,‖669 while according to the same classification the other northern 
European countries, such as the UK, maintained a low proﬁle on the issue, reflecting the low priority 
assigned to the dossier and the lack of interest in what is regarded as an essentially French political 
game.
670
  
Schumacher found that the Polish position was scattered between its tragic partnerships with France 
as its main allay in the EU and between its special relations with Germany. Accordingly, the Polish 
leaders ―refrained from making any reference to the UM/UfM, as positive and negative comments 
alike‖ since this would have generated criticism either at home or in France. The Polish government 
considered that supporting the French initiative might have affected the intersection of interests and 
attitudes between Poland and Germany. However, fears of a negative impact of the UFM on 
Germany‘s ambitions in Eastern Europe prompted them to side with the German Chancellery in its 
opposition to the creation of the UM.
671
 Schumacher believes that this attitude was also evident in 
both Hungary and the Czech Republic which could thus be described as ―unhappy laggards‖. Both 
countries took a negative attitude towards France‘s UM initiative but neither played a visible role in 
seeking to undermine it.
672
  
The way that these two countries dealt with the differences between EU presidency and the UFM co-
presidency is a good example of the ―side payment‖ approach that the EU members have utilised in 
order to reach agreement. Hungary managed to build a balance between Franco-Hungarian and 
Franco-German relations both of which are of major importance to Hungary, first by supporting the 
German and Swedish calls to pay more attention to the eastern members of the EU,  and by building a 
bilateral strategic partnership with France after Hungary's Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany visited 
France.  This deal can be considered ―a reward and a side payment in exchange for Gyurcsany‘s 
moderate public stance on the French initiative.‖673 
According to Schumacher,  the Czech Republic accepted to allow France to keep the co-Presidency of 
the UFM, even during the Czech‘s own EU Presidency, as part of deal with Sarkozy according to 
which the French president promised the domestically-weakened Czech Prime Minister, Mirek 
Topol nek, that he will first ―refrain from interfering in eastern European matters‖, second 
―acknowledge Topolanek as the leader of central and eastern European EU member states, and third, 
facilitate President Barack Obama‘s presence at the EU–US summit in Prague in April 2009.674 
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However, in 2010 the Czech caretaker government of Prime Minister Fischer took a different 
direction from Topolanek and allied his country with Germany, the United Kingdom and Sweden in 
opposing all the French efforts to secure a generous budget for the UFM Secretariat.
675
  
Bicchi places the Southern European partners, Spain and Italy, in the role of ―low-proﬁle supporter or 
favour exchanger‖ despite their efforts to promote, and the resources they put into, supporting the 
project.
676
  France, Italy and Spain have traditionally constituted the main alliance in the 
Mediterranean club and there has been a strong cooperation between them when it comes to Euro-
Mediterranean policy.  As previously explained, Spain was behind the EMP and invested a great deal 
of political capital in promoting the initiative from the early 1990s with support from France, which 
since 1994 and until the Barcelona conference, behaved as a de facto policy co-entrepreneur with 
Spain and the European Commission.
677
  During the preparation and drafting for the Barcelona 
process, the Spanish government made enormous efforts to convince the rest of the EU members that 
the Barcelona Process was not simply a southern European issue, wanting to ―see further 
enhancement of the EU Mediterranean Policy rather than an alternative approach to the area.‖678 
Yet despite the long history of co-operation between France and Spain, the 2007 French 
Mediterranean Union (UM) initiative was a surprise for Spain since France did not consult before 
launching its initiative, either bilaterally or through the Euro-Mediterranean framework.
679
 
Nonetheless, according to Gillespie, although Spain was concerned at the implications of the UFM on 
the EMP, it joined with Italy in supporting the new project and ―tried to work as co-entrepreneurs.‖ 
Ultimately they failed to do so as France insisted on its role as ―the sole leader.‖ Gillespie argues that 
while this was against the trend of cooperation that both countries had built in the run-up to the 
Barcelona Conference, it was inspired by previous forms of co-operation. 
680
   
Spain supported the UM/UFM project for various reasons: first they are considered advocates of a 
Euro-Mediterranean policy and therefore it is difficult for Spain to oppose a new initiative that 
supports its own basic policy towards what it considers as its backyard, ―especially now that the 
eastern enlargement had increased the EU‘s focus on the East.‖ 681Second Spanish –French 
cooperation is not limited to co-operation in the Euro-Mediterranean region but includes other areas 
of co-operation important to Spanish security and economic progress, such as co-operation against 
Basque separatists, Islamist terrorism, the management of migration ﬂows and major infrastructural 
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projects (energy networks, high-speed train links).
682
  Similar to the Czech Republic, Spain made a 
deal with France whereby France would support the ―candidature of Barcelona to host the permanent 
Secretariat in return for Spain accepting that ‗Barcelona Process‘ would disappear from the name of 
the UfM.‖683 
This process of states responding to the French initiative, in the variety of ways depicted by Bicchi 
and Schumacher, is a good illustration of the role of member states within the CFSP as a whole, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. States are fundamentally self-interested and utilise inter-
governmental mechanisms to pursue those interests. At the same time, however, being members of the 
EU means that they are constantly re-evaluating and refining those interests, balancing their relative 
priorities and seeking to maximise gain through bargaining within the Union. They utilise 
compromises and side payments to reach agreements.  
3.6.4  The Institutional Architecture and the Intergovernmental Elements of the UFM  
However, when it comes to the UFM, its decision-making mechanism has been built on consensus 
and states, including non-member states, can exercise veto power, which they have done to politicise 
the UFM agenda. The founders of the UFM were aware that the unequal balance of power between 
the EU members and their Southern and Eastern (SEM) Mediterranean partners was one the reasons 
that limited the scope of cooperation among the EMP partners. Southern Mediterranean states had 
been faced with a "take it or leave it" option regarding the proposed EU initiatives in the EMP
 
and the 
institutional structure of the EMP had been ―slanted in favour of the interests of the European 
Union.‖684 Thus, to redress this imbalance, France had insisted on co-ownership in agenda-setting and 
decision-making within the UFM, as well as intergovernmental co-operation based on consensus.
685
 
Adopting the intergovernmental approach will, Delgado argues, well serve all the UFM partners: for 
the Arab partners this will allow them to guarantee fully their sovereignty thus they ―will have a more 
interested and constructive attitude towards the functions of the UFM.‖686 For the European members 
they would not be ―subjected to the European Union; all countries would be given more leeway, 
gaining independence.
687
  
However, the outcomes of the UFM activities to date have not met the expectations of its founders for 
several reasons. First, unlike the previous EMP initiatives, the UFM has become not just a victim of 
the divergent interests of the EU members but has also proven vulnerable to conflicts between the 
political interests of the non-EU members who have subsequently politicised the UFM agenda. For 
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example, the conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis, and the dispute between the Turks and the 
Greeks over Cyprus, and between Algerians and Moroccans over Western Sahara, has both obstructed 
consensus-based decision-making. In other words, instead of being used in a constructive manner, full 
sovereignty has been employed as an obstacle with conflicting parties utilizing their veto power as for 
political ends.  
This has been particularly true of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Since the launch of the UFM the Israeli-
Arab conflict has blocked any substantive policy developments in Euro-Mediterranean relations and 
every new project becomes its victim.
688
 From the first day of the UFM, it has been plagued by 
questions on how to address the Middle East Peace Process, and on the possible role for the Arab 
League. Unwilling to sit with Israeli delegations, three leaders of the MENA region were absent even 
on the launch day of the UFM in Paris meeting;  former Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi, who 
once described the union as a new form of colonialism,
689
 King Mohammed VI of Morocco and King 
Abdullah II of Jordan. In addition, the Syrian president snubbed Israel by walking out of a speech by 
Ehud Olmert.
690
  
The participation of the Arab league in the UFM has split its members. The debate was on whether or 
not to allow the Arab League to participate in the UFM meetings dominated a meeting of the Union in 
Marseille. Israel opposes granting the Arab League observer position with rights to intervene in the 
UFM meetings, arguing that the Arab League ―has been unhelpful in the search for peace in the 
Middle East‖ and denying it should have an expanded role.691 The Arabs have meanwhile insisted on 
the Arab League‘s participation since it has been customary for a representative of the Arab League to 
participate in EMP meetings.  
By the end of 2008 a deal was done: after an Israeli official was appointed as deputy secretary-general 
(joining officials from the Palestinian National Authority, Greece, Italy, and Malta) Israel dropped its 
opposition to the Arab League‘s request to participate in the UFM as observers, which also gained the 
right to participate with full rights.
692
  
This supports the argument that it is difficult to separate between the non-controversial technical and 
economic issues on the one hand and political issues on the other. The weak role of the supranational 
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institutions, such as the Joint Secretariat, the European Commission and the EP in decision-making, 
reinforces the flaws of the UFM‘s inter-governmentalism. The political mandate relates to all aspects 
of the initiative remains the responsibility of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Senior Officials. 
And even at this level, there are problems. 
The Treaty of Lisbon which entered into force on 1 December 2009 has aspired to overcome the 
constraints that had hampered the CFSP, including complex decision-making, dualism of 
representation and tension between the EU institutions.  However, the picture that emerges from the 
UFM structure, interactions, and activities to date show that these expectations have not been met.  
First, with regard to the presentation of the EU in the UFM there has been no clear answer to several 
questions such as, who will represent the EU in the UFM Conferences of the Heads of State and 
Governments?  What kind of roles will the UFM give to the new positions that the Lisbon Treaty has 
created? I.e. the President of the European Council (Herman Van Rompuy), and the High 
Representative for External Affairs and Vice President of the Commission (Catherine Ashton).  
The UFM has a shared EU and non-EU co-Presidency, whose representatives is elected by the parties 
and remains in office for two years. As explained above, France has managed through its policy of 
making side payments to convince the Czech Republic, Hungary and Spain to ensure it will keep its 
co-presidency position even after the end of the rotating president. However, the European 
representation in the UFM has still not been clear: especially that the European co-President of the 
UFM will not be the new EU President but an "ad hoc" co-President who will take over from France 
for two years.
693
  This leads to questions such as whether the Council should nominate an ad hoc 
representative to the UFM for the prescribed two year period or should the EU President in office be 
the co-President for a six month period?
694
 In addition, the concept of the co-presidency that France 
created in order to support co-ownership has raised the suspicion that ―their notion of the UFM sits 
uneasily with the policy line pursued by Paris and this fact contributes to their perception of loss of 
ownership over Euro-Mediterranean co-operation processes when compared to the Barcelona 
Process.‖695 
The UFM intergovernmental approach which was designed and supported by France has troubled 
some EU members who believe that, although the UFM is French project, it is still an EU policy and 
therefore it should conform to Treaty stipulations.
696
  As a result, there has been tension among 
member states over the role of the European Commission and the role of the EEAS.  The smaller 
members, such as Spain were in favour of involving the EU institutions more, particularly the 
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European Commission. Spain has thus been more of a ―team player and has looked to 
entrepreneurship and alliances rather than a unilateral style of leadership in order to exert influence in 
Euro-Mediterranean relations.‖697   Marginalizing the role of new Lisbon Treaty institutions such as 
the EEAS have also worried Germany, which believes: 
―It is necessary that the EEAS will speak for the European countries‘ ‗[w]e do not 
want southern European countries to focus exclusively on the southern border and 
eastern European countries doing the same on the eastern border. This would lead to a 
division of the European Union‖.698 
In addition to the tension among the UFM member over the location of the Secretariat, the tension 
over its responsibility and role has also affected its ability to function. Ahmad Masa‘deh the former 
Secretary General of the Union for the Mediterranean, was prompted to resign, stating in an interview 
that the Secretariat budget was reduced by more than 60% which reflects the willingness and the 
orientation that the countries have.
699
 
Two years after its establishment, the UFM has not achieved any significant policy outcomes and a 
visible rapproachment between the two shores of the sea is still lacking. The Israeli attacks on the 
Gaza Strip at the end of 2008 effectively stalled the UFM, as the Arabs refused to meet their Israeli 
counterparts prompting the UFM to cancel all the ministerial meetings scheduled for the first half of 
2009. 
The second summit of the Head of States and Governments in Barcelona, which was planned to take 
place in Barcelona on June 7 2010, was cancelled as well under the threat from the Arab side to 
boycott it if Israelis foreign minister, Avigdor Liebermann, would attend. This decision prompted the 
Spanish presidency and the two co-chairs of the Mediterranean Union, Egypt and France, to postpone 
the summit to November ―to give the peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians a chance to 
succeed and time to bear fruit.‖700  Sectoral meetings of the Union for the Mediterranean have also 
been affected by the Arab-Israeli conflict.   
Although the 43 ministers of the UFM countries managed during their ministerial summit in 
Barcelona in April 2010 to reach an agreement on the technical aspects of water co-operation in the 
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Mediterranean region, they failed to reach agreement on the political issues.
701
  The summit failed to 
approve a joint strategy for guaranteeing the water resources of the whole Mediterranean basin 
because of the conflict between the Israeli and the Arabs over the terminology when Israel and Arab 
countries disagreed over how to name the occupied Palestinian Territories.  Israel‘s representatives 
objected to ―occupied territories‖ in the document and proposed instead the term ―territories under 
occupation‖ which was not accepted by the Arab bloc.702 
 According to the former Secretary General of the Union for the Mediterranean Ahmad Masa‘deh, 
neither was there an agreement in the ministerial meeting on labour.  Two other ministerial meetings, 
on higher education and agriculture, were cancelled because of the same discrepancy.  The political 
dialogue and security cooperation among the UFM also remains hostage to the conflict,
703
 as the war 
on Gaza has led to suspension of a Foreign Affairs Ministers meeting which was planned to take place 
in Istanbul in November 2009.
704
  The conflict in the Middle East has also affected the funding 
opportunity of the UFM.  The UFM founders expected the Gulf region to contribute to the project 
with funding, however the ―investors from the Gulf regions will have to be reassured that there will be 
no indirect advantages for Israel.‖705 The conflict between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus has also 
affected the UFM implantation and process.  Cyprus was against appointing a Turkish official as a 
Deputy Secretary General, although after a long negotiation, Cyprus accepted the creation of a sixth 
Deputy Secretary General Position assigned to a Turkish official.
706
 
Thus, although the UFM adopted a ﬂexible, functionalist approach to supporting regionalisation, by  
adopting a purely intergovernmental approach to decision-making and structural institutions, it  has 
led to strengthening ―bilateral deal-making‖ at the expense of regionalism in contradiction to 
community policies.
707
 The UFM has aimed to deploy a strategy of attracting rather than coercing 
countries into co-operation and interdependency, utilising functionalist incentives to increase the sub-
regional co-operation among the UFM members. In fact, it has diluted the supranationalist elements, 
such as they were, of the ENP and moreover, as Bicchi pointed out, the increase in the number of 
participants has further contributed to the dilution of regionalism.  
―By increasing the range of diverse interests that must be accommodated, it implies 
the need to focus on sub-regional projects and the related impossibility to achieve 
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anything substantial with over 40 members‖.708 
3.7 Conclusion  
This chapter traced the succession of European initiatives towards the Mediterranean region (of which 
the OPTs is a key part), assessing the motivations for such initiatives, the means by which they come 
into being, the institutions which they have constructed, and the challenges which they have faced. 
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from this chapter.  
First, with regards to the motives of the European initiatives, this chapter demonstrates that despite the 
importance of economic benefits of such initiatives, such as opening up new markets for European 
products in southern Mediterranean states, European initiatives towards the Mediterranean have been 
motivated predominantly by the shared security concerns of EU member states. Some of these 
security concerns reflected the Cold War era during the 1970s and 1980s; others until now occupying 
a position on the European agenda. In general, instability, fears of violent spill over into Europe, 
combating terrorism, securing energy and controlling illegal  migration have been  the main motives 
of the European regional initiatives towards the Mediterranean region from the 1960s to 2009. 
The EU has sought to secure these interests by adopting an approach which builds on and extends its 
own successful experience in economic integration. Drawing on liberal principles and values, such as 
trade liberalisation, complex economic interdependencies, the eradication of differences between 
―high and low‖ politics, and economic aid to support reform, they have adopted economic tools to 
achieve political ends.  In this they have endorsed a largely functionalist approach.  However, at times 
– and corresponding to the more supra-nationalist ―moments‖ in the CFSP‘s own history - they have 
attempted to advance a more normative approach which has sought to promote democratisation and 
respect for human rights not just as means to an end but as desirable in their own right. The fortunes 
of these initiatives have founded on a lack of political commitment on the part of member states to 
pursue the sanctioning tools available to them when doing so threatened the short-term security 
interests they had been most eager to defend.  
They have also been victim to the basic inter-governmentalism which continues to lie at the heart of 
all the regional initiatives. The EU institutions, particularly the Commission, have admittedly played 
significant roles in developing and promoting the initiatives, but the institutions which have 
subsequently been set up have not had the power to overcome the self-interested politicking and 
bargaining of member states. The EU institutions have in many ways and instances set the agenda in 
favour of the regional initiatives. For example, the European Parliament‘s reports on human rights 
violations were important in putting human rights issues onto the Euro-Mediterranean agenda. The 
European Commission reports added new inputs to the member states‘ proposals and 
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contributed to bringing closer the views of member states. The European Commission was also 
behind the increase in the European aid to the Mediterranean states to go in parallel with trade 
agreements.   It has acted as the executive power of the EMP and the ENP. In fact, the European 
Commission was in some ways the father of the ENP, showing that the role of the supranational 
actors in European foreign affairs has increased since the Maastricht Treaty and the power and 
influence affecting decision-making the European foreign affairs have been diffused across different 
institutions and actors in the European institutions.  That the roles of the European Commission and 
the EP in proposing and implementing policy have generated a functionalist dynamic goes in parallel 
with inter-governmentalism. 
But at the same time, the inter-governmentalism of the various initiatives has been subverted by 
member-states themselves. The chapter shows although EEC/EU members come to the negotiating 
table at the European level with pre-determined interests that reflect their domestic preferences, the 
outcomes of European policies are not just a product of self-interested behaviour.  Despite the strong 
divergent interest of the member states, they can co-operate with each other in order to achieve their 
common goals.  The French, Spanish and Italian alliance to support the GMP and the EMP and later 
the UFM support this argument. In addition, the preparation, formulation and negotiation of these 
initiatives shows that the members had been flexible in their negotiation positions; they bargained and 
compromised, exchanging favour for favour.  
The side payments that Sarkozy offered to the Czech Republic and Spain in order to gain their support 
for the UFM was a clear example of this tendency.  Thus, we see the socialising impact of 
membership. The French submission and compliance to the German pressure to include all the EU 
members in the UFM is another example shows that EU members modify their national preferences to 
correspond with the rest of the EU members. Thus membership of the EEC/EU can itself affect how 
understandings of state interests are constructed at any given point in time (again suggesting that 
constructivist approaches to understanding EU policy-making can be useful).  Finally, and whilst 
there is no space to elaborate fully on this aspect now, the roles which have been played by dominant 
individual personalities like Nicolas Sarkozy or Angela Merkl, and their political preferences, can 
influence the will and formulation for policy. 
This chapter shows how small and medium members, states such Spain, can change and influence the 
policies of the big members and the direction of the European policies in general.  Domestic pressure, 
local constituencies and party politics within states also has also played a role in shaping European 
policies and changing its outcomes. Excluding the agricultural products coming from Mediterranean 
non-members from the GMP and EMP agreements have been a result of the pressure coming from 
Italian farmers, for example. In sum, member states have been constructing their national 
understandings of interest as much within the framework of their EU membership as on the basis of 
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their status as independent nation states.  Membership of the EEC/EU can itself affect how 
understandings of state interests are constructed at any given point in time so constructivist 
approaches can also be useful where constructivists have argued that EU actors alter their behaviour 
and interests and identities as a result of the socialising process in the EU. 
Nonetheless, in tracing the European initiatives towards the Mediterranean region it is clear that the 
members are the main players. They upload their national preference to the European level believing 
this is the best way to pursue these preferences more effectively since they cannot attain them through 
unilateral action. The Spanish and the French enthusiasm for the EMP and the UFM are examples of 
that. In contrast, the research shows that the member states also adjust their policies to go with the 
EEC/EU regulations and norms.  
In other words, there are both top down and bottom-up dimensions to European foreign policy toward 
the Mediterranean. There are both inter-governmental and supranationalist dynamics driving and 
shaping collective foreign-policy making, and there are both state and non-state (both sub-national 
and supra-natioal) actors involved. It could then be argued that the European regional initiatives 
towards the Mediterranean have developed along a ―third way‖ which does not match to one single 
classic theory or model. In this multi-level multi-actor environment, and given the still dominant 
position of inter-governmentalism in the policy-making process, it can be concluded that the member 
states will mostly co-operate and adopt the CFSP if they have a clear convergence in their interests.  If 
they believe that ‗collective action‘ through EU mechanisms will serve their interests better than 
going it alone, they come together to gain a maximum interest. However, if member states believe that 
going with the EU will put their interests at risk, they are unwilling to co-operate.  Finally, if the 
member states‘ interest becomes contradictory with EU‘s policy programs, including institutional 
engagement within EU, they rather choose their own national interest and sacrifice the EU‘s CFSP.  
In the middle, there are an infinite number of negotiable ―bargains‖ to be made. 
This creates tension between the member states and the European institutions themselves, especially 
when member states retreat from the normative dimensions to supranationalist commitments, such as 
with human rights or democracy promotion.  EU members prefer to approach the region in a realist 
manner, focusing more on short-term priorities, mainly security cooperation and limiting the influence 
of Islamist parties which are seen as hostile towards the West and Israel.   
This leaves a gap or paradox between the European Union‘s stated intentions and actual policy on the 
ground.  It shows that the EU is a realist actor in liberal clothes.  In other words, democracy and rule 
of law are not an ends of European policies, but rather a means to enhance European security. If 
liberal values and policies put European security at risk or lead to instability and conflict in the short 
run, they are abandoned (or at least relegated) in the EU‘s priorities. 
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Thus, the political behaviour of the EU towards the Mediterranean can be explained and understood 
principally within the realist framework where the security, stability and self -interest of the EU and 
its member states are the main factors determining its behaviour. Finally, external factors also play a 
role in limiting European regional initiatives, specifically the Israel-Arab conflict. The European 
attempts to establish security guarantees between the conflicting parties of the region and to create a 
stable regional environment through regional cooperation have been undermined by the interests of 
the conflicting parties who have politicised the European initiatives and made them victim of their 
own conflict. The next chapter will explore the EU‘s political role in, and policy towards, the MEPP 
in more detail, extending the context of EU policy-making towards the OPTs which has been started 
in this chapter. 
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Chapter Four: The EPC/CFSP Political Involvement in the Middle East Conflict and Peace 
Process from the 1970s -2009 
―The Europeans will be unable to achieve 
anything in the Middle East in a million years.‖ 
Henry Kissinger.
709
 
4.1 Introduction  
According to Gomez, the Arab-Israeli conflict has long been ―a benchmark of its [the EU‘s] status as 
an international political actor.‖710 This chapter will focus on the developing political positions of 
Europe towards the Conflict and the Peace Process under the EPC and the CFSP starting from the 
beginning of 1970s until the beginning of 2009. The objective of the chapter is twofold. Firstly, to 
provide a narrative of the developing policies and role of the EEC/EU over the period, and secondly, 
to ―un-pick‖ this narrative to identify the main determinants of that role. These determinants are 
identified as: a) the divergent interests and identities of the member states, b) the relations of member 
states towards the U.S and, relatedly, the U.S position towards the European role, c) the inclination of 
Israel to resist a European political role, and the preferences of some member states to protect Israel‘s 
interests, and d) the hindrances caused by the institutional structures and mechanisms of the 
EPC/CFSP in presenting a unified, coherent and independent political role.  
 The chapter focuses on the collective policy pursued by the EEC/EU rather than on the policies of 
individual European states, although separation of the two is not always practical and it will be 
necessary to highlight specific instances of member-state policy. The chapter concludes that the 
analysis demonstrates the relevance of realist interpretations of EU foreign-policy making, 
highlighting the ongoing prevalence of inter-governmentalism, and suggesting that the development 
of a (limited) European political role in recent decades has been more a consequence of functional 
spill-overs and external environment than supranationalist integration within the EU. 
4.2 The Narrative of Developing European Collective Foreign Policy towards the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict and the MEPP 
This section provides a narrative of the development of collective European foreign policy towards 
the conflict and the MEPP.  It is divided into sections addressing the era of the EPC and that of the 
CFSP. It does not seek to address in detail the most recent era of the European 
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External Action Service (EEAS) since it is still too early to make a measured assessment of that 
component and since the thesis ―ends‖ its analysis with the events of early 2009. 
4.2.1 The EPC Mechanism and the Community’s Policy towards the Middle East and the 
Arab-Israel conflict 
Modern European relations with the Middle East can be divided into four major phases. The first 
phase being from the First War World War until the Second World War (1914-1950s). This period 
witnessed two major events; first the colonising of the vast majority of the Arab World by the main 
European powers France, Britain and Italy, and second, establishing  Israel under support and 
protection of the Western empires mainly Britain.
711
 The second phase started in the 1950s and lasted 
until the end of the 1980s. This period witnessed two major political developments. First, the decline 
of the European presence in the Arab World; second, ―triumphs of independence movements in the 
Arab states.‖712 A result of these events the Europeans, as Hollis described it, ―retreated into the 
background and focused increasingly on developing their European Economic Community.‖713  
The third phase of European-Arab world relations began with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
establishment of the EU in 1992, until the start of the Second Intifada in 2000, and the collapse of 
MEPP. This period was marked by the launch of the MEPP in Madrid Conference in 1991. Finally, 
the last phase of the European involvement in the Middle East covers the period from 2000 till 2009. 
To place the second phase in context, we must first briefly examine the earlier historical period. The 
era from 1914 onwards witnessed the major events that have since shaped Middle Eastern politics.  
After the conclusion of World War I in 1918 and the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, the main 
European powers - Britain and France - sought to implement their secretly managed plans to redesign 
and partition the Arab world between themselves. The 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement was a secret 
agreement between the governments of Britain and France, according to which Syria and Lebanon 
would come under French rule, while Iraq and Palestine would be placed under British rule. 
Britain had, however, made contradictory promises to both the Arabs and British Jews in order to 
obtain their support for the war effort.
714
 In the Hussein-McMahon correspondence of 1915, the 
British promised their Arab allies, led by Sherif Hussein of Mecca, that they would support the 
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creation of an independent Arab state if they fought with Britain against the Ottomans and the 
Germans. At the same time they promised the international Zionist movement support for a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine via the 1917 Balfour Declaration. In the event, the League of Nations awarded 
Britain and France mandates to rule over the territories as they had wished in their own Sykes-Picot 
agreement.
715
 
As a result of the Balfour Declaration and a tolerant policy towards Jewish migration to Palestine, the 
Jewish population in that territory increased rapidly during the inter-war period at the expense of the 
native Palestinians. According to Sherman ―the Jewish population in Palestine grew from one-sixth to 
almost one-third of the total‖. 716Additionally, under the supportive structures of the British mandate, 
the new Jewish migrants managed to build a Jewish quasi-state, equipped with both financial and 
military resources. 
717
 
During the 1920s and 1930s the conflict between the Palestinians and the Zionist movement 
intensified in Palestine. The British tolerance of Zionist immigration and the latter‘s exclusivist 
practices against the Palestinians provoked increasingly fierce Arab resistance, with violence breaking 
out between the two communities in instances such as the Jaffa riots in 1921 and the Great Uprising 
of 1936-1939.  After a respite during World War II, tensions mounted once more, with the Zionists 
now turning their attention towards the British themselves. Jewish terrorism and the pressures of 
maintaining order in Palestine proved too much for war-exhausted Britain, and it turned the 
―problem‖ of Palestine over to the new UN for resolution.  On 29 November 1947 the United Nations 
General Assembly approved UNGA Resolution 181, which recommended partitioning Palestine into 
two states, one Jewish and one Arab, with Jerusalem remaining an International City under UN 
control. The fighting intensified after the partition resolution, as the Zionists sought to extend and 
consolidate their control over as much of Palestine as possible in advance of any territorial division. 
The armies of their Arab neighbours - Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq – moved in to liberate 
Palestine and in the resulting war (and largely as a consequence of forced evacuations by the Zionist 
army) a hundred thousand Palestinians were killed and hundreds of thousands more forced to flee 
their homes and become refugees. The State of Israel was declared on the date on which the British 
mandate expired and the British withdrew from Palestine, 14 May 1948. When in the subsequent war 
the Arab armies were defeated, a new reality was created which would shape the entire region 
henceforth.  
In the surrounding Arab states, the humiliation of defeat provided fuel for anti-colonial resistance 
movements, which blamed the poor performance on old elites which had collaborated with the British 
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and French at the expense of their own peoples. A wave of populist revolutions and nationalist coups 
d‘états swept across the region, pushing Britain and France out of their colonial outposts and leading 
to newly independent Arab nation-states. 
Britain and France were thus largely supportive of the new Jewish state which represented a 
remaining ―European‖ bastion in the region. Together with the United States, on the 25th of May 1951 
they issued the Tripartite Declaration advancing a collective position towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. This sought to stabilise the Armistice Agreements which had ended the war and to control 
the flow of arms to the Middle East so as not to supply weapons to states harbouring aggressive 
designs. The three countries thus supported the existence of the State of Israel within the 1949 
armistice lines, not the borders set by the 1947 partition resolution, therefore recognising Israeli 
sovereignty over those areas occupied by force in 1948-9.   
Many other Western states also supported Israel, particularly those countries that were most culpable 
in the Holocaust - especially West Germany. The latter provided the young Israeli state with extensive 
reparation payments (including a first payment of $865m in 1952) and clandestine shipments of 
weapons.
718
 West German economic aid continued throughout the 1960s, long before America 
became Israel's main source of outside support (Economist, 2006).  Meanwhile, France was soon to 
break the Tripartite Agreement, becoming Israel‘s major arms supplier, and providing Israel with a 
modern air force and ultimately with nuclear power.  In 1956, France and Britain collaborated in and 
supported Israel's attack on Nasser's Egypt as their interests in resisting Arab nationalism in other 
colonial outposts coincided with Israel‘s ambitions to extend its borders.719 
Whilst European states were individually supportive of the Israeli state, in general during the 1950s 
and 1960s, the EEC did not arrive at a collective or positive position towards Palestinian issues such 
as the right to self-determination, the return of the refugees or the desirability of a Palestinian state. 
According to Othman; ―the West saw the solution of the refugee problem as occurring over time with 
the absorption of the refugees into their host societies and believed the Palestinians would come to 
accept this.‖720 To sum up this period, it can be argued that the Western European colonial states, 
mainly Britain and France, and then West Germany, played vital roles in laying the groundwork for 
the creation and consolidation of Israel.  
The second phase of the European policies towards the Middle East began in the mid-1950s.  This 
phase witnessed the retreat of the European empires from the Middle East and the embedding of the 
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Cold War. In addition, this period witnessed the establishment of the EPC in the 1970s.  Indeed, the 
1970s and 1980s could be seen as a period in which the European Community and its member states 
were experimenting with foreign policy cooperation, sometimes with a successful outcome, 
sometimes not.
721
 From 1970 to the Oslo agreement, Europe changed its view of the case on the issue 
of Palestinian refugees into a national cause and Europe has subsequently played an important 
role in promoting the idea of  with the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the right of the 
Palestinian people to self-determination.  
 Over the years that followed the establishment of the European Community in 1957, and then the 
establishing of the EPC in 1971, the Arab-Israeli conflict was a pivotal issue for the European 
Community in its foreign affairs and dominated the relationship between Europe and the Arab World, 
even to the point of becoming hostage to it. The conflict was one of the most controversial foreign 
policy issues for the Community, and served to unify it on some points and divide it on others. It was 
not too be long before conflicts between the interests and priorities of the European countries began to 
surface, due to distinctions and differences in the historical ties between various European countries 
and the Arab world.  
In the first decade after the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957 the European Community was 
considered quite supportive of Israel.
722
 However, by the mid-1960s a group of countries, led by 
France, had converted to the Arab cause and were seeking a new, common European position with 
respect to the Arab-Israel conflict. Other states, however, proved disinclined to support the common 
policy that France had been looking for.
723
 
The June 1967 war brought to light the divisions within the EEC over the role and policies of the 
Community towards the Middle East in general, and particularly with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.
724
 The six member states did not take a common position towards the June War and the 
European Community had been incapable of presenting a common stance.
725
 The problem was so 
intense that avoidance of the issue was even deemed preferable to confronting it. The German 
Chancellor, Kissinger, said after the Rome Summit ―I felt ashamed at the Rome Summit, just as the 
war was on the point of breaking out, we could not even agree to talk about it.‖ 726 
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Each member state had taken a separate position based on its national interests and policies at the 
time. France was the only member which condemned the Israeli aggression, and considered that Israel 
had started the war. Trying to retain some of its historic influence within the Arab region in the new, 
post-independence era, France supported the position of the Arab states in the UN and demanded the 
implementation of UN Security Council resolution 242, itself largely formulated by France.
727
 
General De Gaulle declared that the Arab-Israeli conflict had to be settled on the basis of a full Israeli 
withdraw from the territories recently occupied and mutual recognition among the parties to the 
conflict. France also imposed a complete cessation of future arms sales to Israel.  
France's position stood out as unique amongst the other generally pro-Israeli European countries.
728
 
The other five members of the community, especially Germany and Holland, were largely supportive 
of the Israeli aggression, not least out of a sense of obligation to the Jewish state in the wake of the 
Holocaust.
729
 Within that rubric, however, some differences prevailed.  Belgium, not wanting to form 
its own policy, was a staunch supporter of the UN, while Italy held a pro-Israeli stance despites 
factional difference within its own government.
730
 Britain, somewhere in the middle, saw itself as 
neutral in the conflict but hoped to achieve an international solution which would satisfy its own pro-
Israeli ally, the United States. 
The efforts at constructing an independent European identity and voice free of American dominance 
in a Cold-War-divided continent and led by France bumped up against British trans-Atlanticism. 
Larger states sought to influence the continent disproportionately as smaller states took refuge behind 
the United Nations; and historical national interests and concerns took precedence over any urgency 
to find a common voice.  The result had initially been in Israel‘s favour. However, following Israel's 
territorial expansion in the wake of the 1967 war, European governments began to adjust their policies 
in the direction of greater balance. Concerns over the European failure to act commonly towards the 
1967 war, and the increased economic power of the community after its enlargement to include the 
UK, Denmark and Ireland, prompted the Community to coordinate and harmonise their foreign policy 
through the EPC.  During the 1970s, the European Community issued a series of official publications 
and declarations towards the conflict in the Middle East within the framework of the EPC, each of 
which introduced a new political stance towards the conflict. The Community, via these declarations 
managed to define a set of principles on which the member states could agree the solution of the 
conflict should be based.  
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4.2.2  Schumann Paper of May 1971 
The Schumann Paper of May 1971 is the first example of the Community‘s effort to grapple with the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Only a couple of months after the establishment of the EPC system, and at the 
first EPC ministerial meeting in Munich in 1970, the first item on the agenda was the Middle East 
conflict, put there at the request of France.
731
 Due to considerable differences in the points of view 
and perceptions of the member states, the meeting failed to reach any kind of consensus or common 
position on the conflict. This failure motivated the French government to propose a new initiative, 
through the Political Committee, a diplomatic manoeuvre aimed to persuade the European 
Community of the advantages of having a common position on the conflict.  
The Political Community meeting had exposed a huge gap in the positions of members on a range of 
related aspects of the conflict including, for example, the question of Palestinian refugees, the city of 
Jerusalem, and the demilitarized zone to be established between the conflicting parties.
732
 After 
intensive negotiations, the meeting ended with reconciliation among the six members and by the 
middle of May 1971 the Community announced the Schumann Paper, which was the first official 
stance toward the conflict in the Middle East within the framework of the EPC.
733
 The main ideas 
within the document repeated elements of the United Nation Resolution (UN) 242. It first established 
demilitarized zones between Israel and the Arab states and second, the stationing of the UN troops to 
separate the conflicting parties. Third, it laid out an Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories 
with minor border modifications. Fourth, internationalisation of the City of Jerusalem. Finally, it 
established the solution of the refugee problem by either repatriation in stages or compensation under 
the supervision of an international commission, and finally, the regulation of shipping in the Gulf of 
Aqaba and the Suez Canal. The paper addressed the problem of the ‗Arab‘ refugees and not the 
‗Palestinians‘ – a point that was later to become the crux of EEC declarations on the Middle East 
question.  
The Schumann Paper had been met with approval in the Arab capitals, but had provoked a vehement 
Israeli ―denial of the Community‘s right and qualifications to involve itself in the Middle East 
dispute‖. 734 In spite of its reserved language, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands - more sensitive to 
Israeli concerns - only approved the statement on the condition that it was not made public.
735
 
However, while the paper was never published, its contents were leaked to the press.  Domestic 
pressure caused the German Foreign Minister, Scheel, to assert during a visit to Israel that the 
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document was only a working paper and merely constituted a basis for further discussion, in turn 
causing great irritation in Paris, and clearly showing the limitations of a common European policy 
towards the conflict at the time.
736
  
Nonetheless, and despite the German attitude, the paper did show the capability of former enemies 
within Europe to bind together and produce a common position towards a controversial and crucial 
issue such as the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was, then, perhaps of more importance internally than 
externally. Secondly, the paper showed the potential for the Community to play a role in the conflict 
in spite of divergences within itself. Thirdly, the French efforts, led by the French Prime Minster, 
Maurice Schumann, showed the French weight in the Community, and its eagerness to exploit this in 
pursuing a common foreign policy.
737
  
The degree of understanding which had been achieved between the member states gave Europe the 
chance to enhance its system of Political Cooperation and to affirm its international identity. The 
declaration was envisaged as a significant step towards a coordinated foreign policy.  
There had been no further joint papers or declarations towards the Middle East for several years. 
According to Allen and Pijpers, the attitude of each of the now nine members of the community 
nonetheless continued to develop toward a positive reassessment of Arab demands while their 
relations with Israel continued to worsen.
738
 The next test as to whether they could formulate their 
shifting positions into a shared policy was to come in 1973. 
4.2.3  The Oil Crisis and the 1973 Declaration  
The October 1973 war between Egypt and Syria, on the one hand, and Israel, on the other, showed the 
impact of the Cold War competition between the superpowers - the U.S and the USSR - on the region. 
Once war had broken out, and as Israel came under intense pressure from Arab armies, the U.S 
supported and sided with Israel, while the Soviet Union supported the Arabs.  
As a result of their ―anger and impotence to confront Israel militarily‖ the Arab oil-producing states 
utilized their oil as a political weapon against the U.S and related allies of Israel.
739
 They selectively 
applied an oil embargo against certain European Community member states. Britain and France were 
considered friends and were treated accordingly, with no sanctions imposed on them; the Dutch, like 
the United States, were considered ―hostile states‖. The rest - Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland 
and Luxembourg - were ―neutrals‖740 against whom a 5% cutback sanction was applied.741 As a 
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consequence of the crisis, the price of oil quadrupled by 1974 to nearly US $12 per US barrel, 
affecting all member states regardless of status.
742
  
The European powers found themselves in a defensive position, suffering the repercussions of the war 
in the Middle East, but for the first time being unable to bring an influence to bear upon it. The nine‘s 
initial reaction to the October 1973 war was in some ways similar to that following the Six–Day war, 
with each member state adopting a different stance.
743
 Reactions toward the crisis were based on the 
degree of oil vulnerability and dependence, hardly surprising since ―60 per cent of the European total 
energy requirement during the 1970s came from the Arab world.‖744  
The greatest divergence in response was evident between the positions of France and the Netherlands.  
French policy towards the Middle East had changed after the 1967 war.  Under President Georges 
Pompidou, it had shifted quite markedly from traditional support for Israel to favouring the Arab 
countries. In continuation of Charles de Gaulle‘s policy, and his attempts to establish a European 
identity and foreign policy independent from that of the United States, the French adopted a relatively 
anti-Israel and pro-Arab stance on the war.
745
  
A few days after the war started, and while the Arab forces were still in a state of advance, the French 
government stated that it was still in favour of a peaceful and negotiated solution for the Arab-Israeli 
conflict based on the UN resolutions. The French considered a cease-fire as a step to pave the way to 
real negotiations in a framework to be defined in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 
242.
746
  
Britain had tried to establish a balance in its policy towards the war, between its political interests 
with its close ties with the U.S on the one hand, and its economic and energy interests on the other.  In 
the end, Britain followed the French political stance. In addition, the British government ―decreed an 
embargo on all arms to the Middle Eastern countries liable to resort to violence to solve the crisis.  
The British stance towards the conflict provoked the Israeli government, led by Golda Meir, who 
accused Britain of ―sacrificing small nations to win peace‖.747  
West Germany tried to satisfy all the conflicting parties by announcing its ―neutrality‖ towards the 
conflict. At the same time, demonstrating its on-going bias towards Israel, it allowed the Americans to 
utilise its territories and airports to provide Israel with weapons.  The ―double-faced policy toward the 
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conflict‖, as Sus748 called it, did not last after the scandal had been exposed by the press, as a result of 
which the government asked the U.S to stop using its land to transit arms to Israel.  The rest of the 
member states of the Community had different political positions on the war. As Denmark and the 
Netherlands accused Syria and Egypt of being the aggressors and of having started the war, both 
countries refused to allow France and Britain to speak on behalf of the Community in the Security 
Council at the United Nations.
749
 
It seemed, then, that the 1973 war had increased the divisions within the European Community, 
revealing the fragility of the EPC. The main options of the Community were either to face the oil 
crisis with a united front and succumb together if necessary, or to sacrifice unity on the rock of 
national interests and thus renounce all hopes of becoming a great bloc.
750
 The tension between the 
member states was ultimately resolved through secret diplomacy encouraged by the United States.
751
 
The exploitation of the oil weapon forced those member states which had previously pleaded 
neutrality to take sides on the issues stemming from the Arab-Israeli conflict.
752
 With their economies 
under threat, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark became more receptive to France‘s arguments 
in favour of a united European position on the conflict, and a more balanced (or less pro-Israeli) 
policy approach.
753
 Under pressure from Britain and France to counter the crisis by a common action, 
the nine had published a joint statement in which they defined the principles that they believed should 
form the basis of a Middle-East peace agreement.  
In their statement, the Council of Ministers called for a ceasefire which would pave the way to start 
negotiations between the warring parties based on UNSCR 242. In addition, the statement stressed 
―the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 
1967.‖ The most important element of the 1973 Declaration is that the European Community, for the 
first time, mentioned the ―legitimate rights‖ of the Palestinians. The Community recognised that ―in 
the establishment of a just and lasting peace, account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinians.‖ 754 
The Arabs acclaimed the new stance of the European Community expressed through the Declaration 
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and regarded it as a new step forward for the recognition of Palestinian rights. In addition, they 
considered the new stance of the Community as ushering in a new era of Arab-European friendship. 
In response to the Declaration, the Arab oil ministers made the decision to exempt the Community 
Members (apart from the Netherlands) from the 5 percent cut in exports scheduled for December.
755
 
Furthermore, at the Algiers summit on the 29
th
 of November 1973, the Arabs issued a communiqué 
directed at Western Europe, in which they remarked on ―the improvement indicated by the November 
6
th
 Communiqué in the attitude of the nine European countries to the Palestine question.‖756 
4.2.4  European-Arab Dialogue 1973 
 The oil crisis prompted the European Community to open a dialogue with the Arab world, to discuss 
any future problems occurring between them, in recognition of the strategic importance of the Arab 
region to their collective interests. As a result of the French diplomatic efforts - first in strengthening 
the Community unity and the European voice towards the Arab World, and secondly in strengthening 
the European ties to the Arab world - the European-Arab (Euro-Arab) dialogue was initiated in 
Copenhagen in December 1974, co-hosted by the European Community and the League of Arab 
States.
757
 
 Since then the Euro-Arabian relationship has always revolved around the Palestinian issue, it has 
been a source of both trouble and cooperation between the two sides. The nucleus of difficulties has 
been the Arab preference to focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the rights of the Palestinian people, 
and the European preference to limit cooperation to the economic and commercial fields, excluding 
any political consideration.
758
  
As the Europeans saw it, the dialogue was to be a forum to discuss economic affairs (and thus secure 
oil supplies among other things), whereas the Arab side saw it as a forum to discuss political affairs. 
The Community member states, fearing that their own deferring national policies towards the conflict 
would obstruct a consistently unified Community position, had produced a consensus formula. It 
stressed the view that the initiative should not hinder international efforts in the oil and raw material 
sectors, nor interfere with the diplomatic efforts for a peace settlement in the Middle East. ―Thus it 
was clear from the beginning that the Arab–Israeli conflict would be absent from the agenda of the 
dialogue.‖759 
During the dialogue, the European Community continued to repeat the statement that had already 
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been issued, unable to progress beyond it. The Arabs hoped to achieve such political goals as the 
recognition of the PLO and the adoption by the Community of strong action against Israel policy in 
the occupied lands. The Europeans had been unable to satisfy their partners in the dialogue due to the 
different attitudes of the community members towards the Palestinian question, which in the end 
confined the community as a whole and restrained its movements.  
As a result, in the end the gap between both sides over the Sadat peace initiatives blocked any 
progress in the dialogue and led to its suspension. The Arab states were insistent that the Palestinians 
should be independently represented in Arab-Israeli negotiations, something that the Europeans were 
neither able to agree upon among themselves nor able to impose upon the negotiations even if they 
had wished to do so. While some European states were prepared to be more accommodating to the 
Arab position - France and Britain in particular had certain established position of interests and 
commercial advantage to protect - others including the Germans and the Dutch still had special 
sensitivities over Israel which made any far-reaching, comprehensive relationship with the Arab world 
hard to defend.  
In any case, no group of nations would readily enter into negotiation so conscious of its own 
vulnerability and so sceptical of the other side‘s ability to deliver any positive contribution. The Arab 
League was weak, united only in readiness to engage in log-rolling in the interest of the 
Palestinians.
760
 There had also been structural reasons for the failure of the Dialogue to progress. The 
ECC had no structures to accommodate the Euro-Arab dialogue, the objectives of which extended 
beyond political cooperation into areas of community competence. 
 As a result it was hard to handle bureaucratically or to take seriously in economic terms. On the 
economic side, aims for progress towards economic co-operation were stagnating. Although the 
economic programme was ambitious and serious, few concrete projects were actually implemented. 
There was a contradiction between what the Arabs wanted and what the European Community was 
ready to offer. This was especially so in the field of financial investment and trade co-operation. The 
Arabs asked for multilateral trade agreements on preferential terms, but the Europeans rejected this on 
the grounds that most of the Arab countries had already signed individual preferential agreements 
with the Community. Similarly, the Arabs demanded the protection of their investment against 
commercial risks which the Community was unwilling to offer. The Community argued that in the 
present economic situation, it was difficult for it even to protect its own citizens against such risks.  
Ironically, even though the Euro-Arab dialogue took in principle an inter-governmental approach, it 
began to reflect a second level of tension within the European Community, that is the tension between 
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the member states on the one hand and the European institutions on the other. The Arab states were 
pushing for deals which necessitated the involvement of the European Commission, something 
propelled not least by the economic interests of European member states including their own 
dependence on Arab oil.  
 However, as the Commission became more involved through its working groups on economic 
cooperation and trade, tension developed between the member states and the ECC.  France in 
particular feared that the involvement of the European Commission might strengthen the latter‘s role 
and its authority in the EPC, which would put the member states‘ interests at risk. As a result France 
lobbied for the Commission‘s role to be limited to offering consultation and expertise.761  
Other critics considered the European Commission‘s involvement in the Euro-Arab Dialogue to be 
breaking down the boundaries between the EEC and the EPC, since the dialogue required the creation 
of special EPC-EEC working groups which reported directly to the Political Committee of the EPC 
and the Committee of the Permanent Representative.
762
  
Despite the failure of the Euro-Arab Dialogue to establish a political dialogue between the European 
Community and the Arab League, some scholars believed that it nonetheless contributed to building 
mutual understanding between both sides and brought the European Community to a closer 
appreciation of issues close to Arab hearts.
763
 For example, in 1977, four years after the 1973 
Declaration, the Community came closer to recognising the political rights of the Palestinians. During 
the London Summit, the EEC issued the London Declaration which introduced into an official EEC 
text the words ―homeland for the Palestinian people‖ 764crucially implying a recognition of Palestinian 
national identity.  
4.2.5  Venice Declaration of 1980 
The Dialogue had also paved the way for the next European initiative, the Venice Declaration of 
1980.  Following the signing of the Camp David Agreement between Israel and Egypt under an 
American umbrella, the European Community was moved to initiate an independent European 
initiative towards the Middle East, once more led by France and Britain who put pressure on the other 
members to launch this initiative.
765
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The renewed diplomatic efforts of the nine members towards the Middle East culminated in the 
Venice Declaration on 13 June 1980, which was considered the most cohesive, advanced and 
coordinated European initiative towards the Middle East thus far. The unsatisfactory Camp David 
Accords had prompted France and Britain to consider either amending UNSCR 242 or drafting a new 
resolution that explicitly referred to the Palestinian right to self-determination as an integral 
component of any peace settlement.
766
 However, the U.S threatened to veto any alteration of the 
UNSCR 242, so instead the European Community drew up the Venice Declaration.
767
 
The essential part of the Declaration was the European Community‘s emphasis on the right of the 
Palestinian people to self-determination, and the need to ―associate the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization in any peace talks in the region.‖768The European Community emphasised that the 
Palestinian problem was not ―simply a refugee issue,‖ that the Palestinian people should be allowed to 
exercise ―fully their rights to self-determination,‖ and that the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
should be associated with peace negotiations.
769
  The Declaration also included unambiguous 
statements on the illegality of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories and the need for an end to 
Israeli occupation. Additionally, the nine stressed that ―they will not accept any unilateral initiative 
designed to change the status of Jerusalem.‖770 
During the 1980s, indeed until the Madrid Conference in 1991, the European Community remained 
fettered to the text of the Venice Declaration, and did not move beyond its parameters in the slightest. 
What had amounted to a subsequent deterioration of the European role in the 1980s came about as the 
result of various factors. 
4.3 The Role of the EU in the Madrid Peace Process Conference 1991 and the Era of the CFSP 
The last section established the divisive effects of superpower rivalry in the Middle East during the 
Cold War era. However, the political landscape of international relations had changed in the 1990s, 
resulting in opportunities for new patterns of behaviour to emerge. With the end of the Cold War and 
the establishment of its CFSP, Europe saw new opportunities to increase its influence in the Middle 
East, which were given added potential with the initiation of first the Madrid and then the Oslo 
processes. This section will consider firstly the developments of the MEPP from its inception in the 
early 1990s. At each stage of the MEPP the section will highlight the European Union‘s role and 
contributions to the process. 
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The end of the 1980s witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union and, accordingly, the end of the old, 
bipolar order.
771
 The global impact was soon evident when in August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait. The 
subsequent Gulf War of 1991, when the U.S led an international coalition of forces to expel Iraq, 
marked a change in the rules of international relations and acknowledged the emergence of a new 
world order.
772
 In a speech to the American Congress in March 1991, following the cessation of the 
military operation, U.S. President George Bush set out the new rules: peaceful settlement of disputes, 
solidarity against aggression, protection of the weak against the strong, reduction and control of 
weapons arsenals, and the principles of justice and fair play.
773
Also, during the Gulf War the two 
superpowers had coordinated their policies against Iraq, indicating an end to superpower competition 
and the victory of ―moral and legal norms dictated by the U.S rather than by real-politick of norms 
negotiated by superpower rivalries.‖774 In sum, the U.S was left as the centre of power around which 
all others revolved.  
These changes at international level had been reflected directly in the Middle East. The dramatic 
change in the international balance of power and the Soviet withdrawal from the region had created a 
new environment and opened new ―windows of opportunity‖,775 one of which was the instigation by 
the U.S of new efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The U.S invited the various relevant parties 
to a multi-lateral peace conference, to take place in Madrid at which the nature of the New World 
Order was made evident when Bush said in his introductory speech that ―the U.S and the Soviet 
Union are here today - not as rivals, but as partners.‖ 776 Without the possibility of shelter behind 
either an American or Soviet super-power sponsor, old adversaries were compelled to attend. Egypt 
and Jordan, long-time US allies and eager to see a resolution to the conflict, were quick to sign up, 
whilst Syria – deprived of military and diplomatic support from a dramatically-weakened Soviet 
Union-
777
 saw attendance as a better alternative than isolation and marginalisation.  
The PLO, meanwhile, had been brutally weakened by the Gulf War. Not only did they face the loss of 
financial support from the Gulf as punishment for Arafat‘s perceived support of Saddam, but 
thousands of Palestinian workers had been expelled from the Gulf States and became a new wave of 
refugees. The Arab world was deeply divided by the war and in no condition to collectively promote 
Palestinian rights. The Soviet Union was no longer available to support progressive liberation 
movements.  In short, there was no option but to participate in a peace process which might have been 
                                                          
771
  Nye, J. S. (1992). What New World Order? Foreign Affairs 71,(2). p. 83. 
772
  Joseph, R. (2006). The New World Order: President Bush and the Post -Cold war Era. In Medhurst, M.  
(ed.) The Rhetorical Presidency of George H.W. Bush, Texas: Texas and A&M University Press. p.18. 
773
 Ibid. 
774
  Elshelmani, S. A. (2000). The New World Order and Its Impact on the Arab-Israeli Peace Process (1991-
1999). Centre For Middle East and Islamic Studies Durham: Durham.p.58. 
775
  Murphy, E. (1995). The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the New World Order. In Hifaa Jawad (ed.) The Middle 
East in the New World Order. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.p.84. 
776
 Bush, G. (1991,October) Speech by George Bush during the Madrid Conference Opening Speeches.  
777
  Murphy, E. op. cit., p. 84. 
 153 
 
the last chance for the PLO to overcome its international isolation and political and financial crisis. 
On the Israeli side, the War - and the superpower alliance - had demonstrated that Israel was no longer 
a unique strategic asset for the U.S; indeed it had proven something of a liability.  Iraqi missiles 
falling on Israeli cities prompted Israel to rethink its security, whilst American pressure on the Shamir 
government, including threats to withhold economic and military aid, prompted Israel to participate in 
the peace process.  
The changes in the political vision and security strategies of both Israel and the Palestinians, therefore, 
made possible the launching of the American peace initiative. The conflicting parties were sent letters 
of invitation by the U.S and the Soviet Union as co-sponsors, although the U.S was to dominate the 
peace process itself.  The delegations invited were from Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Jordan. A 
Palestinian delegation was to be included as part of the Jordanian delegation (part of the deal agreed 
between the U.S and Israel) and was to include Palestinians from inside the West Bank and Gaza 
rather than representatives of the PLO. The Conference opened amid much posturing by the various 
parties in October 1991.  
The European Community was invited to the conference as an observer, alongside the Gulf 
Cooperation Council and the United Nations. This signified that the EU was not to be granted a 
significant political role in the peace process.
778
 In the event, the then-European Economic 
Community governments asked for 13 seats in the conference, one for each of the 12 member states 
and one for the European Community as a collective entity.
779
  
Despite their numerical presence, their subsequent role was very limited. Despite intensively 
participating in the conference itself, their role was limited to chairing the Regional Economic 
Development Working Group (REDWG), which aimed at strengthening intra-regional ties and 
enhancing cooperation through the establishment of institutions, and providing financial support to the 
working groups on Water and Refuges, Arms Control, and the Environment. The multilateral track 
was the only form in which Israel and the U.S allowed the EEC to exercise any agency in the Middle 
East Peace Process.
780
 These multilateral negotiations started in Moscow a year after the original 
Madrid meeting in 1992. They soon became hostage to the bilateral negotiations, however, and made 
little progress.
781
 On the positive side, the involvement of the European Community in Madrid‘s 
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multilateral working groups promoted its image as a new economic agent in the MEPP.
782
  
4.3.1  Europe’s Role in the Oslo Peace Process 
Although the Madrid Peace Conference succeeded in bringing the parties together around a 
negotiation table, and although the negotiations lasted for a total of 18 months, they had not produced 
any fruitful results. The distance between the conflicting parties remained insurmountable and the U.S 
was unwilling to use its economic and political power to force the parties to make concessions. As a 
result of the lack of progress in the multilateral negotiations, the PLO and Israel started direct and 
secret negotiations in Oslo in 1992. The secret talks were assisted by mediators from non-EU Norway 
and led to the dramatic Oslo Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements and 
the subsequent Israeli-Palestinian Accords of 1993. Signed in Washington on 13 September 1993, the 
Declaration directed the PLO to establish a new Authority in the Occupied Territories for which it 
was to be given temporary civil responsibilities for a period of five years (1994-99).   
The main points of the Oslo Accords were that the Israelis would withdraw their forces from parts of 
the Gaza Strip and West Bank, and would affirm a Palestinian right of self-government within those 
areas through the creation of a Palestinian National Authority (PNA). This would have an elected 
Council for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not 
exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on UNSCCRs 242 and 338. The Oslo 
Accords gave the PA the responsibility for the administration of the territory under its control.   
They outlined the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinians in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip so they might have control over their own education, culture, health, social welfare, direct 
taxation and tourism - the main five responsibilities that were to be transferred to the Palestinians 
immediately following the implementation of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement signed in Cairo between 
Israel and the PLO on 4
th
 May 1994.  However, the Accords kept the security of the OPTs, of Israelis 
in the West Bank and Gaza, of the Israeli settlements in those areas, and of Israeli freedom of 
movement on roads in Israeli hands. In addition, the Oslo Accords gave Israeli forces the upper hand 
in controlling the international borders and the crossing points to Egypt and Jordan.  
The main permanent status issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, and 
borders were excluded. Moreover, as a result of the secret negotiations, both parties signed letters of 
mutual recognition whereby the PLO recognised the right of Israel to exist (along with renouncing 
terrorism, violence and the desire for the destruction of the Israeli state - in other words ending the 
Palestinian Intifada) and in return the Israeli Government recognised the PLO as the legitimate 
representative of the Palestinians.
783
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Following the signing of the Oslo Accords, which set out the main principles of the peace process, 
both sides spent seven months negotiating the practical terms of implementation. Agreement was 
finally reached and signed in Cairo on 4 May 1994 by Chairman Arafat and the Israeli Prime Minster, 
Rabin. This agreement set out the processes and procedures for the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and 
Jericho and for the transfer of administrative authority to the PA.  Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian 
cities, towns and villages began after a further Taba Agreement was signed on 28 September 1995. 
The first stage was withdrawal from the main cities of the West Bank; Jennin, Nablus, Tulkaram, 
Qalqilia, Ramallah, and Bethlehem.  
In the second stage, the Israeli army withdrew from 459 Palestinian towns and villages. The 
agreement called for the creation of the Palestinian Legislative Council - which would consist of 88 
members - and the launch of the Palestinian general election process (presidential and PLC), which 
would be staged 22 days after Israeli withdrawal from a selected number of areas in 1996.
784
 On the 
ground the agreement divided the West Bank into three zones. Area A, amounting to 4% of the West 
Bank, includes Gaza and the main Palestinian cities. According to the agreement this area is totally 
under Palestinian civil jurisdiction and internal security control. Area B, totally under control of the 
Palestinian civil jurisdiction, but with overriding Israeli internal security, covers around 450 
Palestinian towns and villages and makes up 25% of the West Bank. Finally Area C, with Israeli civil 
and overall security control, includes the remaining 71% of the West Bank, including uninhabited 
locations, Israeli settlements, military installations, and the Jordan Valley and bypass roads between 
Palestinian parts was split into two security zones, H1 and H2. Palestinian police controlled the 
smaller area, H1, while Israel remained in control of the larger area, H2, where Jewish settlements and 
many historic sites important to both Jews and Muslims are located.
785
 
The Israeli withdrawal from Hebron was supposed to start in March 1996 according to the Taba 
Agreement. However the assassination of Israel‘s Prime Minister Rabin by an Israeli Jewish extremist 
on 4 November 1995 and then the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime Minster in May 1996 
slowed down the speed of the peace process, especially when Netanyahu took a different approach 
from the previous Labour governments of Rabin and Peres. Netanyahu insisted on renegotiating the 
agreements in line with his campaign slogans which stressed a ―peace with security‖ agenda that is 
land-for-security instead of land-for-peace, which had been the premise of the MEPP thus far.
786
 
 After months of tense negotiations, the Hebron Protocol was signed on 17 January 1997, detailing the 
Israeli redeployment from the city. According to the protocol the ―Palestinian Police will assume 
responsibilities in Area H-1 similar to those in other cities in the West Bank; and Israel will retain all 
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powers and responsibilities for internal security and public order in Area H-2.‖787 In addition, Israel 
would continue to carry the responsibility for overall security of Israelis.‖788 As a result of the hostile 
attitudes of the Israeli Likud Government towards the peace process, their refusal to withdraw from 
Palestinian towns as the Taba agreement required, and as a result of Netanyahu‘s decision to construct 
a new Jewish settlement on Gabel Abu Ghneem (Har-Homa in Hebrew) in East Jerusalem, extremists 
on the Palestinian side initiated a series of suicide bombings targeting the Israeli cities, bringing the 
MEPP to a halt.  
The U.S intensified its efforts, attempting to relaunch the MEPP and complete the implementation of 
the Oslo II Agreement.
789
 The conflicting parties met at the Aspen Institute‘s Wye River Conference 
Centre, with the meeting culminating in an agreement known as the Wye River Memorandum signed 
on 23 October 1998 under the auspices of the American President Bill Clinton. According to the 
agreement, Israel would withdraw from 13% per cent of the West Bank in several stages, liberating a 
number of Palestinian prisoners then held in Israeli prisons, allowing the opening of an airport 
in Gaza, and opening a "safe corridor" between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In return, the 
Palestinians were to revise their Palestinian National Charter, take tough anti-terrorist measures, and 
reduce the numbers of Palestinian police forces.
790
 However, despite US pressure, the strict conditions 
imposed by the Israeli Cabinet and by the Knesset, especially on their own Government, meant that 
further Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank would not exceed one per cent for two years.  
Israeli troops finally withdrew from parts of the West Bank close to the northern town of Jenin 
carrying out the first stage withdrawal from 2% of the West Bank in November 1998.
791
 (MEDA, 
2010). Four days later another commitment of the agreement was implemented with the opening of 
the Palestinian airport in Gaza. However as result of fierce objections to the Israeli withdrawal from 
religious parties in Netanyahu‘s government coalition, and what Israel viewed as an insufficient 
Palestinian commitment to ending terrorism and incitement to violence,
792
 Netanyahu announced that 
he would not continue to implement the next phase of withdrawal that was scheduled for December.  
In fact, on 20 December 1998, he suspended implementation of the agreement altogether. In May 
1999 Israeli elections took place and were won by the Labour candidate Ehud Barak. This gave the 
MEPP new momentum since he had been elected on the promise of progress in the negotiations with 
the Palestinians and unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. Responding to American pressure to revive 
the peace process quickly, Barak began new negotiations with the Palestinians, aiming for an updated 
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version of the Wye River Agreement, culminating in the Sharm El-Sheikh agreement of 5 September 
1999.  
Under this agreement, both Israel and the PLO committed themselves to full and mutual 
implementation of the Interim Agreement and all other agreements concluded between them since 
September 1993.
793
 In addition, the two sides pledged to conclude ―a comprehensive agreement on all 
Permanent Status issues within one year from the resumption of the Permanent Status 
negotiations.‖794 According to the agreement, the Israelis would withdraw from 11% of the OPTs by 
20 January, 2000. They would also release some 350 Palestinian political prisoners.  
However, the optimism surrounding the MEPP under Barak‘s leadership vanished when both 
conflicting parties failed to agree on the areas to be handed over to the Palestinians. In addition, as 
consequence of the continuous Israeli settlement activities in West Bank, the negotiations were halted 
on 5 December by the Palestinian side.  
The U.S maintained pressure on both sides, inviting them to the Camp David summit in July 2000. 
Nonetheless, Arafat, Barak, and US President Clinton still failed to resolve their issues and the 
Summit broke up with both sides blaming each other for its failure.  The situation in the OPTs rapidly 
deteriorated and, following a controversial visit by Ariel Sharon to the Harem el-Sharif in Jerusalem, 
a second Palestinian Intifada began, inviting fierce Israeli retaliatory measures. 
Although the EU had a representative at the signing in Washington of the 1993 Oslo Accords, the 
Europeans had played no role in the secret negotiations, and were largely excluded from playing a 
political role in the subsequent peace process in the early years. However, they did enlarge on the role 
- previously carved out under Madrid - of economic sponsor for the MEPP. On the 8th September, 
five days before the Declaration of Principles was signed, the Commission of the European 
Community proposed a U$600 million [€420 million] aid plan for the OPTs over the following five 
years. The American administration subsequently organized an international donors‘ conference to 
mobilize the resources needed to support the Palestinian institutional framework on which the peace 
process was to be built.  The objective, according to Lasensky, was ―intended to mobilise resources 
needed to make the agreement work therefore more than two billion dollars was pledge over five 
years‖.795  
International donors pledged over $2 billion to the development of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
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over the course of the next five years.
796 
The sum continued to increase incrementally during 
subsequent years as a result of the faltering peace process and accompanying instability in conditions 
prevailing in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. Nonetheless, the Palestinian Occupied Territories 
have received over $6 billion in assistance to the Palestinians since 1993
797, an amount that ―is 
exceptional in its extent per capita and is considered as the highest since WW2 to a population.‖798 
During the conference the EU, through the European Commission, proposed an amount of €700 
million ECUs to support the Palestinian economy by the end of 1997, 
799
 and the EU was 
subsequently to become the most proactive donor of all (many more details of which will be provided, 
and a more elaborate analysis given, in a later chapter of this thesis).  
By now, the EEC had transformed into the EU and was determined to use its new CFSP instrument, 
the Joint Action, to strengthen the EU‘s political involvement in the MEPP.  On 29 October 1993 the 
European Council declared the Middle East to be one of five priority areas for the implementation of 
joint actions on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty.
800
 The EU actually adopted a Joint Action on 25 
September 1995, announcing its intention to participate in observing the elections for the Palestinian 
Council provided for by the Declaration of Principles, and to organise the coordination of the 
observation in accordance with international rules.
801
 One year later, on 25 November 1996, another 
very important action was undertaken when Mr Miguel Angel Moratinos was nominated as the EU 
Special Envoy for the MEPP.
802
 The last EU Joint Action towards the Middle East was adopted on 29 
April 1997, establishing an assistance programme in order to support the PA in its efforts to counter 
terrorist activities emanating from the territories under its control and to assist in the establishing of a 
related Palestinian administrative structure.  
Looking at the role of the EU in the MEPP during this period, it can be observed that there was a 
gradual increase in European presence in the region.  Although the EU‘s role was limited to financing 
the PA and monitoring its first general elections on 20 January 1996, this nonetheless represents an 
improvement on the very marginal role of the EEC during the Madrid Conference, and one which has 
developed a new political dimension since the development of the CFSP with the appointment of a 
                                                          
796
  Hollis, R (1997). Europe and the Middle East: Power by Stealth? International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944) 73(1).15-29. p.15. 
797
  Schmid, D. Moses, S. Tovias, A. and Calleya. S. (2006). Mapping European and American Economic 
Initiatives Towards Israel and the Palestinian Authority and Their Effects on Honest Broker Perceptions 
EuroMesco Paper.  
798
   Keating, M. (2005). Aid Diplomacy and Facts on the Ground. In Keating, M. Le More, A. and Lowe, R. 
(Eds.) Aid Diplomacy and Facts on the Ground: The Case of Palestine. London: Chatham House.p.17. 
799
  European Union Committee. (2006). European Union Committee 26th Report of Session, the EU and the 
Middle East Peace Process.  London: House of Lords. p.13. 
800
 Barbé, E., Sabiote M.A. and Lecha, E.S. (2008, February). Spain and the Arab-Israeli conflict: A Demand for 
a Greater European Role. Working paper Monograph of the Observatory of European Foreign Policy, 4.  
801
 European Commission (1996, January 22). European Union Action Decision on the 1996 Palestinian 
Election. Official Journal of the European Communities Press. 11 (4491/96).  
802
  European Commission (1996). European Council Joint Action on the EU Special Envoy for the Middle East 
Peace. Official journal of the European Communities.  
 159 
 
Special Representative/Envoy of the EU to the Middle East, the latter significantly enhancing the 
presence, visibility and political impetus of the EU. 
The first test for the Special Envoy was the negotiations for the Hebron Protocol in which Moratinos 
played the role of mediator between the Israelis and the Palestinians.‖803 In addition, for the first time 
the EU gave both sides letters of assurance carefully negotiated by the EU Special Envoy and signed 
by the EU Presidency.
804
 Moratinos was working quietly behind the scenes and the EU to supplied 
Arafat with a letter assuring him that it would use all its political and moral weight to ensure that the 
agreement would be fully implemented.
805
   
Al-Fattal considered the European letter ―a new quality of commitment by pledging to use all its 
political and moral weight to ensure that all the provisions in the agreement already reached will be 
fully implemented‖.806 During the Wye River Memorandum negotiations in 1999, however, the EU 
Special Envoy‘s role in the negotiation was limited to monitoring the process and was once more 
fairly marginal.  
4.3.2  Berlin Declaration 1999 
 In order to convince Arafat not to proclaim a Palestinian state unilaterally as a result of Netanyahu‘s 
policy, the EU issued in March 1999 Berlin Declaration. The declarations stressed several points, first 
reaffirming the ―continuing and unqualified Palestinian right to self-determination including the 
option of a state and looks forward to the early fulfilment of this right.‖ Second, creation of a 
democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State on the basis of existing agreements and 
through negotiations would be the ―best guarantee of Israel's security and Israel's acceptance as an 
equal partner in the region. Finally, and more importantly, the EU declared its ―readiness to consider 
the recognition of a Palestinian State in due course in accordance with the basic principles referred to 
above.‖807  
As a result of the Berlin Declaration, the PLO Central Council postponed its own declaration of 
Palestinian statehood. Perhaps more importantly, by declaring its own commitment to supporting a 
Palestinian state in due course, the EU was moving the international agenda towards that position. 
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This was to become more significant as the MEPP threatened to dissolve entirely. 
4.3.3  Europe’s Role in Sharm-el Sheikh 2001 
Fearing the collapse of the peace process, President Clinton convinced both Israel and the PA to meet 
in Sharm-el Sheikh. The meeting included representatives from Egypt, Jordan, the UN and the EU. 
The scale of the meeting was designed to pressure the parties into reaching a new agreement on how 
to move the MEPP forward.  The summit established a fact-finding commission, resulting in the 
Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report, which proposed recommendations on how to end 
the cycle of violence, rebuild trust and resume negotiations.
808
 The commission was chaired by 
former US Senator George J. Mitchell and included the EU‘s CFSP High Representative Javier 
Solana, affirming the developing political role of the EU. In April 2001 the Mitchell Committee 
presented its report to the new President of the United States, George W. Bush. However the new 
American administration showed little interest in the MEPP, other than to send CIA Director George 
Tenet to the region to attempt to build a ceasefire as the violence escalated, an effort which failed with 
its rejection by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. American interest was revived, however, after the 11th 
September attacks in 2001, but according to Musu the main motivation for this renewed interest was 
to convince Arab allies to participate in the international collation in the war on terrorism rather than 
to actively pursue peace.
809
  
The U.S sent retired Marine Anthony Zinni to implement the Mitchell Committee Report and the 
George Tenet recommendation. But Zinni had failed to stop the violence and the Palestinian Intifada, 
since his efforts did not address the root cause of the violence - the Israeli occupation.
810
 Nonetheless, 
President Bush was moved to give a major speech in which, for the first time in American foreign 
policy towards the Israel-Arab conflict, the U.S explicitly expressed its desire to see a Palestinian state 
existing alongside Israel in peace and security, evidence of how far the international agenda was 
swinging in favour of Palestinian statehood.
811
 
In response to the escalating violence between Israeli and Palestinian groups, threatening the collapse 
of the PA itself, the U.S revived its role in the MEPP and supported the formulation of the Middle 
East Quartet, also called the Quartet on the Middle East. On April 10th 2002, Colin Powell announced 
the formation of a ―Quartet‖ of forces aiming to make progress towards the implementation of Bush‘s 
vision of a two-state solution and addressing the looming humanitarian crisis within the Palestinian 
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community.
812In contrast to Clinton‘s efforts to maintain American dominance in the political 
management of the MEPP, this effort was a way to reactive a multilateral approach to the MEPP, 
encouraging the engagement of outside actors. The U.S invited the UN Secretary-General, the EU 
High Representative for CFSP, and the Russian Foreign Minister to participate in the new Quartet. 
The Quartet then appointed its own Special Envoy, currently the former British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair. Blair‘s appointment came after the former World Bank President, James Wolfensohn, had quit 
the position in 2006 in response to American restrictions on his mandate and responsibilities, which 
were limited to the economy and coordinating the aid of international donors.  It seemed that, for all 
the U.S‘s apparent new multilateralism, it remained unwilling to allow partners a genuine political 
say. 
 In order to enhance the European role in the MEPP and to put an end to the violence in the OPTs, 
German Foreign Minister Jaschka Ficher drafted an initiative in April 2002 called the ―Seven Point 
Plan.‖ The main point of the plan was that Israel should withdraw to a line close to the pre-1967 
borders, after which a Palestinian state would be established. Four months later, in August, Denmark 
(who then held the presidency of the European Union), added a time frame to the seven-point plan 
and presented it to the EU Foreign Ministers‘ meeting which subsequently adopted it. 
 In the absence of any alternative vision, the Quartet had adopted, adapted and elaborated upon the 
European initiative, calling it the Road Map for Peace in the Middle East. Officially, the Road Map 
was launched at the Sharm el–Sheikh summit of April 2003, hosted by the U.S President Bush and 
attended by Prime Minster Sharon for Israel and (the then) Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas for the 
Palestinians. The main points of the Road Map were that the Palestinians would have, by the end of 
2005, a Palestinian state. However, this required them to abandon the use of violence, and to reform 
the PA. In return, the Israelis were to halt settlement activities in the OPTs and accept the emergence 
of the reformed democratic Palestinian government. The Road Map comprised three goal-driven 
phases with the ultimate goal of ending the conflict as early as 2005. However, as a performance-
based plan, progress depended upon the good faith efforts of the parties, and their compliance with 
each of the obligations. The three phases of the Road Map were as follows: 
―Phase I (as early as May 2003): End to Palestinian violence; Palestinian 
political reform; Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian cities and freeze on 
settlement expansion; Palestinian elections. Phase II (as early as June-Dec 
2003): International Conference to support Palestinian economic recovery 
and launch a process, leading to establishment of an independent Palestinian 
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state with provisional borders; revival of multilateral engagement on issues 
including regional water resources, environment, economic development, 
refugees, and arms control issues; Arab states restore pre-intifada links to 
Israel (trade offices, etc.) Phase III (as early as 2004-2005): second 
international conference; permanent status agreement and end of conflict; 
agreement on final borders, clarification of the highly controversial question 
of the fate of Jerusalem, refugees and settlements; Arab state to agree to 
peace deals with Israel.‖813  
Musu argued that inherent contradictions in the Road Map limited its potential for success.  The 
Palestinians were in fact unable to take the steps required; for example, they could not take tough 
measures against terrorism when their infrastructure and security facilities had been destroyed by the 
Israeli Army. As a result, the tension between both parties continued.
814
 In 2005 Israeli Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon unilaterally, and without any coordination with the PA, withdrew Israel from the Gaza 
Strip. An agreement was subsequently concluded between Israel and the PA on movement and access 
between Gaza and Egypt.  
On the 12
th
 of November 2005 the Council of the EU welcomed the agreement and issued a Joint 
Action establishing an EU monitoring mission to oversee implementation of the Israeli/Palestinian 
agreement on operation of the Rafah border crossing point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. 
Alongside EUBAM Rafah, the the Council of the European Union adopted a Joint Action establishing 
an EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) for a period of three years 
which aimed to support the PA in establishing a sustainable and effective policing arrangement.
815
  
We can see, then, that since the breakdown of a meaningful MEPP in 2000, the EU has been able to 
move its role on beyond simply economic and technical support. Its growing involvement in the 
actual political processes, although still subordinate to that of the United State, has allowed it to 
become actively engaged in designing processes and assisting in their implementation. Through its 
declaratory policies, it has moved the agenda towards support for Palestinian statehood as an end-goal 
of the MEPP, and through its participation in the Quartet, and design of the Road Map, it has 
established its own place in the negotiating framework. Furthermore, through its Joint Actions it has 
played a significant role in reforming and training the Palestinian policy and security agencies as part 
of the Road Map process. Furthermore, the EU plays a vital role in managing the border between 
Gaza and Egypt after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.  
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There have been several reasons for the increased role of the EU‘s involvement in the MEPP.  First 
was the development of the mechanisms, instruments, and capabilities of the CFSP after each reform 
treaty; second, the EU‘s membership in the Quartet which contributed to softening the Israeli rejection 
of a European role; and third, the close relations between the EU and the U.S as a result of the 
participation in the Quartet. 
Although the deterioration of the Peace Process after the Second Intifada began in late September 
2000 as result of the collapse of the Camp David summit and the provocative visit by Ariel Sharon to 
Al-Haram Al-Sharif (the Temple Mount), the dramatic changes in the Middle East had opened up new 
opportunities for the EU to increase its political presence in the MEPP.  Alongside its participation in 
the MEPP, the EU‘s role shifted from being that of a receiver or negative participant to policy-maker 
and initiator of the Road Map. The Danish proposal to the Quartet, the European Neighbourhood 
policy, and the EU Common Strategy for the Mediterranean, were clear examples of an increased 
European ability to approach the Middle East in a relatively unified way.  
The first direct involvement in the Middle East Peace Process after the Intifada was the participation 
side by side with the U.S in Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee which aimed to propose a 
recommendation to end the violence and rebuild the trust and resume negotiations. The commission 
was chaired by the former US Senator George J. Mitchell and members of CFSP High Representative 
Javier Solana and others.   
The EU continued to utilise European declarations as instruments to set the political agenda. After the 
outbreak of the Second Intifada on the 22
nd
 of September 2002, for example, the EU issued the Seville 
Declaration, emphasising that a settlement ―could only be achieved through negotiation‖.  The 
declaration stressed that the aim of the negotiations was to put an end to the conflict in the Middle 
East through ―establishment of a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign State of Palestine, on the 
basis of the 1967 borders, if necessary with minor adjustments agreed by the parties‖.816  
As result of the terrorist attacks on the U.S on the 11
th
 of September 2001 and on European cities and 
fears of the spillover of violence to Europe, the European Security Strategy European and decision 
makers considered resolution of the conflict in the Middle East conflict to be ―a strategic priority for 
Europe‖. The Strategy emphasised that ―without solving the conflict there will be little chance of 
dealing with other problems in the Middle East‖.  Finally, the EU repeated its insistence that it ―must 
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remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved.‖817 
The change in the mechanism of the common security policy following the appointment of the High 
Representative for the CFSP after the Amsterdam Treaty, contributed to enhancing the EU presence 
and coordination. In addition, the European Union was striving to provide economic aid and 
assistance to the Palestinians and the peace process. Furthermore there had been a change in 
America‘s attitude towards the peace process and a multilateral approach to the Middle East conflict 
through the Quartet. This approach, which allowed the international community to take part in finding 
a solution and settlement to the conflict, increased EU-US coordination and cooperation in the Middle 
East and led to a reduction in Israeli fears of European involvement in the conflict especially as they 
had been considered as pro–Arab.  
4.3.4  The EU’s Role in the Middle East Quartet 2002 
The role of the EU in the Quartet has been controversial and there have been divergent views on it. 
On one hand some believed that participation in the Quartet ―gave the European role a higher political 
relevance and resonance.
818
 It was seen as a unique opportunity for the EU to sit equally at the 
negotiation table with the rest of the main international players, especially the U.S who had dominated 
the MEPP since its inception in the 1990s. Therefore, supporting the Quartet would enhance the EU‘s 
presence and influence in the peace process, and would provide Europe with a tool with which to 
influence American policies as they were formulated. David Quarrey stressed that the European 
Union, through the Quartet, managed to contribute to the peace process in the Middle East either 
through the meetings between the Quartet and regional parties that had now effectively become 
Quartet policy, or through EU initiatives, such as the Temporary International Mechanism, as a 
vehicle for maintaining humanitarian and other support to the Palestinians. 
Quarrey emphasised that building on the above success and achievements ―it would be unfair to say 
that the EU merely signs up to whatever line the U.S wants to take in the Quartet.‖819 On the other 
hand, there were others who argued that the EU being part of the Quartet was a main factor in the 
European role being weakened in the Middle East, especially in terms of the political identity of the 
EU in the Mediterranean region being conditioned by the presence of the U.S.
820
  Thus far, the Quartet 
had failed to substantially alter the dynamics of international involvement. Rather, it had 
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predominantly provided a multilateral cover for persisting unilateral US action - or inaction.
821
 In fact 
they believed that European participation in the Quartet did not add any value to the European role for 
several reasons: First, the U.S dominated the Quartet having supported its creation in order to absorb 
the external pressures yet maintained an undisputed role as the sole mediator accepted by both 
parties.
822
 Second, the limited role of the Quartet in the political level of negotiations was due to the 
Israeli and American rejection of any role of the Quartet in the negotiations. 
The resignation of the Quartet‘s former special envoy over his role and authority was a clear example 
of the limited role of the Quartet. As a consequence there were voices calling upon the EU to 
withdraw from the Quartet as its role is limited to justifying, implementing, and ratifying US policy in 
the region.  In his ―End of Mission Report‖, Álvaro de Soto, the UN's former Middle East envoy, 
described the decision-making in the Quartet stating that the Quartet:  
―Functions in a flimsy framework of ritual and tradition passed orally from person to 
person. Unfortunately, it is a bit like the children's game of "Chinese Whispers", here 
the message transmitted at one end reaches the other end in a manner that doesn't 
necessarily resemble the original.‖823  
He stated that the U.S considered the members of the Quartet as a group of friends therefore the ―US 
doesn‘t feel the need to consult closely with the Quartet except when it suits it.‖824 As a consequence 
de Soto believed that the other members of the Quartet, the EU, Russia and the UN - had become a 
"side-show".
825
 De Soto considered the way that the U.S dealt with the Hamas government as a clear 
example of this.  
―In a 13 January meeting, I had gathered the impression that, though the U.S had 
clearly decided who were "the bad guys"... On 29 January, we received a draft 
statement prepared by the U.S that would have had the Quartet, in effect; decide to 
review all assistance to the new PA government unless its members adhered to three 
principles: nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements 
and obligations including the Road Map.‖826  
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4.3.5  The Election of Hamas 2006  
Among its activities, the EU had been insistent that the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary 
(legislative council) elections should go ahead as scheduled. To this end, they funded and supervised 
the elections to ensure appropriate standards of fairness and regulatory conduct. To their chagrin, 
however, the Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas, emerged as the largest party in the Legislative 
Council, an outcome that was against the mainstream predictions and which presented a major change 
in the Palestinian political landscape which had been, until that time, dominated by the secular 
nationalist Fatah faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation.  Hamas won 74 seats in the 132-
seat Legislative Council.  Following its triumph, Hamas nominated its leader, Ismail Haniyeh, to 
serve as Prime Minister, presenting the EU with a major dilemma.  
The international community, including the European Union, refused to recognise or deal with a 
Hamas-led government, or any National Unity Government in which Hamas participated, as long as 
the movement refused to accept the Middle East conditions which included: first, renouncing 
violence; second, recognising the State of Israel; and third, respecting previous agreements and 
obligations in the MEPP. In a statement, the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council 
endorsed the Quartet conditions and gave its ―full support for President Abbas' determination to 
pursue a peaceful solution of the conflict with Israel‖.827 Moreover, the Council stressed that 
―violence and terror are incompatible with democratic processes and urged Hamas and all other 
factions to renounce violence, to recognise Israel's right to exist and to disarm.‖828 
 Finally, the Council committed to a peaceful and negotiated solution of the conflict with Israel based 
on existing agreements and the Roadmap, as well as to the rule of law, reform and sound fiscal 
management as pre-conditions to continue to support Palestinian economic development and 
democratic state building.‖829 As result of Hamas‘s rejection of the Quartet conditions, the EU froze 
its direct aid to the PA, the first time that the EU ―made use of its economic instrument as a way not 
only to enforce political reform but also a change in the diplomatic and political perception of the 
conflict by one interested party.‖830  
In addition the EU created a new funding mechanism called the Temporary International Mechanism 
(TIM) which aimed to bypass the Hamas government in administering funds to avoid a humanitarian 
crisis in Palestine. The mechanism facilitated needs-based assistance directly to the Palestinian 
people, including essential equipment, supplies, and support for health services, support for the 
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uninterrupted supply of fuel and utilities, and basic needs allowances to poor Palestinians.
831
 The 
election of Hamas and the EU‘s subsequent rejection of the Palestinian government demonstrated the 
contradictions in its own policies towards the Palestinians. On the one hand it endorsed democratic 
reforms of the PA to create a political structure capable of being a partner in the MEPP and of 
subsequently running the Palestinian state. On the other, it was unwilling to support Palestinian 
democracy when it threatened the EU‘s own interests in securing a peace agreement to its own liking. 
Moreover, it was concerned to thwart the ambitions of Islamist political movements which it 
perceived to pose a security threat to itself, as well as to Israel. The limitations of EU policy towards 
the MEPP were all too evident, and the consequence was that, once more, in effect the EU was limited 
to role of economic support for the Palestinians rather than the political activism to which it had 
aspired.  
However, the outlook for the EU role in the post-Annapolis future seemed less promising. Annapolis 
designated the U.S. as the sole arbiter of the peace process, leaving little space for the EU, or indeed 
the Quartet, in the negotiations. 
4.3.6  The Annapolis Conference 
Following a series of bilateral meetings between Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli 
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, beginning in February 2007, U.S President George W. Bush, on 16 July 
2007, called for an international meeting of representatives from nations that support a two-state 
solution. Thus, on 27 November 2007 The U.S. administration under Bush leadership organised 
Annapolis Conference in Annapolis, Maryland, with the aim of reviving the MEPP. In addition to the 
conflicting parties and the U.S, several intergovernmental organizations that attended the conference 
include: the United Nations represented by the Secretary General, the Arab League represented by its 
Secretary General, the EU Commission, the EU High Representative and the Quartet Special Envoy. 
The conference marked the first time a two-state solution was articulated as the mutually agreed upon 
outline for addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Annapolis Conference ended without 
immediate results but both sides committed themselves to reach an agreement by the end of 2008.
832
 
Despite the promises that had been made at Annapolis, there was not much progress at the meetings 
of the steering committee in the following months.
833
  
 
The EU participated in the preparation of the conference. From 11 to 14 November, the head of the 
CFSP Javier Solana visited the cities of Ramallah, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Cairo in order to 
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encourage the leaders attending the conference.
834
 Germany and France had also played an important 
role in mobilising the diplomatic momentum to make the Annapolis conference a success. Thus in the 
weeks before the Annapolis, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her Foreign Minister Steinmeier 
had met numerous top Arab officials to persuade them that their participation and support in the 
conference was crucial for lasting peace.
835
  During the conference, the Presidency of the EU 
reaffirms the EU's ―determination to support the efforts of reaching comprehensive peace in the 
Middle East through a lasting and just settlement of the conflict.‖836  
 
In addition, the EU presidency stressed the EU ―ready to offer a wide-ranging and coherent 
contribution as highlighted in its state building for Peace in the Middle East: an EU Action 
Strategy."
837
 Finally, the Presidency reiterated the ―EU's engagement to further strengthen its on-
going programs to foster the economic and financial development of a future Palestinian State through 
the continuation of assistance and in close cooperation with the Quartet Representative.‖838 Although 
its effort in preparing and convincing the conflicting parties to attend the conference the EU did not 
play any role in the bilateral negotiation.  
4.4 Un-Picking the Determinants of EPC/CFSP Policy towards the Conflict and the MEPP 
This section seeks to identify the key determinants which have shaped the narrative provided above. It 
demonstrates the fact that European polices towards the conflict in the Middle East, and towards 
OPTs in particular, cannot be considered without reference to domestic, regional and international 
factors; to those within the EU and those which relate to its environment.  In fact, the EPC /CFPS 
were themselves the outcome of the interaction between these broader determinants.   
This section will argue that the EPC /CFSP policies towards the Middle East have been shaped by 
four determinants: First, the divergent interests and identities of the EEC/EU members and their 
consequent differing political stances towards the conflicting parties. Second, the Europeans‘ 
Transatlantic relationships, both individually and collectively.  Third, Israel itself has been a 
determinant in shaping European policies towards the region and its political involvement in the 
Middle East through its resistance to such a role and its ability to draw on particularly sympathetic 
relations with some member states to sustain that resistance. Finally, the institutions of the EEC/EU 
have interacted with each other in order to produce certain policy directions, and in fact member states 
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have been able to exploit these interactions to circumvent European constraints when it has suited 
them. 
4.4.1  The First Determinant: the Divergent Interests and Identities of the EEC/EU Members 
and the Lack of a Unified Vision over the European Role in the Middle East 
The EU members did not just differ in their interests and political stances towards the conflicting 
parties but were also divided over what the role of the EU in the region should be. While some 
members had been supporting strong independent European role in the Middle East, others preferred 
only a peripheral role complementing the U.S role, not competing with it. 
Despite the fact that the member states had always supported the principle of a peace process between 
Israel and the Palestinians, there was little disagreement as to what a final solution might look like.
839
 
This was due to the fact that the vast majority of the Community‘s members still looked at the Middle 
East and their own foreign policy in ―purely national terms and have national interests or policy 
preferences in the region.‖840  
 
The following analysis will focus on the six members of the EEC/EU that have been particularly 
active in the trying to influence and direct the EPC and CFSP towards the Middle East France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. It is the objective here is to expose the 
main nation-state driven policy trends in the EEC/EU and how these trends affected the direction of 
the EPC/CFSP. It is important to shed light on the policies of these members, since the EPC/CFSP 
have dominated by their national interests, which notably hinder a common and coherent policy. 
4.4.1.1 France  
As the previous chapter shows, France, alongside Spain, had a huge interest in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) for several reasons, including geographical proximity and on the basis of the 
previous French colonial rule in large parts of the region demographically. For example, as France has 
been home to the largest Jewish community in Europe at around 600 thousand, it is also home to 
about 2.9 million Muslims, mostly descended from the Maghreb.
841
  
In addition, French interests have also been related to its colonial history in the region where it 
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inherited Lebanon and Syria after the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and Sykes-Picot 
Agreement in 1916.
842
 Before World War II France did not support the efforts to establish a Jewish 
homeland in in Palestine since they were focusing on the Maghreb and considered Zionism as a tool 
of the British Empire.
843
   
However, the sense of guilt over the holocaust changed the French policy after World War II. 
Between 1948 and 1967 France had become the leading supplier of arms to Israel by helping it build 
its nuclear station.
844
 This policy continued until 1967, when Charles de Gaulle accused Israel of 
starting the 1967 war. French policy has since become characterised by a clear pro-Arab stance with 
its priority being the promotion of closer relation with Arab states.
845
  Since then, there has been a 
foreign policy concept which understands ―France‘s role as one of the 'great powers.'‖ De Gaulle's 
main objectives were to ―ensure France's national sovereignty and independence in a bipolar 
international system.‖846 As demonstrated in chapter three, France had adopted the role of 
‗entrepreneur‘ in the 1980s, and it continued to demand a greater role for Europe in the Middle East 
Peace Process, believing that European involvement in the region could usefully counter-balance the 
impact of super-power rivalries. Indeed, France believed that Europe would gain a decisive influence 
in the Middle East once a peace agreement had been reached.
847
 As the French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Michel Jober, stated ―sooner or later the Soviet Union and the U.S would be fed up with 
confrontation between each other and both the Israelis and the Arabs would ask the community for 
help.‖848 
 Secondly, French governments promoted European collective policies and activities in the region as a 
vehicle for those initiatives which France alone could not accomplish, and which were intended to 
supplement French efforts at the national level. Ultimately, this has impacted European attempts to 
build a balanced relationship between the conflicting parties in the region, and left France a biased 
actor in its dealings with the peace process.
849
  
In his assessment of the impact of the oil crisis on West European foreign policies, Feld found that the 
stage was set for France to offer a vision of Europe‘s role in the Middle East at odds with America‘s. 
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The Americans wanted to build a consumer‘s alliance to oppose the embargo, while the French 
favoured bilateral negotiations and bargaining with oil-producing countries, aspiring to an 
improvement of relations with the Arabs.
850
 In the end, France refused to participate in the conference 
and instead, along with Britain, led the European diplomacy which resulted in the 1973 
Declaration.
851
  
France‘s pro-Arab positioning extended significantly towards the Palestinians. On 14 October 1974, 
France supported a UN Resolution inviting the PLO to participate in the General Assembly's 
November debates on the Palestinian question, which led to PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat's historic 
speech at the United Nations on 13 November 1974.
852
 France had been one of the first countries to 
allow the PLO to open an Office of Information and Liaison in its capital city in October 1974. And 
French diplomacy under the leadership of Valery Giscard D‘Estaing was behind the inclusion of the 
word ‗homeland‘ in the 1977 London EPC Declaration.853 
 All French initiatives in support of the Palestinian cause, from General de Gaulle to President 
Mitterrand, had revealed continuity and it is fair to say that French diplomacy was the driving force 
behind the EPC‘s (re)orientation towards the Middle East during the 1970s and to some extent into 
the 1980s.
854
  There were various factors which helped the French leadership to achieve this.  
Firstly, Britain did not join the Community until some years after the EPC had been initiated and 
France‘s own leading role in policy formulation towards the Middle East had been established.855 The 
other significant power, Germany, apart from holding its normative commitments to Israel, had little 
interest in the region other than in developing economic ties. The way was open then for France to fill 
the policy direction void with its own self-interest.
856
 When domestic changes within European states 
in the mid-1980s began to shift their collective interests in the Middle East, the French adopted a 
more unilateralist approach towards the Middle East, abandoning the EU as the main vehicle for the 
promotion of their interests. For example, according to Gianniou, during the Lebanon war on June 
1982, France ―disassociated itself from its European partners, who were unable to agree on a common 
approach.‖857  Since the Charles de Gaulle era, French policies have fluctuated between being pro-
Arab and pro-Israeli. Georges Pompidou (1969–1974) adopted the de Gaulle doctrine while Valéry 
Giscard d'Estaing (1974–1981) and François Mitterrand (1981–1995) tried to build a balanced policy 
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between the Arabs and the Israelis.  
For example, despite the pro- Israeli policy of Mitterrand, he interfered twice to save Arafat‘s life: 
once in Beirut in 1982, again in 1983, as well as having invited and treated him as president.
858
 
Jacques Chirac (1995–2007) meanwhile revived de Gaulle doctrine supporting the Palestinian rights 
and trying to build an independent policy from the U.S. Thus, he opposed the American invasion of 
Iraq and was critical of Israeli policy. When Chirac visited to Jerusalem's Old City in 1996, he 
provoked Israel by asking it to accept the creation of a Palestinian state, to return the Golan Heights to 
Syria and to withdraw from the Israeli buffer zone in southern Lebanon.  He also sent a junior 
minister to pay a call on Orient House, the PLO headquarters in Jerusalem‖.859 From there, Chirac 
went to Egypt and, in a joint press conference with President Mubarak, the French president 
emphasised that ―Egypt and France must have a leadership role; Egypt for the whole of the South and 
France for the whole of Europe.‖860  During the 2006 Lebanon war, France supported Lebanon against 
the Israeli attacks, calling from the start for an immediate ceasefire.
861
 France directly entered the 
arena to negotiate for ceasefire without consulting with the EU. 
 Despite his efforts to renovate the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership through the UFM initiative French 
policy towards the Middle East and the U.S. under Nicolas Sarkozy has been going in the opposite 
direction from Chirac policy Sarkozy, has deliberately sought closer relations with Washington and 
has shown greater warmth towards Israel than was typical of France in the past.
862
 He has tried to gain 
the trust of both conflicting parties. 
 Thus, during his visit to Israel, Sarkozy repeatedly described himself as a "friend of Israel‖863 while at 
the same time calling on Israel to halt Jewish settlement activity in the West Bank and to ease travel 
restrictions on Palestinians living there.  It can be concluded that from the 1970s to the end of 2007 
the French political stances towards the Middle East was part of a wider French strategy to balance 
the U.S. and to create an independent French and European voice from those of  the U.S. and the 
USSR. In addition, while the French approach was to utilise the EPC to strengthen France‘s own 
policy-making, it actually weakened the European voice by adopting unilateral polices outside the 
EPC frame-work when convenient.  
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In order to maintain this control over the policy directions of the EPC, and at French insistence, the 
activities of the EPC were kept as separate as possible from those of the Commission and the 
Parliament, illustrating France‘s clear intention to keep the collective foreign policy-making process 
strictly separate from of the Community itself and strictly within the limits of intergovernmental 
procedures.
864
 Nonetheless, French diplomacy during the 1970s and 1980s did manage to transform 
the Palestinian question from a refugee problem to a political issue in the international arena and 
established the principle of there being a place for a European voice in Middle Eastern affairs. 
865
 
4.4.1.2 West Germany 
 Despite the Franco-German friendship at the European level and their intensive cooperation, their 
policies towards the Middle East and the conflicting parties have followed distinctly different, and 
occasionally conflicting, approaches.
866
 In addition, they have had conflicting views over the role of 
the EEC/EU in the Region.  The World War II atrocities and the Holocaust heavily influenced 
German policy towards the Middle East. The "moral standard" resulting from the Holocaust became  
the basis of German foreign policy towards the Palestinian cause and the Arab region as a whole.
867
  
This factor made Germany the main and strongest supporter of Israel, although it adopted the ―role of 
‗low-profile supporter‘‖ of the MEPP and occasionally ―vetoed any European initiative which could 
be depicted as biased against Israel‖.868 In addition, Germany policy emphasised multilateralism and 
reliability, while traditionally displaying a reluctance to press hard for national interests (almost the 
reverse of the French approach).‖869 Thus, Germany perceives the EEC/EU as being a civilian or ‗soft 
power,‘ concerned primarily with trade and economic power as the main states‘ power instruments.870  
Germany did not build a diplomatic relation with Israel until May 1965. However, since 1949 and 
without exception, all the German governments since the establishment of Israel have shown strong 
support for Israel. However, their political stances towards the U.S. have varied widely. For example, 
the first Chancellor Konrad Adenauer supported Israel firmly and pledged to pay $3 billion dollars for 
the Holocaust survivors.
871
 This policy continued during the 1960 until the beginning of the 1970s 
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which witnessed intensive interest in the Middle East after the Palestinians shifted their struggle 
against Israel to Europe cities. Since 1970, the German policies have witnessed a marginal shift 
through trying to find a balance between the right of Israel to exist and the rights of the 
Palestinians.
872
  
Germany accepted the Schumann document in 1970 which asked Israel to withdraw from the 
Palestinian land occupied in 1967. In addition, Germany participated and supported the French 
President Pompidou‘s initiative (the Euro-Arab Dialogue) in 1973 following the October War and 
the first oil shock, between the EEC and the Arab League and the Vince declaration in 1980, which 
was pioneering and advanced all the policies which will be explained in the analysis of the collective 
policy of the EEC under the EPC. 
 This change might be explained as a result of the EPC and the impact of the oil embargo on the 
countries supported Israel during the 1973 war. During the Helmut Kohl period (1982–1998) 
Germany maintained it traditional policy towards the region, but at the same time the German 
decision-makers tried to build a balance between the German growing economic, trade and energy 
interests with its partners in the Arab world on one hand and its special relationship with Israel on the 
other hand.
873
  
However, the German foreign policy under Gerhard Schröder (1998–2005) witnessed a shift mainly 
towards the U.S. Schröder considered the German and the European interests as priorities for his 
government at the expanse of the German -US traditional alliance and historical ties. Therefore, 
Germany withdrew its unconditional support to the U.S. and rejected the U.S. plan to invade Iraq, and 
the concept of clash of civilisation. In contrast, the German diplomacy increased its presence in the 
Middle East through its initiatives and visits to the parties of the conflict in the region, such as several 
visits by the former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer to Israel and the OPTs between 1998 
and 2002.
874
 In addition, under the German EU Presidency in the first half of 1999, the EU issued its 
Berlin Declaration that for the first time mentioned the EU‘s readiness to recognize a Palestinian 
state.
875
 
As I will explain in detail in the next section, Germany accepted the Berlin Declaration of 1999 and 
strengthened its role in the MEPP through its ‗idea paper‘ which was prepared by Fischer and became 
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later the origin of the Road Map. In addition, Germany participated in the United Nations Interim 
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and was active in European missions in the region, either the border 
monitoring mission, EU-BAM, between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, or the established police mission, 
EU COPPS, in Palestine.
876
   
There were several reasons behind this shift in German policy. Firstly, Germany was 
seeking to develop its role and expand its influence in the ongoing efforts to settle the 
conflict. Secondly, the Schengen Agreement, which led to the eradication of internal European 
borders, had made Germany more exposed to security threats emanating from Europe‘s southern 
neighbours. Thirdly, there were fears of a spillover of violence from the (MENA) region after the 
outbreak of the second Intifada in Palestine. These fears were exacerbated the 9/11 terrorist attacks on 
the United States, the 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 7
th
 July 2005 London 
bombings.
877
   
However, the changes did not reflect a German desire to replace the U.S. role as a third party mediator 
in the MEPP.  The Germans believed that their role and that of the EU in the peace process should be 
complementarily to, rather than in competition with, the role of the U.S.  Schröder said that Europeans 
―cannot and will not play the role of patron in the peace process; this part belongs to the U.S and 
international organizations.‖878 Nevertheless, Schröder stressed that instead of focusing on the 
political aspects Europeans could contribute through ―pointed economic aid, opening of regional 
markets, and participation in the construction of infrastructural measures. Thereby we can do justice 
to our historical responsibilities to Israel and peace.‖879 
 Schröder‘s government did not change the civilian identity of German foreign policy. According to 
Calleo, the Nazi past and the devastation of the World War II meant that Germany ―willingly accepted 
limits to its own sovereignty, exercised a policy of self-restraint in international affairs, and supported 
all attempts to create an international order based on mutually accepted reciprocal dependence.‖880 
Accordingly, the German collective approach kept a low political profile and focused on non-political 
aspects of peace making, such as economic assistance and development aid.‖881  
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German relations with Israel were a highly sensitive issue. The special German commitment included 
providing financial assistance to Israel and a responsibility that Israel should not stand alone, and thus 
German governments have often been hesitant to criticise Israel policy too harshly. Further, Germany 
imposed its conditions on the mandates of the European envoys to the region in order to protect its 
interests and alliance. This policy continued under Angela Merkel‘s leadership which reconfirmed 
strong pro-Israel German-US alliance,
882
 which ended in the support the Israeli governments during 
their attacks on Lebanon in 2006 and on Gaza in 2008 during a three day visit to Israel.  During this 
visit to Israel, Merkel gave a landmark address to the Knesset, Israel‘s parliament, and signed off on a 
range of projects, including education, the environment and defence.
883
  
In sum, the Holocaust and the economic interests of Germany in the region were the main factors 
driving the largely passive German foreign policy towards the region. To balance its policy Germany 
invested a lot in build-up of Palestinian infrastructure and the PA. For example, between 1992-2006, 
Germany had invested more than €500m in the improvement of the Palestinian economy and 
infrastructure and the establishment of PA institutions.
884
 
4.4.1.3 The United Kingdom 
Britain has tried to build a balance between the conflicting parties despite being more sympathetic to 
the Arabs. Britain took a tough decision during the 1980s when Margaret Thatcher took a tough line 
on terrorism, including refusing to meet members of the PLO.
885
 In fact, there has inevitably been 
some European influence on the British perspective. The British sometimes have gone further than 
they might otherwise have gone in order to maintain consensus; they might also have agreed on some 
points in order not to be left behind by some of their partners in the EEC.
886
  
As member of the EEC, Britain had accepted all the EPC declarations and the idea of involving the 
PLO in any settlement between the Arabs and the Israeli. But Britain was closely aligned with the 
U.S. throughout the Cold War and thus followed a similar Middle East foreign policy approach as that 
of the United States.  
Thus, Britain has tried to function as a bridge between Europe and the U.S, believing that American 
involvement is crucial to the chances of peace.
887
 Indeed, UK relations with the U.S. were considered 
a far more crucial national interest than the construction of an independent European role in the 
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Middle East, or anywhere else for that matter. According to Musu, the United Kingdom‘s policies 
towards the EPC and the Middle East were torn between two different propositions. On the one hand, 
―given its historical past as a colonial power, it has a natural inclination to encourage European 
initiatives in the peace process and is very reluctant to accept the secondary role to which the 
European Community and then the EU is relegated.‖888 On the other hand, Musu argued, the ―high 
priority given to transatlantic relations prompted the United Kingdom to exercise caution in 
encouraging the development of an independent European policy towards a peace process that so 
often not only differs from the American policy, but goes openly against it.‖889 As the Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Carrington, said in the early 1980s ―I believe that our contribution to a settlement of 
the Arab–Israeli dispute can be made most effectively in co-operation with the United States.‖890 For 
this reason the UK first refused to support the launching of the Euro-Arab dialogue unless an 
agreement was found on how to associate the U.S with the political cooperation procedures.
891
 
 
 
Britain joined the U.S and twenty-six other countries in sending forces to the Gulf to eject the Iraqis 
from Kuwait. Under Tony Blair (1997 -2007) Britain strengthened its relation with US at the expense 
of the EU policy. In addition, in a policy that contradicted the policy of Germany and France, Blair 
supported the U.S. in its war on Iraq in 2003 and also supported Israel and the U.S. during the war on 
Lebanon in 2006, asserting Israel's right to self-defense and refusing an immediate ceasefire. In 
addition, Britain convinced the rest of the EU members to put Hamas on the European terrorist list.
892
 
In sum, except the London Conference, which aimed to reform the PA, Britain under Blair‘s 
leadership was a passive actor in the MEPP.  This continued under Gordon Brown.
893  
To conclude, the main pillars of the British policy towards the Middle East have been, firstly, 
supporting the European involvement in the MEPP as long as this role did not distract the U.S. away 
from its efforts to reach a settlement between the conflicting parties. Secondly, the European 
involvement in the MEPP and the region should therefore be limited to the activities that were 
welcomed by the Americans, the Arabs, and the Israelis.  
4.4.1.4 The Rest of the EU Members   
The Netherlands has traditionally sympathised with Israel and been one of its staunchest supporters in 
the EEC.
894
 During the 1973 war the Netherlands accused Syria and Egypt of being ―the aggressors 
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and of starting the war,‖895 and along with Denmark refused to allow the (pro-Arab) France and 
Britain to speak on behalf of the Community in the Security Council at the United Nations.
896
 
However, Dutch foreign policy towards the conflict in the Middle East has since softened, not only as 
a result of the oil embargo, but also through the reconciliatory processes of the EPC mechanism. 
According to Soetendorp, the Dutch ―allied with the other five member states in acknowledging the 
Palestinian question had a political dimension too.‖897In addition, the Netherlands joined with 
Luxembourg, Belgium, Britain, France and Italy in voting for a UN resolution stating that recognition 
of Palestinian‘s rights were an essential component of any Arab-Israeli peace settlement.898  
 During the 1970s and 1980s, Italy was considered one of the stronger supporters of a common 
European approach to the conflict, mainly within the framework of a broader Mediterranean policy. 
This trend in Italian foreign policy aimed to balance the distribution of power within Europe itself, 
where most of the interests and activities were dominated by - or in - the northern European 
Community states.
899
 Italy was also considered one of the supporters of the recognition of Palestinian 
rights along with France. Italy was one of the first European member states to have accorded political 
recognition to the PLO before the publication of the Venice Declaration. Studying the voting 
behaviour of the European Community members in the UN General Assembly, Lindeman found that 
– along with France and Ireland - Italy defended the PLO‘s national cause and was ―more openly 
critical to the Israeli State and rather supportive to the cause of the Palestinian people‖.900  
Good relations with the Arab states and with the Palestinians remain by large and a constant factor in 
Italy‘s policy. Greece also was one of the main supporters of Palestinian political rights. Greece did 
not recognize the State of Israel de jure until it joined the European Community in 1981, when at the 
same time it recognised the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
901
 
There are some observers who consider the Greek political stance towards the conflict in the Middle 
East as a product of its own, complex, historical experience with the Turkish invasion in the North 
part of Cyprus. They argue that the Greek support of the Palestinian‘s rights is motivated by the belief 
that the Palestinians, like the Greek Cypriots, are ―suppressed peoples‖ and that if Greece accepts the 
Israeli occupation of the Palestinian lands, it will mean that they will have accepted the Turkish 
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occupation of Cyprus.
902
 
The perspective of Greece, for example, is a clear example of the fulfilment of that influence. The 
most recent joint military exercise between Israel and Turkey has raised Greeks concerns since 
―Greece believed that the Turkish-Israel agreement to hold joint military exercises changed the 
balance in the area and undermines peace and stability.‖903 The Irish are highly sensitive to the 
Palestinian problem since it has itself been a colony which, like Palestine, has been divided.
904
 In the 
same context Cyprus is sensitive to the Palestinian problem since it shares with Ireland the experience 
of occupation by foreign forces.
905
 In addition to the Mediterranean EU states the Scandinavian 
member states, especially Norway and Sweden, are inclined to pursue more pro-Arab policies.
906
 In 
fact Sweden took a controversial decision towards the conflicting parties Swedish government to 
grant in May 2006 a Schengen visa to a Hamas minister, despite the EU‘s political boycott of the 
Islamist Palestinian movement.
907
 
Like its Mediterranean neighbours, the Spanish Franco-led regime also tried to position Spain as a 
"friend" of the Arabs, refusing to recognise the Israeli state.
908
 Spain has a long historical connection 
with the Arab areas of North Africa, especially with Morocco.  According to Segal, despite shared 
cultural affiliations, and although most of the EC members considered the Soviet Union as the main 
threat for their national security during the Cold War, the Spaniards perceived instability in the 
Maghreb as posing a greater and more immediate threat to themselves.
909
Accordingly, this led to 
significant and frequent bipartisan efforts to secure broad understandings and working agreements 
between Spain and its North African neighbours.
910
 
Spain was also at pains to develop empathetic relations when it came to the Middle East in general, 
for example allowing the PLO to establish offices in Madrid. Any pro-Republican sympathies with 
Israel were dashed by Israel‘s abstention in 1967 of a UN Resolution, put forward by Spain and 
ardently supported by Arab states that advocated that Gibraltar be returned to Spanish sovereignty.  In 
1973 and under pressure from America, Spain made airbases available to US planes providing 
logistical support to the Israeli war effort but in 1979, the centre-right Suarez government refused to 
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allow the U.S to send F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia via Spain, and, during the 1986 US bombing raid 
on Libya, the socialist government similarly allegedly refused to allow the use of US bases in 
Spain.
911
 Efforts in 1981 to bring Spain into line with new NATO allies in its relations with Israel 
were disrupted further by Spanish anguish over the Lebanon war.   
Thus the Spanish stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict only really changed when Spain joined the 
European Community, at which point the Spanish government was forced to recognise the Israeli state 
as a condition of its accession.
912
Spain began to see itself as a facilitator of the Peace Process, within 
the context of the EEC. PLO chairman Arafat was received in January 1989 by Prime Minister 
Gonzalez and, during Spain's six-month presidency of the EC that same year, its representatives 
worked actively on Arab-Israeli issues.
913
 It was no coincidence, then, that the Spanish hosted the first 
Peace Conference in Madrid in 1991. 
For historical and ideological reasons the new EU member states which have recently joined the EU 
after the enlargement, such as Poland and the Czech Republic show pro-Israel policies.
914
 In fact the 
EU enlargements have further interrupt the progression towards a unified Middle East policy by 
introducing more diverse interests and less cohesiveness into the EU, thereby making cooperation 
even more difficult.
915
 This latter group of member states in Eastern and Central Europe have their 
own perspective on the EU‘s approach to the MEPP, especially from their recent experience of the 
importance of the role of democracy in bringing about and consolidating peace.
916
 Kolarska-Bobinska 
and Mughrabi found that the new member states are the strongest US allies and are thus considered 
potential allies of Israel.
917
  
The role of the U.S. has a distracting impact on certain new member states which have come to view 
Israel less within the conflict and more as an ally of the U.S.
918
 The 2003 war in Iraq is a clear 
example of how the attitudes of new EU members are increasing the divisions within the EU and its 
policies towards the Middle East.  Most of the new EU member states contributed to the U.S-led 
coalition in Iraq. According to a Crisis Group report, these members ―feel gratitude to the U.S. and 
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believe their ultimate security depends on its continued engagement with Europe.‖919  
An example of these attitudes is the Czech Republic‘s view toward the 2009 war on Gaza. Kaczyński, 
the Czech President, expressed a partiality to the democratic vision that Israel seeks to project and for 
the fact that it puts a strong emphasis on security.
920
 It thus adopted a stance more in line with the U.S, 
distancing itself from southern EU countries, which expressed their concern for a degree of 
reconciliation.
921
 
The third position amongst EU member states towards the Middle East is the group which endeavours 
to maintain a policy of ‗equal distance‘ from the conflict, thereby aspiring to nurture good relations 
with both parties and present themselves as a neutral players.  Such countries include some of the 
Scandinavian members like Finland and Sweden.  According to an Irish foreign ministry official; 
these countries do not seek to profile themselves in an overtly active way.   
4.4.1.5 Impact of Divergent Interests of the EU members on the European Policy towards the 
Middle East  
Clearly the different national interests of the EEC/EU member states reduced its ability to do much 
more than make Declarations of policy towards the Middle East, which amounted to little more over 
the years than a broad shift towards support for a negotiated settlement. Nonetheless, for Israel this 
amounted to a swing in favour of the Arabs. Doing anything more, even at the behest of the 
determined French, raised all the problems stemming from differential relationships with the United 
States, the tensions that came from small EEC/EU states eager to resist the domination by larger 
states, and the problems that would stem from a more integrated implementation process in terms of 
undermining the shared preferences for an inter-governmentalist approach to foreign policy.  
In short, collective foreign policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and its parties was constrained by 
the two arenas of conflict: that between member states, and that between member states and the 
Community. Clearly, Europe remained simply too divided to play a more decisive role. While EU 
member states were in broad agreement about the desired outcome of a final settlement, they have 
continued to be divided over specific steps in the peace process and split in their support for the 
Palestinians and the Israelis. We can see the EPC/CFSP was bedevilled by tension between the 
national interests and agendas of member states. As a result of intergovernmentalism, and specifically 
the need for unanimity in the principal decision-making bodies, the EPC/CFSP were victim of endless 
negotiations over the conflicting national interests of member states. The ability of any member state 
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of the EU to veto any decision that did not meet their interests, priorities or agenda, inhibited 
proactive policy-making and kept the EU‘s foreign policy profile to a minimum. Indeed, the conflict 
between the differential interests of the member states has even been exacerbated by the 
intergovernmental approach, which propels member states to focus on national rather than collective 
interests.  
Moreover, since efforts to promote their national interests through the EU policy-making process have 
been likely to be obstructed by member states with opposing interests, they were often prompted to 
initiate their own foreign policy initiatives outside of the frame work of the EU.  This policy 
proliferation has been endorsed by the European treaties, which allows the member states to initiate 
their own policy as long as they do not harm or contradict the general trend of the CFSP, but it does 
weaken the EU diplomatic role on the international stage while at the same time creating confusion 
among peripheral partners.   
The various contradictions and conflicts between interests, agendas, and priorities of member states 
have been witnessed in the GAERC meetings which mirror the conflicts between large and small 
members, between the ‗old‘ and ‗new‘  Europe, the rich and the poor, the realist and the moralist, the 
interventionist and the anti-interventionist (or neutral), the original six and the latecomers, the insiders 
and the outsiders, the federalists and the intergovernmentalists, the Atlanticists and 
Mediterraneanists.
922
 In these meetings, each European state belongs to several groups 
simultaneously, intermittently opposing certain countries on selected issues while seeking alliances on 
others.  Similarities have been interwoven with dissimilarities, and some countries do not easily fit 
into any of the aforementioned categories. 
How a political community defines its interests depends not only on objective, material factors (such 
as geography, size and wealth), but also on a range of subjective, normative considerations. These 
include the identity of a community, historical experience, patterns of economic interdependence, 
political culture, cultural links with the outside world, dominate moral and ethical values, perceptions 
of justice, a shared belief of common good and its conviction in what makes it distinctive as a political 
community.
923
  These have been linked to their perception of where the threats to Europe come from; 
while Germany looks at the threats of the instability coming from the ex-Soviet Union, or from 
terrorism, the Mediterranean member states consider the threat to come principally from illegal 
immigration from North Africa.   
Crucially, the tension between member states has not only been about national interests but also about 
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their differing visions for Europe, or, perhaps one could say, how they understand the European role.  
Clearly apparent is how each member state envisions a different reality of the European Union‘s 
interests and role in the world. Despite the fact the CFSP rests on a shared European identity, which 
has evolved gradually over the last few decades,
924
 Kochnev argued that ―Europe has no...single, 
unique identity‖ because ―Europe is the home of a pluralistic society, coexisting and interacting with 
one another.‖ 925 
 There is a consensus that the foreign policy of any country is heavily influenced by national identity, 
which inevitably appears through domestic societal pressures on decision-makers.  In fact, national 
interests and identities are contingent and socially constructed.  Therefore, most member states of the 
EU reflect and inject their identities, which are an amalgamated construction of common history, 
cultural norms, values, language, ethnicity, political culture, religion and perceptions, into verbal 
translations about expected foreign policy behaviour and action orientation within the CFSP.
926
 Hyde-
Price has emphasised that identities ―shape the definition of national and European interests and 
thereby constitute an important influence on foreign policy behaviour.‖927 Broader foreign policy 
approaches, particularly regarding European integration, have been bound up with a sense of identity 
in foreign policy.  This is why, for instance, there tends to be ideological competition at the EU 
intergovernmental conferences, as the position of each member state tends to reflect its own 
conception of the model political community.
928
 
Although EU states have shared a high contemporary general propensity for common action owing to 
certain inherent characteristics, the CFSP nonetheless represents a multiplayer mix of identities, 
values and ethics, each with the belief that its explicit perceptions and values must, at a bare 
minimum, be considered, but optimally, prevail and dominate the institutional framework.
929
 
According to Hill, the EU‘s lack of influence over education and the diverse historical experiences of 
member states have played a significant role in weakening the common identity of European foreign 
policy.
930
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The multiple identities of the EU countries have contributed to the stimulation of disunity among EU 
members.  EU member states fear that creating a common European identity would come at the 
expense of their national identity; therefore, in order to protect relevant distinctiveness, a sacrifice to 
create a common European, or international identity, has consistently been made. As a consequence of 
being under the pressure of domestic electorates to protect the aforesaid characteristics, national, 
rather than European loyalties and identities, prevail.  
More precisely, when it has come to the different ‗models‘ for Europe, some member states, such as 
Germany, have perceived it as being a civilian or ‗soft power,‘ rendering it concerned primarily with 
peace keeping and trade, whereas others, such as France, have looked at the EU as a superpower 
equivalent to the U.S. and aspire to increase its role in the world. The concept of civilian power can be 
summarised as an international actor which influences the international system by using economic, 
financial and political means instead of military power, and promotes the ideals of democracy, human 
rights and economic growth through co-operative use of non-military means.
931
 The superpower or 
realist approach, by comparison, may be said to engage in the opposite. Due to this conflict of 
perception, the EU still lacks a firm identity as a geopolitical entity, and consequently lacks a shared 
understanding of joint global interests.  
This division has been clearly played out in responses to proposals for a European military force: 
when EU Defence Ministers agreed to establish such a joint military force in 2000, the UK was 
particularly keen to map it onto, rather than against, NATO forces in Europe in deference to Britain‘s 
relationship with the U.S.  Germany, meanwhile, had opposed the idea of a ―standing‖ EU army, since 
this conflicted with its civilian concept of the Union, but supported the idea of working parallel to its 
ally the United States. France, and recently Spain, however, have considered the U.S. as a hegemonic 
power threatening the international role and position of the EU and seek instead policy which clearly 
asserts Europe‘s independence from the U.S and its capacity to assert itself as it pleases.   
Although member states have agreed on the need for the Union to exercise a role in the region 
Middle East or the shores of the Mediterranean, these countries have lacked the vision necessary for 
this role: its shape and nature, extent and quality. Although the vast majority of EU members share the 
same opinion about the ―proper‖ policy there are often two, three, and sometimes even more different 
views on how to approach the conflict in a unified manner.
932
 Diverse political interests, towards the 
peace process and towards the U.S. and their European counterparts, have led member states to 
reroute policies towards the role of international players, such as the United States, and local 
conflicting parties, such as the Palestinians and Israelis.  
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 Additionally, the international alliances and relations of member states to other countries, whether 
they are enemies or allies, have had a direct effect on the positions of those states toward the 
Palestinian cause.  
From a speech delivered by Dominique Moïsi, the Deputy Director of the French Institute for 
International Relations (IFRI), one could conclude that the dilemma of member states towards the 
Middle East has been determined by the political stance of the major member states, explicitly 
Germany, Britain and France, by stating that: 
 
―The EU can only succeed in the Middle East if the French are sometimes prepared to 
annoy the Arabs, if the Brits are sometimes prepared to annoy the Americans and the 
Germans are sometimes prepared to annoy the Israelis.‖933  
The voting behaviour of the member states in the UN has been another example of the divergent 
interests of the member states in the Middle East. On the 1
st
 of July 1997, at the UN General 
Assembly, the vast majority of member states had agreed upon a common position calling on Israel to 
avoid changing the status quo at (Har Homa) in East Jerusalem. However, Germany abstained.
934
 
German policy was against the main fundamental European policy on this matter whereby the EU 
considered all Israeli activities in east Jerusalem illegal, an obstacle to peace, and against international 
law. 
These elements have contributed to the paralysis of EU‘s capabilities to forage a CFSP in the region.  
Since EU Member States have not demonstrated a unity of purpose and action in respect of the 
MEPP, the formulation of any common policy, despite the geo-strategic importance of the region, has 
been hindered by the question of how each member state‘s interests are attained in the process.935 As a 
result, the EU‘s policy has often represented the lowest common denominator.  Pijipers supported the 
above statement by arguing that the desire of the EU to play a political role in the Middle East through 
its collective presence has come at a price.  He added ―the constant need to find a compromise among 
a few dozen states with strong national traditions has led to a lot of ambiguity.‖936  
According to Behr, this is ―a basic precondition for many important European initiatives and therefore 
serves as an indication for the limits of European consensus.‖937  The vast majority of EU‘s members 
perceive the Middle East and their own foreign policy in ―purely national terms and have national 
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interests or policy preferences in the region.‖938 These methods, according to Laipson, may ―conflict 
with or compete with their European Community partners' interests and policies.‖939 
4.4.1.6 Impact of the Tension between EU Collective and Individual Member State Policies 
The main reason behind this conflict has been that the member states have had the freedom to pursue 
their own foreign policy and goals outside of the EU framework, as long as their policies have not 
contradict mainstream EU policies. This right has been emphasised through the Constructive 
Abstention article introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty. The treaty stated that ―If member states 
abstain, they are not obliged to apply the EU decision; but they must accept, ―in a spirit of 
solidarity.‖940 These policies may not harm the EU Policy directly, but they still might lead to 
confusion, frustration, and contradictions, since several member states have periodically utilised that 
right and initiated new proposals and policies in order to solve the conflict in the Middle East. In fact, 
this right has weakened the European role and stance in the Middle East. 
Soetendorp argued that the ―common policy has not prevent[ed] some member states, and France in 
particular, from practicing their own diplomacy in the region when their national views reached 
beyond the common denominator.‖941  Pijipers further showed how France and the other three large 
EU member states persistently send envoys to the region as if no EU presidency or foreign policy 
coordinator existed.
942
  The Spanish peace initiative in November 2006 was another clear example of 
European dualism in representation. Soon after Israel invaded the Gaza Strip in November 2006 
through the ‗Autumn Clouds,‘ Operation the Spanish government, led by Jose Luis Rodriguez 
Zapatero, and in cooperation with France and Italy, initiated a new peace plan for the conflict in the 
Middle East.  During a press conference, Zapatero emphasised that the three countries share the same 
values, interests, morals and vision over the Middle East, especially in regard to Palestine, and as a 
result the three countries should act together.
943
 
Although the founders of the peace plan tried to promote it as an EU plan, the trilateral initiative was 
immediately rejected by Israel who argued that there had been no prior coordination between 
European and Israeli diplomats. Doubly unsupported by Washington, the initiative eventually died 
away.  During the December 2006 European Council meeting, the Presidential Conclusions did not so 
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much as even mention it.
944
 
4.4.2  The Second Determinant: European Transatlantic Relationships 
Studying the EU-US relation in detail is beyond the scope of this study, but since the U.S. is the EU‘s 
most important strategic partner in their relationship vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli, it is an important factor 
in the equation of Euro-Mediterranean relations. Both the international players interconnected have a 
lot in common politically, culturally and in terms of strategic interests. Their relationship is not just 
important for the Middle East, but also for the rest of the world. Over the past 50 years, the 
transatlantic relationship has gone through ups and downs; since World War II both have been linked 
economically through the Marshall Plan, and militarily through NATO. In fact, Europe‘s development 
to its current state ―occurred under the mantle of the U.S. security guarantee‖ and could not have 
occurred without it.
945
  
These days, the EU-US relationship is still the most influential, comprehensive and strategically vital 
relationship in the world. Aaccording to statistics, the EU and the U.S. ―combine some 60% of the 
world's GDP, with the EU having overtaken the U.S. numbers of around US $10 trillion.‖ 946 Both 
international actors represent ―around 40% of world trade in goods and even more in services‖ and 
they hold ―80% of the global capital markets.‖ They are each other's main trading partner and source, 
as much as recipient, of foreign direct investment.947  
In addition, the EU and the U.S. are partners in fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the 
world. Their cooperation in this field has intensified since September 11. In addition, and for both 
cultural and historical reasons, several members of the EEC/EU such as Germany, Britain, and some 
of the new EU members have a special relation with the U.S, and thus they always take US policy into 
account.948  However, although economically they are relatively balanced, militarily the U.S. is in a 
stronger position since the EU lacks military capabilities and is dependent on NATO.  
 It can be agreed that the EU and US special relationship erodes the effectiveness of EU policies 
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towards the Middle East. Thus it is important to take into account the relationship between both actors 
when we analyse European policy towards the Middle East. In theory, both share common objectives 
in the region with regard to promotion of peace, stability and economic development.949 However the 
question remains as to what is the best way to advance peace.  
The U.S‘s own position has developed over time. Until the 1960s, America's geographical distance 
permitted a degree of detachment from Middle Eastern affairs which contrasted with the physical 
proximity and direct involvement of the EU states and particularly of the former colonial powers, 
Britain and France. For example, in the 1950s it avoided overly close ties with Israel in order to enlist 
Arab assistance in the containment of Soviet expansion. 
 Only after the Six Day War in 1967 did the U.S become Israel's leading supplier of weapons, and 
only in the early 1970s did America's growing dependency on foreign energy supplies render it 
vulnerable to OPEC disruptions. Möckli argued that the European-US relations vis-à-vis the Arab-
Israeli conflict have evolved in three phases. Whereas during the Cold War the collective diplomacy 
of the EEC and the U.S polices towards the Middle East took too divergent approaches, creating a 
great deal of transatlantic tension, the nature of the relation shifted during the 1990s to 
―complementary approaches.‖ 950 
Finally, Möckli argued that since the launch of the Quartet in 2002, the EU-US moved to 
―coordinated approaches.‖951  During the 1970s, the EPC declarations vis-à-vis the Middle East 
conflict were advanced and pioneer this in fact had created a refit between the EEC and the U.S.  For 
example, as I will explain in detail, the U.S was not happy with the European community declaration 
which came in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab oil embargo on some of the western countries.  In 
addition, the U.S had also opposed the Euro-Arab dialogue that France initiated to reduce the tension 
between western countries and the Arab world after, in 1973, the U.S considered the initiative to be 
submitting to Arab blackmail.  
According to al-Malki there had been an understanding between the two great powers about the 
management of the conflict and the rejection of solutions that favoured one party over the other.
952
 He 
referred to the need for a continual conflict to ensure the ―perpetuation of the Cold War and to feed it, 
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yet without allowing matters to get out of hand.‖953  The Cold War policy According to al-Malki 
―reduced the ability of the EEC to manoeuvre its foreign affairs and kept the EPC profile relatively 
low
954‖.  
They frequently amended some EPC policies and toned down their rhetoric about Israel to satisfy 
American demands (sometimes to the relief of some of their own members) but in doing so lost the 
authority that comes from an independent voice. Johansson-Nogués went further, speaking of ―the 
U.S‘s Cold War threat to withdraw its military presence in Europe if the EC/the twelve did not fall in 
line on important US policies for the Eastern bloc or in the Middle East.‖955  Accordingly, such threats 
prevented the Europeans from developing an independent policy outside the Cold War framework 
during the bipolar era.
956
   
This policy applied to the Middle East, where the Europeans were kept on the sidelines of diplomatic 
activity to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict throughout the 1980s excluded by America (preoccupied 
with a bipolar vision of the world) and its ally Israel (fearful of a pro-Arab bias in EPC policy-
making). It was only after the Oslo Agreement between Israel and the PLO was endorsed by the U.S 
that the U.S and Israel softened their stance on a European political role in the Middle East. 
Möckli convincingly argued that, after their experience in the Middle East, the Europeans had, since 
the 1970s, acknowledged that ―pursuing alternative policies that openly challenge US positions has 
proved counterproductive and undermined their own cohesion‖.957  US lack of interest in the 
European role continued during the 1990s; the first example was the Madrid Peace Process 
conference where the EEC role was limited to the multilateral economic role. 
According to Musu, the U.S. had not been interested in supporting or promoting a European role at 
the Madrid conference for many reasons; firstly it believed that the European involvement would 
―complicate the negotiations process between the conflicting parties‖. Secondly, the U.S. preferred to 
―keep the MEPP in its own hands.‖958 As Bereuter argued, Europe partnered with the U.S. against the 
Soviets and a united Europe was in America‘s interests as long as it was a partner rather than a 
counterweight to US influence in the Middle East.959  
Although Europe had relatively enhanced its capacity as a diplomatic actor in the Middle East through 
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the CFSP in 1992, and although it had become the main donor of the MEPP, the role of the EU in the 
process continued to be limited to the economic role and aid, and the U.S. continued to be the 
dominant external political force in the Middle East.960  During the George Bush era, the U.S. showed 
a lack of interest in the Middle East, excepting the adoption of the Road Map as a way to convince the 
Arabs to participate in the war on Iraq. Thus the Clinton administration saw the European role in the 
MEPP as strictly secondary, and not really necessary, unlike the economic role. Dennis Ross, who led 
the U.S. peace efforts in the region repeatedly made it clear to the EU and the parties that ―any 
mediation in the conflict was a US responsibility.‖961Additionally, Ross‘ team never recognised that 
the EU‘s special envoy had or should have had a role in mediation, and certainly not anything 
comparable to theirs.‖962 From their viewpoint, the special envoy was useful for ―information 
gathering and sharing but not for consultation, let alone joint negotiation.‖963 
There is no doubt that that the EU has managed to play a political role through its CFSP 
representative and special envoy. Its role on the ground was wide-ranging, from aiding the PA, 
training the Palestinian police, monitoring the operations of the border crossing point between the 
Gaza Strip and Egypt through the EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point 
EUBAM Rafah. Its final role was crisis management, such as brokering the deal over the Israeli siege 
to the Nativity Church in Bethlehem from April 2 to May 10, 2002, where more than 200 Palestinians 
blockaded when the Israel army occupied Bethlehem and tried to capture wanted Palestinian militants 
who fled into the Church of the Nativity and sought refuge.  Although there was an absence of 
European initiatives to put an end to the conflict in the Middle East, its special envoy played an 
important role on the ground.  An example of this has been the bringing of Arafat and Levy together 
in Brussels for a re-launch of the peace talks, after the crisis over new Israel settlement in east 
Jerusalem.  The EU special envoy also played an important role in brokering the deal over Hebron, 
securing the commitment of the Palestinian while the U.S. took care of Israel.964  
The absence of the European political role from the MEPP continued until the formation of the 
Middle East Quartet in Madrid in 2002, where the EU for the first time participated with the U.S, 
Russia, and the UN in putting the MEPP agenda. As explained previously, the Road Map, a first 
official document of the Quartet, was a European proposal.  The European participation in the Quartet 
faced several criticisms which will be investigated in detail through our analysis of the European role 
in MEPP in the next section.  
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It would be unfair to blame the U.S. for the European absence from the MEPP. As explained 
previously, several states including Germany, Britain and new EU members have not been interested 
in more European political engagement in the Peace Process, but rather prefer to compliment the 
United States‘ role in the process. This vision has not been limited to the member states but also to the 
EU officials and institutions. For example, the former European External Commissioner Patten 
emphasises that ―the EU intends to continue to work closely with the U.S. not as competitors, but as 
partners.‖965 His view was shared by the former Special Envoy to the MEPP Miguel Moratinos who 
stated that ―the Europeans do not want to interfere in the MEPP negotiations between the parties for 
the sake of appearing as another mediator…We simply cannot confront the United States, and we do 
not want to undermine the peace process.‖966 In another interview, Moratinos stated ―my role is 
complementary to the U.S. It has to be so. My role is not about competing for influence but in striving 
to help MEPP.‖967According to Christopher Hill, the Europeans are even more opposed to the U.S. 
Position over the Israel- Arab conflict, but they keep their concerns ―behind the diplomatic arras‖. He 
related this policy to the fear of being seen as ‗soft‘ on terrorism, of raising the spectre of 
appeasement - an accusation which Israel and its friends are not slow to throw at Europeans, together 
with that of anti-Semitism.‖968 
4.4.3  The Third Determinant: the European–Israeli Relations   
As chapter three demonstrated, the official relations between the EEC/EU and Israel have been 
developing since 1960, when Israel was part of the global Mediterranean policy, and relations have 
been progressively upgraded since Israel is now a member of all the European regional initiatives and 
has signed several agreements with the EU, such as the EU-Israel Association Agreement, which 
entered into force in 2000. The rest of the EMP agreement (the EU Israeli association agreement) 
covered free trade in industrial and select agricultural products, freedom of establishment, free 
movement of capital, the harmonisation of regulatory frameworks as well as social and cultural 
cooperation.969 According to EU statistics, the ―EU is Israel's largest import and export market and 
accounts for about a third of Israel's total trade.‖970 Israel is one of EU's leading trading partners in the 
Mediterranean area and ranked as ―the EU's 25th major trade partner globally‖. From mid-2003 to 
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mid-2008 was around 5% per year.  In numbers, the EU goods exports to Israel reached €14.0 billion 
in 2008, and the EU goods imports from Israel for the same year reached €11.2 billion.971 
Member states‘ historical relations with the conflicting parties in the Middle East, particularly in the 
cases of Germany and Holland, because of their role in the Holocaust, and in the EPC declarations 
during the 1970s and 1980s, have played an enormously significant role in determining the European 
policy towards the Middle East. This history and the policies have created a strong opposition from 
Israel towards any European attempts to extend its role from payer to player. Some critics believe that  
Israeli attitudes towards the European Community‘s involvement was  the strongest and most negative 
factor in limiting Europe‘s ability to have a role in the Middle East, since the EU engagement often 
meets scepticism by consecutive Israeli governments.  
They argued that even if the Europeans managed to unify their voices and interest, the Israelis would 
not open the door for them to become involved in the region‘s conflict.972 Alpher believes that the 
Holocaust and the political stance of the Europeans towards Israeli wars ―make it difficult for Israel to 
trust Europe and allow it to play a major role in the MEPP.‖973 Plus, he accused the European member 
states of focusing more on their economic interests than on the security concerns of Israel.  
According to Israel, Europe‘s pro-Arab positions during the 1970s and 1980s have ―encouraged Israel 
and the U.S. to exclude the European Community from peace negotiations, reducing its opportunity to 
act.‖974 The Israeli Government expressed a hostile response to most of the European Declarations. 
For example, the 1973 Declaration was viewed as a European effort to appease the Arabs. The Israeli 
Government accused the European Community of ―putting the cart before the horse by making 
concessions to the PLO in advance of the PLO's renunciation of violence against Israel.‖975 It also 
accused the European Community of having relinquished the UN Security Council 242.   
Yigal Allon, the envoy to Belgium and the EEC, stated that the declaration by the Community had 
supported and advocated the Franco-Soviet theme, which represented and advanced the Arab position 
in an attempt to gain guarantee oil supplies. After the Venice Declaration the Israeli cabinet stated: 
―nothing will remain of the Venice Decision but a bitter memory…All men of goodwill in Europe, all 
men who revere liberty, will see this document as another Munich-like capitulation to totalitarian 
blackmail and spur to all those seeking to undermine the Camp David Accords and derail the peace 
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process in the Middle East.976  
EU-Israeli relations were further damaged by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The European 
Community condemned the invasion, and continued to call for a full Israeli withdrawal from all of 
Lebanon. It further imposed an embargo on arms sales to Israel, this being lifted in stages after the 
opening of the Madrid Conference in 1991 and the signing of the Oslo Agreement in 1993. The 
mistrust between Israel and Europe continued during the 1990s.  For example, the Madrid Conference 
was a clear example of the rejection of the European involvement in the MEPP. During the 
preparations for the conference, the Israeli government showed a hostile attitude towards European 
participation in the peace conference. Although the Europeans insisted on EEC participation in the 
conference, the 12 European governments had participated in the conference as individual partners 
which irritated the U.S. and weakened the European Community‘s presence.977 The Wye River 
negotiation in October 1998 was another clear example of Israel‘s unwillingness to acknowledge the 
EU‗s status as a political actor in the Middle East.  Here, Israel denied the European Special Envoy to 
the MEPP, Moratinos, access to the negotiation table, which was, according to Kurikkala ―naturally 
humiliating to the biggest donor which wished to play a more prominent mediatory role.‖978  
According to Ginsberg, in the eyes of the Israeli government the EC had made three tactical errors 
that doomed its role as an acceptable mediator in the peace process. First, it demanded that Israel 
make concessions to the Palestinians in advance of direct peace negotiations; second, it made 
concessions to the Palestinians that prejudged Israeli interests in advance of direct peace negotiations; 
and finally, it insisted on the United Nations as the appropriate forum for negotiations towards a 
comprehensive peace settlement, knowing that this was unacceptable for Israel.979 
The European Union‘s inability to build a coherent CFSP contributed to the Israelis‘ objection to their 
role in the MEPP.  The former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin asked some European politicians 
―why we Israelis should trust you when even your own house is not in order.‖980  The Israeli 
Government has indicated that the role of the European Community from the Israeli point of view was 
no more than to facilitate and help the countries of the Middle East to meet each other to conduct 
direct negotiations, but by no means should the Community impose the terms of a peace process.  
 Israel´s former foreign minister David Levy also referred to Europe´s attempt to seek a mediatory 
role by stating that ―Europe already plays an important role in the negotiations; in the economics of 
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peace. We will reject all interferences in the (political) negotiations.‖981  In sum, Kurikkala believes 
that, as long as Israel and, to a certain extent, the U.S are unwilling to give the EU a place at the 
negotiation table, the Union remains a political non-actor in the region when it comes to substantial 
high policy question.982  
4.4.4  The Fourth Determinant: Decision-Making and the Mechanism of the CFSP and the 
European Role in the MEPP 
As chapter two demonstrated, until 2009 European foreign affairs remained an on-going puzzle 
characterized by a complex and highly fragmented institutional structure.
983
 It was under the 
responsibility of the four main institutions of the EU: the European Council, the Council of Ministers, 
the European Commission and the European Parliament. Within the CFSP´s institutional structure, 
authority had been granted to various other bodies and figures (EU High Representative, 
Commissioner for External Affairs, EU Special Representative).  The main decision-making power 
was still in the hands of the members which dealt with the decisions in the European Council and the 
Council of Ministers, and made their decision only by consensus. This means that contrasting other 
areas of EU policy making (such as trade), the CFSP remained in principal at the intergovernmental 
level.  Interactions between the main players within the EU institutional structure have been a divisive 
factor in determining what has been called the ―capacity for collective action‖.984  
The EU policy towards the Middle East and the OPTs in particular is a victim of dualism of the EU 
system, the proliferation of structures, multiple players, actors and agents involved in the CFSP 
formulation.  Monar studied the institutional constraints of the EU and found that the institutional 
limitations of its dual system of foreign affairs clearly have had an impact on Mediterranean policy.  It 
can be further inferred that this impact is purely a negative one since the institutional restrictions of 
the system make the EU a ―clearing house‖ of different interests rather than a unitary actor with 
defined objectives and strategies.
985
  He emphasised that due to the Union‘s system lacking the single 
governmental structures and central authority of a nation-state actor on the international stage, its 
policy on the Mediterranean depended on interest constellations that vary over time and the capacity 
of the institutional setup to merge these interests into decisions in the Eoropean Commission and/or 
the CFSP framework‖986  Monar linked the institutional constraints with the national interests of the 
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member-states as follows: 
―The resulting institutional constraints become particularly tangible if a policy 
touches vital interests of the Union and its member states because then the internal 
struggle for securing priorities and defending particular interests of all the actors 
involved becomes all the more intense.‖ 987 
He concluded that the decision-making has been slow, often reduced to the lowest common 
denominator among the member states' interests, and the process is sometimes even paralysed.
988
 In 
addition, the intergovernmental approach within the Council of Europe and the European Council has 
made the problem-solving style of decision-making the primary method of formulating policy toward 
the OPTs and the conflict.  
4.4.4.1 Dualism in the European Representation 
As already explained in chapter two, the pre-Lisbon Treaty structures authorised the Presidency to 
represent the Union in matters coming within the CFSP, assisted by the High Representative for the 
CFSP. This created a dualism in the EU representation in the Middle East, since both The Presidency 
and the High Representative were in direct political competition to represent the EU. Consequently, 
this affected the EU‘s ability to conduct a coherent, unified foreign policy, since each of the EU actors 
delivered different answers to the same question.  Most criticisms were directed to the former HR, 
who sometimes ignored the regulations of the EU.  
 Solana stated in interview ―I do whatever I want ... I pursue my own agenda. I don‘t have to check 
everything with everyone ... if you ask for permission, you would never do anything.‖989 EU‘s 
participation in the Quartet has been an example of the dualism representation in the Middle East. 
There are several European actors into the Quartet including the presidency of the EU, the EU High 
Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, and the European Commissioner for External Relations, 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner. 
While the role of the European Commission Technical Assistance office in Ramallah was limited to 
co-coordinating, managing and monitoring the large EU assistance programme to the Palestinians, the 
responsibilities and roles of the European delegation to Israel dealt with six main fields: politics, 
economics, projects, information, culture and science.
990
 Both of the delegations lacked political 
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competence in representation of the European Commission which, however, also lacked political 
competence and influence in the CFSP as a result of the rights of the member states to initiate and 
conduct policies outside of the EU CFSP framework, providing that the policy does not contradict or 
harm the EU approaches. 
During the 2006 Lebanon Crisis, for example, more than 25 European ministers - each from a 
different country - travelled to Beirut, delivering mixed messages to put an end to the war between 
Israel and Hezbollah.
991
  Another example pertains to the January 2009 War on Gaza. The techniques 
that the EU used to deal with the conflict indeed reflected the contradictions and problems caused by 
the CFSP mechanism, both in terms of duplication of the diplomatic representation and in terms of the 
conflict and clash in interests and views between the member states toward the conflict and its 
collaborators. With regard to the representation, the war witnessed dualism in the EU representation. 
During this time, there were two separate European diplomatic missions in the Middle East aiming to 
stop the violence and broker a cease-fire in the Gaza Strip.  The first delegation was the Czech 
government and group of EU ministers, the 'troika', which included the EU High Representative for 
CFSP, Javier Solana, and the European Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner 
and the French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner. 
 The European delegation was chaired by the Czech Foreign Minister, Karel Schwarzenberg, who 
held the presidency of the EU at the time. The second delegation was headed by the French president, 
Nicolas Sarkozy, who assumed presidency of the EU until the term ended on 31 December, 2008. 
Both delegations met separately with the Israeli and Arab leaders in Jerusalem, Ramallah and Cairo in 
order to put an end to the violence.  In fact, the dual representation caused severe confusion within the 
EU and in the Middle East.  Despite the lack of objectivity from the European Commission on the 
French initiative, as long as the message of the EU was preserved and delivered, anxieties were 
muted. 
However, the Czechs were not happy. The Czech Prime Minister, Mirek Topolanek, in a statement 
described the task of Sarkozy as a useful contribution to resolving the conflict, but made it clear that 
the French president did not represent the European Union. 
As a way of avoiding the anger that Sarkozy‘s visit had caused, the French diplomats legitimized his 
visit as that of co-chair of the Union for the Mediterranean, a position of which he had previously 
proposed the establishment in 2007, and which was later founded in Paris in July 2008 with co-chair 
Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, at the helm. 
The political statements of both delegations had caused confusion and showed that the EU leaders 
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contradicted one another in their messages and on their stance towards the conflict and Israel. While 
the Czechs supported Israeli strikes on Gaza, describing them as "more defensive than offensive," the 
mere act of iterating this statement sparked anger within the EU and its member states.  For example, 
a British diplomat said that the communication had not been co-ordinated in advance with the Czech 
Republic's EU partners. 
992
  This allowed observers to interpret it as an indication that France did not 
have confidence in the Czech Republic‘s ability to deal with such a delicate task.993  
4.4.4.2 The Tension between Member States and the EU’s Main Institutions 
This section will demonstrate tension between the member states and the European institutions and 
how these tensions have affected the EU‘s role in the MEPP and EU-Palestinian relations. The 
appointment of the special envoy in 1996 provided the EU, for the first time, with a single interlocutor 
for dealing with other regional actors, in an attempt to reduce the difficulties and inconsistencies of 
the CFSP due to the rotating EU Presidency system.
994
  
However, the new post has also added one more actor to the multiplicity of EU actors.  It has also 
faced several problems, some of them related to the structure of the CFSP, and others related to the 
fact that its responsibilities might conflict with others within the EU institutions. According to Musu, 
the new position has been ―marred by the very nature of its mandate which, though formally quite 
broad, does not include the possibility of committing the member states to any step which has not 
been previously agreed upon.‖995 Stetter supported this argument stating that ―the main problem is 
what message has to be presented since such an individual cannot move without the full support of 
member states due to reduced speed‖.996  
In addition, Musu emphasised that the capabilities of the Special Envoy to the Middle East initiatives 
are very limited and tightly bound to the indications received from the Council.  Such an individual 
cannot officially commit any member state to any step which has not been previously agreed upon.  It 
is, therefore, hard to envisage a role beyond that of ‗facilitator‘ of the peace talks.997 With regard to 
the structural constraints facing the Special Envoy, the relationship with the rest of the CFSP 
institutions, such as the Special Envoy‘s relationship with the Commission, the presidency of the EU 
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and the Commission Delegation, is one of the elemental problems on the ground.  Patokallio argued 
that the relationship between these parties is surrounded by uncertainty and ambiguity.  Patokallio 
maintained that:  
―According to the Special Envoy‘s mandate, the tasks of the envoy will be without 
prejudice to the role of the commission, which will be full associated in these tasks. 
But to what extent should the two consult each other on policy initiatives, and how 
should the full association of the commission in the special envoy‘s work be 
interpreted, and by whom? In practice these ambiguities have not proven serous 
source of disagreement.‖998  
Nor has the relationship between the rotating Presidency and the Special Envoy always been an easy 
one, especially when the presidency is in the hands of one of the smaller member states. The envoy 
represents continuity, while the presidency changes every six months.  On the ground, the envoy 
necessarily deals with the ambassador of EU member states holding the local presidency in each 
country.  There have sometimes been attempts to subordinate the local presidency to the Special 
Envoy, or to circumvent it, with predictable friction.
999
   
Although the member states of the EU are willing to be involved in, and indeed aspire to see the EU 
playing a stronger, more coherent, consistent and credible role in the MEPP, their reluctance to move 
beyond an intergovernmental framework has denoted a deliberate policy to curtail the role of Union 
officials, personnel and representatives through complex conditions, legislations, regulations and 
procedures.  The purpose of such multifarious conditions has fundamentally been put into place in 
order to protect their interests. Power of veto has been utilised as a way to impose these regulations on 
their counterparts in an effort to achieve agreements. The appointment of the EU Special Envoy to the 
Middle East Peace Process, whose main responsibility is to fill the gap between the interests of the 
European minsters and provide a continuous approach of the EU, has been a clear example of the 
assumption mentioned above. 
According to Müller, ―during the negotiations of the Special Envoy‘s mandate, Berlin pointed out to 
its European partners that it would support the appointment of Mr. Moratinos only if certain 
conditions were met.‖1000 Müller asserted that the Germans imposed three conditions for acceptance 
of the new position.  First, and most importantly, Germany argued that there had to be a guarantee that 
Mr. Moratinos‘ mandate would not interfere with bilateral negotiations.  Second, it was to be expected 
that his role would not be in competition with the role performed by the U.S.  Finally, it had to be 
determined that the Special Envoy would not engage in mediating activities without the prior request 
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of both parties to the peace process.
1001
 The way that the member states treats the EU representatives 
to the Middle East has exacerbated the problem and, as a result, hindered their roles in the region.   
After evaluating the role of the Special Envoy to the Middle East, Kurikkala found that the member 
states deliberately weakened the role in the Middle East by ―creating tension between the High 
Representative of the CFSP and the EU Special Envoy to the Middle East (EUSR).‖1002 Kurikkala 
interviewed the economic advisor of the former EU Special Envoy to the Middle East, Miguel Ángel 
Moratinos, who blamed the member states for not being willing to find a solution to interinstitutional 
stalemates.  He argued that ―it‘s difficult to find an agreement when the member states want to keep 
them apart ―It‗s the old divide and rule principle.‖1003 As a result of the restrictions that the member 
states imposed on the EUSR, the fact that the position lacks political weight is a factor that has 
diminished its opportunities to influence the member states‘ divergent positions.1004 
Several additional factors contributed to the strengthening or weakening of the relationship between 
the member states and the Special Envoy or the High Representative of the CFSP.  The capacity and 
resources of the member state holding the presidency of the EU has been one of the main determinates 
that shape these relations. For example, Kurikkala found that the larger member states were generally 
assessed to be less dependent on the Special Preventative and the Council Secretariat to prepare and 
report for the presidency and to get information and visibility.
1005
 This is due to such strong 
presidencies as France, and the other more considerable EU member states, which evidently have a 
comprehensive web of embassies with relatively numerous staff in order to obtain the most up-to-date 
information from the region through their own diplomatic representations. Small countries, in turn, 
have given more space to Moratinos and his team.
1006
  
The upgrading of the European–Israeli relation in April 2008 is a clear example of the differences 
between the policy of the member states and the policy of the European institutions. In addition, most 
crucially, this example shows the authority and the ability of the member states to curtail the EU 
institutions and personalities. Considering the stances of the three main players within the EU, it 
becomes noticeable that there are different political stances towards this issue.  On the 9
th
 of 
December
 
2008, the EU's 27 Foreign Ministers unanimously approved upgrading relations with 
Israel.
1007
  
The Czech Foreign Minister, Karel Schwarzenberg, maintained that ―upgrading EU-Israel relations 
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would be good for the Palestinians, as well [because the] EU would be better placed to get Israel to 
ease conditions in Palestinian areas and Palestinians would benefit economically from more EU-Israel 
trade.‖1008 This action was rejected by the European Parliament and the European Commission. The 
former EU‘s External Relations Commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, told reporters in Brussels:  
―good and trustful relations with Israel are essential in order to make our voice heard, though it was 
not deemed a good time to increase current level of relations.‖1009  The interference of Ferrero-
Waldner in ―high politics,‖ and on such a sensitive issue as the upgrading of European Israeli 
relations, displeased the member states and a resultant appeal was put forth to the EU‘s External 
Relations Commissioner to stop interfering in the Council of the European Union policies because it 
was outside of the European Commission‘s mandate.1010  The decision to upgrade EU-Israeli relations 
also went against EP, which had on the 12
h 
April 2008 suspended its vote on whether or not to 
upgrade EU-Israel relations in the wake of increasing unrest around Israeli settlement building 
policies, violations of Palestinian human rights and the continued Gaza siege. The Vice President of 
the European Parliament, Luisa Morgantini, issued a statement about the decision saying ―it's time for 
the Israeli Government to stop considering itself above the law and start respecting it.‖1011  
The attempts that the former EU‘s External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten, made to boycott 
products and exports produced in the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza is another clear 
example of the continuing division between the views and actions of the individual member-states and 
the activities of the Brussels-based institutions. Patten insisted that exports from these settlements 
should not be labelled ‗Made in Israel‘ and should not enter the EU market on the preferential terms 
offered by the association agreement. However, Patten‘s ability to adopt a hard line has been 
undermined by pressure from Britain, Belgium and Germany.
1012
  
As mentioned earlier, the Middle East and its Peace Process reflect the divergent interests of the 
member states. One of the clearest examples in this regard is the open letter that ten Mediterranean 
EU members wrote to Tony Blair, the Special Envoy to the Middle East Quartet.  In their letter, which 
was published in Le Monde on 10 July, the ten foreign ministers stated that ―the Road Map has failed‖ 
and ―the overly strict conditions we have habitually imposed as prerequisites for the resumption of the 
peace process have only made the situation worse‖.1013 The ministers clarified that the ―negative 
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appraisal compels us to change our approach. Above all it allows us to broaden our outlook. It‘s 
Europe‘s duty to say this to its Israeli and Palestinian friends.‖ Finally, the ministers believe that the 
political solution in the region has to engage negotiations ―without prerequisites on the final status, 
even if it means acting in successive phases.‖ 1014 
Firstly, the political stances of the Mediterranean members had expressed in the letter show the 
differences between the policies of the EU, which supports the Road Map and participates in the 
Quartet, and the policy of several members who expressed their dissatisfaction with the EU policy 
towards the Middle East outside the frames and EU institutions.  Secondly, it showed how the 
member states go alone and challenge the official positions and policies of the EU towards the MEPP 
and conflicting parties when these members feel that the EU cannot meet their interests. 
The refusal of the the Council of the European Union to receive and publish a report prepared by a 
group of European diplomats in Jerusalem and Ramallah about Israel‘s unilateral measures in 
Jerusalem is a further example which shows, first the conflict in policies between the EU institutions 
agendas and second, the extent to which member states of the Council of Europe seek to avoid direct 
criticism of Israel.  Solana explained to the ministers that European influence over Israel would be 
largely compromised if the report were to be published.  In addition, Jack Straw, the former British 
Foreign Secretary, announced the decision by explaining that several states considered that the 
proximity of elections in the region made it improper to publish this text.
1015
 The report, which has 
since been published by the Guardian newspaper, emphasised that ―there is clearly a consistency in 
the acts of the Israelis, having nothing to do with questions of security, in fact nothing other than the 
continuation of the colonization of OPTs‖. The EP, in turn, criticized the the Council of the European 
Union and considered not publishing the report as ―a political scandal‖1016 and contrary to the calls of 
the EU to halt expansion of Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territories which undermining the 
objective of a two-state solution with the Palestinians.
 
 
While the European Council‘s attention has been focused on supporting the MEPP between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians, which might lead to stability and security, the European Commission‘s 
concentration is on reform and aid as a precondition to achieving peace, which has been found to be in 
contrast with human rights issues and democracy, which are the main goals of the European 
Parliament. 
 As has been explained above, the ultimate aim of the three European institutions is to create a 
democratic, independent Palestinian state existing side by side with Israel.  However, the question 
remains as to which are the best ways to achieve such goals and what priorities and agendas the EU 
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must focus on in order to attain this as a reality.  The tension between the three institutions is at the 
core of the issue that hinders the European efforts and role in the MEPP, development, aid, democracy 
promotion and institutional reforms.  
Analysing the role policies of the EP towards the European Migration and Middle East policies, 
Stetter found that that the marginal role of the EP in the CFSP mechanism within the cross-pillar 
institutional setting has often prompted the EP to focus on voicing harsh criticism about the substance 
of EU policies in both areas, and consequently on developing an alternative policy agenda.
1017
  
―The focus on alternative agenda can be observed on three diminutions. First, by 
putting emphasise on the issue of democracy and human rights, parliament has 
combined its alternative policy agenda with an underlying normative frame. Second, 
parliament has given a particular voice to the way in which it perceives the interests 
and demands of those affected by EU policies, be they the southern Mediterranean 
countries in the EMP in general, and Israel and Palestine in particular,....Third, 
parliament has not stopped at criticising the content of policies but has proposed an 
alternative institutional setting and also in its day-to-day operations -demand a 
complete abolition of the pillar structure in both areas.‖1018 
Stetter argued that, as a result of these scepticisms, the parliament has focused on developing 
alternative policy agendas which have not been dealt with as extensively by other actors. A main 
focus of this alternative agenda has been the areas of democracy promotion and human rights. He 
considers the successes of the EP to lie in using its capabilities in the budgetary process and in 1994 in 
including the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights into the EU budget out of which, 
for example, MEDA democracy projects were funded.
1019
  
The European parliament used its power in 1998, when parliament blocked the conclusion of three 
trade agreements with Israel. The EP was not satisfied with the EU policies towards the Middle East 
region and the EP, and on an institutional level, the EP referred the EU‘s weak role in the Middle East 
to the intergovernmental mechanism of the CFSP.
1020
  The EP considered the mechanism and the 
institutional setting in foreign policies as being largely insufficient in nature and argued that EU 
decision-making was being blocked by the intergovernmental nature of its foreign policy which is 
why the Union has not yet succeeded in playing a credible role in the Middle East. 
Analysing the EU stances above shows that the EU is acting in a clearly realist behaviour. On the 
political level, the reluctance to impose conditionality as evidence of the EU‘s prioritising of the 
MEPP, which it seeks to keep alive by refraining from criticising and provoking the Israeli 
                                                          
1017
 Stetter, S.op.cit, p.159. 
1018
 Stetter, S.op.cit.,p.160. 
1019
 Ibid.p.159. 
1020
 Ibid. 
 203 
 
government and its main ally -the US.  Only thus can the EU maintain a role and a place at the 
negotiations table. The European experience of dealing with Israel has shown that criticism of Israeli 
policies has only led to a marginalization of the EU as an actor in the MEPP.
1021
  On the economic and 
trade level the EU statistic speak for themselves. For example, according to European Commission 
figures, Israel is one of the biggest EU trading partners in the Euromed area, with total trade 
amounting to more than €25.7 billion in 2007. The EU is Israel's largest market for exports and its 
second largest source of imports after the US.
1022
  
David Cronin believes that Israel has developed strong political and economic ties to the EU over the 
past decade that makes it a member of the EU without membership. His argument was supported by 
the EU‘s foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, during his farewell trip to Israel in the autumn, shortly 
before he stepped down as CFSP chief. He declared that:  
 
―There is no country outside the European continent that has this type of relationship 
that Israel has with the European Union….. Israel, allow me to say, is a member of 
the European Union without being a member of the institutions. It‘s a member of all 
the [EU‘s] programmes; it participates in all the programmes.‖1023   
4.5 Analysis and Conclusion  
Reviewing the history of EU collective foreign policy making towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
the peace process, we can, then, draw the following conclusions: 
Firstly, the discussion above supports a largely realist understanding of European Common Foreign 
policy-making. EU members come to the EU negotiating table with pre-determined interests that 
reflect their identities and domestic preferences. The process of the decision making is still dominated 
by an intergovernmental approach and therefore policy tends towards the lowest common dominator 
which can be reached through bargaining. The EU member states may largely share the same view 
about the conflict, but they differ on the ―proper‖ policy towards the parties/countries involved in the 
conflict, partly for historical reasons specific to individual member states, partly as a result of their 
perceptions of current self-interest, and partly as a result of differing visions of the correct nature of 
any European role. As a consequence, there is a gap between European ambitions and performance.  
In fact, each single element of the EPC/CFSP has been the outcome of a cumbersome and 
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bureaucratic process; involving compromise-building between the member themselves, the European 
Commission and the European Parliament. The outcomes of these negotiations show that, although 
the member states have their own pre-defined interests and identities, EU membership itself, and the 
processes of socialising and interacting with other member states on the European level, do have an 
impact on the perceptions of these interests, and can alter them. Thus, it can be argued that 
constructivist arguments are also helpful in identifying how interest and identity are not fixed.  
Member states feel normatively obliged to take into account the interests of the EU in the formulation 
of their own foreign policies, so there is an element of Europeanisation in this regard rather than 
supranationalism per se. Greece, for example, has altered its policy towards Israel and recognised it as 
a result of the pressure from the European community. Likewise, Germany has re-orientated its 
foreign policy and supported all the key European foreign policies and declarations such as the 
London Declaration (1977) and the Venice Declaration (1980) that supported the Palestinian right to 
self-determination.1024  
As demonstrated in the second chapter, the members have utilised the EPC/CFSP in two ways: first to 
upload their national interests to the European level so they can pursue them more effectively and 
counteract deficiencies in their own national foreign policy. Secondly they utilise the EPC/CFSP as a 
cover or a way to pass and reduce the costs of pursuing a controversial policy. This instrumentalism 
combined with the socialising impact of membership and the inter-governmental negotiation process, 
to result in a progressive improvement in collective policy-making albeit one with serious limitations. 
For a start, there have also been cases where the members go-it-alone and conduct national policy 
against, and in contradiction with, the common foreign policy of the EU. Sweden granting a Schengen 
visa to a Hamas minister, despite the EU‘s political boycott of the Islamist Palestinian movement, is 
an example of this trend.1025 Christopher Hill maintained that: 
―There are obvious enough cases of national defections from a common line, or more 
accurately, of preventing a common line, over Iraq and over the Israel-Palestinian 
conflict. Equally, there was some striking solidarity on view in the rapid responses to 
the 11 September events, and in the linking up of foreign policy to anti-terrorist.‖ 1026 
He argued that EU members have been willing to change and support the CFSP if they think that  
there is a threat to their interests, but they will go national when they can‘t agree.  For Hill, this 
doesn‘t mean that we are observing ―a wholesale return to the national principle in European foreign 
policies.  Most states may have no intention of relinquishing their own diplomacy, but equally it 
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would not occur to them to opt out of the CFSP.‖1027 
The constructivist approach has also contributed to explaining aspects of the EPC/CFSP foreign 
policy in this case. Governments of member states are not immune to ―pressures from below‖ in 
formulating their perceptions of national interest and projecting these into the common foreign policy 
negotiating process. For instance, during the oil crisis in 1973, French public opinion- deep concern 
with rising oil prices- played a role in adjusting the French position to launch the Euro-Arab 
Dialogue.
1028
 Similarly, public sympathy with Israel has played a strong role in determining 
Germany‘s policies towards the region. This contributes to our understanding of the role of ―identity‖ 
at the national level.  
The role of the EU in Madrid conference and in the multilateral track can be explained through the 
functionalist liberal conception of operation where economic cooperation spillover in political issues 
its own experience with regional economic and political integration. There is belief that Multi-
sectoral cooperation will enable the conflicting parties to set aside their political differences.1029 
In addition, the increasing role and involvements of Solana and the EU special representatives, 
Miguel Moratinos and Mark Otte, the EU envoy for the MEPP, in the negotiations between Israel and 
the PA, Moratinos has played an important role in mediating an agreement between Israel and the 
Palestinians for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Hebron. This gives indications of elements of 
increasing role of the EU institutions in the CFSP such role supports the functionalism where the 
European Commission and EU personalities, such as Solana and Moratinos, have played important 
roles in the peace process.  
However, the development of the European policy towards the conflicting parties shows, as well, that 
there are cases where members have conducted a national policy outside the framework of the EU and 
in contradiction with its policy and the policies of its members.  The inability of the EU members to 
reach an agreement promptly then to pursue their interest individually or grouping with other 
members to achieve them might explain the individual initiatives that the member states proposal 
from time to time outside the EU frame work.  As a result, European voices and credibility have 
become weakened in the region.  
The inherent limitation of the EU‘s foreign policy machinery has been a determining factor in its 
handling of the Middle East peace process. The pillar system- the institutional structure- has had a 
huge impact on every aspect of European foreign policy.  Diffusing powers among several 
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institutions, its multipliers have led to dualism in presentation and slowness in implementation. While 
the development, trade and aid issues are handled under the Community pillar, illegal immigration 
and asylum issues are the third pillar. Finally, the political and security issues are mainly considered 
at intergovernmental level. Such a division among the EU institutions and absence of a single 
authoritative voice has made it difficult for the EU to have a comprehensive and common policy 
towards the Middle East, in general, and the OPTs, in particular. In fact, this tension reflects the 
tension between the intergovernmental and the supranational approach to the European policies.  
Analysing the CFSP players, it can be noticed that there is an element of neofunctionalism, which 
advocates supranationalism in the CFSP.  The increasing roles of the HR, the EU special envoys in 
the MEPP, the European Commission in implanting the European aid and technical assistances, 
sending electoral observers and supporting the Palestinian police force and the role of the EP in 
advocating the human rights issues are examples which support the argument that the CFSP contains 
some supranationalistic elements.  
The functionalism/supranational theoretical approach has proven to be unsatisfactory when it comes 
to the particular case of the CFSP provisions, mainly the high politics of the EPC/CFSP which are 
determined through the declarations and statements. This is because of two reasons; first, these 
declarations have been taken via consensus decision-making by the EU members only. Second, the 
roles of the supranational actors have been limited to an implement of the CFSP which determines by 
the member states in the European Council which put the principles and general guideline of the 
European foreign affairs. Thus these responsibilities do not amount to decisive political interventions. 
In fact, the union‘s prestige was raised by the assigning of a special envoy; however, this was in line 
with the policy of the member states to appoint representatives in the absence of collective agreement 
on strategies. In sum, from the commencement of the creation of the EPC at the end of the 1960s until 
2009, the innate problems of the European foreign affairs have remained the same. The issue of 
intergovernmentalist orientation remains and the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP is a central 
element for the understanding of the European foreign policy behaviour in the Middle East. 
 With regard to the evaluation of the European policy on the ground, we can reach a number of 
conclusions regarding European foreign policy-making towards the Arab-Israeli conflict (and therein 
Palestine) during the era of the EPC. Firstly, the intergovernmental, consensus-based approach to 
decision-making and the distribution of power within the EC (between individual states) has prevailed 
in foreign policy-making towards the Middle East. Since the member states have demonstrated 
different interests their relations with the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as differential 
visions of what role the European Community might play (political or economic, American junior 
partner or independent actor), a lowest common denominator approach to policy-making has 
prevailed. Bouts of French diplomatic activity resulted in Declarations, and over time these 
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demonstrated a swing towards a more pro-Arab position overall. However, when member states 
proved too divided to reach a consensus, France and other states would revert to pursuing their policy 
interests outside of the EPC framework independently, and at times at odds with each other.  
Secondly, the lack of a legal framework within the EPC, which has resulted from the member states‘ 
insistence on keeping the EPC outside of the EC as a protective measure to maintain their sovereignty 
in foreign affairs, has meant that even if they wanted to, there was in practice little they could actually 
do beyond making declarations. They lacked legal, institutional and financial instruments to 
implement the European policies on the ground.  Thirdly, EPC policy towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict has been a victim or hostage of the Cold War between the U.S. and the USRR. It was difficult 
to operate independently from the U.S. during this period.  In fact, even when the European 
Community had accrued the tools to implement its policies, transgressing an American stance in this 
global climate proved to be enormously difficult because the U.S. protective umbrella remained a 
necessity.   
Fourthly, these constraints together have ensured that the EPC demonstrated reactivity rather than a 
reflective instinct. It took almost thirty years for the European Community to develop a relatively 
coordinated foreign policy towards the conflict in the Middle East. Nonetheless, although there were 
limitations imposed on the EPC, the declarations of the European Community toward the Arab-Israeli 
situation during the EPC era have remained the cornerstone of EU policies nowadays. In fact, the 
European declarations and statements would later become guiding documents of the international 
community and were adopted by the UN and the U.S. some 20 years later.  
There is no doubt that the European Community has managed through their declaratory policy to 
establish a European vision and principles on which European policy makers believed that solution to 
the conflict between the Israelis and the Arabs should be based.  In doing so, ironically, they have 
managed to move beyond the issuing of declarations and to demonstrate a role for the EU after all. As 
Patokallio says, ―I declared therefore I exist‖1030 so the EPC did nothing more than declaration, and 
these declarations without action to implement. 
The chapter has demonstrated that, over time and since the launch of the MEPP, the EU has indeed 
managed to develop a political role for itself in the region, manifested in a set of new foreign policy 
instruments, although this has never matched its economic weight. Ultimately, it is a role that has 
been limited to supporting the implementation of the peace process on the ground rather than 
initiating the policies which promote it; i.e. its role has been reactive rather than proactive, and 
ultimately subject to the will of the main players in the peace process, the U.S. and Israel, both of 
whom have sought to limit the European political role in the MEPP.   
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The political role of the EU has been based in its use of declaratory policies, which have become 
guidelines or compasses of principle for the international community. In particular, the EU has moved 
the international agenda progressively towards support for an independent Palestinian state. The EU 
policy towards the peace process is a victim of the intergovernmental-oriented approach towards the 
CFSP which has amplified the tension between the member states over their national interests and 
over the European Union‘s role. In addition, the chapter has demonstrated that the intergovernmental 
approach has caused great conflict and tension between EU members on the one hand and the 
European institutions on the other.  
These conflicts have contributed to weakening the European role in the MEPP and its policies towards 
the Palestinians. Complex decision making, dualism in representations and multiple European 
messages are the main consequence of these conflicts. The EU‘s capacity to mediate in the MEPP has 
been hampered by a complex mix of factors, such as decision-making deficits, historical experience of 
the EU members, internal divisions, contemporary commercial and political interests, and domestic 
pressure. These factors have led to the subordination of EU policy to the U.S, and kept it firmly in the 
back seat of the MEPP. Thus, the EU has not yet emerged as a decisive actor in the Middle East 
conflict. 
If the EU has carved out a role for itself, it has been within the area of leading the way in providing 
financial assistance and technical aid to the PA. This has been an area in which the U.S. and Israel has 
been willing to allocate a role (or at least, not to obstruct it) to the European, and where the Europeans 
have themselves been most able to find common ground. Nonetheless, as the next chapter will 
demonstrate, this has still not translated into the influence which the CFSP might have aspired to and 
has rather demonstrated the same flaws within the policy-making processes which have been 
highlighted in this chapter. 
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Chapter Five: The Impact of the CFSP Mechanism on EU Aid and Technical Assistance to the 
OPTs and the MEPP 
5.1 Introduction 
 The aim of this chapter is to assess the impact of EU aid and technical assistance to the MEPP and 
the Palestinians in Palestine. The two crucial questions that will be dealt with are; to what extent has 
European aid served its stated objectives in building a Palestinian state, and to what extent has this 
aided the EU‘s prominence in the MEPP. Aid is the EU‘s strongest tool used to influence the factions 
in the Middle East as without it, the PA and the peace process will collapse. However, with regard to 
the first question whilst EU aid has helped build Palestinian infrastructure and kept the PA afloat, it 
did not manage to build a sustainable Palestinian economy, as actually intended by the EU. Instead, 
the majority of funds was utilised to support the MEPP and its security provisions, to the detriment of 
other development projects. This influences the second aspect. 
Effectively the EU is hampered by the dualism inherent in its policy-making as it is subject to the 
political constraints of its member states as set out by intergovernmentalism. Hence, the EU is unable 
to employ its aid policies towards the OPTs in a manner that effectively transformed its economic 
power into political prowess.  Therefore EU aid policies are in fact governed by realist constraints 
instead of, as commonly thought, liberal principles and values. This is exemplified in that the EU aid 
is utilised for short-term interests, ultimately reducing the EU‘s role to ―cheque book diplomacy‖1031 
by focusing on security concerns. 
This chapter is separated into three sections. Before analysing the two questions posed, the chapter 
begins by tracing the broader motivations behind the EU funding. Given its colonial past, and being a 
civilian actor lacking military capabilities, constitute the main motives behind the EU as a global 
donor. By using statistical evidence, this general understanding will be put into the context of 
Palestine, ultimately explaining the EU‘s political behaviour towards the Middle East. The second 
section delves into this more thoroughly, showing how the security concerns and the EU‘s political 
ambitions to play a role in MEEP are the main driving forces behind European aid, which resulted in 
the EU being the main donors of the PA.  
The third section takes this problematic further by assessing the interaction between the CFSP 
decision-making and the challenges that the EU aid faces on the ground in Palestine.  Here the focal 
points are how the CFSP‘s policy-making and the dualism therein cope with the challenges that the 
European aid faces on the ground as well as the corruption in the PA, and the restrictions that the 
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Israeli occupation imposes on the European aid and developmental policy in Palestine. This chapter 
will arrive at the conclusion that EU aid is a victim of the intergovernmentalism which allows the 
member states to dominate the CFSP, rendering the EU unable to mobilise sufficient political will to 
use the tools at its disposal to implement its aid policies in a strategic and coherent fashion. 
5.2 The General Rationale behind EU Aid  
The main objectives of international assistance in any post-conflict situation are to reduce the 
devastating effects of the conflict, subsequently creating a peaceful political and economic 
environment. Indeed, these objectives motivated the post-Oslo (1992 onwards) assistance to the 
Palestinians and Israelis.
1032
 It is held that there are three main inter-related ways in which donor 
assistance may affect the prospects for peace, as set out by Brynen.
1033
 First, the attitudinal effect is 
emphasised. Economic development generates tangible effects, whereby rising incomes and improved 
services are associated with the progress towards peace whereas conversely, deprivation contributes to 
social dissatisfaction and political radicalisation. Second, it is suggested that external aid can act as a 
prize to political players, changing their motivational structure by increasing the attractiveness of 
cooperative behaviour.   
Alternatively, withholding aid can be used as a punishment for non-cooperation.  Third, international 
aid can persuade local pro-peace actors to continue their activities or be redirected towards 
strengthening their political positions through local patronage politics.  Such motivations may be 
applied to the Palestinian case where, according to Wake,
1034
 the main aim of international donors is 
to achieve four functions:  to preserve support for the peace process on both sides, to encourage the 
execution of the Oslo Accords at regular intervals, to prepare the way for Palestinian statehood and to 
build a Palestinian administration to act as an effective partner for peace. Endorsed by the World 
Bank, it is suggested that the international community‘s role in this case is primarily to supply peace-
building aids by supporting the PA in its obligations to its people and in its negotiations for a 
Palestinian state.
1035
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5.2.1  The EU as a Global Donor  
According to a study conducted by Wanlin,
1036
 together, the EU and its member-states are ―the 
world‘s biggest donor of development aid, accounting for 52 per cent of Global Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) in 2005.‖ The study shows that the European spending is rapidly increasingfor 
example ―in 2006, the EU spent €48 billion [U$ 68.5 biillion] (0.42 per cent of Gross National 
Income (GNI) on development aid, compared with €35billion [U$49.9 billion] in 2004. The same year 
the U.S. spent 0.17 per cent of GNI, and Japan 0.25 per cent.‖1037 
According to the EU, in 2008 the EU aid accounted for almost 60% of world aid and the Commission 
alone committed €12 billion [U$17.9 billion], more than one fifth of the overall European effort.1038 
According to the report, European assistance is provided to more than 160 countries and territories 
worldwide in order to fight poverty and promote economic development and democracy.
 1039
 Most 
European treaties include articles aimed at regulating and framing the European financial assistance 
commitment.  For example, the influential Rome Treaty of 1957 stated that ―colonies and former 
colonies of the EEC member states should receive grants from the newly established European 
Development Fund (EDF) and become associated with the development of the Community.‖1040 
Furthermore, Article 130 of the Maastricht Treaty states that European Community policies ought to 
foster: 
―The sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries- the 
smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy; 
the campaign against poverty in the developing countries.‖1041 
There are several reasons explaining this foreign aid policy; a) the internal rationale relating to the 
EU‘s character as a soft or civilian power. As a result of the lack of military power, the EU utilises its 
foreign aid policy as an instrument in the CFSP to increase its presence and influence on the global 
stage. Then, b), a common awareness of implicit post-colonial morality toward former European 
colonies as well as historic sensitivities explain why these earlier satellites are amongst the greatest 
recipients of aid. Amongst other examples this is substantiated by the French legacy in Algeria, 
Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia, which collectively constitute the top ten recipients of French aid.
1042
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Such policies demonstrate how EU member states‘ past continues to manifest itself politically. 
5.2.2  EU Motivation for Providing Aid and Technical Assistance to the MEPP and Palestine 
There are several possibilities that drive the European aid to the PA and the MEPP, the most 
prominent being security concerns and strengthening its image as global civilian power. According to 
a member of the Council of the EU what drives EU aid to the Palestinians ―is a belief that social 
development, the creation of employment possibilities, the related stability and hope will establish a 
conducive environment for Palestinians to engage with their Israeli neighbours in peaceful 
negotiations towards a resolution to the conflict.‖1043 This is further supported by Roy, who aptly 
states that European strategy in the OPTs is built on the assumption that ―stability and security were 
based on economic improvement and strengthened social relations and it was generally believed that 
prosperity would lead to peace and peace would lead to a Palestinian state.‖1044 
In a paper setting out the Commission‘s views on how the EU could lend its support to the peace 
process in the Middle East, the Commission underlines that the success of the MEPP will depend on 
two factors: the diplomatic front, in which there should be continued support for the process that 
began in Madrid, and the economic front, on which the time is now right for the European 
commission to embark on ambitious co-operation programmes for the economic development of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip.
1045The Commission‘s emphasis that it is essential that efforts to bring 
conditions in the OPTs up to a satisfactory economic level are accompanied by actions to support the 
economic development of the region as a whole.
1046
The Commission added that the support of 
―economic and social projects, such as schools, hospitals, water supply, waste management, and 
completion of industrial parks‖1047 should be at the forefront of the agenda.  
With regards to security concerns, the EU is interested in a successful and flourishing MEPP which 
would reduce the instability in the region which in turn would have a direct impact on Europe, 
therefore the EU deploys its financial resources in order to stabilise the region. Hervé de Charrette, 
France‘s former Foreign Minister concisely summarised these concerns: ―when violence returns to the 
Middle East, sooner or later it will show up in Paris.‖1048 The terrorist attacks of the 11 September 
2001 in New York, the 11 March 2004 in Madrid and the 7 and 21 July 2005 in London initiated a 
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‗securitisation‘ of European agendas by bridging the gap between internal and external security.1049 
These attacks prompted EU decision makers to structure their policies around this emerging ‗threat‘ 
prioritising national security interests. In fact, connecting aid to security is encouraged under the 
Maastricht Treaty whereby ―community policy in the sphere of development co-operation [shall] be 
complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States‖1050 an association which has intensified 
since 11 September.  
This shift is epitomised as well in British policy making, when the government linked its foreign aid 
upon the condition that this aid would serve to protect and enhance British security concerns.
1051
 
According to a leaked Whitehall paper ―Britain's overseas aid budget by demanding that projects in 
the developing world must make the ―maximum possible contribution‖ to British national 
security.‖1052 Finally, there is a desire to translate the EU‘s economic strength into corresponding 
political and strategic capability.
1053
 In other words, eager to increase its role in the peace process, EU 
officials have sought to ensure that developmental aid has political dimensions in the sense that the 
EU seeks to profile itself as a powerful actor in the MEPP and cooperate with the PA based on 
economic support. Its desire to increase its role in the MEPP can be regarded not only as a significant 
part of the process itself, but also as an attempt to gain political space in the region. Several observers 
believe that part of the European funds and support to the Palestinians are granted on the assumption 
that this could give the EU influence over Israel, thus buying time for further negotiations on the 
political front.
1054
  
5.2.3 EU Aid to OPTs 
5.2.4  European Aid before MEPP 
European aid to the OPTs commenced in the 1970s, with contributions to the UN Relief and Works 
Agency‘s (UNRWA) emergency fund and general fund for refugees. Since 1971, the EU has regularly 
supported the UNRWA; with its contribution accounting for 25% of UNRWA‘s General Fund (GF) 
whilst the overall EU‘s contribution, represents 52.5% annually.1055 In addition to this the EEC 
supported the Palestinians through NGOs. For instance, in 1986, the Council of Ministers adopted a 
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resolution setting aside €139 million in financial aid programmes for the Palestinians in West Bank 
and Gaza between 1987-1993.
1056
 According to a UNRWA report, the EC contributed €246 million 
[US$351 million] to the UNRWA‘s GF from 2002 with a contribution of €66 million [US$ 94.2] in 
2007 and plans to contribute another €264 million [US$ 377 million] until 2011.1057 Furthermore, 
since 2000 the European Commission has been the largest contributor to UNRWA‘s Food Aid 
Programme.
1058
 
The 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference opened new opportunities for the EU to extend its 
role covering new areas such as trade, development, human rights and democratisation.  As chapter 
four demonstrated, during this conference the U.S. deliberately sidelined the European role in the 
bilateral negotiations between the conflicting parties. However, in compensation the EU chaired the 
multilateral committee called REDWG.
1059
 REDWG was the largest of the five working groups, both 
in terms of participation and in the number of projects initiated and executed. The five working 
groups were set up to run parallel with bilateral negotiations whose aim was to encourage the Israelis 
and their neighbours in the Middle East, the Gulf and the North Africa to cooperate on long-term 
goals and issues related to the region overall.
1060
 According to the EU statement, REDWG‘s 
objectives included facilitating the emergence of an economically interdependent and pluralistic 
regional environment.
1061
  
The creation of such a forum further encouraged communication and exchange between Israel and 
Arab states, thereby becoming a vehicle to allow all parties to address concerns and explore new ideas 
in regional terms.
1062
 
 
During the 100 meetings of REDWG, a number of projects were identified 
which focused primarily on infrastructural development or on exploring sectoral areas.  For example, 
in 1995, a secretariat was established in Amman where, under EU tutelage, there was official 
cooperation with Middle Eastern partners.
1063
  
Although vast European efforts were made to fund regional projects, REDWG groups and projects 
ultimately became hostage to the negotiations between Israel and Palestine. In addition, the Arab 
states considered any regional cooperation with Israel without solving the greater conflict would lead 
to normalisation with Israel at the expense of the Palestinian cause.
1064
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5.2.5  After the MEPP 
 In October 1993 in Washington the first conference of donors was held, following the signature of 
the Declaration of Principles. The American administration organized the conference to mobilize the 
resources needed to support the burgeoning Palestinian institutional framework International. During 
the conference donors pledged more than US$2 billion [€1.404 billion] to the development of the 
Occupied Territories. The EU pledged US$250 million [€175million] in grants for the period 1994-
98.
1065
 This sum continued to increase incrementally during subsequent years as a result of the 
faltering MEPP and accompanying instability prevailing in the Palestinian territories.  
The EU pledged a further 400 million Euro at the 1998 Washington ministerial donor conference for 
the period 1999 to 2003.
1066
  From 1993 to the end of 2001, the EU had committed approximately 1 
billion Euros in grants and loans for Palestinians, and a further 407 million Euros in contributions to 
UNRWA.
1067
 This amount of EU aid goes in parallel with the aid provided by the EU members 
outside the EU framework.
1068
 Since the beginning of the Intifada II, the EU has increased its aid and 
changed its direction to respond to the intifada. Thus the EU increased its budgetary support to the 
PA, aiming to ease the consequences of the fiscal crisis caused by Israel's refusal to transfer tax 
receipts owed to the PA; humanitarian aid, and increased aid to UNRWA and the MEPP projects. 
According to figures from June 2001 ―the EU has provided, on a continuous basis, 10 million Euros 
per month in direct budgetary assistance to the PA. 
 The main objective is destined towards helping the PA to secure its basic expenditures with respect to 
public service salaries, social, educational, health and core functions.‖1069 Since 1993, the OPTs have 
received over $6 billion in assistance.
1070
 According to Keating, the total amount of financial support 
―is exceptional in its extent per capita and is considered as the highest since World War II to any 
population.‖1071 
 Since the Washington conference, several conferences have been organised to provide further help 
and funding to the PA. On 14 January 2003, the British government under Tony Blair organised an 
International Conference on Palestinian Reform in London. The conference provided a platform for 
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international debate on Palestinian internal reform, as well as the PA‘s role in anti-terrorism 
campaigns.
1072
 After the Annapolis Peace Conference in the U.S on 27 November 2007, designed 
to‗re-launch‘ the MEPP, the French government hosted the Paris Donor Conference on 17 December 
that year which pledged to provide the Palestinians with US$7.7 billion [€4.901 billion]. Both the 
member states and the European Commission committed a total of US$3.4 billion over the subsequent 
three years spanning from 2008 until 2010.
1073
On 24 June 2008, the German Government organised 
the Berlin Conference aiming to support Palestinian Civil Security and The Rule of Law. On 2 March, 
2009 the Sharm el-Sheikh Conference, boasting 90 participating countries, offered assistance for both 
the recovery of Gaza and the support of the entire Palestinian economy. Participants offered 
approximately US $4.5 billion [€3.1508 billion] over two years, with the European Commission 
pledging US$552.6 million [€386.9 million] to the reconstruction of Gaza and the PA reform.1074 
There are several institutions, states and organizations involved in providing financial assistance or 
aid-coordination. Data from the Palestinian Ministry of Planning (MoP), suggests that there were 
upwards of 80 donors to the PA in 2009 giving an aid package of US$ 7,670.95 [€ 5,371 billion]  
Moreover, it shows that the main donors are the U.S, the EU, Norway, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 
Britain, Japan and Canada. The donors support agencies include the American USAID, the EU aid 
agency, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Red Cross and several UN 
Organizations (such as the UNRWA, the UNDP and the UNESCO).
1075
 Similarly, the Quartet 
representatives, the Local Aid Coordinating Committee (LACC), the World Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund, are involved in aid allocation and are responsible for the coordination 
and oversight of such funds.
 1076
 
Between 1994-2009 the MoP in the PA‘s data suggests that the total disbursed funds amounted to 
US$11,801,079, [€ 8,262,903 billion] while the total pledges and commitments made by international 
donors during the same period approximated $13,817 billion; [€ 9,628 billion ] $2 billion less than the 
original commitment. If grants and loans are included, the total amount increases to US$14,320 
billion [€ 9,978,748 Billion] at an annual rate of approximately $800 to 1 billion [€557-0.6974 
million] The greatest assistance was disbursed in 2007, amounting to U$1,540 billion; 2 billion 
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compared to the lowest amount in 1998, which did not exceed U$420.[ € 292.92million]1077 
 The EU is one of the main donors to the PA and society, receiving more assistance than any other 
country worldwide. Statistics show that the EU is the second biggest donor to the OPTs after the 
United States, with 13.1% of total pledges. From the outset of the creation of the PA in the mid 1990s, 
the EU alone spent US$3,770[€ 2.6294 billion] (in financial assistance and technical aid to the 
Palestinian society and PNA.1078 Table No. 2 and charter and charter No. 4 demonstrate a gradual 
increase in the EU aid to the PA which totalled €225 million in 2000 doubling in 2007 to €563.28 
millon [U$394.3985 million] This was given to rectify the shortfall in the aid after the international 
consensus to boycott the Hamas-lead government and after its military took over Gaza in June 2007. 
Overall, between 2000 and 2009 the EU spent more than €3,356, 39 [2, 35,008 billion] as aid to the 
PA and the Palestinians.  
According to the MoP and Administrative Development‘s Directorate General of Aid Management, 
this aid is distributed through several channels, such as humanitarian aid, support to refugees through 
the UNRWA, food aid programmes, development assistance to the PA and NGOs, budgetary support 
to the PA, the MEPP projects, the People-to-People programme, the CFSP counter-terrorism 
programme, and building Palestinian institutions.1079  
Table No 2: European Commission   Assistance to the Palestinian People in 2000-2009 
(Commitments in € Million) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL 
225,2 148,
5 
325,
9 
270,
9 
255,
2 
280,
9 
349,
9 
563,
3 
496,
7 
439,
9 
3356,4 
Source:- EC Assistance to the Palestinians EUExternal Action (EU External Action , 2009) 
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Figure 4: The EU Financial Disbursements to the PA from 1999-2009 
 
 
Source:- Palestinian Authority, Ministry of planning and administrative development, Directorate 
General of Aid Management and Coordination March 2010. 
5.2.6  Distribution of Funds 
In order to illustrate to what extent European aid fulfils its objectives and has increased the 
organisations prominence in the region it is important to see how exactly the funds are distributed. 
The Director General of Aid Management and Coordination in the PA‘s MoP categorised EU 
assistance into several sectors. As table No (3) indicates the distribution categorises assistance into 
five main areas of implementation: infrastructure, government sector, productive sectors, social 
sectors and institution building. Therefore the EU aid and assistance list includes health, water supply 
and sanitation, government and civil society, humanitarian aid, communication, transport, storage, 
social services, energy, financial and business services, agriculture, industry, tourism, urban/rural 
development, budget support and education. The MoP report indicates that humanitarian aid and 
budgetary support has absorbed the largest portion of actual EU aid during the last 15 years, claiming 
a total of U$2.186 billion [€ 1.470 billion] (62%) of the total disbursed.  
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Table 3: EU Financial Aid Distribution by Sector. 
 
Sector Total Committed Total Disbursed 
Health $100,675,638 $88,486,796 
Education $54,868,179 $49,610,916 
Water Supply & Sanitation $49,464,929 $45,427,923 
Government & Civil Society $297,100,606 $244,475,084 
Communications ,Transport & Storage $48,482,319 $19,592,396 
Social Services $592,362,385 $581,692,833 
Energy $10,552,606 $4,643,605 
Financial & Business Services $26,584,388 $25,945,183 
Agriculture $10,111,124 $8,370,293 
Industry $17,292,337 $17,292,335 
Tourism $2,696,629 $2,035,929 
Urban/Rural Development $176,090,060 $267,434,928 
Budget Support $898,195,100 $875,342,028 
Humanitarian Aid $1,523,547,047 $1,311,788,719 
No Sector $3,572,742 $4,688,880 
Grand Total  $3,811,596,087 $3,546,827,848 
Source:- Palestinian Authority, Ministry of planning and administrative development, Directorate 
General of Aid Management and Coordination March 2010. 
The data suggests that humanitarian aid ranked first on the EU‘s funding list, totalling U$1.311 billion 
[€0.9179 billion (37%). In second place was budgetary support with $875.342 million [€612, 8987 
million] (25%). The social service sector occupied third place with $581.692 million [€ 407.2903 
million] (16%).   The fourth sector that gained European funds was urban/rural development reaching 
U$267.434 million [€ 187.2525million] (8%). Government, police, and civil society placed fifth with 
approximately U$244.475 million [€171.177 million] (7%).  Health and education occupied the sixth 
and the seventh places with U$88.486 million and U$49.610 million [€34.736 million], respectively 
(4%). Water supply and sanitation, considered a branch of infrastructure, ranked eighth with 
U$45.427 million [€31.8072 million] 
In order to help PA financial sectors, the EU allocated $25.945 million [€18.1662 million] to the 
financial business services.  As the table shows, Communication, Transport and Storage sectors were 
also on the European developmental policy towards the PA with a total of $19.592 million [€ 13.718 
million] disbursed. The industrial and agricultural sectors occupied the eleventh and twelfth
 
places, 
where the former was committed and disbursed identical amounts; around $17. 292 million [€12.1075 
million] (1%) while the latter commitment of U$10.111 million was not met with the disbursed 
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U$8.370.  Energy and tourism ranked last in the funding policy where the EU committed $10.552 
[€7.0795 million] to energy, whilst the disbursed total was $4.643 [€3.2509 million].  
Figure 5: The EU Disbursements to the PA from 1999-2009 
 
Source: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of planning and administrative development, Directorate 
General of Aid Management and Coordination March 2010. 
The MoP‘s data shows that the agricultural, gender and cultural sectors were not attractive enough for 
the EU to justify endowment.  While local agriculture is vital to the population‘s survival, the EU 
merely relinquished U$5.527 million [€3.8699 million], whilst the gender sector was allocated 
U$6.527 million (0, 17%) and the culture sector accounted for (0.15%). Tourism, solid waste and 
youth sectors were less important since the three sectors attracted $5.340 million [€3.739 million], 
$3.454 million [€2.4184 million] and U$366 [€256.2], respectively. Although generating employment 
has supposedly been a European priority since 1994, the EU has not spent or committed money to this 
sector. The figures demonstrate that industries with export potential, agriculture and construction have 
shrunk to the half their 1999 output. Working towards future independence has been subordinated to 
short-term crisis management. 
Aid towards the health sector also increased after Hamas took over due to the new EU Financial 
Instrument, TIM, which directly supported the health sector thus avoiding the Hamas government. 
The total health sector budget jumped from U$9.051 million [€ 6.33 milion] in 2005 to $23.836 
million [€ 16.6895 million] in 2006. The political crisis simultaneously affected the energy sector was 
appearing on the European aid agenda whereby the siege on Gaza resulted in the EU paying $50,506 
million of Gaza‘s electricity bill directly. 
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Figure 6: EU Annual Disbursements per Sector (Including Grants and Loans 2002–2009) 
 
Source:- Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development, Directorate 
General of Aid Management and Coordination March 2010. 
There have been various phases of developmental assistance to the PA since the 1993 Oslo Accords.  
In the seven years following Oslo, the DoP were adhered to by various international participants 
through the transfer of financial aid to the PA in its embryonic aggrandizement towards its fledgling 
statehood. When the 2000 Al-Aqsa Intifada arose, due to the decreased living standards amidst 
shocking violence, international and specifically EU aid was redirected to humanitarian and PA 
budgetary endeavours rather than to project aid, despite small surplus amounts given during these 
turbulent times.  
From 2003-2006, the Road Map and Disengagement Plan served to strengthen Abu Mazen‘s political 
involvement in the allocation of funds.  In parallel, the oversight on the PA finance system had been 
tightened as a result of a determined demand for transparency in management of the national 
accounts. 
 While the March 2005 London meeting suggested an increase in international assistance to the PA in 
the hope of administrative, economic and security reforms in the region, the democratically-elected 
Hamas victory 10 months later caused donors to re-examine their aid policy. The Quartet‘s three 
preconditions to aid; the recognition of Israel, ratification of existing agreements and an end to 
violence; exemplified these modifications.   
As Hamas systematically rejected these preconditions, budgetary support to the PA has been, and 
continues to be, suspended indefinitely. European aid to the PA and society takes different forms and 
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is provided through different channels, ultimately, distributed through three channels: budget support, 
rebuilding infrastructure and humanitarian aid. 
5.2.6.1 Humanitarian Aid  
Having outlined the corresponding statistics as Figure No. 7 shows the question remains why the EU 
and international donors decide to fund these sectors.  There are several explanations for this, on the 
forefront being Europe‘s desire to keep the PA afloat to conduct peaceful negotiations with Israel. 
Concrete European support for the PA matches European statements emphasising that without this 
support the PA will collapse.  The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, and the 
chair of the AHLC, the International Donors‘ Conference, stated that the ―EU cannot allow that to 
happen.‖1080 This route, which is an appropriate instrument, given the PA‘s good performance in 
public sector management remains indispensable in allowing the PNA to continue to provide basic 
services. 
 
Figure 7: EU Humanitarian Aid and Support to UNRWA.  
 
 
Source:- Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development, Directorate 
General of Aid Management and Coordination March 2010. 
Derived from the European belief that there is a link between economic growth, prosperity and peace, 
there is a fear that the lack of basic services, whether food, education, health or jobs, will drive the 
Palestinian population towards fundamentalism, thereby jeopardizing the peace process. Therefore, 
the possibility of overspill into Europe ensured determination to meet and provide for the 
Palestinian‘s basic needs subsequently advancing the peace process.  Therefore, humanitarian aid is a 
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tool to reduce public pressure on the PA, especially when its institutions fail to meet the basic needs. 
In this case, humanitarian aid aims to ―preserve existing governmental structures to ensure that the PA 
does not fall apart.‖ 1081 
Several observers and international organisations have raised doubts over the impact of these 
instruments, specifically how this enables Palestinians to build an independent economy, especially 
since the majority of these funds go towards paying the wages of 150,000 civil servants, including 
around 60,000 employees in Gaza who no longer really work.
1082
 The United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) further emphasised the importance of humanitarian relief, 
nonetheless this kind of support is ―inadequate for making a lasting dent in Palestinian poverty and 
economic vulnerability in a context of asymmetric containment.‖1083  
The report encourages donors to create ―a long-term relief strategy for the Palestinian 
economy.
1084
Additionally, this conclusion, supported by the OPTs Human Development Report of 
2004, suggests that this type of assistance ―does not incorporate any development priorities and is not 
linked to a strategic plan or central vision; rather, its role is limited to relief aid.‖1085 
 The lack of political will to challenge the Israeli occupation on the ground prompted critics to accuse 
the EU of easing the Palestinians‘ life by taking on Israeli responsibilities as the occupying power. 
Thus, the EU indirectly contributes to the continuing occupation rather than its termination.
1086
 It is 
argued that transferring from state-building to relief and emergency assistance policies have 
contributed to ―cushioning the harmful impacts of Israeli policies on the Palestinian territory.‖1087As 
the statistics substantiate, since the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000, the EU has shifted its 
focus from institution building to Palestinian emergency and humanitarian aid.  
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Figure 8: Direct Budget Support.   
 
Source:- Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development, Directorate 
General of Aid Management and Coordination March 2010. 
5.2.6.2 Budget Support 
In 2008, budget support alone increased by nearly 80 percent from 2007, close to $1.8 billion 
[€1.2603 billion], and equivalent to about 30 percent of GDP. The PA used donor largesse to pay 
salaries and clear arrears to public sector employees and the private sector that had accumulated 
during 2006 and 2007. The 2009 budget assumes that donors will maintain their high budget support 
and calls for roughly U$2.8 billion [€1.960 billionin] aid for 2009, taking into account the recovery 
and reconstruction needs in Gaza.
1088
 The European direct budget support goes alongside EU strategic 
security interests, especially as this support helps the PA‘s security agencies which absorb a huge 
amount of its budget.  European financeial support and EU reform policy towards Palestinian police 
and security agencies‘ is part of the European desire to protect the MEPP and to raise the performance 
level of the Palestinian police and security agencies to uphold its obligations and commitments. 
Ideally, strengthening Palestinian security forces will raise Israeli confidence in the Palestinians and 
the Israeli‘s will be less fearful of ceding control to it. 
In his speech at the previously mentioned Berlin Conference Javier Solana, former EU High 
Representative for the CFSP clearly connected supporting the Palestinian police and security forces 
with Israeli security, pinpointing this as a milestone for the protection of Israeli security and 
interests.
1089―The EU wants a Palestinian police force that serves the community; this is in the best 
security interests of Israel and the security of Israel will derive from a secure and violence-free 
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Palestinian society‖.1090 Chris Patten the former External Relations Commissioner in the European 
Commission, statement is another example that emphasizes that without EU assistance "there would 
have been no Palestinian interlocutor for the negotiations now under way.‖1091 He added that ―at every 
step, the EU's help was made conditional on reforms that would make a viable Palestinian state a 
reality one day and in the short term make the OPTs a better, safer neighbour for Israel.‖ 1092 
Europe‘s focus on security also resonated with the PA budgets. The overall cost of the Palestinian 
Security Sector Reform and Transformation (SSRT) program between 2007 and 2010 is estimated at 
$228 million [€ 159.6 million]. The PA budget for security and rule of law was 43.1% in 2007 of the 
total, 33.6 % in 2008, 32.1% in 2009 and 30.9 % in 2010. According to the Palestinian strategy for 
implementing a vision of the future the Palestinian state proposed at Paris donors‘ conference, the 
number of security services professionals would increase from 110 in 2008 to 152 in 2009 and 194 in 
2010.
1093
In contrast the Palestinian infrastructural sector shared 2.8 % in 2007, 6.0% in 2008, 7.9% in 
2009, and 8.9% in 2010. According to the plan, the industrial capacity development took 3.9% of the 
PA budget in 2007 and 6.0% in 2008, around U$12 million, and 6.7% in 2009, nearly U$17 million [€ 
11.9031 million], and 7.5% in 2010, or U$31 million.
1094
  
This policy explains the copious EU investment and effort given to the Police Mission in the 
Palestinian TerritUories (EUPOL COPPS). EUPOL COPPS was established at the end of November 
2005 to provide enhanced support to the PA in establishing sustainable and effective policing 
arrangements.  In September 2008, the European Commission agreed to finance several programmes 
related to the rule of law and improved security, including building a new security forces headquarters 
in Nablus.
1095
 
According to a UN report, the focus on security over development the biggest operational constraint 
on the proliferation of a viable economic state for Palestine.
1096The report points out that ―this 
tendency has been ushered in since the Oslo Agreements and the subsequent Road Map.‖1097 
Exorbitant Palestinian spending on security agencies has prompted experts to criticize the PA. They 
emphasise that the Palestinian Reform Development Plan (PRDP) proposed during the Paris donors‘ 
conference was designed as ―fundraising documents written to please donors and fit their political 
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agendas, rather than actual development strategies to reduce poverty on the basis of actual Palestinian 
needs.‖1098  
5.2.6.3 Productive Sectors and European Aid  
Statistics indicate that despite the importance of the productive agriculture, industry and tourism 
sectors in strengthening the Palestinian economy and promoting their capacity to be independent, the 
EU has paid even less attention to these sectors (U$17.292 million  [€12.1075 millio] to industry, 
U$8.370 to agriculture and U$2 million to tourism).  Sidelining the agricultural, industrial and tourism 
sectors, as indicated by the previously mentioned figures, the UNCTAD report suggested that ―not 
just the Europeans showed lack of interests in the Palestinian agricultural sector but most of the 
international donors neglect this sector‖. The statistics show funds disbursed to agriculture declined 
from U$9.8 million [€6.86 million] per year in 1999-2000 to U$7.6 million [€4.20million] per year in 
2001-2004. Additionally, the report found that the funding of enterprise development dropped from 
U$20.4 million to U$13.5 million during the same period.
1099
  
Figure 9: Agriculture, Tourism and Cultural Resources  
 
Source:- Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development, Directorate 
General of Aid Management and Coordination March 2010. 
 
Several observers have attempted to explain the European lack of interest in these sectors. Le More 
linked the pressure of actual conditions with sectoral allocation arguing that the EU ―changes its 
developmental strategy to harmonise with the Israeli security measures rather than challenge it.‖1100 
Attributing the lack of investment in the agricultural sector to the sensitivity of the intrinsic nature of 
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this sector ―it touches upon contentious issues of land and natural resources.‖1101 Le More extended 
this deduction to refugee aid, which is not politically attractive because it lies at that root of the 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict.1102 Regarding the industrial sector, whilst European financial assistance 
helped Palestinians build industrial facilities, the Israeli security restrictions imposed on the 
movement of people and goods makes it difficult for Palestinian products to access to domestic and 
international markets. These restrictions may have prompted a focus on other economic sectors, 
demonstrating how the EU adopts its policies according to Israeli occupation policy not according to 
Palestinian needs.  
5.2.6.4 The Rehabilitation of Basic Physical Infrastructure 
The EU committed itself to the rehabilitation of basic physical infrastructure, such as roads, schools, 
health clinics, water and waste networks, in order to provide immediate and tangible benefits to the 
Palestinians.  In addition, EU aid aims to support the MEPP by building Palestinian institutions, 
which includes supporting reform and democratisation programmes through development assistance 
to the PA and NGOs. Building Palestinian institutions was viewed by most as a first step towards the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
1103
 As table (3) shows the EU invested around one 
billion dollars in Palestinian infrastructure from the beginning of the transitional stage and after the 
establishment of the PA and its institutions (1994-2001). EU statistics show that during the Oslo 
period, EU assistance was U$278 million [€194.6 million], U$96 million [€67.2 million] of which 
was allocated to infrastructure, while only $8 million was devoted to humanitarian aid. Data shows 
that while education ranked second after infrastructure in terms of EU aid at U$26 million [€18.2 
million], the health sector was at U$22 million [€15.4million]. Allocated funds aimed at the 
agriculture sector indicated that it was not a priority since the EU spent a meagre $1.5 million to 
support rudimentary agricultural needs. 
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Figure 10: Health and Infrastructure. 
                           
Source:- Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development, Directorate 
General of Aid Management and Coordination March 2010. 
The private sector was designated U$6 million [€ 4.2 million], while U$3 million [€ 2.1 million] was 
set aside for water and sanitation. During these years, EU support was channelled into infrastructure, 
social development and social services.  However, the EU funding to infrastructure sector declined as 
the EU and its members were hesitant to commit further taxpayers‘ funds to the OPTs since they are 
unable to prevent Israel from destroying it. As the EU failed to exert influence over Israel it 
channelled aid in accordance with Israeli occupation. 
5.3 Challenges Facing the EU Aid to the PA and the Palestinians  
The EU has faced a number of challenges in its attempts to formulate and implement its aid and 
development policy in Palestine. Some of these challenges resulted from the EU decision-making 
mechanisms; others are a consequence of the policies of the recipients on the ground, mainly the PA 
and the Israeli occupation. The next section will illuminate the main challenges facing the EU aid 
policy. In addition, the section assesses how EU decision-makers cope with this and their impact on 
its aid policy in general.    
5.3.1  Challenge 1: Dualism in the European Aid Policy  
Theoretically, the Maastricht Treaty involves aid policy coordination between EU member states and 
the European Commission relating to ―joint action development and co-operation.‖1104 However, these 
expectations have not been fully implemented since the EEC countries have been unable to agree 
upon any common foreign aid policies.
1105
As a result, the EEC/EU has not developed a strong 
common position to influence Western aid coordination and cooperation, which has significantly 
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weakened both its and the member states‘ leverage in dealing with recipient countries and other major 
Western aid donors.
1106
Foreign prestige and international visibility consistently prove to be the 
motivations behind individual member states‘ aid outside of the EU framework. A study in 2004 by 
Open Europe found that ―25 EU member countries spent a net U$26 billion [€18.2billion] on their 
own bilateral overseas aid policies (ODA), and channelled a further $8 billion (30%) of their aid 
spending through the EU aid budget.‖1107 
The right of the member-states to adopt commercial aid and developmental policies which are 
independent from the EU further complicates the performance of the CFSP. Smith maintains that 
several areas of external economic relations are not controlled exclusively by the Community, 
therefore granting member states the authority to export credits, promote investment and conclude 
economic cooperation with third countries.  So long as the provisions of their agreements do not 
violate the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), they can also tax and freeze foreign assets.
1108
 This 
exemplifies the first layer of contradictions between the member states and the European Commission 
which runs rampant throughout policies in Palestine. 
Member states are generally reluctant to give more responsibilities to EU institutions because of the 
poor reputation of the Commission‘s development aid policy. Allegations of corruption, lack of 
evaluation and monitoring mechanisms, mismanagement, complexity and overly bureaucratic 
procedures may contribute to the rationale behind member states‘ behaviour.1109Due to its 
development co-operation of political expediency, slow delivery and mismanagement in 2000, Clare 
Short, the former British International Development Minister, criticised the European Commission, 
stating that it is ―the worst development agency in the world.‖ Short suggests that ―Member states 
should think seriously about scaling back European Commission programmes and spending them 
better elsewhere.‖1110 
Member states have individual development and assistance programmes in the OPTs reflecting their 
interests and agendas. As Robert Springborg asserts, European actors ―have tended to keep one 
another informed of joint projects outside the structure of the EU which are arranged on a bilateral 
and multilateral basis between European countries.‖1111 Domestic political pressures led member 
states to develop separate programmes which could contradict the broader strategies of the EU and its 
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member states.
1112
 Nonetheless, as Springborg points out, Palestinians rarely depend on the EU for aid 
but investigate alternative means, either through individual European member states or the U.S.  
The member states‘ individual projects in Palestine, especially in infrastructural development, are a 
clear example of the multi-faceted channels of European aid towards the PA. These sundry 
contributions add to the fragmentation of aid policy reducing its effectiveness and impact as a foreign 
policy instrument. This argument supported by Holdar emphasises that EU aid policy seems to 
complement, rather than substitute, foreign aid and policies of the member states.
1113
  The mechanism 
for the delivery of aid to the West Bank and Gaza has been heavily shaped by national priorities. 
Despite the formation of a high-level Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) and consultative group 
structure, there was little real coordination or even communication at the local level. Virtually all 
donors want to become involved in projects that maximize their political visibility and credentials. 
5.3.2  Challenge 2: Short-Term Interest vs. Long-Term Policies 
This section will demonstrate how European aid is directed to serve the short-term interests of the EU 
rather than the long-term interests of the Palestinians. More specifically, this aid has been directed to 
support the MEPP and regional stability at the expense of other sectors.  
Since the events of 11 September 2001 in New York, the March 2004 attacks in Madrid and the 
strikes of July 2005 in London, there has been an increased focus on linking European aid to other 
external policy objectives, such as security, trade and migration. For instance, the European Council‘s 
March 2004 Declaration on Combating Terrorism called for counter-terrorist objectives to be 
integrated into external assistance programmes. The declaration stated that the EU and its institutions 
ought to ―make more efficient use of external assistance programmes to address factors which can 
contribute to the support for terrorism, including in particular support for good governance and the 
rule of law.‖1114 The regulation of the instrument for stability has further defined the precedence of 
assistance to authorities involved in fighting terrorism, emphasising the importance of supporting 
counter-terrorism legislation.
1115
 Identifying the concrete direction and aims of European aid and 
assistance, through the distribution by sector, indicates where European priorities and agendas in the 
OPTs lie. 
Table No (3) and pie chart No (5) indicate that there is a harmonisation between the statements of the 
European offices and the direction of European aid policy to the PA and the Palestinians to stabilise 
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the Middle East through the MEPP. As the Table No (3) shows, EU aid and assistance became a 
victim of the politicisation of the agenda through its member states, i.e. supporting short-term political 
goals rather than consistent long-term strategies. The EU developmental strategy became hostage to, 
and a victim of, the peace process, and building peace was at the expense of Palestinian 
developmental needs.   
The MoP‘s data suggests that the majority of EU aid goes to service sectors that are related to and 
support the MEPP and protect it from collapse. The EU directed its aid to three main sectors. Firstly, 
the humanitarian aid aimed at alleviating the suffering of the Palestinians either as a result of the 
Israeli occupation or as a result of boycotting the Hamas- led government after the 2006 election. 
Secondly, direct budget support was given to the OPTs Authority as a way of keeping it alive and 
negotiating with Israel.   
This indicates that the social sector, which includes humanitarian aid, education, health and social 
services, has absorbed the largest portion of actual assistance to Palestinians over the last fifteen years 
approximating U$2.20 billion. This was followed by direct support of the PA government, 
encompassing several branch sectors, such as direct budget support, government and civil society and 
institutional building.  Here, the total disbursal of EU funds is roughly U$1.11 Billion [€ 0.7772 
million].  Combined, the social and government sector were at the top of the EU agenda in the OPTs 
with a total investment of $3.80 billion [€2.66 billion] whilst the infrastructure sector, rested at a 
modest U$ 245.7 million [€172 million]. The total assistance to the production sector was even more 
disproportionate, estimated at U$27.6 million [€19.3million]. The two sectors on the periphery of 
these categories- financial and no sector- attracted U$30 million [€ 21 million] 
These figures demonstrate how aid to the Palestinians and the PA serve the security and stability 
interests of the EU rather than reflecting the Palestinian priorities of development and sustainable 
economic progress, Table No. 3 shows that humanitarian aid has been used as a stabilising tool and 
support for the current Palestinian leadership which engaged in the MEPP. This policy has come at 
the expense of the productive agricultural, industrial and tourist sectors which are essential to 
economic development. European aid has not contributed to the creation of permanent jobs or 
industrial, agricultural or even commercial infrastructure which is needed for a strong and 
independent economy and indeed it failed to reduce its vulnerability to and dependence on external 
assistance.
1116
  
The statistics of the Directorate General of Aid Management and Coordination in the PA demonstrate 
that the European decision makers also change their strategy according to the political circumstances 
on the ground. For example, the following diagrams and tables indicate that there is a relationship 
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between the European aid donated and concurrent political developments such as crisis or violence. 
During the European boycott of the Hamas-led government the European direct budget support 
declined from U$110 in 2005 to U$20.359 million [€14.2 million] in 2006. This amount reached its 
peak of $384.4 million [€269.15 million] in 2008 after the current Palestinian Prime Minister Salam 
Fayed formed his new cabinet. European humanitarian aid is a further example, which increased by 
19% after Hamas took over in Gaza in the middle of 2006, reaching $221 million [€154.7million] and 
U$412.5 million [€288.8 million]  in 2007 which totalled 43% $955,684 million [€ 669,152 million] 
of all humanitarian aid directed to the Palestinians between 2002 and 2009. The importance of 
humanitarian aid on the EU agenda is supported by the database of the Directorate General of Aid 
Management and Coordination in the PA. 
5.3.3  Challenge 3: The Palestinian Authority  
Just as the Israeli occupation and its policies are considered obstacles facing EU aid, certainPA 
practices are obstacles.  Financial corruption is the main challenge that EU funding has had to tackle.  
However, since the appointment of Salam Fayyad as Palestinian Prime Minster, who adopted and 
implemented comprehensive reforms, the challenges have lessened in comparison to the Arafat era. 
From the outset of the peace process, the PA was plagued with corruption. There was a clash between 
international donors and Arafat over the financial assistance to the PA as well as the agenda and 
priorities of European assistance. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) identified the major 
problems as being: ―(i) diversion of tax revenue to special accounts, excessive hiring in the civil 
service and security apparatus, and (ii) PA commercial operations and monopolies with no 
transparency or accountability.‖1117According to the IMF, ―Arafat saw both aid and PA public finance 
as a political resource, to be used to consolidate his political position.‖ Therefore, Arafat “encouraged 
a variety of irregular mechanisms of revenue generation such as petroleum excise taxes being 
deposited, with full Israeli knowledge and cooperation, in a private account outside PA ministry of 
finance control.‖1118 The IMF estimated that approximately $486 million was passed onto Arafat in 
this way between 1995 and 2000.
1119
 
In addition, the Bank‘s report claims that ―Arafat‘s own large presidential budget - accounting for 
around eight per cent of the PA budget, or U$ 114.7 million [€283.5 million] in 2003 - was without 
the effective oversight by the Ministry of Finance or the Palestinian Legislative Council.‖1120 An IMF 
investigation found a ―series of semi-public enterprise and monopolies were acquired and held by the 
Palestinian company for commercial services or under other auspices worth U$700-900 million‖ 
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[€490-630.1 million]. The report maintains that ―their profit also remained outside effective public 
control. Some domestic tax revenues (notably from toionbacco and alcohol) also passed to accounts 
beyond ministry of finance control. All told, almost U$900 million [€ 630.1 million] in revenues was 
diverted in this way.‖ Moreover, Kurikkala argues that ―while donors wanted to direct money to basic 
infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and roads, Arafat‘s main interest was to spend money for 
high–profile national projects that served the purpose of creating an image of a state-like entity.‖1121 
Lasensky maintained that Chairman Arafat ―had great difficulty acceding to the donors‘ demands for 
transparency and accountability.‖ ‗My money‘ said Indyk, is how Arafat typically referred to 
international assistance.
1122
 
According to Brynen corruption and the misuse of international and public fund reached various 
Palestinian security services that ―enforced their own system of taxation, protection, monopolies or 
extortion‖ whereby ―some of the security force‘s payroll was paid in cash for private or political 
gain.‖1123  
Excessive hiring without regard to budget constraints was another problem that increased the burden 
on international aid and unsustainable fiscal structure. According to the IMF, Palestinian society is 
young ―with 57 percent below the age of 20 and the growth rate, currently at 4.2 percent, is one of the 
highest in the world.‖1124Therefore, the ability to fulfil the population‘s basic needs are major 
challenges facing the PA and the international community. The World Bank has concluded that there 
is some modest over-employment (around five percent) which, in turn, increases the burden on 
international aid.  The PA needs more than U$115 million [€ 80.5million] a month just to pay the 
salaries of 145,000 public sector employees, about half of whom are listed as security forces.
1125
 The 
IMF criticised the employment policy of the PA during Chairman Arafat‘s period, claiming that 
appointment selections based on loyalty rather than ability resulting in incompetent or corrupt 
officials, ultimately undermining the PA‘s credibility and governing effectiveness.1126 
However, according to the World Bank, the PA has made significant progress in tackling corruption 
and improving governance in recent years. This includes establishing a Single Treasury Account, 
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through which all payments are made and government revenues are collected. In March 2007, Patten 
stated that these reforms were ―one of the few success stories of the past few years in Palestine.‖1127 
Internal conflict between Fatah and Hamas was another obstacle to international assistance. The way 
the EU responded to Hamas‘ victory raised serious questions about the EU‘s commitment to reliable 
support. The dilemma concerned how the EU could deal financially and politically with a Hamas-led 
Palestinian government when the organization was ‗blacklisted‘ by the EU since September 2003. 
Although European treaties, particularly the Maastricht Treaty, empowered the EU enabling it to link 
its aid and development policy with its CFSP, this represented the first time the EU exploited this 
power. Europe ―made a complete use of its economic instrument in order to incite not only political 
reform but also a change in the diplomatic and political perception of the conflict by one interested 
party.‖1128 
During the Arafat period, the EU threatened to terminate or suspend aid to the PA, however, these 
threats were not realised. Nonetheless, the question remains: why did the EU continue its assistance 
policy in spite of the blatant corruption and financial mismanagement? Whilst a decision was made to 
cease the assistance policy after Hamas‘ 2006 electoral success, Wanlin believes that ―whether aid 
payments were frozen or not, any decision inherently rested on a political judgment.‖1129 Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner emphasized the strong commitment to support the PA in its ―quest for improving the 
lives of Palestinian people towards a peace agreement with Israel.‖1130 
The Director-General in charge of the PEGASE aid mechanism, Koos Richelle, confirmed the link 
between European aid and commitment to the peace process. Stating that ―the Commission is happy 
to use PEGASE to show strong support to the PA which is fully engaged in a credible and legitimate 
peace initiative with Israel under the leadership of President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad.‖1131 
The willingness of member states and the EU to play an active role in the MEPP and secure their 
place at the negotiation table between the Palestinians and the Israelis has contributed to the dilemma 
that the EU is facing in the Middle East. Member states acknowledge that if they want a chance to 
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collaborate, American and Israeli conditions must be accepted, as they are the strongest players in the 
process. Such conditions have been imposed on a Hamas-led government as a pre-condition to 
recognise and to deal with its non-violence, along with the recognition of Israel‘s right to exist and 
acceptance of contemporary agreements and obligations. With regard to Arafat‘s financial policy, the 
EU officials acknowledged that, although taxpayers‘ money was misused by Arafat, the priority of 
peace-building avoided using conditionality due to internal considerations and the fear that such 
action would collapse in the PA and discourage Arafat from cooperating in the peace process. Hanafi 
and Tabar assert that the commitment to the peace process did not leave many options to the 
international community in its relation with the PA.  In short: 
―Donors‘ commitment to the peace process is the anchor that shapes the way the 
donors intervene in the society. This inevitably has an impact on the incentives or 
penalties that donors can provide to encourage better conduct among Palestinian 
recipients.‖1132 
According to Indyk, a former US ambassador to Israel, the Israelis approached the predicament by 
stating that, basically, ―Arafat‘s job is to clean up Gaza. It‘s going to be a difficult job. He needs 
walking around money.‖1133 The Hamas takeover of Gaza is another challenge haunting EU 
development and aid policy efforts in Palestine.  At the Sharm El-Sheikh conference, in the aftermath 
of the Israeli military offensive, the international community pledged to support the Palestinian 
economy for the reconstruction of Gaza.  Participants pledged approximately US$4.5 billion over the 
next two years.
1134
 Plus, they were committed to disbursing these pledges as quickly as possible in 
order to better the daily lives of the Palestinians.  However, at the time of writing this thesis, donors‘ 
efforts have been thwarted; first, by the blockade that continues to be imposed on Gaza which hinders 
the entry of basic materials, second, due to the dispute between Palestinian factions, and finally, from 
the legal dilemmas which prohibit the EU from dealing with organisations on their terrorist list.  
Three months after aid was suspended to the PA at the request of the Quartet to avoid any financial 
links with the Hamas-led government, the European Commission, collaborating with the World Bank, 
designed the TIM.  This mechanism is designed to relay a reliance on the presidency and international 
organisations to ―help alleviate the socio-economic conditions which continued to deteriorate in 
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theOPTs,‖1135 by providing funding for emergency health, social and fuel costs. It is regularly pointed 
out that, in overall terms, European aid has paradoxically increased since the boycott was imposed. 
The EC‘s TIM has three windows covering the following:  first, the Emergency Services Support 
Programme (ESSP) of the World Bank to fund the running costs of hospitals and health care centres; 
second, the Interim Emergency Relief Contribution , which secures the uninterrupted supply of energy 
utilities, including fuel; and third, to provide support to vulnerable Palestinians through the payment 
of social allowances to the poorest segment of the population and to key workers delivering essential 
public services.
1136
 Although there has been a boycott of the Hamas-led government, in 2008 the EC 
committed €361.5 million, as compared to €554 million in 2007 and €342 million in 2006.1137 
Building upon the TIM, on 1 February 2009, the European Commission launched a new mechanism 
called PEGASE.
1138
PEGASE goes further than TIM and has a three-year horizon directly linked to the 
Palestinian Reform and Development Plan, which was presented by the Prime Minister Salam Fayyad 
at the Paris Donor Conference.
1139
 Under PEGASE, financial and technical assistance is provided in 
four key areas, namely 1) governance, 2) social development, 3) economic and private sector 
development governance (including rule of law, justice and security, social development (education, 
health, skills training and employment), economic development and 4) public infrastructure, including 
water and energy.
1140
  
Despite the EU‘s efforts to support the most destitute Palestinians, TIM has been unable to prevent the 
growing humanitarian crisis caused by the financial boycott and Israeli violence.
1141
 However, one of 
the main criticisms of TIM is that the mechanism undermines the financial reforms that the EU had 
successfully pressed for, such as the single treasury account. Youngs argues that ―under the TIM, it is 
not clear who decides who gets what, and diplomats complain of money draining into a black 
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hole.‖1142 These criticisms are also echoed by Assburg, who considers the TIM as being so vulnerable 
to corruption that it ―contradicts the objective of institution building the EU encouraging in the 
PA.‖1143  
5.3.4  Challenge 4: The Israeli Occupation  
As an occupying power, Israel has a huge impact on international aid and its effort to build the 
capacity necessary for a war-to-peace transition. Its military operations affect both the Palestinian 
economy and the international donors. The repressive and arbitrary measures that Israel executors 
have historically taken have several forms. First, the deliberate and systematic destruction of 
Palestinian infrastructure, which was built and funded by European tax payers.  
The European Commission estimated that the damage imparted by Israel to EU-funded projects in the 
OPTs amounts to €44 million [$62.8 million]. 1144 A total of 17 infrastructures valued at €17.3 million 
[$24.7million] have been destroyed by the Israeli army, including the destruction of the runway at 
Gaza International Airport, the airport itself, the headquarters of the radio station of the Voice of 
Palestine, various schools in several Palestinian cities, the irrigation systems in Jericho, the Central 
Statistic Offices, the Gaza seaport, offices of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, and the 
studio of the OPTs Broadcasting Corporation.
1145
  
 Since the most recent war on Gaza, (from 27 December 2008 until 18
 
January 2009) a report 
produced by the European Network of Implementing Development Agencies for the Europe Aid 
Cooperation office assessed the cost of damage in key areas to total an approximate €514.3 million1146 
84 percent of the damage was inflicted on three key sectors: housing, agriculture and the private 
sector – areas that play a key role in food security, economic development and employment of the 
Palestinian population. 
1147
 
Second, the Israeli military and security measures against the Palestinians, such as closure policies, 
curfews, military checkpoints and restrictions on the movement of Palestinian goods and people 
across borders and within the West Bank and Gaza Strip, have contributed to the immobilization of 
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the Palestinian economy. Closure and movement restrictions have resulted in donor projects becoming 
less effective, time-consuming and costly in their implementation.
1148
 The Israeli military and security 
measures against the Palestinians have hindered international assistance to the WBGS and restricted 
international endeavours to help build a Palestinian economy, especially as Israel retains control of 
East Jerusalem, 60% of the West Bank and a large proportion of the Gaza Strip.
1149
  
There are restrictions on international agreements that the PA has conducted with the international 
community, such as the EU Association Agreement. The Israeli refusal to recognise the international 
agreement that the PA conducted with the EU is the most prominent examples demonstrating how the 
occupation is a major obstacle in the path towards a strong, independent Palestinian economy.  
The Israeli refusal to recognise the EU-PLO Association Agreement has blocked the preferential 
import of Palestinian goods to the EU, while simultaneously providing Israeli origin certificates for 
goods produced in the West Bank and Gaza.  Thus Israel is awarded trade preferences to which it was 
never entitled. Furthermore, holding the tax revenues collected by Israel on behalf of the Palestinian 
people has hindered the efforts of building a sustainable and efficient Palestinian economy. Used as a 
tool of collective punishment, the Israeli government periodically withholds the tax revenue, totalling 
$55 million a month in customs and duties.  For example, Israel withheld such a tax after Hamas won 
the 2006 elections.  Similarly, Israel denied portions of the tax revenues when the Palestinian Prime 
Minister asked the EU not to upgrade EU-Israel relations as long as the latter continued to expand 
West Bank settlements.
1150
 Israel has further imposed restrictions on international representatives and 
workers in delivering humanitarian aid. Such agencies in particular are subjected to strict Israeli visa 
regulations. 
The European Commission has condemned the Israeli policy, emphasising that Israel's settlement 
policy and its security restrictions on movement and goods ―helps strangle the Palestinian economy, 
increasing Palestinian dependence on foreign aid and ultimately forcing European taxpayers to bear 
much of the cost.
1151
 Roy Dickinson, a senior European Commission diplomat in Jerusalem, stated 
that: ―settlement activity, including land expropriation, roads used exclusively by settlers and army 
roadblocks which are meant to protect settlements, also harms prospects for a recovery of the 
Palestinian economy.‖ 1152He elaborates that: ―it is European taxpayers who pay the majority of the 
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price of that dependence.‖1153 
The EU, in particular the Commission in charge of aid to Palestine, expressed chagrin towards Israeli 
military measures against EU-funded Palestinian infrastructure and castigated restrictions imposed by 
Israel upon the Palestinians and international donors‘ humanitarian aid.  For example, the EU 
Development and Humanitarian Aid Commissioner, Louis Michel, legitimized Israel‘s right to self-
defence but has questioned the relationship between its military policy against civilian facilities and 
terrorism. He noted the frustration of the moral obligation of manifold payments and criticised the 
Israeli government during his visit to Gaza after its war last January stating that ―the EU was tired of 
paying for the same infrastructure only to have it repeatedly destroyed.‖1154 Similarly, in her statement 
at the Sharm El-Sheikh Conference, the former Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner also called upon all 
parties to ―refrain from imposing their own definition and standards of humanitarian aid or attempt at 
controlling its flow and destination.‖1155  
The EU and the international donors have pursued a balance between development strategies and 
funding emergency assistance in response to the crisis while some of the PA‘s critics would prefer to 
see donor funding stopped, other individuals believe this would have a detrimental effect on the peace 
process by increasing the agony of the Palestinians and breaking up the PA.  This, according to the 
House of Commons, ―would leave civilians fewer alternatives from turning to undesired and extreme 
measures.‖1156 The EU possesses the resources and treaties to empower and protect its political and 
economic interests.  It has the ability to impose sanctions on Israel if it persists in violating human 
rights.  It has the political clout to demand compensation for the Israeli destruction of its projects in 
the OPTs and the prerogative to reduce intensity of the relationship between itself and Israel. 
However, the EU is not using any of its aforementioned options and instruments. This is due to the 
built-in limitations of the EU and its capacity to act. The use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy 
tool is particularly problematic as it requires an endorsement from both the European Commission 
and the first and second pillars of the CFSP. Therefore, even though some member states have the 
political will to utilise these legal instruments against Israeli policy, the mechanism of the CFSP is the 
major obstacle tying their hands reducing their capability to impose their policy. Member states in 
charge of the CFSP will, through the intergovernmental approach, not allow its relations with Israel to 
be put at risk since this may jeopardise its role in the peace process.   
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The Union has viewed the protection of Israel and close relations with it as a high order priority.
1157
 
The close relation of some of the EU members with Israel and their historical, political and cultural 
ties with the Jewish state (and the U.S.) has prompted them to avoid antagonising Israel. Therefore 
European policy is sacrificed over the relationship with Israel.
1158
 The identity of the European 
identity as a civilian power also play an important role in shaping the CFSP.  Pace refres the EU‘s 
lack of interest in sanctioning Israel or penalizing Israeli violations to the the EU identity as a 
normative power. She argues ―identity constructions do not tally with coercive EU action.‖1159 
Furthermore, Pace belivies that normative power constructions constrain its own actions: inaction 
rather than coercion is the option in such a case.‖1160 Patten, indicated some of the legal difficulties of 
imposing sanctions on Israel. He highlighted the difficulties of taking legal or political action against 
the Israeli destruction of the Palestinian infrastructure funded by the EU, stating: 
―The process would be extremely difficult for two main reasons. Firstly, the 
internal structure of the EU would hamper the process of compensation, since 
projects are not only channelled through the Commission, but also through 
member states. Second, upon completion a project becomes the legal property 
of the people it is supposed to benefit, making EU legal action almost 
impossible.‖1161  
The the Council of the European Union hesitates to condemn the Israeli destruction in the OPTs 
which was built and funded by European taxpayers, epitomised by Benita Ferrero-Waldner‘s actions. 
Using the legal framework she justified the EU‘s refusal to ask for compensation from Israel for the 
destruction that was incurred during the war in Gaza.  Other officials hinted that the lack of member 
state support was behind the European hesitation. If the Commission does not believe it will gain 
support from Member States, it sees ―no point in being big and brave,‖ as one EU official stated.1162  
Most of the criticism of Israeli policy comes from the European Commission and not from the 
European Council.  Patten‘s attempt to boycott the products and exports produced in the Israeli 
settlements in the WBGS are a clear example of the division between the views and actions of 
individual member states and the EU institutions.  Patten insisted that exports from these settlements 
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should not be labelled ‗Made in Israel‘ and should not be permitted to enter the EU market on the 
preferential terms offered by the Association Agreement.  However, Patten‘s ability to adopt a hard 
line has been undermined by pressure from Britain, Belgium and Germany.
1163
 
Youngs criticised the EU for its lack of firm action and response towards the Israelis‘ closure of parts 
of Palestine, undermining the EU‘s economic engagement with the Palestinians. He believed that ―one 
area where the EU could have had a thoroughly significant impact was in halting the slide of 
Palestinian economy, but nothing valuable was done to ensure that Palestinian producers could 
actually export to the European market and circumvent obstacles imposed by Israel.‖ He stressed the 
linking of European aid to diplomacy, expressing that ―European generosity was not accompanied by 
nor was forceful diplomacy. The physical products of many EU projects swiftly destroyed in Israeli 
attacks, with little in the way of concrete European reprisals.‖1164  
 
Fisk believed that ―European taxpayers fork out for the projects. US taxpayers fork out for the 
weapons which Israel uses to destroy them.
1165
 Then EU taxpayers fork out for the whole lot to be 
rebuilt.‖ The EU bore the cost of Israel‘s reoccupation of the OPTs and removed Israel from its 
obligation of providing the funding, assistance and services that such an occupying power is obliged 
to impart.  This causes the dilemma of whether to turn a blind eye to the systematic Israeli destruction 
of the OPTs or whether to apply international law and force Israel take responsibility as an occupying 
power. 
 Karim argues that although emergency relief is vital to Palestinian survival, Israel‘s occupation must 
be addressed otherwise aid enhances the occupation.
1166
 She suggests that Continued EU support to 
the PA emergency service provisions and humanitarian aid relieved Israel of its obligations under 
international law. She added ―the international aid has made the occupation cost-free and it has even 
enhanced Israel's economy since every dollar produced in the occupied territories, 45 cents flows back 
to Israel.‖1167 Nicola goes further to accuse the donors‘ money as a tool in the Israel hands In Nicola‘s 
words: 
―Aid money continued to flow nonetheless with or without awareness that thereafter 
their aid had shifted to serve a completely different and contradictory political Israeli 
agenda and became an instrument of Israel‘s foreign policy and thus became part of 
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the problem and not of the solution, without alleviating the Palestinian economic 
plight.‖1168 
This has spurred Palestinian leaders to call for a suspension of European aid to the PA and 
have Israel take responsibility for the occupation according to the Geneva Conventions. Sari 
Nusseibeh, former PA representative in Jerusalem, urged the former British Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown to earnestly consider the cessation of European aid since the donated money is 
sustaining the occupation.  Nusseibeh explained that: 
―The Israelis are happy because they do not have to pay the cost of the occupation. 
The Europeans are happy because they feel they are doing their part by providing 
economic assistance … and the Palestinians are happy because we have jobs and we 
feel free.‖1169  
Nusseibeh concluded by stating that Israel cannot continue to occupy the OPTs using EU funds and 
American dollars.
1170
 Conversely, the EU is in a political dilemma:  it cannot impose sanctions on 
Israel for reasons previously explained, and it cannot halt aid to the OPTs because this may worsen 
the prevalent humanitarian crisis.   
5.4 Analysis and Conclusion  
 This chapter has demonstrated how the EU‘s inherent imbalance of power and the intergovernmental 
approach to the CFSP has limited the EU‘s ability to achieve the overarching goals in the Middle East 
and the OPTs. Thus two fundamental questions have been dealt with: first, to what extent European 
aid and technical assistance has served its stated objectives in the development of Palestinian 
economy and building a Palestinian state. Secondly, to what extent it is a political tool used to support 
the European role in the MEPP. The effort to answer these takes us via a number of observations.  
The history of European aid and technical assistance suggests that the Madrid and Oslo peace 
processes served as an opportunity for the EU to extend its political role in the Middle East. This was 
especially true for the supranational institutions, who have been able to carve out for themselves an 
increased role through actual implementation on the ground of policy decisions regarding financial 
aid.   
The role of the European Commission in distributing aid through the TIM and PEGAS, its role in 
coordinating and training the Palestinian police forces and finally its role in monitoring the Rafah 
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border are examples of the new importance of supranational actors. However, this role has still been 
limited due to the inherent imbalance in the distribution of power between the EU institutions 
themselves. EU aid and technical assistance to the OPTs became a victim of the dualism in the 
decision-making of Europe‘s CFSP. The ill-structured decision making of the EU and the 
intergovernmental approach to the CFSP has lead to realist politics triumphing over liberal principles 
and values. 
The facts support the realists‘ understanding of European policy towards the MEPP. Firstly, the 
extensive focus on building a strong Palestinian police force and reforming its institutions at the 
expense of other economic sectors suggests that European aid and technical assistance has been 
driven by the aim to stabilise the region through the MEPP rather than to support the Palestinian 
economy per se. Once again, the EU has utilised liberal values as a tool to accomplish its own 
security aims. European Commission activity in the sphere of development co-operation has been 
forced into service for the self-interested security-driven policies of Member states, expressed through 
the decisions of the Council. More than that, the Council has acted to obstruct the Commission from 
implementing developmental assistance activities if they are seen as counter-productive from a 
security point of view, and when they might entail using legal instruments to sanction Israel at the 
expense of EU-Israeli bilateral relations. Intergovermentalism has meant the privileging of short-term 
over long-term interests.  
As a result of the outlined effects, EU aid policy has not coped with external threats in helping the 
Palestinians to build an independent economy or boost the peace process. Specifically, it has not been 
able to overcome or negate the impacts of on-going Israeli Occupation and Israeli efforts to subvert 
the peace process to their own ends. In the absence of a clear momentum for development, and a 
political willingness to back it up, EU financial assistance has come to reinforce the occupation rather 
than replace it – its pays the costs of occupation and the costs of the peace process which is going 
nowhere. 
The problem can be put thus: the power to make policy lies with the second pillar, which is inter-
governmental. The power to implement policy and resources lies with the first pillar, which includes 
the supranationalist institutions. The tension between the interests of the two pillars means that policy 
becomes bogged down and fraught with contradictions. If this is true of the CFSP in general, nowhere 
is it more apparent than in the provision of financial aid to the Palestinians.  
Thus, in the end, European aid serves the EUs political and security ends rather than their stated (and 
normatively-dressed) objectives of Palestinian economic development. The clearest illustration of this 
was the EU‘s willingness to turn a blind eye towards Arafat‘s corruption as long as he acted as an 
Israeli-approved partner for peace, but their freezing of aid to a democratically-elected Hamas-led 
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government which refused to recognise Israel or any previous agreement made. 
It is also evident in a basic contradiction in EU policy.  The EU has not substantively challenge 
Israel‘s occupation policy, preferring to focus on aid and developmental to the Palestinians rather than 
sanctioning of Israel.  This was due to pressures from member states who sought to avoid 
antagonising Israel or the U.S, and partially explains why the EU never asked for compensation for 
the Israeli destruction of its projects in Palestine. But without challenging the cause of Palestinian 
under-development, economic assistance can never fully achieve its aims. Despite the existence of 
divergent interests among the member states towards the OPTs and Israel, a unified aid policy which 
aims to support the MEPP is agreed upon whilst retaining individual aid and assistance policies 
separate from the EU framework.  But the Member states have to overcome those divergent interests 
and agree on more than just the provision of aid, but rather a clear route to the end of occupation, in 
order to actually implement the policies successfully.   
What has actually happened has been that the substantial European aid has contributed to increasing 
Palestinian dependency on foreign aid rather than supporting sustainable development. This has 
contributed to the subordination of the sovereign and political decisions of the PA. Additionally, the 
dependency on international aid affects the political participation of the Palestinians in the PA‘s 
decision making. As the PA‘s main income derives from international donors, the PA experiences 
little obligation to adhere to the desires of its people. 
It is not only the PA but the individuals within it, and dependent on its salaries, who are drawn into 
this cycle of dependency and subsequent political disempowerment. The status quo becomes the only 
acceptable short-term option for individuals who need that monthly pay packet to survive and support 
their families, even though it destroys aspirations for a long-term sustainable alternative. The human 
cost of the EU‘s failings is immeasurable. 
So when we ask the two questions posed at the start of this chapter, we are confronted with the 
following answers: First, although the Palestinians are the ―largest per capita recipients of 
international development assistance in the world,‖ 1171 and although the aid has significantly 
contributed to the creation of a supportive environment of institutions and infrastructure (building 
schools, hospital and roads for example),  the Palestinian economy is in its  worst economic 
depression in modern history.
1172
 58 percent of Palestinians live below the poverty line, and about half 
of those live in extreme poverty.
1173
 Moreover, the economy suffers from high unemployment, 
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reaching up to 40% in Gaza and 19% in the West Bank.
1174
Clearly, with regard to the peace process, 
the EU has not managed to utilise its aid in an efficient way in order to influence the conflicting 
parties or to build an environment in which to achieve sustainable peace.  
Regarding the second question, Europe‘s ‗chequebook diplomacy‘ has not ultimately given it the 
political role it has sought. The EU has failed to use its economic leverage as Israel‘s main trading 
partner, since it has never linked those trade relations with the peace process.  In fact, there is 
ambivalence in the EU‘s Middle East policy, since aid to the Palestinians was conditional, but not aid 
towards Israel. This may have been in order to avoid controversy with Israel in an attempt to secure a 
diplomatic role in the MEPP.  The Israeli government has rejected any European participation in the 
MEPP whilst the Palestinian‘s always welcomed it. Overcoming this requires resolving the 
intergovernmentalist obstructions to formulating and exercising political will, and committing 
themselves to their own vision of security built on regional human and economic development.  
A key component of this vision has been political development, specifically democratisation, political 
reform and human rights across the region. The following chapter will examine EU policies towards 
the PA and the Palestinians in this regard. 
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Chapter Six: The Impact of the CFSP Mechanism on European Democratisation and Political 
Reform Policies towards the OPTs 
6.1 Introduction  
 Democracy promotion, human rights and institutional reform are among the key stated aims of the 
CFSP policy towards the Mediterranean non-member states, including the OPTs. As Chapter Three 
demonstrated, these themes, and the values behind them, are embedded within the EMP and the ENP 
agreements in general, and accordingly the EU has included endorsing policies promoting democracy, 
institutional reform and human rights in its treaties and conventions with the PA. Both the Interim 
Association Agreement with the PA, which was signed in February 1997, and the EU-Palestinian 
Authority ENP Action Plan signed in December 2004, included a clause related to democracy 
promotion and human rights.  
The objectives of this chapter are twofold:  firstly, it seeks to explain why democracy promotion is an 
important issue for EU policy globally, regionally and in the OPTs in particular. Secondly, the chapter 
―un-picks‖ this narrative to identify the main determinants of the actual EU democracy promotion in 
the OPTs specifically and how the EU its member states and the decision-making mechanism interact 
with these determinants. These determinants are identified as a) the divergent interests and political 
stances of the EU members towards the EU democratisation process in the OPTs b) the Israel 
occupation d) the PA‘s political behaviour and performance and c) the institutional structures and 
mechanisms of the EPC/CFSP.  
This chapter argues that although the EU shows willingness and is interested in the promotion of 
democracy, reform and human rights in Palestine, in fact, on the ground, the EU and its member states 
have not shown a readiness to implement or enforce these policies towards their partners in the 
Middle East. The political behaviour of the EU on the ground shows that there is a European tendency 
to support their own political, security and economic interests at the expense of normative 
commitments to democracy promotion and human rights. This tendency supports the realist approach 
to understanding European policy-making towards the Palestinians.  The CFSP mechanism and its 
intergovernmental approach ultimately make the EU‘s own democratisation and reform policy a 
victim of short interests, mainly security, objectives. 
6.2 The European Union’s Motivation behind Democratisation Efforts in General 
The treaties which established the EEC in the 1950s hardly mentioned human rights or democracy; 
the focus of the treaties was on economic cooperation and integration as a means of ―securing 
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peace.‖1175 However, the Community has evolved over time to become more and more a ‗community 
of values,‘ transforming itself into something resembling a constitutional order.1176 Since 1991 the EU 
has placed the promotion of democracy and human rights at the heart of its foreign policy.
1177
 
Terminology inspiring values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of 
law, respect for human rights and political reforms was integrated into most of the European 
Community‘s treaties, conventions, and legal systems. For example, the Treaty of EU considered 
democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedom as one of the ―main 
objectives of the CFSP.‖1178 The rest of the EU treaties have successively stressed integration, 
promoting democracy and human rights.  
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam reaffirmed that the EU ―is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common 
to the Member States.‖1179 The Nice Treaty in 2000 extends the objective of promoting human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, from development co-operation to all forms of co-operation with third 
party countries, thus covering trade and association agreements.
1180
 Needless to say, European 
officials place emphasis in their speeches on democracy and human rights issues. In a speech given by 
the former External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, emphasised the fact that the EU 
takes seriously ―respect for human rights at home or elsewhere in the world as obligation‖.1181 The 
External Relations Commissioner believes there is a link between democracy and the three elements 
of economic growth, prosperity and peace. She stated that:  
―Human security, democracy and prosperity can only be achieved in 
societies where fundamental human rights are respected. Humanity will not 
enjoy security without development; it will not enjoy development without 
security; and it will not enjoy either without respect for human rights.‖1182  
 
She added that, in addition to the EU considering democracy and human rights to be a priority, the EU 
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utilised its development aid programs, in particular the European Initiative for Human Rights and 
Democracy as incentive tools to encourage adopting the values of democracy and respect for human 
rights.
1183
 In 2003, a Commission communication on Governance and Development provided policy 
guidance designed to strengthen the link between development, governance and political reform 
initiatives. The Commission stated that it sought to use its aid programmes ―to promote freedom 
across the world as a basis for sustainable development‖.1184  
 
―We take a two-pronged approach: first, mainstreaming human rights 
concerns into all our policies and programs, and second, financing specific 
projects to promote and protect human rights. By mainstreaming we mean 
integrating human rights and democratisation throughout the EU policies, 
programmes and projects.‖1185  
 
In the framework of its CFSP, the EU has forged a range of tools which have been used to promote 
human rights and democratisation such as through the policy of enlargement, the policy of 
partnership, political dialogue, and human rights and democracy clauses in the EU‘s agreements with 
its international partners. As a result, the EU became one of the most important players promoting 
democracy and reform around the world, especially towards its partners and neighbours in the 
southern or eastern countries.
1186
 In order to implement these objectives and promote these values on 
the ground, the EU is spending millions of Euros yearly. According to Youngs, the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights spends more than 100 million Euros a year.
1187
 
 
Several factors explain the motivations behind the EU's efforts to promote democracy.  Some refer to 
the domestic factors inherent in the internal structure of the EU, in other words, the way European 
policy-makers perceive the international identity of the EU as a normative power among international 
players. This trend is led by Germany, which sees the EU as a normative power which must utilise 
economic and trade instruments to achieve political goals. Other reasons relate to the competence of 
the EU and its lack of military capabilities and finally the history of its members. The EU considers 
the democratisation process as part of peace-building which is often a main component of peace 
accords for national reconciliation after civil war or conflicts. Perthes argues that the ―experience of 
two catastrophic wars in Europe (both concerned with nationalism and racism) was seen as 
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contributing to a strategy that ought to avoid the use of force.‖1188 At the same time, McFaul argues 
that European democratisation policy is based on an idea that ―encourages human development, 
fosters a relatively high degree of political equality, and promotes peace.‖1189 McFaul concludes his 
argument by saying that ―democracies do not fight one another, and they generate prosperity in their 
geography.‖1190  
 
Pace emphasizes that all efforts at exporting democracy underline the EU‘s desire to ―create an image 
for itself as a normative, global actor.‖  It might also be that the European Union‘s lack of military 
capability to impose its policy on its neighbours and partners is one of the reasons that prompted the 
bloc to exploit peaceful and civil means as a way of change, including such strategies as membership, 
economic trade development, rule of law, human rights, democratisation and reform.
1191
  
In addition to the aforementioned internal factors, there are external factors that have prompted the 
EU to promote democracy abroad. Morlino divided the external motivations behind the European 
democratisation efforts into four categories. First, during the 1970s and early 1980s the Community 
had to cope with the need to facilitate democratic consolidation in formerly authoritarian Greece, 
Spain and Portugal as a key aspect of these countries‘ admission into the Community. Second, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s posed dangers of post-Communist 
instability and hyper-nationalism for the EU.   
 
The response culminated in the formal decision, made in December 2002, to enlarge the Union to 
include ten new Member States.
1192
 Third, Morlino considered the geographic location with Europe as 
one of the most important motivations behind the European efforts aimed at democratising the 
Mediterranean, the Middle East and North Africa. Finally, the colonial history of several key EU 
Member States (Belgium, France, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK) meant that since the 
1960s, the Community has been engaged in more traditional forms of democracy promotion through 
its aid and development policies, particularly vis-à-vis the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries.
1193
 
6.2.1  EU Democratisation Motivations in the Middle East  
The EU considered the Mediterranean and North Africa (MENA) region as a strategic partner due to 
both economic (trade, migration, energy) and political (stability, security) interests. However, 
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European interests in the region face several challenges that might put European interests at risk. 
Autocratic, non-democratic regimes, poor records in protecting human rights and freedom of the 
individual, and lack of rule of law are considered by the European decision-makers as the main 
sources of instability in the region which might spill over onto European soil. Its geographical 
proximity and fears of mass migration and radical Islam and terrorist attacks prompted the EU to 
tackle these challenges. In its strategy to fight terrorism, the European Council emphasises that the 
European Union‘s ―aid projects to third countries in the field of good governance and the rule of law 
are addressing factors which can contribute to radicalization and recruitment‖1194 Jünemann argues 
that most of the European initiatives towards the MENA region build on the strategy of ―stabilization 
through co-operation.‖1195  
She added that this approach was ―combined with a forceful attempt to export the west European 
security model based on democracy and the market economy.‖1196 She considered EMP at a regional 
level, and its bilateral Association Agreements, and the European Neighbourhood Policy (2003) and 
its Bilateral Action Plans, to be the main tools with which to implement the new European 
approach.
1197
 Keohane echoed the belief that fears of radical Islam and terrorist attacks was one of the 
main motivations behind the promotion of democracy and economic and legal reforms in the MENA 
region.
1198
  
Youngs also supports Keohane‘s argument stating that the main strategy of the European partnership - 
democracy promotion and reform towards the Middle East – is built on an ideology which addresses 
the social and economic roots of radical Islam, so that ―political liberalization would be less likely to 
produce anti-western orientations and over time provide the means to more effectively secure a Euro-
Mediterranean area of shared prosperity and stability.‖1199  
Both the EMP and the ENP initiatives include democracy and human right clauses in their 
agreements. In addition, they have initiated several projects to encourage adopting and implementing 
good government and the rule of law, democracy and human rights. Moreover, the European 
Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region of June 2000 emphasises the importance of 
democracy and respecting human rights as an important element:   
 
―The EU will work with its Mediterranean partners to: develop good neighbourly 
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relations; improve prosperity; eliminate poverty; promote and protect all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, good governance and the rule of 
law.‖1200 
6.2.2  Motivation in the OPTs  
The EU generally believes that only a capable and institutionalizedPA could be an effective 
participant in any renewed peace process. In other words, the main motivation behind the EU 
democratisation efforts in the OPTs is that reforming the PA would increase international and even 
Israeli confidence in the PA and enhance its ability to negotiate authoritatively on behalf of the 
Palestinians. Chris Patten, the European Commissioner for Foreign Relations, laid out the European 
reform agenda:  
―In particular we need to focus our efforts on creating a constitutional 
government by shaping the institutions foreseen in the basic Law and making 
them efficient and accountable; establishing a truly independent judiciary and 
a harmonised national legal and regulatory framework more suitable to a free 
society and market, as well as abolishing state security courts; establishing 
democratic participatory politics and a pluralist society by creating a more 
effective Legislative Council that would exercise enforceable Domestic and 
International Agenda.‖1201  
 
Democratisation, human rights, and reform have become located at the heart of the official EU 
rhetoric in its relations with Palestine, especially as the  EU‘s policy on human rights and 
democratisation in the Mediterranean has been presented by the EU as a strategic, not merely an 
ethical imperative.
1202
 Similar to the rest of its Association Agreements, the EU gives human rights 
and democracy priority in its relations with the PA. Article 2 of the Association Agreement states that: 
 
―Relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement 
itself, shall be based on respect of democratic principles and fundamental 
human rights as set out in the universal declaration on human rights, which 
guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential 
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element of this Agreement.‖1203 
 
In addition, the association agreement emphasises ―promoting respect for human rights and 
democracy, inter alia through socio-professional dialogue.‖1204 In 2004, the EU and the PA agreed on 
an ENP Joint Action Plan setting out jointly agreed priorities. The Interim Association Agreement is 
the main instrument for the implementation of the Plan. Three subcommittees were established to 
facilitate implementation of the priorities of the Plan. Democracy and rule of law were one of the 
main principles of the Action Plan. The partners utilised the Plan as the main instrument to achieve 
and establish an independent, impartial and fully-functioning judiciary in line with international 
standards and to strengthen the separation of powers. The main objectives of the Action Plan were to: 
―Adopt a coherent strategy for judicial reform, ensure progress on 
unification of the legal codes of the West Bank and Gaza Strip Ensure, 
effective implementation of the Basic Law, in particular those articles 
relating to Citizen‘s Rights and Civil Libertie …transparent division of 
responsibilities between the Supreme Judicial Council and the Ministry of 
Justice and strengthen the administrative capacity, improve conditions for 
training in relevant areas (including human rights) and examine possibilities 
for establishing a Judicial Training Institute Implement reform of the PA 
security services.‖1205 
 
According to the treaty, the Action Plan covers a timeframe of three to five years. Its implementation 
would ―help fulfil the provisions in the Interim Agreement (IA) and [will] encourage and support the 
PA‘s national reform objectives and further integration into European economic and social 
structures.‖1206 The EU-Palestinian Authority action plan covered several areas of cooperation. The 
articles of EU- Palestinian Authority Action Plan emphasised several aims called ―priorities for 
action.‖ These priorities included political dialogue, democracy and rule of law, human rights issues, 
trade liberalisation, judicial reform, economic and social cooperation and development
1207. ―Political 
dialogue, reform and building the institutions of an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian 
State‖ occupied an important position in EU-PA relations. The action plan considered this aim as 
―facilitating efforts to resolve the Middle East conflict and to alleviate the humanitarian situation in 
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the PA.‖1208 In addition, the political section of the EU-PA action plan emphasised several issues such 
as the importance of ―ensuring respect for international law, in particular international humanitarian 
law, the fight against terrorism, co-operation on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
ensuring respect for human rights in the fight against terrorism and incitement to violence.‖1209  
 
The European strategy stressed the need to adopt a coherent strategy for judicial reform, ensure 
effective implementation of the basic law, in particular those articles relating to citizen‘s rights and 
civil liberties, progressively improve the courts‘ infrastructure, improve conditions for training in 
relevant areas (including human rights) and examine the possibility of establishing a judicial training 
institute and implement reform of the PA security services. On the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms level, the agreement also stressed the need to ―strengthen legal guarantees for freedom of 
speech, freedom of the press, freedom of Ensure the respect of human rights and basic civil liberties in 
accordance with the principles of international law, and foster a culture of non-violence, tolerance and 
mutual understanding.‖1210  
6.2.3  European Democratesation Efforts in Numbers  
The EU provided substantial financial assistance to support democracy promotion and reform in 
Palestine. Assistance for the Palestinians has been provided through different financial instruments 
and institutions, such as the MEDA programme, which is the finical instrument of the Barcelona 
Process, the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and the European Instrument 
for Democracy & Human Rights EIDHR, which replaced MEDA in 2007 and became the main 
financial instrument for democracy promotion, human rights and reforms programmes.  
 
According to European Commission statistics, between 1994 and 1998, € 4.201 million out of a total 
€ 308 million was allocated to human rights and democracy projects.1211 In his analysis of the 
European agenda in Palestine, Stetter found that projects and programmes, and financial assistance 
that directly or indirectly relate to democratization processes and human right rights ―comprised 
around € 231.2 million or 52.6 per cent of all assistance to the OPTs in 1994–98.‖1212  
 
―The EU has committed €22.5 million (5.1 per cent) of assistance to 
‗institutional building‘, € 50 million (11.4 per cent) in support of 
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municipalities‘, while the ‗private sector‘ received £ 22 million (five per 
cent)‖.the Palestinian elections were supported with € 12.9 million (2.9 per 
cent) ‗TV/Radio‘ with € 1.5 million (0.3 per cent) and ‗MED/PEACE 
Networks‘ with _8.3 million (1.9 per cent). Support for ‗education/running 
costs‘ comprised € 114 million, that is, 26 per cent of all assistance.‖1213 
 
Figure 11: EU Disbursements on Palestinian Institution Building 2002-2009. 
 
Source:- Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development, Directorate 
General of Aid Management and Coordination March 2010. 
6.2.4  The EU’s Democracy Promotion Achievements in the OPTs  
 As this figure No. 11 shows, the EU allocates part of its financial aid to support the institutional 
building of the PA, democracy promotion and human rights. The figure shows a gradual increase in 
EU disbursements on Palestinian Institution Building, especially after the current Prime Minister 
Salam Fayyad put reforms and transparency in places of authority on the PA‘s agenda. In addition, the 
increased European interest in the institutional building came to meet the needs of the Palestinian 
Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) sets out (the Palestinian Authority‘s vision for institutional 
reform and development and its ambitions to establish a democratic and sovereign Palestinian state. 
On the ground, the EU‘s efforts succeeded in implementing many of the European reform and 
democratisation programmes. For example the EU financed a number of major projects in public 
financial management. A €4 million project to support the Internal Control and Internal Audit 
Departments of the Ministry of Finance is helping to improve public financial management and to 
increase efficiency and accountability. A long-term project with the State Audit and Administrative 
Control Bureau, the PA‘s external audit institution, was recently launched. The EU also finances the 
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―modernising of Palestinian Customs through the third ASYCUDA programme, a €2.5 million 
project.‖1214 
The EU actively participated in the Task Force on Reform, whose role is to monitor and support the 
implementation of Palestinian civil reforms, and guide the international donor community in its 
support for the Palestinian reform agenda. The members of the Quartet have managed to impose many 
reform obligations on the Palestinians.  In order to build Palestinian government institutions, financial 
aid, material assistance and training were provided to key ministries and agencies: the Legislative 
Council, the police, the Statistics Bureau, the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation, local authorities, 
etc. Furthermore, the EU wanted to give the PA democratic legitimacy, and therefore the EU 
supported and funded the presidential and the legislative elections in 1996, and in 2005, deploying 
election monitors and organizing the overall co-ordination of the election monitoring.
1215
  
The European Commission provided the PA with €7.5 million which was used for preparing the 
electoral law, drawing the electoral districts‘ boundaries, setting up the election administrative 
machinery, training election officers, conducting a public civic education campaign. Furthermore, 
―the EU committed €10million (US$12 million) out of the Community budget to cover the cost of the 
observation operation [which] included approximately 300 observers.‖1216 In addition, the European 
Council endorsed, in November 2004, a short-term program of action, proposed by the High 
Representative, to support the PA in the fields of security, reforms, economy and elections. Therefore 
since 2004 the:  
―EU has contributed € 13.3 million to its set-up, approximately 65 per cent 
of its total costs of the Palestinian election. The EU also contributed to the 
2004 voter registration, the summer registration of 2005, the Palestinian 
Legislative Council Elections of 2006, and the update of the registry of 
voters in 2007.‖1217  
In 2002-2003, judicial reform programmes amounting to a total of seven million Euro were launched, 
aimed at modernising the Palestinian judicial system. The EU supports this judicial reform through a 
number of major programmes these include: ―establishing the Palestinian Judicial Training Institute a 
permanent professional training system; providing legal training for judges and prosecutors and IT 
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training for all legal staff.
‖1218
 The programmes comprise both material assistance and the training of 
judges and prosecutors. Moreover, the EU has organised human rights training for Palestinian security 
services.
 1219
 Finally in the field of reforming and modernising the Palestinian police, more than €16 
million has been provided by the EU for the reconstruction of the Jericho Police Training Centre, 
which was designed by EUPOL COPPS, and for regional police and security facilities.
1220
 
 
Following the Barcelona Process, the European Union, mainly the European Commission, managed 
through the MEDA programme to set up the element of conditionality ―by arguing that any violation 
of human rights or of democratic principles would immediately entail a suspension of the aid.‖1221 
This strategy enforced the PA to implement several steps aimed at improving the PA reforms, 
especially in the financial sector and transparency. 
The Ad Hoc Liaison Committee
1222
 meetings between 2003 and 2009 recognised the improvements 
that the PA have achieved in its effort to reform its financial system. For example, in its meeting in 
Rome in December 2003, the Committee emphasised EU budgetary support and its conditions as well 
as US support, and has managed ―advancing key reform measures such as financial 
accountability.‖1223As a result of increasing domestic and international pressure in June 2002, the PA 
adopted a wide-ranging programme on reform. A number of important measures were taken, such as 
the adoption and implementation of the Basic Law, and legislation on the independence of the 
judiciary.
1224
 In February 2003, the Palestinian Legislative Council adopted the 2003 budget which 
was for the first time made public, and more generally, important efforts were made to strengthen 
financial control.
1225
 In addition, the European Commission has succeeded in promoting transparency 
in public finances to the PA through unification of its account into a single financial account under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Finance which is monitored periodically by the International Monetary 
Fund.
1226
 In 2002, under pressure from international donor community, President Yasser Arafat 
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adopted a work plan for the new government, known as the 100-Day Plan.
1227
  
In order to support the reform and rebuild the police force in the West Bank and Gaza, linking 
security as a development precondition to democratic governance, and in an attempt to link security 
assistance to the strengthening of the rule of law and supporting the peace process, the EU adopted in 
2005 Joint Action to establish the European Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support 
(EUPOL COPPS), and EU Border Assistance Mission Rafah (EU BAM Rafah). Several observers 
believe these reforms would not have seen light without international pressure on the PA and without 
the conditionality being used as a tool to enforce and implement the reforms that the PA needed.  
 
Brown argues that, as a result of the obligations imposed by the Task Force on Reform on the 
Palestinians, ―the PA had perhaps the most transparent and efficient fiscal apparatus of any Arab 
state.‖ He adds that ―the Basic Law was not merely dusted off and approved; it was also amended in 
order to transfer executive authority from the office of the president to a cabinet headed by a prime 
minister fully accountable to the parliament.‖ Brown considers the constitutional reform one of the 
pre-eminent achievements of the international pressure on the PA and the conditionality where as a 
result of this pressure ―the internal security placed under the authority of the cabinet, theoretically 
ending its isolation from parliamentary oversight.
1228
 However, the European Union‘s achievements in 
this area were not an easy task. The following sections will look at the determinants and challenges 
that EU deomocratisation efforts are facing and how the EU and its mechanism faced them.  
6.3 EU Democratisation Determinants 
6.3.1  The First Determinant:  Difference between the Member States’ Attitudes towards 
Democratisation Efforts in the OPTs  
Despite the unified European approach towards the promotion of democracy, behind the façade there 
lies the enduring reality of differences between the EU‘s members. Although they have a long 
experience of cooperating in the Middle East, EU member states have very different views on the 
long-term role of political Islam in the regional order. These differences are the result of their own 
approaches, interests and priorities in the region, but have also been tinged by each country‘s 
particular domestic experiences and established practices of relating to Islam in their domestic 
context. To demonstrate how great these differences continue to be, one does not need to look any 
further than the policies of the EU‘s three largest member states. Each of them has positioned itself 
quite differently on the engagement- versus- containment pendulum concerning political Islam in the 
aftermath of 9/11, demonstrating the complexity of finding a common approach that goes beyond the 
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lowest common denominator. 
Although the European integration process (specifically the Schengen Agreement (1985) which 
erased the border between EU members) ―Europeanised‖ the external threat coming from the MENA 
region, different perceptions of the threat have contributed to a division in European member states 
over the democratisation process. European member states are divided into two groups in their stance 
towards the promotion of EU democracy and reform policies; the first group are the southern 
members: France, Spain, and Italy, who are cautious of supporting the European democratisation 
effort due to fear of the destabilising change in the MENA region which might affect their security 
directly due to geographical proximately.  
The main characteristic of the policies of the southern members is that they would prefer a gradual 
change in MENA, since they believe sudden change might bring chaos and violence rather than 
stability. In other words, they believe in changing the system rather than changing the regimes. Pace 
describes this policy as EU members preferring to deal with ‗the devil you know.‘1229 Therefore they 
―judged the EMP to have tied southern EU states into at least some critical focus on democracy.‖1230 
Youngs believes that as way to maintain good relations with their partners in MENA the southern 
members of the EU have attempted to ―exclude references to democracy from the Barcelona Process 
but under the insistence of the northern states on such a commitment only after northern states 
sanctioned new aid funding for the region.‖1231 In contrast, the second group, the northern members - 
Germany, Sweden, and Denmark- show more interest in the democratisation programme and are 
louder in their criticism of the non-democratic states in the MENA region.
1232
  
The southern states welcomed the Barcelona Process and its democratisation programmes ―as a means 
of constraining the idealistic fervour,‖ as they perceived it. In addition, Youngs argues that the 
northern EU members ―still argued that there was more scope to push harder for political change 
without endangering stability in the short term.‖1233 Jünemann supports Youngs‘ argument, believing 
that southern Europe members are ―tacit allies in the attempt to undermine the EU‘s external policy of 
democracy promotion‖. She refers to this attitude as a need to cooperate with the regimes in MENA 
region.  
 
―Since the fight against international terrorism has gained top priority, demands to 
reduce political conditionality within the EMP have been brought forward by 
Europeans too. Their motivation derives not so much from the proclaimed partnership 
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spirit, but rather from the fear that sanctioning instruments might have negative 
repercussions on their national interests in the region.‖1234  
After analysing the EU‘s budget and the individual member states‘ democracy promotion and reforms 
budget towards the MENA region, Youngs found that - except for the high level of support provided 
by nearly all European donors to the OPTs - ―the democracy assistance to the Middle East was 
disproportionately low in the case of Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, the European 
Commission and, most markedly, France.‖1235 In his analysis of the attitudes of the main European 
member states France, Germany and Britain towards democracy and human rights issues, Behr found 
that the French foreign policy towards the issues of democracy and human rights in the MENA 
regiont is a reflection of French identity and interests.
1236
 He highlighted the importance of Islamist 
terrorist attacks on French soil and the desire to reduce the effect of the Islamic ideology on the 
French identity especially, with more than four million Muslims, mostly from North Africa, living in 
France. These factors prompted the French government to take a strong stance against Islamist groups 
and governments and turn a blind eye to human rights abuses by French allies in the Middle East; thus 
they ―worked within the EU to moderate criticism of Arab regimes.‖1237 
The French attitudes towards Islamic movements in the Middle East, mainly Hezbollah in Lebanon 
and Hamas in Palestine, differed significantly. France not only opened dialogue with Hezbollah but 
also rejected proposals from other member states to put it on the EU terrorist list. With regards to the 
POTs, France resisted the proposals from other European member states to include Hamas in the EU‘s 
list of terrorist organisations.
1238 
However, the French stance changed in 2003 under pressure from the 
Netherlands and Britain after a suicide attack by Hamas in revenge for the assassination of its leader, 
Ismail Abu Shanab.
1239
 
Pace explains French attitudes by saying that the French government approved of ―managed 
democracy‖ in the Middle East, when it suited them.1240 In addition, France argued against an 
immediate suspension of EU aid to the PA after the Hamas victory in the January 2006 parliamentary 
elections.
1241
 France supported Russia in its decision to invite Hamas leaders to Moscow, saying ―the 
move could help advance the peace process.‖ 1242 Moreover, the French opposed the American 
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method of pushing for the democratisation of OPTs as a way to isolate and replace Arafat. Therefore, 
at the beginning of 2004, France supported and encouraged delayed elections in the belief that these 
would actually return Arafat to office with renewed legitimacy.
1243
  
With regards to the French stance towards the Israeli violation of the Palestinians‘ human rights 
during the Israeli war in Gaza, the French government, accompanied by Austria, Britain, France, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Latvia, Sweden, Romania, Greece, Belgium, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, 
Luxembourg and Spain preferred to abstain during the voting on the report of the UN Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Gaza War, led by Justice Richard Goldstone.  
Although the EU played a critical role in helping Spain to adopt democratic methods, Spain has not 
been one of the more active players in European democracy promotion.
1244
 In addition, the current 
Spanish government is reluctant to criticise the non-democratic regimes in the Middle East and North 
Africa and has invariably made ―diluted EU criticisms of democratic abuses in North Africa.‖1245 For 
example Spain continued to resist proposals from other EU member states for critical demarches on, 
for example, the Moroccan government‘s frequent clampdowns against the press.1246 Additionally the 
current Spanish government, led by Zapatero, blocked the European Parliament‘s attempt to insert a 
strengthened democracy clause in the new financial instrument guiding EU aid to the Neighbourhood 
Partner states. 
1247
 This attitude has prompted the rest of the EU‘s member states, mainly northern 
European states, to criticise Spain for ―cosying up‖ to authoritarian Arab regimes who ―could not 
possibly understand‖ the need for such a position.1248  
Youngs relates this policy to many reasons, mainly to Spanish fears that democracy promotion and 
removal of authoritarian regimes might be more harmful than beneficial for Europe, especially as 
transition to democracy could create instability and violence in Spain‘s neighbours which might affect 
Spain especially due to its geographical proximity with North Africa and the Middle East.
1249
 
Therefore Spain, like the rest of the southern European member states, has been against the use of the 
conditionality clause in its agreements.
1250
 With regards to OPTs, the Spanish government opposed 
America‘s isolating of Arafat since he was elected by his people. Spain was also against including 
Hamas on the European Union‘s terrorist list.1251 After the 2006 election, Spain was in favour of 
dealing with the Hamas-led government as the best way of moderating the movement and 
encouraging it to become involved in the peace process.  
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In general, the Scandinavian member states of the EU are considered the strongest advocates of the 
promotion of democracy and human rights within the EU and around the world. According to 
Youngs, Swedish democracy promotion is not connected to geographical coverage and was not as 
concentrated in its regional priorities as that of many other European donors. In addition, the Swedish 
do not hesitate to criticise or stop their aid to the non-democratic states ―in cases where the abuse of 
democratic rights worsened.‖ Sweden was however, not supportive of any general use of political 
conditionality, which in broad terms was seen as a blunt instrument for incentivising political 
reform.
1252
 
 
With regard to the Middle East and North Africa, the Swedish government was the main engine 
behind the EU democratisation and human rights programmes towards the region. For example 
Sweden always criticised the restrictions on press freedom in Morocco, but clashed with the latter – 
and with Spain and France – most strongly on Western Sahara.1253 Also, Sweden was not engaged in 
providing assistance for Middle Eastern security forces. With regards to the Palestinian issue, in 
addition to their aid and technical assistance in the field of reform and education and human rights 
programmes, the Swedish were in favour of supporting Arafat against the efforts of the Americans 
and some EU members to ostracise him.
1254
 The Swedish policy kept its relationship with Hamas 
officials and called on the EU to recognise the Hamas government. In fact, Sweden granted a visa to a 
Hamas government minister.
1255
 
According to Youngs, although Tony Blair‘s government did not pay attention to democracy 
promotion, either in Labour‘s 1996 policy document, Britain and the World, or in the party‘s 1997 
election manifesto, the issues of human rights and democracy become important in British foreign 
policy after 11 September 2001. The UK then considered the Middle East a priority area for UK 
democracy promotion. The British government was particularly interested in reforming the PA, 
especially regarding security forces and institutional reform. For example, in 2003 the British 
government agreed a 50 million euro aid package for the OPTs including a notable (15 per cent) shift 
of UK funds into the area of ‗institutional reform.‖In 2004, Blair‘s government followed the 
American policy towards Arafat and pressed the Palestinian leader for new elections.
1256
  
Within the EU, Germany is viewed as a main supporter of democracy and human rights. This, 
according to Behr, is because these values reflect the German identity as a ―civilian power‖.1257 With 
regards to the Middle East, Germany has a different attitude to France. According to Behr, it has 
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shown a willingness to engage in a dialogue with the Islamist movements and ―rather than hindering 
change in the Muslim world, it has sought to engage with new regimes and forces, on the premise that 
this engagement could lead to moderation and a gradual transition to democracy.‖1258 However, 
Germany shares the same concerns as the rest of the EU members over the impact of Middle Eastern 
instability as a result of sudden change in the Arab regimes. 
 
Therefore, the German government adopts engagement methods with civil society, positive 
conditionality and public diplomacy.
1259
 German policy towards the OPTs also differs when it comes 
to German -Israeli relations. Although the Germans are willing to engage in a dialogue with the 
Islamic movement in the Arab world, Germany refuses to deal with a Hamas-led government. In 
addition, Germany, together with, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia voted against the report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, led by Justice 
Richard Goldstone.
1260 
  
6.3.2 The Second Determinant: The Israeli Occupation  
The Israeli occupation can be considered among the external factors that the EU democracy and 
reform project has to cope with in Palestine. A number of observers think that attempting to build a 
democratic and viable Palestinian state is a difficult or even impossible mission under conditions of 
occupation. Al-Fattal argues that ―even if the elections had resulted in a positive scenario, under 
occupation it would have been rendered superfluous because the rules of procedure entailed in making 
decisions binding are subject to change at the whim of the occupying power.‖1261 Israeli occupation 
weakened the institutional capacity of the PA through daily attacks on the Palestinian infrastructure 
and institutions, such as such courts, ministries legislative councils and the arrest of more than half of 
its - mainly Hamas - members.
1262
  
 
This was recognised by the European Neighbourhood Policy 2008 Progress Report on the, OPTs 
which  stated that ―the respect of human rights and basic liberties, in particular the right to life and 
personal safety, suffered further setbacks as a result of the violations committed by Israeli forces: 
―Two important specific areas need to be tackled. Firstly, the issue of 
reconciling the declared Jewish nature of the State of Israel with the rights of 
Israel‘s non-Jewish minorities. Secondly, the violation of Human Rights in 
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the context of the occupation of Palestinian Territories. There is an urgent 
need to place compliance with universal human rights standards and 
humanitarian law by all parties involved in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict as 
a central factor in the efforts to put the Middle East peace process back on 
track. This will require a special effort by the EU and the setting up of an 
appropriate strategy.‖1263  
After the war on Gaza in December 2009 the UN Fact Finding Mission, headed by South African 
judge Richard Goldstone, accused both Israeli and Hamas forces in Gaza of ―committing war crimes 
and possibly crimes against humanity and violations of international law.‖1264 Ironically, Naser 
believes that donors helped the Israeli occupation by their assistance. He argues that donors relieved 
Israel of its obligations under international law as the occupying power, and at the same time used 
their aid to appease the Palestinians. This is why Israel played the fundraiser for the Palestinians by 
collecting taxes, but withheld their dues when the January elections changed the rules of the game.
1265
 
Youngs also acknowledged that there were difficulties in adopting reforming policies under Israeli 
occupation, asserting that:  
 
―There is a two-way relationship between the occupation and the reform of 
Palestinian institutions: ―[…] one cannot not have a fully functioning, 
democratic Palestinian state until occupation is ended, so that is still the big 
issue, and that focusing and pressing on issues of corruption, for example, 
should not be a kind of pretext for taking the critical spotlight off 
occupation.‖1266  
Nathan also highlights that ―reforming and building a democratic Palestinian necessitates an end to 
violence and Israeli occupation holds each other hostage.‖1267 He adds that:  
 
―The cause of reform faces a difficult conundrum. One the one hand, real 
progress in reform seems impossible without some diminution of the conflict 
with Israel and relaxation of Israeli restrictions on travel within the West 
Bank and Gaza. On the other hand, such political changes seem unlikely 
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unless robust Palestinian institutions—the kind the reformers have worked to 
build—can guide Palestinian society.‖1268  
The Palestinian General-Delegate to the UK, Manuel Hassassian, also stated that the occupation was 
the key factor hindering progress, arguing that: ―the occupation has played a detrimental role. We 
cannot undermine the fact that the Israelis have not been very helpful, cooperative or happy to see the 
involvement of the Europeans in building capacity for the Palestinians.‖1269  
6.3.2.1 The EU Response to the Israeli Occupation Policy  
According to several observers, European policies towards Israel and towards Israeli military 
operations in the OPTs contain many contradictions which can be understood within the framework of 
the European CFSP. 
First, the EU never implements the conditionality clauses in its partnership and association 
agreements with Israel, despite the latter‘s violation of Palestinian human rights. Although it reiterates 
its stance in this regard, the EU effectively turns a blind eye to Israeli atrocities and human rights 
violations, including separate road systems designated for the settlers, checkpoints, curfews, the 
‗partition wall‘, settlements, and the Israeli destruction of Palestinian infrastructure. All these are 
military actions which contradict the European Mediterranean Partnership‘s democratization and 
reform policy, in which Israel participated and of which it is a part. In fact, the EU institutions hardly 
ever describe (at least officially) ―the occupation as a violation of democratic and human rights.‖1270 
The EU and its member states have never allowed the European Commission to suspend the EU-Israel 
Association Agreement, impose any sanctions on Israel or use its trade partnership as a policy to 
enforce Israel to implement its commitments and obligations. In fact many times the member states 
have shielded Israel from all EU proposals to sanction Israel. Legally, their policies in this regards is 
backed up by the EU pillar structure, which separates the economic and trade decision in the first 
pillar from the political decision in the second pillar.   
 
As chapter four demonstrated the EU member refused to sanction Israel or impose any kind of 
restrictions on its products that might provoke the Israeli governments and its main ally -the US. The 
divergent opinions among the EU members and the European institutions about boycotting products 
and exports produced in the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza and over upgrading EU-
Israel relations explained in chapter four are other clear examples of continuing division between the 
views and actions of the individual member states and the activities of the Brussels-based institutions. 
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The focus on human rights in the Middle East, and in particular in the OPTs and Israel, was reflected 
in the stance of the EP towards implementation of the Association Agreements with the PLO (on 
behalf of the PA) and with Israel.  While this example shows the importance the EP is paying to 
human rights and democracy in the Middle East, it goes further to support the argument about the 
inconsistency within the European institutions and policies. It can be shown that whereas the EP 
supports the values and principles of human rights and democracy, the European Commission and the 
Council of Europe support the strategic interests of the EU in the Middle East, including matters of 
security and stability. As chapter four demonstrated, to exert pressure on Israel to respect human 
rights in the OPTs the EP called on 10 April 2002 for a suspension of the Association Agreement with 
Israel. The EP went further to suggest imposing economic sanctions against Israel.
1271
However, the 
European Council refused to acquiesce with the democratic mandate and did not respond to the 
invitation of the EP despite the fact that the EU has the right to do so, according to Article 2 of the 
Agreement, which states that ―relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the 
Agreement itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles‖1272  
 
Instead, as mentioned in chapter four, the EU voted to upgrade relations without respecting its own 
stated human rights conditions. The last attempt of the EP to shed light on the human rights in the 
Palestinian Territories was on 7 September, 2009 by Clare Short MP, aiming to end the siege of Gaza 
as a legal action to require the EU to uphold the human rights conditions entrenched in the EU-Israel 
Association Agreement.
1273
 
The different stances towards the report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict 
(Goldstone Report) between the member states of the EU and the European Parliament is another 
example of the contradiction in European policy towards Palestine. While some EU members 
supported the Goldstone Report, others were against it while the European Parliament endorsed it and 
accused Israel of having perpetrated war crimes during its military operation against Hamas in 
January 2009. 1274 Javier Solana, the former High representative of the CFSP stated after voting in 
the UN that ―the EU is also missing a unique opportunity to increase its credibility and niche to 
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contribute to the solution of the conflict.‖1275  
6.3.3 The Third Determinant: the Performance of the Palestinian Authority 
This section will highlight the main characteristics of the PA especially its institutions and political 
culture. The main purpose of this section is to demonstrate how the CFSP decision-making dealt with 
the Palestinian leadership and the challenges that emerged due to the Pas failure to engage in a 
meaningful democratization of Palestine.
1276
  
Despite the Israeli occupation and its military and security restrictions, Palestinian society has not 
lacked democracy. In fact, under occupation and before the PA was established in 1994, the 
Palestinians experienced the basic elements of democratic practice. For example, during the 1980s, 
there were trade and student unions elections and there were social, political, professional and popular 
civil institutions and NGOs which served the population in sectors such as health, education, and 
welfare.
1277
 A survey conducted before the implementation of the Oslo Agreements shows that 
Palestinians strongly supported the core elements of democracy. The survey shows that ―77% of the 
population supported general elections, and 66% supported the freedom of the press.‖1278  
However, the Palestinian leadership which returned to the Palestinian Territories in 1994 adopted 
―authoritarian forms of authority based on traditional and patrimonial power structures at the expense 
of democratic reforms.‖1279 In his paper entitled ―Building, Institutionalization and Democracy: the 
Palestinian Experience,‖ Amal paints a bleak picture of the PA‘s performance, arguing that the short 
Palestinian experience of state building and government shows the ―Palestinians are following the 
experience of most postcolonial states where a dominant party ruled the state for a long period and as 
a result blocked the way for a real change of power.‖1280  
His description of the main characteristics of the PA since it was established in the mid 1990s 
includes ―violations of basic human rights, corruption, clientelism, economic monopolies and the lack 
of accountability.‖1281 Jamal illustrates by examples the nature of the political culture of the PA 
between 1994 and 2003, arguing that in addition to Arafat‘s attempts to control the NGOs by 
―transferring the authority for registering NGOs from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of the 
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Interior, which is controlled by the president himself.‖1282 He added that the PA suffered from ―the 
lack of clear judicial regulations regarding the legislature‘s supervision of the governmental budget.‖ 
He also added: ―The PLO elite have returned to its homeland with a political culture that is far from 
embodying basic values of representative government such as accountability and transparency.‖1283  
The structures of Arafat‘s new system or way of governing invited heavy criticism. Many accused 
him of using the government as a device to co-opt opponents, and turning it into an appeasement 
mechanism. Rubin claims that four factors combined to influence the Palestinians‘ relative democratic 
failure. First: the type of elite formation; second, the poor exposure of the elite to democratic values; 
third, the strong diasporas, and finally a wrong approach to coercive means.
1284
  
 
Rubin elaborates in his description of the nature and the influence of the Palestinian dominant 
leadership and elite claiming that: ―this leadership has emerged and been formed in exile, absorbing 
and developing different ideas and representing different interests than those of the domestic 
population in the occupied territories.‖ He added ―this leadership did not participate actively in 
domestic Palestinian politics until the signing of the Oslo Accords.‖1285 Rubin criticised Arafat when 
he utilised his presidential prerogative to ratify any new legislation, and to hinder legislation that 
threatened his position or curtailed the powers of the PA; 
 
―While strengthening his position, Arafat weakened the other authorities of the 
Palestinian democratic system, namely – the legislative (PLC – Palestinian 
Legislative Council) and judicial branches – and subordinated them to the executive 
branch.‖1286  
 
Asseburg argues that although the PA has all the elements of a state, such as ministries, security 
forces, judiciary and legislative council, the Palestinian political system is ―characterized by the 
prevalence of informal institutional arrangements and clientelism, by authoritarian government 
practices and human rights abuses, and by an inflated and inefficient public sector responsible for the 
misuse of funds.‖1287Asseburg concludes that ―legitimate, viable, efficient and democratic institutions 
have not been created in the Palestinian territories.‖ Azmi Shu'aybi was a member of the Palestinian 
elite who first served as the PA Minister for Youth and Sports between 1994 and 1998. 
Simultaneously, he was the Chair of the PLC Budget Committee, but due his opposition to the 
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hegemonic policies of Yasser Arafat he was later dismissed by Arafat. Shu‘aybi stated: ―Arafat is 
conducting himself on the basis ―I am the state, and the state is me‖. This state of affairs has been 
accepted without the least protest. Of course, the tendency to accept without question was well 
established in PLO institutions and was simply imported ready-made into the territories with the PA.‖ 
1288
  
Shu‘aybi also criticised the way thatPA recruits in public administration stressing that rather than 
making appointments on the basis of general interest the main consideration is to get the most out of 
each appointment in terms of social, personal, clan, or part loyal interests.
1289
 He concludes that the 
PA contributed to the suffering of the people it was supposed to represent: 
 
―Through corruption, economic monopolies, authoritarianism, repression, disdain for 
democratic processes and judicial fairness, ‗asha‘iriyyah‘ (reviving the hamayel, or 
clan system), nepotism, and other practices, PA policies exacerbated the 
fragmentation of Palestinian society, increased class and ―hamayel‖ divisions, 
contributed to the growing economic impoverishment, and were largely responsible 
for the social disintegration that occurred during this time.‖1290 
 
Hooper argues that ―the revenues from the economic monopolies controlled by high-ranking PA 
officials do not even appear in the budget since they do not reach the Treasury. These officials have 
monopolies over central sectors of the Palestinian economy, such as petroleum, gravel, flour, sugar, 
and so on. Monopolies operate in a grey area and their revenues are managed confidentially.‖1291 He 
concludes that this pattern enables PA officials to avoid public scrutiny and legal regulation and form 
an easy way of financing activities of the PA that would be heavily criticized if subjected to internal 
public scrutiny or external supervision by donor countries.  
 
A poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip between 13 and 15
th
 March 2008 showed that ―85% of the Palestinians believe that 
corruption exists inPA institutions and 59% of those believe that it will increase or remain the same in 
the future.‖1292 In 2003, The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions index included the PA 
for the first time with a ranking of 78 out of 133. Recent polls have indicated a general perception of 
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lack of public confidence in Palestinian public institutions.
1293
 According to the Palestinian Centre for 
Human Rights (PCHR) 2002 report, ―the Executive branch continued to dominate the other branches 
of government. This reflected negatively on the rights and freedoms of Palestinian citizens, who were 
subjected to the inadequacies and violations of the PA.‖1294 In addition, although the Palestinian Basic 
Law prohibits torture, force against detainees and illegal arrests, there have been numerous reports of 
cases of torture and ill-treatment in PA detention centres, namely those operated by the security 
services. According to human rights organisations, security services arbitrarily detain persons and use 
excessive force. The European Neighbourhood Policy Country ReportPA of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip asserts that: ―despite PA declarations condemning such practices, the security services do not 
appear to have clear procedures for investigating complaints effectively and impartially and there 
limited control over their interrogation methods.‖1295 
6.3.3.1 The Situation after Arafat 
The Palestinians managed to enhance the PA performance by implementing the Palestinian Reform 
and Development Plan (PRDP) of 2008, which focussed on the PA‘s planning and budgeting 
consolidation and security sector reform.
1296
 But the human rights records and democracy in the PA 
still fell substantially below the EU‘s preferred standards. According to the 2008 European 
Neighbourhood Policy Progress Report for the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the PA forces in the 
West Bank have managed to “crack down on criminals and members of armed groups, as well as 
opposition members, with reports of violations of fundamental rights in the process, especially in PA 
detention facilities.‖1297 In addition, the European report points out that the freedom of press was 
increasingly ―curtailed and 32 journalists were arrested by the PA without due process; none of them 
were brought to court.‖1298  
 
The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) report for 2008 also criticized the PA government 
for using the military court system – deemed illegal since it infringes on the basic law as well as 
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criminal procedure law.
1299In addition, the Centre asserted that ―it has received affidavits from 
Palestinians who were subjected to beating, torture and inhuman and degrading treatment by the 
Palestinian police while in detention, mostly in the Gaza Strip, but also in the West Bank.‖1300 A 
survey conducted at the Palestinian Research Centre in 2007, shows that ―51% of the Palestinians in 
the West Bank and Gaza evaluate the performance of the Executive Force as negative, increasing the 
level of anarchy and lawlessness, while only 29% see it as positive, contributing to the enforcement of 
law and order.‖1301  
 
The OPTs Democracy Index, founded and developed by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey 
Research (PSR), appears to show that in 2007 the status of Palestinian democracy had improved 
compared to the previous reading in 2006. In fact the Index shows that this limited improvement can 
be seen as deterioration if compared to the readings of 1996 and1997. It received 563 marks in 1996 
and 514 marks in 1997. In 2007 the Index witnessed a marginal increase reaching 502 marks 
compared to 499 marks in 2006. The Index shows improvement in equality and social justice; 
however, the OPTs Democracy Index shows a decline in performance and the role of public 
institutions and freedom of the press and expression in the civil and political freedoms. 
6.3.3.2 How the EU Dealt with the PA  
The question is why the EU continued to support the Palestinian leadership after Arafat and until the 
current leadership of the PA led by Abu Mazen, despite the PA quite openly showing a lack of interest 
in domestic democratic reforms. The answer to this question is connected to the flaws in CFSP 
mechanism and the imbalance of power between member states and EU institutions, and indeed 
between the EU institutions themselves.   
6.3.3.3 Tension between the Member States Interests 
As the main geo-strategic interests of the member states in the Middle East and the OPTs is to 
maintain stability through supporting the peace process, the member states are not interested in 
supporting democratisation and reform policy if these are at the expense of security stability and the 
peace process. In other words, the member states are ready to contradict their declarations which 
repeatedly call for a viable democracy in the OPTs if this policy leads to instability.  Second, the 
member states are not interested in changing or challenging the status quo of a strong Palestinian 
leadership which has been seen by the EU as the main peace partner for Israel. Finally, fears of 
Hamas profiting from a democratisation process prompted the member states to support the current 
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PLO leadership and its policy against Hamas.  
By utilising their power over the European Commission, the member states have not allowed the 
European institutions such as the European Commission and the EP to impose any kind of serious 
sanctions or restrictions against the PLO leadership in spite of its authoritarian propensity, its human 
rights abuses, and even though the PA has violated its agreement with the EU.  
This might explain why EU financial aid to Palestinians was never made conditional during the period 
1994 to 1998 on the development of democratic institutions or financial transparency. It also explains 
why the EU refused to deal with the Hamas government after the election of 25 January 2006 when it 
secured a large majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislation Council.  In fact, one month before the 
election Solana threatened to freeze European aid to the PA if Hamas were to win that month‘s 
poll.
1302Solana told journalists at the time that ―it is very difficult that parties that do not condemn 
violence without changing these positions can be partners for the future‖1303  
Stetter raised suspicions about the true intentions of the EU in the OPTs. He wondered whether the 
encouraging language of the Barcelona Declaration and the European Neighbourhood Policy really 
reflects the situation on the ground or rather provides ―camouflage for autocratic regimes.‖ He added 
that even the task of European financial assistance is to ―strengthen the rent-seeking attitude of a non-
democratic government at the expense of domestic reform efforts.‖1304 Stetter takes the financial 
assistance to the education sector in the OPTs as an example to support his argument; 
―This aid aimed to cover recurrent costs, and can therefore be characterized 
as hidden budgetary support which stabilizes a key sector of Palestinian 
society, thereby releasing domestic reform pressure from the Palestinian 
leadership.‖1305  
 
Asseburg also claimed that the main interest of the EU in the OPTs is stability and achieving peace, 
not democracy and human rights, both of which could be implemented after achieving peace. In other 
words, peace should come first and democracy second. Thus the European Union‘s main strategy was 
to support Yasser Arafat since he consented to engage in negotiations with Israel and ―efficiently 
crushed the opposition to the peace process‖.1306 However, after the collapse of the Camp David peace 
negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis under American supervision and after the 
eruption of the second Intifada, the political stance of the international community towards Arafat‘s 
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leadership changed. While there were a number of states in the EU such as France and Spain who 
―wished to work around President Arafat‖ since he had been legally elected by his people.1307 Others 
such as the U.S, Germany, and the UK lost confidence in him as a ―peace partner‖1308 and even saw 
his removal ―as the main benchmark (or even purpose) of reform‖.1309 
 
As a consequence of the attitude of the international community towards Arafat, several observers 
believed that the European democratisation and reform programmes after the Camp David aimed to 
―bypass Arafat or diminish his centrality‖.1310 Brown believes that the international actors supported 
reform when it was seen as ―a tool to weaken Arafat and transfer power away from those parts of the 
Fatah leadership seen as uncompromising and corrupt.‖1311 It was seen as a way to curtail and limit 
Yasser Arafat‘s power while keeping him in his position as elected leader. The international 
community, particularly the U.S, put pressure on Arafat to amend the Palestinian Basic Law and 
create a prime ministerial post and choose a prime minister who would begin working on reforming 
Palestinian institutions.
1312
  
 
Under international pressure and after the U.S refused to release the Road Map until Arafat accepted 
the appointment of a prime minister, Arafat eventually agreed and transferred some of his power and 
authority, especially over the security forces, to the control and authority of the new Prime Minster, 
Abu Mazen.
1313
 Many critics argue that although the EU and its member states were well intentioned, 
their reform and democratisation strategy was subject to short term aims; first to strengthen the 
existing Palestinian leadership and utilise the reform programmes in order to give the PA the 
legitimacy and recognition and to strengthen its grip on society through the policy and security 
agencies in order to implement the demands and the needs of the peace process; second to make sure 
that the financial aid was being used efficiently and not to fund terrorist activities or violence, 
especially with the allegations of corruption in the PA. It was highly selective in its reforms, projects 
and funds; for example, the EU focused on finances and security, leaving other areas of PA reform 
without sufficient diplomatic support.  
 
Asseburg blames the EU for the lack of rule of law and democratic decision-making processes in the 
Palestinian Territories as well as the human rights abuses of the PA as ―it has been directly involved 
in the process of building these governing institutions through technical and financial support as well 
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as budget support to the PA.‖1314 She points to the fact that the EU reform programmes and the 
financial assistance in this regard focus on the ―technical and material aspects of institution-building, 
rather than on its content‖. She added:  
 
―The EU has insisted again and again on the financial transparency of the PA 
and accountability with regard to the use of EU aid, but it has done so much less 
vigorously with regard to a democratic decision-making process, local elections 
or the rule of law.‖1315 
 
Brown argues that international reformers including the EU had ―a remarkably short-term focus, a 
highly personalized view of the process, and a very instrumental view of reform, leading them to turn 
harshly against the achievements of the Palestinian reform movement when it brought unexpected 
results.‖1316 He added ―when reform of Palestinian institutions contradicted other short-term goals 
(such as backing particular leaders or parties), it was immediately and totally subordinated.‖1317 
 
Gillespie, Youngs, Behr, and Pace also point out that the EU and the member states failed to engage 
in a meaningful dialogue with the Islamists in the Mediterranean region including Palestine, although 
these movements constitute the majority of democratic opposition in the region.
1318
 Pace views the 
exclusion of the Islamic NGOs from European funds in the MEDA programme and the limiting of 
funds to the secular, liberal groups of NGOs is another paradox and contradiction of the European 
conception of civil society that the EU encourages and supports.
1319
 She adds that the European funds 
for democracy promotion and reform through the MEDA were ―distributed to the groups which do not 
deal with ‗sensitive‘ issues which might jeopardise the EU relations with the countries‘ regimes.‖ This 
attitude according to Pace has ―limited the ability of the NGOs of political mobilisation‖ and second 
―makes the groups funded by the EU exhibit little potential for political mobilization in their societies, 
since they do not challenge their governments.‖1320 Perhaps the European decision not to freeze the 
Association Agreement with the PA as a result of the human rights abuses, or non-democratic 
principles according to the Barcelona Process and European Neighbourhood policy, is an indication of 
the contradiction in European democracy promotion in Palestine.  
6.3.3.4 EU Democracy Promotion after Hamas  
In the last Palestinian parliamentary election, organised on the 25 January 2006, the Islamic 
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Resistance Movement, Hamas, emerged as the largest party on the Palestinian political scene. The EU 
insisted on, supported, funded and supervised this election. The outcome went against mainstream 
predictions and was a major change in the Palestinian landscape which until then had been dominated 
by the secular nationalist Fatah faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Hamas won 74 
seats of the 132-seat Legislative Council.  Following the Hamas ‗List of Change and Reform‘ triumph 
the movement nominated its leader, Ismail Haniyeh, as prime minister. He resigned on 15 February as 
part of the process to allow a unity government between Hamas and Fatah to be formed. He was then 
sworn in on 18 March, 2007 as head of the new cabinet.  
 
The cabinet consisted of Hamas and Fatah members, and of members of other parties and 
independents. The international community, including the European Union, refused to deal with or 
recognise a Hamas-led government, or any National Unity Government in which Hamas participated, 
unless the movement accepted the Middle East Quartet‘s conditions which are: first, renounce 
violence, second, recognise the state of Israel, and third, respect previous agreements and obligations 
in the Peace Process. In a statement, the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council endorsed 
the Quartet‘s conditions and its ―full support for President Abbas' determination to pursue a peaceful 
solution of the conflict with Israel.‖1321  
 
Moreover, the Council stressed that ―violence and terror are incompatible with democratic processes‖ 
and urged Hamas and all other factions to ―renounce violence, to recognise Israel's right to exist and 
to disarm‖.1322 Finally the Council committed to a peaceful and negotiated solution of the conflict 
with Israel based on existing agreements and the Road Map as well as to the rule of law, reform and 
sound fiscal management as ―pre conditions to continue to support Palestinian economic development 
and democratic state building.‖1323 
As result of Hamas‘s rejection of the Quartet‘s conditions, the EU froze its direct aid to the PA.  
According to Gianniou ―this is was the first time the EU had made use of its economic instrument as a 
way not only to enforce political reform but also to change the diplomatic and political perception of 
the conflict by one interested party.‖1324 In addition, the EU created a new funding mechanism called 
the ‗Temporary International Mechanism‘ (TIM) which aimed to bypass the Hamas government and 
avoid a humanitarian crisis in Palestine.  
The European reaction towards the Hamas government supports the argument of this chapter that the 
main interest of the EU in the OPTs is stability through the MEPP, and that the EU will not accept or 
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recognise any Palestinian leadership which does not accept the European vision of peace settlements.  
The EU response towards the new Hamas-led government posed a critical question as to the type of 
democracy being promoted by the EU. In addition the European stance towards the new government 
showed the tension between the policies of the European institutions. The EU Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism emphasised the ―need to empower moderate voices by engaging with Muslim organizations 
and faith groups that reject the distorted version of Islam put forward by al-Qa‘ida and others.‖1325 
At the same time, the European Council rejected the Hamas-led government and refused to deal with 
Hamas members in the Palestinian National Unity Government (PNUG) although the Council initially 
welcomed the establishment of a Palestinian National Unity Government (PNUG).
1326
  
 
This policy went against European Commission policy, which had established a Task Force on 
Political Islam within the Directorate General for External Relations (RELEX), aiming to draft a 
discussion paper that outlined a set of common principles and conditions that could serve as the basis 
for a more comprehensive European approach towards political Islam. While the resulting document 
received broad support within the Commission, the Council repeatedly refused to endorse this new 
strategy, leading to the shelving of the initiative.
1327
 
 
Also the European Council‘s decision to reject the Hamas-led government and its members in the 
National Union Government went against the policy of the European Parliament. For instance on the 
10 May 2007, the EP issued a resolution on reforms in the Arab world: what strategy should the EU 
adopt? The EP called on Europe to ―give visible political support to…those political organizations 
which promote democracy by non-violent means…including, where appropriate, secular actors and 
moderate Islamists.‖1328 Therefore, the EP called for the recognition of the NUG without 
discrimination between its members.
1329
 
Adrian Hyde-Price considered the EU‘s policies and even rhetoric concerning the region as a 
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reflection of its being predominantly a realist rather than normative construct.
1330
This argument 
echoed by Al-Fattal maintaining that the EU‘s decision to boycott Hamas and turn the wheel of the 
reform and democracy process back was ―a matter of strategic interests, rather than a matter of 
definitions or norms.‖1331 She argues  that the European justifications that the EU cannot legally deal 
with a Hamas government since it is on its list of terrorist organisations, unless the latter renounces 
violence, are unacceptable since the EU refused to place Hizbullah on its black-list despite its 
similarity to Hamas. In the latter case, ―several EU governments‘ interests in Lebanon‘s stability 
(including France, Spain and Britain) are concerned about upsetting delicate confessional negotiations 
by measures that would cripple finding a solution.‖1332 
In the eyes of the EU the current ideology of Hamas is an obstacle towards reaching a peaceful 
solution to the conflict in the Middle East. In addition, the Hamas ideology lies in paradox with 
contemporary Western values and principles; therefore, the EU may be justified on theoretical 
grounds in isolating the movement despite the concrete fact that it ascertained legitimate power 
through a democratic process.  The Union, therefore, has put Hamas on its own list as a terrorist 
organisation following the attacks on 11
 September, 2001 and the ensuing launch of the ‗Global War 
on Terror.‘ 
The EU insistence on the return of security powers to the Presidential office after Hamas won the 
elections and Ishmael Haniyeh was appointed Prime Minister is another example of the contradiction 
in the EU‘s reform policy. The international community, including the EU, pressured Arafat to 
endorse the Constitution and amend the basic law as created by the position of Prime Minister.  In 
addition, the international community pressured Arafat to transfer his authority and power, especially 
over public order and security, to the new Prime Minister as part of reform policy towards the PA and 
as a result of the U.S. and Israel‘s refusal to deal with Arafat as a partner in any peace negotiations.1333 
However, after Hamas won the 2006 election, the international community and the EU encouraged 
the Palestinian president, Abu Mazen, to bring the security forces under his control.   
This policy, according to Youngs, causes the European approach to security reform to appear to be 
short lived and negligent.
1334
 The concrete substance of European strategy invited the conclusion that 
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the EU saw reform as strengthening Fatah against Hamas.
1335
 Youngs has also highlighted the fact 
that fears surrounded any new security initiatives as they were commonly viewed as ―counterterrorism 
dressed up as support for political reform.‖ 1336 
Tocci connects the European Union‘s reform policy in the OPTs with its transatlantic interests and 
relationship with the U.S.  She suggests that the EU does not try to conflict with US policy in the 
Middle East and the OPTs by arguing that ―since the EU‘s priority has been to rebuild a relationship 
with the U.S. in relation to the Middle East, the nullification of any successful reform in the OPTs has 
been encouraged, as was epitomized by the first boycott of the Hamas-led government in support of 
the unelected Fatah party‖.1337  
As a result of these contradictions and clashes, an apt conclusion for this section would be to refer to 
Patten‘s admission that EU policy towards the Middle East is ―laid down not in Brussels, but in Tel 
Aviv and Washington.‖1338 
The independent Task Force for the Strengthening of Palestinian Public institutions emphasises that 
the decision by the international community to disengage from the new PA government would ―risk 
destroying all that has been built during the last decade.‖1339 The report continued by criticising the 
international donors including the EU who created its mechanism to avoid dealing with the PA 
government:
 
―The diversion of donor funding from the PA‘s finance ministry to the office of the 
president or to international agencies may ultimately weaken and marginalize the 
ministry and empower the office of the president in violation of the Basic Law. When 
viewed along with attempts to strengthen the role of the president in other areas, the 
international community is in effect pre-empting the Palestinian transition to 
democracy, rather than promoting political reform the objective of reform would no 
longer be the strengthening of public institutions and their accountability to an elected 
legislature.‖1340  
 
The report states that ―continued international funding and engagement could ensure that the issue of 
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reform would remain on the PA agenda and possibly be accorded more systematic attention and effort 
than before. The international reaction towards Hamas forces the Hamas government ―to seek funding 
from new sources, potentially involving a lack of transparency and accountability to outside 
monitoring would set back the reform agenda once more.‖1341  
Al-Fattal is convinced that by not recognising the Hamas led-government the ―EU has acted in a 
manner demoting rather than promoting progress and democracy on the ground‖. She adds ―not only 
has the Barcelona Process failed to deliver to the Palestinians what it promised 15 years ago, 
prosperity and an autonomous state, but also, it has left Palestinians pessimistic about the future and 
untrusting of the EU as an honest or even effective peace and democracy promoter.‖1342  
 
Youngs also considers the harmful aspects of the European decision to boycott Hamas to outweigh the 
positive aspects. He describes the negative aspects as follows: first by boycotting Hamas and its 
national unity the EU is driving Hamas into the arms of Iran since Hamas ―feels excluded from having 
a genuine stake in governing despite having won the election.‖1343 Second, the European decision has 
―undone on Palestinian institutional reform, an area where European governments and the European 
Commission had begun to establish a useful and leading role.‖1344  
 
Youngs questions the three conditions imposed on the Hamas government by the international 
community and the democracy process and reform in Palestine, pointing out that: ―The well-known 
three conditions imposed on Hamas include nothing that relates to standards of democratic 
governance or issues of civil rights within the Occupied Territories themselves.‖1345 He believes that 
―even if the three conditions imposed on Hamas are deemed necessary, it is important to try and press 
for their fulfilment in a way that does not completely choke off work and dialogue on democratic 
reform.‖1346Additionally, Youngs criticises the EU for neglecting the non democratic measures taken 
by President Abbas after the Hamas triumph in 2006, whereby Abbas regained his control over the 
security services by cancelling his decree from the previous year that had placed the Preventative 
Security Service, the police, and civil defence under the command of the Interior Ministry.  
 
This tolerance, according to Youngs, raises questions regarding the relationship between the demands 
of political reforms from the PA and the peace process. He maintains that European support for the 
transferral of authority and security from the elected prime minster to the presidential office 
―represents a 180-degree turnaround from 2003-04 when the EU had started focusing on bringing 
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security forces under the control of the prime minister's office.‖1347  This policy ―makes the European 
approach to security reform look as if it is governed by short term expediency rather than a well 
thought out approach to enhancing democratic accountability over security forces.‖1348 
 
―The EU must not understand "supporting reform" to mean favouring moderate 
figures seen as "our allies". The point is to support democratic process, not overtly 
give preference to those deemed "helpful moderates‖. If it releases funds to support 
state-building just through those ministries under Fatah control, this will produce a 
lop-sided model of democracy assistance and once again send the wrong signals to 
both Fatah and Hamas.‖1349  
 
Youngs further criticises the refinancing of President Abbas‘ office which is controlled by the Fatah 
movement, asserting that the EU made the same mistake when European leaders supported Fatah 
leaders only because the party recognizes Israel and agreed to engage in negotiations with Israeli 
governments despite PA and Fatah leaders having no transparent financial system or financial 
accountability. He states; 
 
―There is even something counterintuitive in the current approach. Until 2006, for a 
decade EU aid had gone to a small Fatah clique that had wasted these resources and 
created an increasingly corrupt and opaque set of political institutions. And that was a 
large part of why Hamas won the elections in 2006. Now the EU appears to be 
changing its funding patterns deliberately to engineer a continuation of financial 
flows to that same clique. This risks simply recentralising power and reverses the 
EU's support for a more parliamentary style of governance in the early 2000s.‖1350  
 
The two civilian missions in the OPTs (EUPOL COPPS) and the EU Border Assistance Mission 
Rafah (EU BAM Rafah) are not free from his criticism. Youngs sheds light on some weak points in 
the EU‘s policy in this area emphasising that ―most of the aid had gone to the provision of hardware, 
such as anti-riot equipment, rather than being directed at more fundamental reform issues.‖ He 
criticises the EUPOL mission for its tendency to increase factionalism, as there was a perception in 
the Palestinian territories that the EU was ―helping to try and quash Hamas more than giving Hamas a 
legitimate stake in the provision of security.‖1351  
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According to several observers, the suspension of the two European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) civilian missions in the OPTs implies that the EU ―has moved from a gradualist long-term 
―reformist‖ SSR plan to adopting the short term US-Israeli ―restructures‖ policy, which aims to 
buttress Fatah forces loyal to the PA President, in order to overwhelm Hamas.‖1352 They added that, 
not only did this strategy ―back-fire‖ when Hamas took over Gaza, but it could also ―prove equally 
detrimental for subsequent EU security efforts throughout the Middle East.‖1353  
6.4 Conclusion and Analysis 
This chapter has demonstrated how the EU‘s inherent imbalance of power and the intergovernmental 
approach to the CFSP has limited the EU‘s ability to achieve the overarching goals in the Middle East 
and Palestine. The fundamental question which has been dealt with is; to what extent has European 
democracy promotion, reforms and human rights programmes served its stated objectives in the 
building of democratic, transparent Palestinian institutions  that respect human rights and principles 
and values of democracy.  
As explained, the launch of the MEPP and the establishment of the PA and its institutions have given 
the EU and its institutions mainly the European Commission the opportunity to increase its role and 
involvement in the MEPP on the ground. The European Commission can play a  vital role in 
reforming the PA and ―democratising‖ its institution and citizens. The European philosophy behind 
democracy promotion in the OPTs is built on two assumptions, first:  reforming the PA and its 
institution would increase international and even Israeli confidence in the PA and enhance its ability 
to negotiate authoritatively on behalf of the Palestinians. Second, creating a democratic, viable and 
peaceful sovereign Palestinian state would be the best guarantee for Israel‘s security and Israel‘s 
acceptance as an equal partner in the region.‖1354  
On the ground, the EU and its member states have relatively managed to achieve some results and 
build new Palestinian institutions from scratch.  The European Commission has managed to raise the 
awareness of human rights and democracy within the Palestinian police and security services via its 
periodical training courses, workshops and cooperation with the Palestinian NGOs. Values of human 
rights, rule of law, transparency, and modernisation of the judicial system are the main elements of the 
EU-PA agenda. Tracing the history of the EU and its policies in this regard several conclusions can be 
drawn. First as a result of the MEPP the role of the supranational actor mainly the European 
Commission and the EP has increased especially the European Commission which is responsible for 
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designing, implementing and monitoring EU policy and programmes in the area of democracy 
promotion, reform and human rights.  
This increased role supports the argument that the CFSP approach towards the PA and the 
Palestinians has elements of functionalism. However, despite its increasing role as an executive power 
the European Commission power still marginalised and limited due to the essential imbalance in the 
distribution of power between the EU institutions themselves and since the final say in the CFSP  still 
belong to the member states in the Council of Minister. Therefore, the intergovernmental approach 
and dualism in the decision-making has lead first to realist politics triumphing over liberal principles 
and values. Second. Democratisation process and reform policy of the EU become victim of the 
member states interests. As a result of the short term priority the member states‘ prefer to support the 
partners of MEPP at the expense of democracy and reform.  
The evidence presented above suggests that, far from representing a genuine commitment to the 
normative components of democracy, the EU utilises democracy promotion and reform policy and 
programmes as a way to support the MEPP and stability in Palestine. But despite the huge amount of 
European financial assistance and effort aiming to support the democratisation processes in the OPTs 
and to reform the PA, these ambitious objectives have been undermined by contradictions and 
shortcomings which indicate the gap between the ambitions and political goals of the EU and the 
reality on the ground. First, the EU supports democracy promotion and human rights programmes but 
supports the Palestinian leadership despite its lack of democratic principles and its poor record of 
human rights and corruption; second, the EU and member states refused to recognize the 
democratically elected Hamas government and to deal with the Government of National Unity despite 
declaring their confidence in electoral processes as a means of selecting a government.  
Finally, the EU and its member states are hesitant to renounce the Israeli violation of Palestinian 
human rights and the destruction of Palestinian infrastructure, creating an environment in which it is 
impossible to build reliable, functioning and credible Palestinian political institutions. As explained, 
the gap between what should be done and the reality of what is being implemented on the ground 
emanates from within the institutional structure of the EU foreign affairs system which is multi-
layered and driven by actors with different interests and objectives.  
Compared to the Council, the European Commission is a more idealistic body which acts on the 
liberal premise that encouraging dialogue with the political parties in the region, including the 
moderate Islamic parties, would increase economic cooperation and trade, political reform, 
democratic transformation and respect for human rights. The European Commission believes that 
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supporting these values and principle will foster long-term stability in the region.
1355
 Thus, most of the 
criticism towards the PA and Israeli policy comes from the European Commission not from the 
European Council which represents the member states. However, since the European Commission 
lacks the authority and the capacity to implement or to impose sanctions, its criticism will not find 
support. 
The policy and political behaviour of the EU towards the PA and the MEPP suggest that the EU 
members are interested in short–term goals through a realpolitik approach, favouring primarily a 
status quo in Palestine, supporting the Palestinian leadership often uncritically - which shows in a 
remarkably open way its lack of interest in domestic democratic reforms - and supporting the MEPP 
most of all.   
This might explain why, in the 1990s, the EU and the international community were not particularly 
concerned about the nature of the PA, its lack of transparency and accountability, authoritarianism, 
and human rights abuses, since the member states priority was on sustaining the administration 
through budgetary support which contributed to Arafat‘s patronage system through public sector 
hiring and the provision of ‗walking money‘, in particular to buying the loyalty of the police and other 
security personnel.
1356
 However, loss of faith in Arafat‘s leadership after the collapse of Camp David 
negotiations in 2000 prompted the member states to adopt and utilise the reform agenda as a tool 
through which to change the Palestinian leadership and replace it with a new leadership which would 
accept peace and negotiate with Israel. This also explains why the EU does not recognise the Hamas-
led government and the 2006 parliamentary elections.  
The EU‘s attempts to build a balance between short–term goals and long-term goals indicate that the 
EU and its member states are attempting an intricate juggling act to balance between their values, 
principles, interests and security concerns.  In other words, the bloc is attempting to seek a 
combination between promoting its values and principles as a soft normative power, and the security 
concerns, political and economic interests of its member states in its attempt to act as an international 
political power. The tension between the priority of democracy promotion and the priority of stability, 
and the debate about what comes first, democracy or peace, i.e. first achieving a peace agreement for 
the conflict in the Middle East or implanting reform and democracy. The EU and its member states 
have failed to build a balance between their principles, values of democracy promotion and reform 
and their strategic interests, security, stability, trade, oil and markets. As a result of the imbalance of 
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power between the member states and the European Commission a realistic approach towards 
democracy promotion and reform dominates the European Union‘s policy towards the OPTs and 
Israel. 
This polarization and conflict between priorities, agendas, values and principles on the one hand, and 
interests and security concerns on the other, contribute significantly to the creation of a state of 
contradiction in the European Union's policy towards the Palestinian territories, which consequently 
leads to the lack of credibility that the EU currently suffers in Palestinian society. This wide gap 
between the rhetoric and the policy on the ground support the accusations that the EU has double 
standards and prefers to support stability at the expense of democracy. However, when there is 
contradiction between these liberal values and the security interests of the member states, security 
interests take priority.   The EU is a realist actor in liberal clothes. 
Finally, the democracy promotion and reform towards the PA and the Palestinian not just victim of 
the institutional structure of the CFSP but also of the divergent interest of the EU members  While 
some of the member states, mainly the northern states, consider democracy, human rights and reform 
as a European priority others, the Mediterranean states believe that implementing democracy and 
enforcing respect for human rights might put their short-term interests and the interests of their 
partners at risk. Therefore, they prefer to focus more on supporting the current leadership even though 
this leadership lacks legitimacy and is in violation of human rights.  In addition, the divergent 
attitudes of the member states towards political Islam are another factor that hinders the EU and 
weakens its promotion of democracy in Palestine.  
The EU‘s failure to adopt an ―inclusivist‖ approach towards political Islam has resulted from 
differences between EU and member states actors on this issue.
1357
  Behr argues that ―a more coherent 
approach towards the region seems unlikely, unless EU member states put aside their considerable 
differences concerning Political Islam.‖1358 Despite their divergent interest and views toward the 
political Islam and democratisation in the OPTs and despite EU members have their own pre-
determined political stances towards the conflicting parties in the Middle East, fulfilling the 
obligations of EU membership, shared common interests and interaction with other member states has 
made them change their attitudes towards the conflicting parties.  For example Germany changed its 
policy stance towards Hamas and accepted to put the movement on the EU list of terrorist movements 
after Jack Straw persuaded Joschka Fischer, the German foreign Minister, to do so.
1359
 France also 
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altered its policy, and consented to put the movement on the EU list under pressure of the UK. 
Sweden has stopped its dialogue with Hamas after being palmed by the rest of the EU members for 
giving Hamas leader a visa to visit Sweden to participate in a seminar.  
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Chapter Seven: The Palestinian Perception of EU Policies and Role in the MEPP 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter complements the main arguments of the thesis and demonstrates that the Palestinians‘ 
leadership perceptions of EU foreign policy, in relation to themselves, indicate that they also largely 
subscribe to a realist interpretation of the policy and the processes behind it. The Europeans‘ 
priviliging of their own collective security, and individual state interests, suggests that the normative 
dimensions of democracy promotion and economic assistance are just window-dressing. Since 
Palestinian recipients of EU policy understand them as such, and since they then seek to exploit flaws 
in the policy-making process to advance their own interests, the EU's credibility as a normative power 
is severely restricted. Rather, it is an agglomeration of realist self-interest, modified through processes 
of membership and the restrictions imposed by third parties such as the U.S. and Israel. 
 
The researcher set out to examine whether this was the view of the recipients of that policy, the 
Palestinians themselves. Studies of EU policy-making rarely take into consideration how the impact 
of that policy is perceived by the recipients, or targets of the policy. Yet this adds a vital new 
dimension to our understanding and assessment of policies and the policy-making processes. After all, 
it is they who ―witness‖ the flaws in policy-making processes first hand through the actual 
implementation of the policy. The researcher aimed to gain the policy recipients‘ perspective through 
qualitative fieldwork in the Palestinian Territories themselves and thereby to add an element of data 
triangulation to the study at hand.  
 
This chapter will also explain the divergent views of Palestinian factions towards this assumption that 
the Europeans have a fractured policy towards them and how they play on it. In other words, this 
chapter will try to find out if there is a gap between the way that the EU thinks of its policies and how 
they might be perceived and the way they are actually perceived by its intended recipients. It 
investigates the points of view of Palestinian leadership figures and other Palestinian elites in order to 
depict general perceptions of EU roles and activities in Palestine. Local actors closely involved in EU-
related activities were interviewed in order to reach an understanding of the Palestinian views and 
perception. 
 
The peace process, followed by the 1995 Barcelona process, has extended the EU role to cover not 
only the peace process, but also democratization, reform and financial and technical assistance to the 
PA. Therefore, this chapter will look at the perception of the Palestinian leaderships towards these 
three issues, as well as assessing their perceptions of the EU‘s relationships with the other main 
players on that issue, particularly the U.S. and Israel. 
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The fieldwork discussed below demonstrated that the Palestinians see the EU policies as ineffective 
and contradictory. The Palestinian leadership as recipients lack confidence in the EU as a unitary 
body. Not everyone agrees with this general view; however the weight of the evidence gathered from 
the interviews in this chapter supports it. The Palestinians consequently play on the EU‘s divisions, 
developing their own strategies and policies which take EU policy-making flaws into account. This 
usually involves the Palestinian leaderships seeing the U.S. as the primary king-makers and the EU as 
a moderating subsidiary body.  They get caught up in manipulative politics which aim to use the EU 
as much as an instrument for advancing Palestinian interests relative to US policies as a source of 
policy in its own right.  
 
As a consequence, there are unintended outcomes for European policies towards them. The 
respondents in the interviews conducted for this fieldwork highlight the flaws in the CFSP and how 
Palestinians react accordingly. Although the Palestinians are not fully satisfied with the European 
involvement, politically they act to maximize what they can get and take full advantage of the tension 
between the European Member states, between the EU institutions and the member states and between 
the institutions themselves. In theory the Palestinians would want an increased involvement of the 
Europeans in the MEPP; however, since they are aware of the limitations of European influence on 
the ground, they have evolved their thought process to acknowledge the role of the EU as that of a 
political moderator and financial guarantor.  
 
This chapter aims to firstly demonstrate that the Palestinian leadership has realised the inherent flaws 
in the mechanism of CFSP as has been clearly exemplified in the second chapter. This is followed by 
the argument that the Palestinian leadership, on reaching this recognition, then formulates its policy as 
a utilisation of this institutional gap towards its own end. This lowering of expectations among the 
Palestinians translates into the idea that the Europeans, far from putting forward a coherent policy 
which may drastically change the Palestinian situation, can only pay the cost of the MEPP financially 
and moderate American policy towards the Palestinians. Rather than acting as a powerful front on its 
own, European policy can influence that of America  
7.2 Research Rationale and Methods 
The nature of the issue being studied here, how Palestinian recipients of EU policy understood and 
responded to EU policy, led the author to pursue a qualitative approach to data collection, specifically 
elite interviewing. The contemporary nature of the subject allows it to give voice to the very 
individuals who were engaged in the process.  Since the political decisions of the Palestinian 
Authority are taken by small groups of highly qualified and knowledgeable individuals, it was 
possible for the author to use interviews to gain a reasonably representative sample of elite opinions. 
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The researcher considers face-to-face interviewing to be an accurate way of obtaining comprehensive 
understanding for the points of view of the Palestinian leaders: their expectation, experience, opinions 
on contemporary issues, evaluation, challenges and suggestions for the European role. Thus the author 
believes that in-depth interviews allow people to tell their story through the language with which they 
are familiar. 
Qualitative interviews are a well-established academic tradition in anthropology, sociology, history 
and geography, and the method includes a range of possible modes: qualitative interviews can range 
from semi-structured questionnaires to open-ended conversations, direct observation including 
participant and non-participant observation, ethnographic diaries, and more recently photography and 
video. According to Burnham, the design of the mode is directed towards discovering or uncovering 
new insights, meaning and understanding. Qualitative research is an in-depth analysis of the problem 
in order to understand the ―what and why‖ of human behaviour. It enables us to explain how people 
make sense of their experience and their views of the world. 
Moreover, for the researcher it is very attractive in that it involves collecting information in depth but 
from a relatively small number of cases
1360
.The advantages of qualitative research are clear where the 
goal of the research is to explore people‘s experiences, practices values and attitudes in depth and to 
establish their meaning for those concerned.
1361
 Burnham stresses that the emphasis of qualitative 
research on in-depth knowledge is at the expense of being able to make generalizations about the 
phenomenon as a whole, and others argue that it can lead to impressionistic, piecemeal, and even 
idiosyncratic conclusions. However since a relatively large sample of the Palestinian elite was 
engaged for this research (given the objective conditions under which the research took place), it is 
reasonable to argue that we can draw fair conclusions from the interviews whilst not claiming any 
definitive ―truth‖.  Elite interviewing in particular is a technique whose exercise benefits from the 
accumulation of experience. The author attempted to benefit from the accumulation of experience that 
the Palestinian elites have, especially those who have dealt with European officials, European leaders 
and the European representative in the Palestinian Occupied Territories.  
The researcher focused on elite groups who have well-established connections with policy-makers, 
either Palestinian or European. The focus was on people who have been personally and directly 
involved with European policy. The interviewees included a number of current and previous ministers 
of the Palestinian Authority, representatives of a range of political parties including opposition parties, 
the most prominent of which was Hamas, leading NGO figures, and academics with expertise in 
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European policy.
1362
 It should be noted that many interviewees wore ―more than one hat‖. 
Interviewees were selected through the snowballing sampling methods.   
In this procedure investigators use their initial contacts to recommend people in similar circumstance 
to be interviewed. This is a valuable strategy for generating a sample of people or groups which 
otherwise would be impossible to access. Since Palestinian politics is a sensitive arena in which trust 
is extremely important in gaining access, being recommended by someone when approached means 
they are much more willing to be interviewed. The weakness of snowball sampling is that the sample 
generated is very unlikely to be representative of the group under investigation. Although this method 
rarely leads to representative samples, there are times when it is the best method available.  
The researcher was lucky to have good relations with a very prominent political figure in The 
OPTswho was connected to many political, NGOs and academic organisations and who proved 
extremely helpful in starting the snowball. Its worth mentioning that the limitation of this approach is 
that I get to meet people who are networked with each other  and they are influenced by who they 
think I‘m connecting to.  Rolling Interviews were conducted in Arabic, and were taped and 
transcribed; all interviewees were fully informed as to the reason for the interview and the uses to 
which the data would be put by the researcher, and no interviewee accepted the offer of anonymity in 
the referencing of his or her comments.  
The interviewees were asked predetermined questions covering mainly the economic and political 
role of the EU in Palestine. Some of these questions were general questions directed to the vast 
majority of the interviewees; others were additional questions, depending on the affiliation, position, 
background, and experience of the interviewees. This explains why the researcher favoured semi-
structured interviews which gave him the flexibility during the interviews. The sample covered 20 
people  
Most interviews were conducted between March and May 2008 and they all took place in Ramallah, 
Nablus and Jericho in the West Bank. As a Palestinian whose family resides in Nablus, it was not 
possible for the researcher to travel to either East Jerusalem or the Gaza Strip. It is also worth 
mentioning here that on some occasions the interviews specified that some of the information 
provided was off the record, thus the researcher had to turn off the recorder and here the author will 
honour their instructions. In most instances the allotted time–slot was usually one hour, but some 
interviewees informed the researcher that the time was open until the researcher finished all his 
questions. However on two occasions, during the interview with one of the presidential advisors, the 
researcher had to turn the recorder off several times at request of the interviewee to allow him to talk 
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to his guards. As a consequence of this environment the interview time was reduced to 20 minutes, 
full of distortion and noise.  
Perhaps surprisingly, the researcher did not face any problems in gaining interviews with the 
Palestinian leaders approached for the sample. The vast majority of them cooperated with the 
researcher from the first call and most of the interviewees were friendly and interested to see the 
thesis upon its completion. Only one potential interviewee ignored the researcher after several 
promises to meet. Although most interviews went quite smoothly, there was sometimes an impression 
that the interviewees were reluctant to give some pieces of information. For example during the 
interview with Dr Hanan Ashrawi in her office in Ramallah, Dr Ashrawi hesitated to answer questions 
about her evaluation of the role of some of the European leaders still in power at that time, such as 
Javier Solana, or claimed that by answering the question she might be betraying the trust of her 
European friends.  
On another occasion, Dr Nasser al-Shaer (former Education Minister of the Palestinian National 
Authority serving as a member of Hamas and Deputy Prime Minister in the previous cabinet) was 
reluctant to give information about the European states that had opened indirect channels with the 
National Unity Government in order to protect the relations that he had built during his work as 
Deputy Prime Minister. 
Travelling within the West Bank was sometimes a nightmare and was one of the most difficult 
constraints that the researcher faced during his field work. At times it was impossible for the 
researcher to visit Nablus or Ramallah due to the Israeli restrictions. During the fieldwork period, 
moreover, Israel soldiers attacked the researcher‘s house on several occasions, with gas and sound 
bombs, causing a great deal of damage to the house, seizing his personal property, including his 
laptop and books. Israeli soldiers also tried to confiscate the laptop at check points. In short, for a 
Palestinian to conduct this fieldwork under occupation conditions has both a benefit and a loss: whilst 
Palestinian interest and solidarity with his research is high, Israeli obstructions are intimidating, 
repressive and mean the researcher has to constantly find ways around problems rather than being free 
to conduct his research unimpeded. The researcher is aware of the importance of impartiality in his 
search especially that he is conducting a research relating to his home country. Thus, the researcher 
adopted in his research the political terms that the international community utilise in their literature 
and communication. 
 
7.3 Findings 
In general, the Palestinian leadership showed a huge appreciation of the European positions and 
policies, especially regarding the aid policy and the EU having been a pioneer in establishing the basic 
 290 
 
principles and policies regarding the Middle East conflict that later became the main reference points 
for the peace process and international community.
1363
 The Palestinian appreciation is based on the 
fact that the Europeans were ―the first to call for the establishment of Palestinian and Israeli states as a 
basis for ending the struggle.‖1364 Europe was also the first to call for the recognition of the rights of 
Palestinians to determine their fate. In addition, the Palestinian leaders see the Europeans as a valid 
partner in the MEPP, either through the presence of a European envoy to the peace process and High 
Representative or through economic and security aid provide by the EU to the Palestinian people.
1365
  
However, while Palestinian leaders acknowledge that the Europeans were ―pioneers‖ in the political 
attitudes toward the conflict, some assert that their policies and stances have not changed since the 
Venice Declaration in 1980 and that they have been repeating their declarations since that time.
1366
 In 
fact they have failed to ―take advantage of their economic influence‖, which is represented by the 
huge aid provided for Palestinians annually or by their economic partnership with Israel.
1367
 So the 
Europeans were unable to wield political weight in the Palestinian-Israeli political track and unable to 
bring any of their political statements into force.‖1368 Additionally, they are convinced that there has 
been a decline in the EU‘s policy references and ―moral legality of the Palestinian issue such as, the 
European silence on the Gaza siege, Arafat‘s ‗suspected‘ assassination and extension of the Israel 
settlements.‖1369 They believe that the European stance ―deteriorated‖ either regarding statements or 
actions and the way that the Europeans deal with the Hamas-led government.
1370
  
The Palestinian leadership has realised the significant inherent shortcomings and flaws in the 
mechanism of the European CFSP. They pointed to the competition among divergent EU members‘ 
interests, priorities and different political and cultural stances as reasons behind the EU's inability to 
play a role in the in MEPP.
1371
 They acknowledge that the different EU member states have individual 
policies forged from decades of engagement with the Middle East and with the Palestinian context 
which translates into a diverse set of agendas towards the MEPP.
1372
 The researcher asked Saeb 
Erekat what his vision of the European policies in the OPTs and MEPP was. The Palestinian leader 
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rejected the argument that there is one European role or policy in the MEPP; rather ―there are 27 
foreign European policies, so there is no single unified European policy.‖1373 He added: ―I cannot say 
that Germany's position on the Palestinian issue and Iraq is the same as British, French or Greek 
positions.  Of course there is a difference in the political stances of these states.‖1374  
Mohammed Shtayyeh, President of the Palestinian Economic Council For Development and 
Reconstruction (PECDAR) and member of the negotiation team, divided the member states‘ interests 
and priorities in the EU into two parts: Northern Europe, led by Germany whose main aim since 1990 
has been the expansion of the EU to include Poland and the Czech Republic, and Euro-Mediterranean 
members, whose main priority and interests is related to immigration and security.
1375
 These 
differences in interests according to Shtayyeh have an impact on the EU‘s involvement in the MEPP. 
Shtayyeh states: ―When France has the European presidency, we notice that Europe is more involved 
in the region. When Finland or Sweden has the EU presidency, priorities become different. This has 
created a problem for the Palestinians and disperses the European efforts.‖1376  
Building on her experience as a member of the Palestinian delegation to the MEPP, Ashrawi looked at 
the factors determining the European involvement from a different angle. She believes that the EU‘s 
involvement is not just shaped by the member states‘ interests but also by their capacities and 
capabilities, i.e. financial and political capabilities. Ashrawi divides EU member states into three 
categories: first, members who ―wish to play a political role, but are unable to do that‖; second, 
members who are ―able to play a political role, but do not wish to do so because they think that it is 
better for Europe to share the roles with the U.S. as the U.S has bigger abilities‖; and finally, members 
that ―do not have the wish or ability to play any political role in the region.‖  Ashrawi also believes 
that the European role in the MEPP is a secondary role, due to the European divergence and the 
differences in the way the member states think the EU should act in the Middle East: ―should the EU 
have an independent policy from the U.S. or must its policy support the U.S. policy in this regard?‖ 
―I cannot say that Europe speaks in one voice. This is due to their differences. The 
Europeans confirmed to us during our meetings that they cannot easily reach the 
necessary unanimity inside the EU due to having different points of view.‖1377  
The Palestinian leadership believes that the European stance and policy has witnessed several 
contradictions and conflicts not just by member states but also by European officials. Abdullah 
Abdullah, Betawi, Ashrawi, and Arafat personalised the European involvement in the MEPP saying 
that not only are the interests of the member states determining factors of European involvement but 
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also the interests, the personal views and ambitions of a number of European leaders play significant 
role in directed the European policy and involvement in the MEPP. Abdullah Abdullah for example, 
asserts that:  
―The policy of some EEC/EU members was represented by making policy 
personalized by the spirit of president. This means that the foreign policy is 
individual. France is considered the most important example of this in the reign of 
Charles de Gaulle and Jacques Chirac, while historical relations played a stronger role 
in the relations of some EU members; the Mediterranean region, Germany and Britain 
are the most prominent examples of that.‖1378 
Betawi believes that the current French president Nicolas Sarkozy is ―Zionist‖, and that he adopts the 
Zionist ideology in his personal views, therefore causing French foreign policy to become more pro-
Israeli. He stated: ―You will find leaders like Nicolas Sarkozy, who are more Zionist than the Israelis 
themselves.‖1379 Ashrawi confirmed the argument above, stating that ―the personal views of  European 
officials such as Solana and Benita Ferrero-Waldner, who have direct contact with the Palestinians, 
have different views and positions from the rest of the EU members or institutions.‖  
According to Ashrawi, these officials have ―their ears s closer to the ground due to their direct contact 
with the Palestinians.  They have tried to make positive steps, but have not succeeded.‖1380  Ghada 
Arafat, the Head of the European Office in the Minister of Foreign Affairs, states that the European 
politicians visiting the Palestinian Territory have views on its pro-Palestinian attitudes and sympathy 
with the Palestinians. They express it ―behind closed doors‖, which is critically ―in conflict with the 
Palestinian interests‖ expressed in front of the media.1381  She considers this policy as ―a game of 
double standards‖ in their relations with the Palestinians, adding: 
―When you listen to the informal discussion of Solana, you will notice that he cares 
for the interests of Palestinians more than the Palestinians themselves, but when you 
look at the record of meetings, you notice that Solana offered ideas that contradict 
with the Palestinian interests.‖1382  
Arafat believes that the European officials contradict their statements to fit with their interests and 
priorities. She recalled some meetings between the Palestinian leaders and the EU leaders where the 
European leaders changed their statements according to who ran the government. Arafat attended two 
meetings that Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the former European Commissioner for External Relations, 
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had during and after the National Union Government. The first meeting was with Nasser Al Qudwa 
who was at that time the Foreign Minister. The second meeting was with Dr. Riyad Al Maliky, 
current Foreign Minister. She said:  
―During the meeting with Nasser Al Qudwa, Benita Ferrero-Waldner was talking in 
an Israeli voice. She accused us of being corrupt and negligent and threatened to 
punish us in case Hamas won the elections. However, during the meeting with Riyad, 
she was ‗a different person‘ and seemed interested in the Palestinian suffering from 
the barriers. The meeting was full of promises, like recognition of the new 
government and financial and technical support‖.1383  
Hulileh points out that one of the main problems of the EU in the region is that EU members ―try to 
divert the EU‘s policy to the direction that serves their interests, not the interests of the EU as a 
whole.‖1384 Hulileh considers the internal disagreement among the member states to be the main 
reason behind the weak role of the EU in the MEPP, thus according to Hulileh: ―the Europeans will 
maintain the payer‘s position rather than players as long as they fail to coordinate their internal efforts 
to create bigger harmony in their policy.‖1385 Nasser Al-Qudwa, the former representative of the PLO 
in the UN rejected the claims that the EU‘s role is weak in the Middle East preferring to describe the 
role as ―absent, avoiding the trouble of being involved in the issue.‖1386 Al-Qudwa confirmed that the 
Europeans‘ different interests find their way into the UN, where ―the EU members failed to agree on a 
joint European policy towards the Middle East issues during his presence at the UN:‖1387  
―Convincing the Europeans to become involved in the discussions about the Middle 
East was one of the most prominent obstacles that the Palestinians faced while 
dealing with the EU in the UN.  The Europeans preferred [to run] away from the 
discussions because they do not want all of them to agree with you.‖1388 
The former PLO representative to the UN divided the member states into three power centres. The 
first group included Britain, France and Germany. The second group consisted of Spain, Italy and the 
Netherlands. The final group was made up of all others members.  Al-Qudwa asserts that: 
―In the past, the negotiations were easy and we were able to know directly the EU's 
stance and the stance of each state. Things now are more complicated, because the 
EU's internal structure has improved and the internal gathering is stronger. The state 
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that was considered a friend, but hesitates now in helping you as it is afraid of being 
accused of dividing the European decision or the European political coordination.‖1389 
The diverse and differing political views of the members of the EU on the Separation Wall and 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) are clear examples of the European Union‘s inability to reach a 
common foreign policy towards the conflict in the Middle East. According to Al-Qudwa, the EU‘s 
member states‘ political stances toward the Separation Wall were divided into three groups. The first 
group, led by Britain, opposed the Separation Wall issue being discussed in the ICJ considering it a 
contradiction of European general diplomacy, the opposing group, led by Sweden and Ireland, were 
transferring the discussion on, finally the neutral group was led by France.  Al-Qudwa attributed the 
British opposition to discussing the Separation Wall in the ICJ to Tony Blair‘s who, according to Al-
Qudwa  followed the U.S. ―step by step at the expense of the joint European stance‖ and also wished 
―to be close to the Israeli policy.‖1390 
According to the Palestinian leadership the way the member states dealt with the Hamas-led 
government - the National Union Government (PNUG) - is another example of how the EU role in the 
MEPP is a victim of the differing interests of EU members.  It reflects not only how tension  between 
the divergent interests and stance of the EU‘s  members negatively undermined its ability to have a 
credible role in the region but also the deterioration of European stances either in terms of statements 
level or of action.
1391
 Ziad Abu Amr, the Foreign Minister of the PNUG, believes that there was a ―big 
degree of discrepancy in EU states‘ positions on the PNUG‖.  He states that the European stances 
towards the PNUG were divided between two groups of states and institutions: first members who 
have shown a desire to recognise the government and to move away from the U.S and Israeli stance 
through ―gradual lifting of the boycott‖. In this regard Abu Amr asserts ―there were states that told us 
they are ready to deal with the PNUG, but they could not apply this policy due to their commitments 
to the EU CFSP.‖1392  
Several member states recognised the PNUG members and agreed to deal with them France is 
example of this group. In contrast there were member that refused to deal with the PNUG especially 
those members ―that got direct help from Israel to enter into the EU‖. These members according to  
Abu Amr were keen ―not to anger Israel and harm Israeli and US interests.‖1393 Abu Amr believes that 
despite the role of new members of the EU it is ‗marginal‘ in the CFSP mechanism, which is drawn 
up through unanimity.‖1394 Shtayyeh considers that the lack of European ability to reach consensus 
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within the member states has made them dependent on the U.S for the Middle East policy, the NUG 
being an example of how ―the Europeans were unable to split from the U.S position, because they had 
different positions on the PNUG.‖ He explains the Dutch took an extreme position against the lenient 
British one.
1395
 In addition to the factors mentioned above, other leaders such Al-Qudwa think  that 
there are other aspects that affected the European position towards the PNUG; mainly the divergent 
political stance of the EU‘s members towards political Islam, which is a result of the different 
interests of the EU‘s members.1396 They consider the Muslims present in Europe as one of the reasons 
that prompted Europeans to open a dialogue with Hamas. According to Al-Qudwa ―the Europeans 
consider that holding talks with Hamas will alleviate tension created by Islamic groups that live in 
Europe which contains 30 million Muslims.‖1397  
Shtayyeha also links the Muslim population in the EU members and their attitudes towards Hamas, 
arguing that that ―members that have big Islamic communities, like Britain and France, have a more 
lenient position than the position of states that have smaller Islamic communities, like Poland.
1398
 
Others, such as Al-Betawi, believe that the reason for the EU‘s rejection of the NUG is the European 
hostility towards Islam, claiming that ―Europe‘s hostility to Muslims does not aim only to control our 
resources and oil, make our countries consumption market to them and keep us backward.  There is, 
also, religious hostility.‖1399  
The Palestinians are also aware of the impact of the history, different identity and political culture of 
the EU members on the EU‘s policy towards the issues.  In fact, they believe that both the Palestinians 
and the Europeans are victims of this history. The Palestinian leaders believe that the effects of EU-
Israeli relations upon EU-Palestinian relations are complicated by history, political agenda and 
economic interests. However, there is a consensus within the Palestinian leadership that the EU-Israeli 
relations are built, first, at the expense of the Palestinian rights and second, at the expense of 
European values and principles. They consider the Holocaust as a major obstacle that hinders the 
European role in the MEPP. The Europeans suffer from problems when they encounter the impact of 
their history, especially when dealing with Israel. According to Al Khaldi, ―Israel exploits the 
Holocaust by always reminding Europe of it and of its anti-Semitic past‖. He considers this policy as 
―political blackmail,‖ aiming first to create pressures on the EU and enforce it ―to provide help and 
facilitations to Israel.‖1400  
 
In addition, Al Khaldi believes that the EU is ―prevented from criticising Israeli policy or taking a 
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firm position on its policy that threatens European interests or the MEPP.‖ Al Khaldi believes this 
leads the Europeans to adopt ―adulating policies towards the Israelis which come at the expense of the 
Palestinians‖.1401 Al Khaldi attributed the European failure to boycott Israeli products produced in the 
settlements to the ―absence of EU European mechanisms to apply resolutions or absence of a 
monitoring body that follows such issues‖ or the European desire to ―guarantee its place at the table of 
negotiations.‖1402Ashrawi does not stray far from Al Khalid‘s point of view. She argues that European 
neglect of the Israeli settlements products are ―an obvious and flagrant discrepancy in the European 
policies on this issue…[which]…violated the partnership agreement with Israel that does not allow 
the exportation of the Israeli products to Israel if they came from illegal settlements‖. Ashrawi 
justifies this policy by arguing that the EU members ―feel guilty because of the Holocaust.‖  She 
added: 
―Some of the EU members always try to satisfy Israel by all means and the Israelis 
accuse always the Europeans of being aligned with the Arabs. Consequently, the 
Europeans defend themselves and try to get rid of these accusations through being 
closer to Israel and the provision of concessions and temptations.‖1403  
 
Ashrawi‘s understanding and justification of European attitudes are based on the fact that the 
Europeans see the development of their relations with Israel ―as necessary for their interests.‖ 
However she thinks that this policy ―contradicts with European principles and values.‖ She recalls 
some of statements of EU officials who confirm that ―they could not influence Israel unless they do 
not have distinguished relations with it.‖1404 Khatib considers the significant EU aid to the Palestinians 
and the MEPP as ―compensation‖ of the EU's members‘ political inability to reach a unified policy 
towards The OPTsand the conflict in Palestine.
1405
 He adds: ―we always call for the  economic aid to 
integrate with the political role.‖1406  Nasser al-Qudwa believes that the EU is in a stronger position 
than it allows for itself in the relationship, since Israel depends on the European market for economic 
and trade relations, which as al-Qudwa states: ―is more important than the economic relationship 
between Israel and the U.S. So, this is a tool that could be exploited if Europe wanted to move in such 
a direct way.‖1407 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction of this chapter, the Palestinian elites are aware that their relationship 
with the EU is victim of the tensions between its members and its institutions. Azzam Al Ahmed the 
Fatah leader believes that one thing that has weakened EU policy in the MEPP is that individual 
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initiatives of the member states have been conducted behind closed doors and behind the EU. Al 
Ahmed attributes these initiatives to the European countries‘ desire ―to resort to individual initiatives 
when they see that the EU is unable to make Europe‘s real voice heard or when they feel that the 
direct dealing with the Palestinian issue gives them better advantages and a stronger presence.‖1408  
 
Al-Ahmad accuses the Europeans of taking advantage of the Palestinian division and says the 
Europeans ―play on the Palestinian contradictions.”  He considers the Italian and British initiatives to 
have ―back channels‖ with Hamas as an example of the “dual position‖ of the member states of the 
EU.  “While the EU considered Hamas a terrorist group, the Italians and the British have engaged in 
dialogue with them, which contradicts the traditional European stance.  He adds: 
 
―When a country, like Italy, announces publicly that it wishes to bring Hamas to the 
political process and forgets its admission of the Palestine Liberation, which is 
responsible for the political process, this will weaken the Palestinian people and 
Arabic efforts to achieve just settlement and give Israel the justification to wash its 
hands of its commitments.‖1409 
 
The Palestinian leader criticised the way European leaders conduct their policy with the Palestinians 
where Europeans officials have different attitudes and political stances in private to their public 
statements. He stated that: 
 
    
―In private communication, the Europeans say just what satisfies us. That is why I do 
not believe in the secret and unannounced communication, because such 
communication has no value if it was unannounced publicly, especially there is no 
moral or legal commitment in the secret diplomacy.‖1410  
 
The Palestinian leader criticised the Europeans for their policy in widening the Palestinian division by 
exacerbating ―Palestinian contradictions‖ through secret European channels with the Hamas 
movement, which seeks to replace the PLO.‖1411 Ali Sartawi confirmed that after the formation of the 
NUG and under the request of the Europeans there were ―secret deliberations‖ between the European 
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officials and member of Hamas and members of the PNUG.
1412
 According to him, the Europeans 
introduced themselves as researchers from research centres belonging to foreign ministries of their 
states.
1413
 These negotiations, according to Sartawi, were between Nasser Al Shaer, Deputy Prime 
Minister and a number of officials from Britain, Finland and Belgium and were kept away from the 
media under the request of the Europeans. Sartawi revealed that the Europeans threatened the 
Palestinians that if they revealed these secret meetings they would deny them.
1414
  
 
Abu Amr the former minister of the PNUG stated that one of the suggestions discussed between the 
Palestinians and the European officials was that he would be invited to give a speech to the EU 
council but this was met with opposition from some of the member states in the EU since he was a 
member of the PNUG. These countries ―demanded that I should first issue a statement renouncing 
terrorism and recognize the agreements and conditions.‖ Abu Amr declared that the European 
position took a different direction when they linked the political situation on the ground, especially 
the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier, with PNUG recognition. He states that:  
 
―There was an offer from the Europeans to recognise the NUG if the Palestinians, 
especially Hamas, had a truce with Israel and the problem of the kidnapped Israeli 
soldier was solved, and then the boycott would have been lifted.‖1415 
 
When Abu Amr was asked how the EU could recognise the PNUG without accepting the Quartet‘s 
conditions since the EU is one of its main members, Abu Amr answered that:  
―This matter was directly discussed during discussions with the EU officials. They 
told us that solving of the problems of truce and kidnapped soldier will highly 
contribute to the recognition.‖1416 
 
Khatib sees that individual European member states‘ presence in the Palestinian Territories stronger 
than the presence of the EU as a block and he is convinced that the ―German role overshadowed the 
EU role.‖ He argues that: 
 
―Germany, through its Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, played an essential role in 
the mediation between the parties of dispute. So, the Individual states had, and still 
have, bigger contributions and political and economic roles than the EU‘s political 
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role.‖1417  
 
The tension between the member states and the European officials also occupied a significant space in 
the Palestinian awareness.  Shtayyeh described Solana‘s role as ―weak‖ because he has ―been trying 
to please all the actors involved in the conflict and the peace process.‖1418  Abdullah Abdullah 
describes Solana‘s work as ―walking amid a field of mines‖1419 because he ―does not want to make a 
political step that angers the Americans and, at the same time, he does not want to anger the 
establishment to whom he and EU member-states belong.‖1420  
 
In addition, Abdullah stresses that Solana‘s attempts to satisfy everyone have angered all parties.  
Shtayyeh was more critical of Solana‘s role in the peace process by describing it as being ―very weak‖ 
because the ―EU's political presence depends on the U.S role with regard to the MEPP.‖ According to 
Shtayyeh, ―nobody listens to Solana therefore he ―cannot affect the EU's foreign policy‖ and he 
wonders how it would be possible for Solana to affect EU policy when he does not represent all 
European positions. He is convinced that one reason for Solana‘s role in the region having been 
weakened is the competition between the EU member states and the European Commission. He 
believes that ―EU member states‘ national foreign policies would be weakened if they were to 
strengthen Solana's position.‖1421  
7.4 How the Palestinian Leadership Perceive the EU’s Democracy Promotion  
There is a general consensus among Palestinians leaders that the EU and its members are not 
interested in implementing democratic practices and values in Palestine, but rather wishes to develop 
economic and political interest which come at the expense of the Palestinian people. Nasser Al 
Qudwa did not question the intention of the EU in its efforts to reform the PA  and democratise the 
Palestinian people. However, he referred the contradiction between European rhetoric and policy on 
the ground to a lack of political will to implement the EU policies that ―were promised.‖1422  
 
Arafat believes that ―the main interests of the EU‘s members in Palestine are the MEPP in the region 
and any other interests are ―cosmetic measures that allow Europeans to appease European voters.‖ 
She supported her argument by saying that ―Yasser Arafat, implemented a ‗centralised policy decision 
making mechanism‘, but nevertheless the Europeans considered him as a real partner of peace.‖1423 
Furthermore, the Palestinian leadership is aware of the gap between the political attitudes of the 
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member states which are built on strategic interests and the attitudes of the European citizens who are 
generally considered pro-Palestinian.
1424
 Sartawi believes that the EU and its member states will never 
listen to the political will of the Palestinians as long as the Europeans themselves ―continue ignoring 
the voice of ordinary Europeans represented in the EP who repeatedly call for the suspension of the 
EU-Israeli partnership.‖1425  
 
Shtayyeh states that ―the Europeans want tailored democracy, which is in line with the European 
concept‖. He believes the European boycott of the election results, which the EU ironically financed 
and supervised, was due to the way the Europeans look at political circumstance in the region. He 
stated: ―Europe sees that the political game in Palestine is connected with a political track.‖ He added 
that the EU ―does not care for the promotion of democracy, whether in Palestine, Afghanistan, 
Turkey, etc and the real test for western democracy was the Hamas victory in 1996 election.‖1426 
 
Azzam Al Ahmed, head of Fatah's parliamentary bloc in the Palestinian Legislative Council, directed 
very harsh criticism towards democratization efforts of Western countries, including the EU and the 
U.S, stating that ―personally, I think that the U.S. and the EU are the sponsors of suppression, 
dictatorships and corruption in the region.‖  Al Ahmed believes that the type of democracy that the 
West is promoting ―does not suit us, it suits them.‖ He added that ―if Palestine is taken as an example 
in the Middle East, it will be found that corruption is rampant in civil society establishments. Even the 
corruption in the PA is supported by the U.S and Europe.‖ When the researcher asked Al Ahmed 
about the motives of the West in supporting corruption while their main policy is to fight corruption, 
he indicated that the two factions are generally interested in ―creat[ing] a political and social class 
whose interests are connected with the interests of the U.S. and Europe.‖1427 According to Sartawi, 
refusing to suspend the Partnership Agreement with Israel as a result of its human rights violation in 
the Palestinian territories and silence on the violations of human rights in Palestine is further evidence 
of the EU‘s duality. 1428  
 
Additionally, Ashrawi wonders why the Europeans concentrate on corruption in the Palestinian 
Authority and ―turn a blind eye to the Israeli violations of human rights and the destruction of the 
Palestinian infrastructures‖. She attributes it to the desire of the member states to support stability, 
saying ―the Palestinians have problems with the Europeans and the Europeans have problems 
themselves too.‖  She considers EU aid in a developmental role to build Palestinian infrastructure 
under Israeli occupation as ―useless‖ because, according to Ashrawi, ―Israeli practices in the occupied 
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lands destroy all development fundamentals.‖ She states that she ―remember[s] that when the Israeli 
soldiers invaded the territory, they said to us ‗Don‘t worry, the Europeans will construct buildings and 
properties.‖1429  
 
Ashrawi stresses that this problem will continue as long as the occupation continues and that the EU‘s 
members should, therefore, first tackle the reasons for economic recession and destruction- the 
occupation- and then build the Palestinian infrastructure. However, the Palestinian leader 
acknowledges the European dilemma. She argues: ―on one hand they can‘t stop their aid because their 
aid is vital for both the PA and its population: on the other hand they know that the European aid 
seems to patch Israeli practices up.‖1430 
 
In light of this problem, Ashrawi has put forth a proposal that might help both the Europeans and the 
Palestinians. ―The Europeans should try to solve the problem and create a mechanism to achieve 
development and end the occupation at the same time.‖ She suggests that linking the peace process 
and the development process is the solution.  She states that ―the end of occupation and the building 
of the state depend on each other. ―You cannot keep the occupation and build the state. The more you 
end the occupation, the more you build the state.‖1431 In the absence of a strategy that links aid to 
ending the occupation, Ashrawi believes that there exist chronic questions which repeatedly impose 
themselves on European aid and developmental policy in Palestine.  Such questions include: “does 
Europe limit only the Israeli damage and make the Palestinians relatively able to survive? Or does it 
want to tackle the continual Israeli aggression which is regarded the main reason behind the 
Palestinian suffering.‖1432  
 
Ghada Arafat painted a bleak picture of European aid as she directed several criticisms at the EU‘s aid 
and its member states.  Some of the criticisms were related to European priorities, while others were 
related to the ―unwillingness to put pressure on Israel for the sake of any project.‖  However, she 
considers that the EU is using aid as a tool to ―blackmail the Palestinians‖ thus creating a system in 
order to force them, i.e. the Palestinians, to ―take certain political positions‖ and says it has ―drawn up 
an aid system to keep the Palestinian economy dependant on the European aid.‖ Arafat describes it as 
a scandal which can be added to the ―corruption spread among the European staff in the Palestinian 
territories.‖1433  
Shtayyeh believes that the competition between the EU and the member states‘ development agendas 
is one of the challenges that the European Commission faces in Palestine.  He referred to this duality 
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as a desire of member states “to lift their national flags and have a direct presence, as this is 
considered part of their foreign strategy and their bilateral relations with the region.‖ For example, 
“Germany gives us direct aid which is different from the one that comes from the EU, though the 
biggest percentage of EU's budget is given by Germany.‖1434 
The Palestinian leadership also recognises that there are differences between the policies of the 
European institutions within the EU structure due to the different interests and imbalance of power 
and different loyalties inside the EU.‖1435 They are aware of the difference between the European 
Commission's priorities and the presidency's priorities. Therefore, they think ―it is impossible to find a 
unified EU foreign policy.‖1436  The EU political stances towards the NUG are a clear example of the 
differences between the EU institutions. 
Abu Amr stressed that on the institutional level within the EU structure there were differences 
between the European institutions as well. According to his personal experience as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, the EP was pushing to recognise the NUG and the European Commission ―preferred‖ 
to deal with NUG due to their direct contact with the Palestinian issue, while the European Council 
―refused to deal with the NUG.‖  Abu Amr confirmed that during his visit to the EP and meeting with 
the head of the EP and the Committee of Foreign Relations and political groups in the Parliament 
―there was an agreement to forward a motion to the EU calling to lift the boycott on the 
government.‖1437 However, the takeover of Gaza by Hamas stopped all procedures on the part of  EU 
Council. Khatib noted the differences between the positions of the EP towards OPTs and the MEPP 
and the positions of the government‘s member states and the policy of the rest of the European 
institutions. He believes this is due to the impact of public opinion on the parliament.  ―In Europe, the 
public opinion sympathizes more with the Palestinian issue than governments for reasons related to 
strategic interests and the U.S-Israeli relations.‖1438 
7.5 U.S and EU Policy from a Palestinian Perspective 
Although the Palestinian leadership blamed the institutional constraints inherent in the EU‘s CFSP, 
their major criticisms were directed at EU-US relations and the lack of European political will to 
challenge the U.S in the Middle East. In general the main reason for the Palestinian dissatisfaction 
with the European position in the Middle East is the failure of the Europeans to conduct an 
independent policy from the U.S. as they have ―agreed to play a secondary role with the U.S and 
make its political will subject to the U.S.‖ 1439  Several Palestinian leaders went further, arguing that 
because of the EU-US relation the Europeans ―did not succeed in achieving any of their goals either in 
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achieving peace or democracy promotion and development in Palestine.‖1440  
 
Of course not all the Palestinian leaders adopt this argument; indeed a number of Palestinian leaders 
believe that there is no conflict between the two political players since they split responsibilities in the 
Middle East between them since the Europeans know their capabilities both views have different a 
understanding and justifications for their arguments; however this section will demonstrate both 
schools of though and how they think the EU should interact with the U.S when it comes to the 
MEPP.  
Saeb Erekat is convinced that there is no competition or conflict between American and European 
―strategic interests‖ in the Middle East due to shared interests in the region as well as the strong 
historical economic and trade ties between both alliances.
1441
 He analyses the impact of the strong 
trade and economic ties between the two partners insinuating that their economic ties are more 
important than their political differences over the MEPP.  
Erekat demonstrates his argument by recalling statistics and figures to show how both partners are 
economically connected, stating that ―French exports to the U.S totalled around $72 billion in 2007 
and Air France organizes around 37 daily trips to the U.S and German Airlines sends nearly 43 daily 
flights to the U.S.‖ Politically he does not believe that the U.S. and France have different stances 
strategically. ―Europe and the U.S have joint interests and are allies, whether in NATO, the UN or the 
UN Security Council.‖1442 When it comes to the Middle East and the peace process, Erekat believes 
that roles and responsibilities are ―distributed‖ between the Americans and the Europeans by 
agreement and if there is any disagreement between them over the MEPP, this disagreement would 
not reach a substantial enough degree to call it struggle or strategic competition.
1443
  
Erekat states that he ―cannot understand how some can differentiate between the European role and 
the U.S. role. The U.S dominates the Quartet and nobody can compete the U.S in the Quartet‖.  When 
the researcher asked Erekat to give examples supporting his ―distributing roles‖ argument, Erekat 
recalled the dispute over the final statement of the Annapolis Conference, saying: 
 
―During Annapolis Conference, I asked in the final statement that I formulated in 
behalf of the Palestinian side whey did not the Quartet mention that it is one of the 
mediators along with the U.S. However, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
requested me not to include this question. When I objected, Rice said to me that I 
have nothing to do with the relationship between the U.S and Europe. I talked with 
Javier and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, but they told me that 
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they agree with Rice.‖1444 
However, Erakat believes that low ranking EU officials do not share the complementary vision with 
their leaders. He stresses:  
―You can sit with a third-degree European consul who will say to you there is 
disagreement with the U.S and Europe is annoyed from the U.S policy in the region. 
But this is untrue. At the level of the European strategic policies, we notice that there 
is clear acceptance to distribute the roles.‖1445 
Shtayyeh, president of PECDAR thinks that although that Europeans have ―big economic and 
financial ability‖ they lack the ―political tools and will.‖1446 He considers: ―European states that have 
revolved willingly around the U.S orbit.‖ He considered this factor as the main reason that limits the 
role of the EU in the peace process and the region in general.
1447
 Shtayyeh does not agree with those 
who believe that there is a confrontational policy between the EU and the U.S, whether globally or in 
the Middle East region, by asserting that ―the political game is controlled by the U.S which gives 
military orders in the world. The Europeans have specific roles at the global level concerning 
international policy, political abilities, global economy and international security.‖ With respect to the 
MEPP, Shtayyeh thinks the Europeans are at times ―annoyed by some U.S policies, due to their [EU] 
deeper understanding of the problems of the region thus they think they are better than the U.S in 
solving these problems but we can‘t call that conflict or clash of interests.‖1448 Unless Europe starts a 
critical dialogue with the U.S. they ―cannot play a political role in the region‖.1449   
He believes that if the Europeans do not exact a role from the U.S through critical dialogue ―the U.S 
will not give Europe any role‖ and the Europeans will ―remain a group of countries with joint interests 
and without ability to reach unanimity‖ in the Middle East. He endorses that the Europeans should 
criticize the U.S position which aligns itself with Israel. Shtayyeh accused some of the EU‘s member 
mainly Britain whose position towards the U.S ―differs from the position of the remaining countries‖ 
of taking advantage of the EU‘s institutional complexity.  Shtayyeh believes it makes no difference 
who is in office at Number Ten, the Conservatives or Labour, because ―British-U.S relations remain 
strategic‖ and ―do not change with the change of British Prime Ministers or U.S presidents.‖1450  
Khatib is convinced that there is ―a distribution of roles between the U.S and Europe‖ and that the 
Middle East is a playing field where both side are directly involved. The Palestinian leader believes 
that there is an ―understanding between the U.S and Europe gives a bigger role for the U.S in the field 
of politics and the leadership of international community‘s efforts in this regard while Europe is given 
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an essential role in developmental and economic fields.‖1451  He refers to the fact that the ―US has a 
bigger effect in global issues in general or that there are regions, like the Middle East, which Europe 
surrenders to the U.S, while the U.S surrenders other regions to Europe.‖ When the researcher asked 
Khatib if he thought that Europe has the ability but lacks the desire, or vice versa, he considered both 
answers to be correct. 
―There is a category that agrees with the U.S stance and there is another category that 
disagrees with the U.S stance. After some former Soviet Union states joined the EU, 
the U.S. used these states to weaken the EU‘s endeavours to adopt policies opposing 
the U.S. trends inside the Quartet.‖1452 
 
He added that although the Europeans ―have better and deeper understanding of the conflict, they do 
not behave according to their convictions and thoughts as they are affected by the U.S.  Consider 
Europe‘s position on the NUG as a prime example.‖ He asserts that when the NUG was formed, the 
Palestinian leadership witnessed positive attitudes towards the movement, but in reality all European 
countries adopted a passive position on the PNUG as a result of U.S policy. From his experience as 
Minister of Labour and Minister of Planning, Khatib has reached the conclusion that if there is a 
conflict between the American and the European methods in dealing with Palestinian issues, the 
American method wins and consequently represents the dominant behaviour of the international 
community. He supports his argument by recalling the manner in which both sides dealt with alleged 
corruption in the PA as a clear example of American domination. 
   
―While the political agenda of the Americans attempted to use PA corruption as a tool 
to disempower the PA and Yasser Arafat, the Europeans, in contrast, tried to take 
advantage of the current situation to push for reform and improvement…. the U.S 
preferred the political agenda over the developmental, democratic and economic 
agenda, while Europe favoured the developmental, democratic and economic agenda 
over the political agenda.‖1453 
According to him, the capability of the Europeans to conduct foreign policy in the Middle East 
independently from the U.S is reliant on two factors. First, the EU's self-development: the more the 
EU is unified, the more it plays a bigger role in the region, whether politically or economically. 
Second, there is the manner in which the Palestinian leadership deals with the EU:  
―The presence of a Palestinian government that respects the international legitimacy 
highly contributed to the support of the European position and the non-availability of 
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a government that recognize the international legitimacy contributed to the absence of 
the European role.‖1454 
Hanan Ashrawi argues that, from the political behaviour of the EU on the international stage, it has 
the ability and the political will to confront the U.S on issues that are related to the ―European 
economy and Europe‘s vital economic interests‖ such as the World Trade Organization and the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). However, according to Ashrawi,  ―Europe admitted 
that the U.S is the biggest player in Middle East.‖1455 Al Khaldi discloses similar beliefs as Ashrawi 
by viewing the Palestinian-Israeli issue as being ―agreed upon between the EU and US.‖  
Nevertheless, Al Khaldi believes that the ―EU could be the essential party in another issue, like in 
Lebanon‖.1456  
Fatah leader, Azzam Al Ahmed, does not share the views of Erakat, Shtayyeh, Al-Khatib, Ashrawi, 
and Al Khaldi of ―distributing roles‖ between the EU and the U.S but is rather convinced that the U.S 
―dominates international policies, including the European policy‖.1457 Al-Ahmad remembers that 
during his visit to Italy, a top official in the Italian government informed him that ―Italy is not 
independent after the collapse of the Soviet Union  ... and Italy is dominated by the U.S.‖1458  
 
―The European interests, especially Italian and German interests, in Iraq were very 
big before the fall of Saddam. I know that because I was an ambassador in Iraq. The 
Europeans could not maintain their interests there, as they were afraid of the U.S.‖1459 
He added: 
―I am very convinced that the Arabs and the Europeans cannot provide aid for us 
without getting the U.S approval. We noticed how the U.S obliged all worlds‘ banks 
to stop the transference of money to the PNUG I am very convinced that the Arabs 
cannot provide aid for us without getting the U.S approval.‖ 
The Fatah leader is convinced that: 
―The Europeans want to play an influential role, but they are unable to do so, and will 
not be able in the foreseeable future until they regroup and adopt an ethical position 
stemming from their interest so it can be liberated from the U.S foreign policy. The 
EU‘s institutional structure and the British affiliation with the U.S and the affiliation 
of new EU member who ―talks on behalf of the U.S‖ make me pessimistic.‖1460  
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He explained that the Europeans ―were unable to implement their wishes‖ due to the ―American 
domination on the European position.‖ Al-Ahmed accuses the Europeans of ―political hypocrisy‖ 
since they were encouraging the Palestinians ―behind closed doors‖ to organize an international 
conference whilst at the same time, they had a different opinion in their meetings with the U.S.‖ He 
attributed the European refusal to the PNUG government of European ―subordination‖ to the U.S. He 
states that the Palestinians built a huge expectation on the Europeans position. ―We felt that through 
our meetings with the European officials that Europe was ready to deal with the PNUG‖.   
Al Ahmed considers the high expectations of the Palestinians from the European role as a problem. 
He stresses: 
―The Palestinians invested much hope in the Europeans and we have a conviction that 
there are common interests and historical relations linking us with the Europeans. 
Consequently, we feel that we are closer to the Europeans than the U.S. However, we 
always ‗lose our bet‘ with the Europeans and are left disappointed.‖1461 
The Quartet was the first movement towards EU inclusion (which formulated the road map) as a great 
chance for the EU to have direct contact with the conflicting parties with a place at the negotiating 
table with regard to the peace process.
1462
   
 
―When the time of delivery of the Road Map came, the U.S. preliminary presidential 
election started. At that time, the Europeans were the ones who delivered us the Road 
Map. However, when the election calmed down and implementation of the Road Map 
started, the U.S. re-took the initiative and the Road Map has not been implemented so 
far. This means that Europe gave us the check without it being cashed.‖1463 
Samier Hulileh is convinced that European foreign policy in the Middle East is in a political dilemma 
that can be described as a―prioritise conflict dilemma.‖1464 He argues that the Europeans are facing a 
critical situation as on the one hand they are trying to find the way to conduct an independent 
European foreign policy from the U.S while at the same not jeopardising the EU‘s American and 
Israeli relations. Hulileh points out that  risking the EU‘s relationship with its allies, Israel and the 
U.S, will lead to loos the Europeans losing their position at the negotiation table with the main, 
stronger players, especially the Americans and the Israelis, who decide who sits at the negotiation 
table.  Therefore as the Hulileh believes ―the desire to play political role in the MEPP prompted the 
Europeans to follow the Israeli and the American policy towards the NUG and Hamas government 
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because if the EU opposed the U.S‘s policy, it will find itself outside the negotiations.‖1465 
 
The former deputy prime minister, Nasser Al Shaer, agrees that there is American domination of the 
MEPP. He asserts ―we know that the Palestinian issue is in the hands of the U.S, not the 
Europeans.‖1466 Ashrawi blamed the U.S. for the EU‘s limited role in the MEPP, especially since its 
policy is built on dividing Europe ―into New Europe and Old Europe,‖ as Rumsfeld did during his 
speech in the UN that preceded the war against Iraq.
1467
 Ashrawi noted that during the meeting 
between the Palestinian leaders and their European and Americans counterparts the Americans 
―minimized‖ the European role. She considered the American rejection of Britain's former Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair, and request to recognize the London Conference as an international peace 
conference: 
―After he requested that directly twice, the conference was transferred into a 
reform conference, though Blair is an ally of the U.S. Bush refused directly 
Blair's request, in an offensive way, during a press conference in front of the 
media.‖1468 
 
Al-Qudwa is convinced that Europe could play an independent political role in the Middle East 
conflict if the ―political will was available‖ since Europe possesses the requisite ―economic 
components that enable it to play such a role.‖ During his work as a Permanent Observer from 
the PNA for  the UN, he noted that there was significant US influence over European countries and, 
particularly in the UN, a ―special relationship between the U.S and Britain and European countries 
that recently joined the EU such as Czech Republic and Poland‖ According to Al- Qudwa,, the new 
member states caused the Palestinians ―a lot of difficulties, especially with regard to the voting 
behaviour, since ―that have distinguished relations with the U.S.‖ He refuses to attribute full 
responsibility to the U.S because the Europeans have their own reasons which may well intersect with 
the U.S. interests.  
He explains that boycotting Hamas and National Unity governments is an example of the EU-US 
intersected interests. Fears of international terrorism and of giving legitimacy to the European 
domestic organisations that utilise violence for political gain is one of the reasons that prompted the 
EU and its member states to refuse to deal with Hamas and its government, as they considered it a 
terrorist group.  Al-Qudwa argues that although Spain is ―friend and traditional ally for the Palestinian 
people.‖ Spain showed a very strict position on Hamas government since the Spanish suffered from 
terrorism from the Islamic extremist attacks on Madrid and the Basque Nationalist and 
Separatist Organization who regularly attack the Spanish cities. 
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The Islamic leader Al-Betawi thinks that ―Europe does not take its decisions freely, particularly if 
these resolutions did not fit and suit US and Israeli policies in the Middle East.‖1469He described the 
relationship between the U.S and Europe as a ―small child who is looked after by the U.S.‖1470 The 
Islamic leader also confirmed the meeting between the European officials where Hamas leaders had 
the impression that Europe had a direction to recognize the National Union Government but the U.S. 
pushed Europe to follow its policy. Nasser Al Shaer deputy Prime Minister in the previous cabinet of 
NUG asserts that the EU's position did not boycott the NUG and there was understanding by the EU 
which attempted to open communication channels.  However, Al Shaer believes that the European 
understanding of the EU's stance ―tries not to move away from the U.S's position.‖1471 Abdullah 
Abdullah commented on the European role in the MEPP by stating that the EU is ―an economic giant 
and political dwarf this leads to the therefore the U.S. runs the policy and the EU signed the cheque in 
the Middle East.‖1472 He believes the EU ―does not want to face the U.S. for the sake of Arabs,‖ 
explaining that the Europeans value EU-US relations more than EU-Arab relations. However, he says 
that the Europeans ―convinced the U.S.  to continue the peace process with Palestine after Hamas won 
the elections.‖  
Ali Sartawi, a Hamas leader who served as Minister of Justice in the National Union Government in 
2006, shares a similar point of view with Abdullah as he believes that the Europeans do not respect 
the principles and values that they are promoting. He offers the reasoning that they failed to protect 
their principles and values from the U.S tyranny and also that they ―failed in the first test they faced in 
Palestine by refusing to recognize our legitimate and fair elections.‖1473The former Minister of Justice 
claims that the inability of the Europeans to protect their values is due to fact that ―they want to 
maintain their position alongside the U.S. at the negotiations table‖. Despite the bleak picture that the 
Palestinian leadership draws of the EU-US relation in the Middle East, the interviews with the 
Palestinian leadership suggest that that the Palestinians ―cannot bet on the European role.‖1474  
They view the Europeans as mediators and moderators towards the U.S policy regarding the 
Palestinians. The Palestinian interviewees recognise that the Europeans cannot play a significant role 
in the MEPP as decision makers due to their own contradictions in policy and deficit in their 
mechanisms, hence the view that they can only supplement American decisions. Erakat argues that 
Europeans officials are sufficiently ―aware of their capabilities and the limitation of their role, 
                                                          
1469
 Betawi, op .cit. 
1470
 Ibid. 
1471
 Nasser al-Din al-Shaer, is the former Education Minister of the Palestinian National Authority serving as a 
member of Hamas. He also served as Deputy Prime Minister in the previous cabinet. Interview with Author, 15
th
 
of April 2008, Nablus, OPTs. 
1472
 Abdullah Abdullah,op.cit. 
1473
 Sartawi, op. cit. 
1474
 Ashrawi, op. cit. 
 310 
 
therefore it is rare to hear any European official saying that he wants to rival the U.S. role.‖1475In 
contrast, during meetings with the Palestinian leadership, according to Erakat most European officials 
emphasize the fact that ―they want to complement the U.S. role.‖ When Erakat asked if Europe would 
be able to play a political role independent from the U.S, the head of the Negotiations Unit in the 
Palestinian Authority replied: 
 
―I cannot say, but Europe played a big role in affecting US policy, and I cannot 
describe the European role as weak since Europe highly contributed to reduce the 
severity of US policy on the Palestinian issue.‖1476 
 
The Palestinian leader asserts that although the Palestinians are linked with Europe through a 
distinguished relationship and wish the Europeans to play an important political role in the region 
such a role would not cancel out the U.S role. He goes on to say that rather than wanting Europe to 
replace the U.S. they want to help Europe and the U.S. to complement each other‘s roles. Samier 
Hulileh believes that ―if the EU was unable to find solutions to the struggle and independence to take 
decision, it is better for it to concentrate their efforts to affect on other parties, especially the U.S.‖1477 
According to Soboh, since 1993 it has become apparent to the Palestinians that ―Europe is the only 
party able to impact on Israel and makes the U.S. less prejudiced to Israel‖.1478 Soboh considers it to 
be an EU strongpoint that it is ―a strong mediator in the peace process that does not support 
aggression and has a strong impact on the Israeli‘s by making the U.S. less biased in favour of 
Israel.‖1479 He states ―I see that Europe is the only one capable of talking with the U.S. to make the 
peace process possible.‖1480  
7.6 How the Palestinians Responded to the European Policies  
This section shows that the Palestinians take advantage of the divergent European policies and use 
them strategically towards their own end. The lack of leverage for Palestinians in the balance of this 
relationship means that the Palestinians rather than challenge European policy accept these policies 
and make best use of them with particular context to separate European member states. This policy 
according to Hulileh contributed to the decline in the European political stance towards the 
Palestinian rights and issues.  
―I think that the Palestinians contributed to that through the weakness of the 
Palestinian performance and state of internal division. The weakness of Arabic 
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performance was, also, a factor. Moreover, the European political map changed from 
the inside.‖ 1481 
The internal conflict within the EU‘s member states and the weak political presence of the EU in the 
Palestinian Territories prompted the Palestinians to prefer to deal with the individual member states in 
the political field more than with the EU as one bloc.  Erekat points to the rights of the Palestinians to 
utilise all the opportunities to gain the support for their cause including lobbying EU members outside 
the EU framework he states: 
―The Palestinians are not required to give instructions to the Europeans to strengthen 
their role in the region. The Europeans know their role, but they lack the strong 
political will and we cannot convince the Europeans to follow a unified European 
policy.‖1482 
He adds: 
―France and Britain has bigger presence...There are permanent consulates available in 
Palestine, while the EU does not a representative office. The EU has only the EU 
Commission that just provides economic aid, while the U.S. has a special political 
and security envoy.  The same thing is applied to Britain, But the EU does not have a 
permanent envoy.‖1483 
 
Al-Qudwa, points out that the Palestinians have used the weak structure of the EUto expose the 
differences between the member states in order to persuade other members to support resolutions 
relating to the Palestinian cause in the UN. 
 
―In the beginning, the structure of EU was weak and we used to practice pressuring 
tactics with some friends. But with the development of the EU structure, things 
became different.‖1484  
  
Majdi Al Khaldi considers the EU‘s role to be positive and useful; nevertheless it he believes it has 
not reached the ―desirable and required level.‖1485He refers to the limitations of the U.S's position and 
domination as well as the Israeli resistance of the EU's role in the political field. On the other hand, Al 
Khaldi thinks that the EU‘s members are more powerful in their political bilateral relations with 
                                                          
1481
 Hulileh,op. cit. 
1482
 Erekat, op. cit. 
1483
 Ibid. 
1484
Al-Qudwa, op. cit. 
1485
 Al. Khaldi, op cit. 
 312 
 
Palestinians than the EU.
1486
 
 
Hulileh concludes his remarks on the EU –US relationship and the EU policy in the middle east by 
stressing that the ―EU policy in the Middle East EU tries to find a place on the table of negotiations 
through satisfying the U.S‖ He added, the ―satisfying‖ policies go ―parallel with weak Arab position 
that make the them avoid to support the European stance at the expense of the U.S‘s position.‖1487 
Hulileh blamed the Palestinians as well for their ―imbalance in directing the Palestinian foreign policy 
and duality in the Palestinian political speech to the world.‖1488 Betawi, member of the Palestinian 
legislation council and leader of the Hamas Movement believes that there are some question marks 
and a suspicious and political price behind some of the European aid. For example, he claims that 
European aid is given to Palestinian women's activities to persuade them to adopt civilian and western 
laws instead of Sharia law as a European attempt to restructure or reengineer Palestinian society and 
therefore ―destroy the Palestinian people.‖1489 However, he appreciates the EUsince it alleviates 
Palestinians' problems, allowing them to take advantage of European developmental programmes, 
through a selective policy, that meet the Palestinians‘ needs and to reject European funds that clash 
with Palestinian norms and values.
1490
 
 
7.7 What the Palestinians Want from the EU  
This section seeks to affirm what the Palestinians want from the European Union. Saeb Erakat calls 
on Europe to determine its relations with the Arab and Muslim worlds since these relations ―were not 
determined since 1632 when Turkish Othman forces besieged Vienna 480 years ago.‖1491  When the 
researcher asked Erekat what was meant by the determination of such relations, his answer indicated 
that there is ambiguity and confusion surrounding European-Arab relations. Erekat  preferred to 
answer the question by redirecting matters towards the Europeans by enquiring about the basis on 
which these relations depend. 
 
―Do they depend on interests or neighbourhood? Why are they afraid of us? Why did 
you strike Mohammed Ali Basha? When did you strike Saddam Husain when his 
power emerged? Why did you strike Jamal Abdulnaser? Why are Arabs struck every 
time they think in a development project?‖1492  
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Erakat is convinced that the root of the problem between Europe and the Muslim and Arab world is 
that the ―Europeans are afraid from Muslims and Arabs for that reason it was very easy to convince 
the European nationals that Saddam Husain had developed nuclear weapons to strike the EU's capital 
Brussels.‖1493Ahmed Soboh, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, stressed that the Palestinians ―don‘t 
want Europe to show enmity towards Israel‖ because the ―Palestinians signed a peace agreement with 
Israel and they recognized Israel.‖1494 However, Soboh called upon everyone ―to be enemy of the 
Israeli occupation in Palestine, because the continuity of occupation brings more violence, terrorism 
and hatred‖.  He added: ―I do not call anybody to leave his friendship with Israel, but I call everyone 
to win a new friend called Palestine. I do not want anyone to help me live with occupation. I want 
help to end occupation.‖1495 
 
Sheikh Hamed Betawi also has a desire for Europeans to ―adhere and commit to their high values, like 
freedom, justice and equality,‖ and not treat the Palestinians ―like slaves, with no respect to them as 
humans who have interests, opinion, values and aims.‖1496 He adds ―due to a long experience with 
Arabs and Muslims, the EU has acquired a better knowledge and understanding of Arabic and Islamic 
issues compared to American cowboys.‖ Betawi highlights several issues that he claims the 
Europeans must take into consideration when conducting their policies in Palestine.   
It is primarily recommended that Europeans should stand by promoted principles and values they 
promote in order to gain credibility. In Betawi‘s words, ―Europeans should respect the result of 
democracy that they believe in and they should be closer to us to understand our religion; they should 
support right, not tyranny.‖ The Islamic leader also stresses the importance of differentiating between 
resisting the occupation and engaging in terrorist activities.  He states that ―we as Muslims should not 
reply to the U.S. soldier who kills Muslims in Iraq by the killing of Europeans and bombing of their 
trains. We do not accept that at all but we have the right to fight them if they came to our countries as 
occupiers, whether that was in Iraq or any other place.‖  He urges Europeans not to use Islam ―as an 
enemy to unify the European internal front.‖ Finally, the Islamic leader stresses that European 
politicians should know that the Palestinians ―do not hate European people, but we hate the European 
policies, because these policies support injustice. Europe supports injustice and supports Israel 
politically and financially in our favour.‖1497 
Abdullah Abdullah asks EU member states to make ―unified efforts and interests, to talk in one voice‖ 
since ―their deliberate or non-deliberate absence opened the door for the U.S domination.‖1498 The 
manifold European voices, according Abdullah, denote that ―there are many messages and this leads 
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to many hopes and expectations in the region.‖  In addition, the chairman is convinced that the lack of 
a unified European voice will lead to a contradictiont between European promises since ―each 
European has promises that contradict with the promises of other European states.‖ As a consequence 
of the many European voices and messages, several leaders perceive that the EU and Europe are 
urgently in need of a European political leader who has charisma that enables him to direct the foreign 
European policy in a way achieving Europe's unified goals. Khatib believes that ―Europe‘s priorities 
should be strategic and political ones,‖ because besides the importance of region in terms of 
geographical location and energy, he argues that solving the Middle East‘s problems, particularly the 
conflict in Palestine, will lead to ―limit the problems of Arabic and Muslim communities that live in 
Europe.‖ In addition, Khatib calls upon the Europeans to take the Holocaust factor into consideration 
in their attempts to understand the European CFSP. Khatib suggests determining the historical 
relationship between European gentiles and European Jews, principally the legacy of the Holocaust 
and how it has shaped European and Israeli relations.  He attributes this paradox of European policy 
in the region to to the Holocaust factor: 
 
―There is a factor that European academics feel shy to mention, which is the 
holocaust. Here, I want to confirm that the acts of Europeans in the Middle East that 
contradict with their positions and principles stem from the complex of guilt which 
results of the way the Europeans and Germans dealt with the Jewish.‖1499 
 
Hulileh urges Europeans to pay more attention to religious and cultural relations with Palestinians, 
especially as this dimension “does not take big part in the EU-Palestinian relations.‖ He adds that ―we 
as Palestinians should not forget the role played by some European states with regard to Christian 
holy places in Palestine. As far as cultural objectives are concerned, I see that Europe is not interested 
at all in this issue.‖1500 
7.8 Factors Determining Palestinian Perceptions of EU Policy in the OPTs 
Clearly the Palestinian perception of the European role and policy is that they are divergent and 
sometimes conflict with each other.  Several determinants contribute to the views of the interviewees. 
First, the political ideologies and backgrounds of the interviewees; for example, the Islamic ideology 
of the leadership from the right wing of the Palestinian political movements (Hamas) affect their 
perceptions of the EUpolicies in Palestine. Therefore it is not surprising that most of the criticism 
towards the EU democracy and human rights programmes came from the Islamic leaders who believe 
that the Europeans ―enjoy democracy in their countries but when they go out of their countries, they 
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are no longer democratic and become monsters.‖1501 Thus they believe that the EU is not interested in 
implementing democratic practices and values in Palestinian but dictatorships and corruption.
1502
 
Another factor which influences their views is the profession and position of the interviewee in the 
Palestinian political structure.  
In addition, whether the interviewee is in government or in opposition also plays an important role in 
determining the interviewee‘s response to the researcher‘s questions. The researcher noticed that those 
in opposition were more critical of the European policies although most of them, such as Azam Al 
Ahmed, were very active in the peace process and the Palestinian government policies. It could be 
that being outside of the government and not having contact with European officials freed them from 
diplomatic censorship. The researcher found that most of the Palestinian leaders who were involved in 
the Palestinian government and/or in the Palestinian NGOs were reserved and reluctant to talk about 
the EU policy freely or make direct criticism of its policy. As explained in the methodology of this 
chapter the Palestinian leaders try to maintain good relations with their European counterparts by 
avoiding criticising them. Ashrawi, Erakat and Khatib are clear examples of this. 
7.9 Conclusion  
This chapter has shown that the Palestinian leadership are aware of the deficits inherent in the 
mechanism of the EUCFSP, either due its flawed structure or due to conflicting interests of the 
member states. However, although the Palestinian leadership has shown dissatisfaction with the 
results of the EU‘s mechanism they are, on the ground, exploiting the mechanism which in turn has 
contributed to distorting their voice and efforts and role in the MEEP and Palestine. Approaching EU 
members individually and lobbying them behind the EU frame work is a clear example of the 
Palestinians‘ exploitation of the EU‘s CFSP. Awareness of the difficulties in achieving consensus 
among the 27 members of the EU has caused the Palestinians to play on the differences between the 
political stances of the member states.   
This has contributed to weakening the European role and voice in the OPTs erritories and the MEPP. 
Furthermore, taking advantage of the various channels of European aid is another example of the 
Palestinians taking advantage of the EU members‘ desire to increase their presence and prestige in 
OPTs through their aid and the developmental programmes outside of the framework of the European 
Commissioning.  
The Palestinian leadership has shown dissatisfaction with the European position in the MEPP because 
of their lack of independence from the U.S.  In theory the Palestinians called upon the EU members to 
play a political role in the peace process; however, on the ground they are not interested in supporting 
a strong European role since they know that the MEPP is in the hands of the U.S. who has influence 
over Israel. Therefore, the only role that the Europeans can fulfil, according to the Palestinians, is to 
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influence and moderate the U.S. policy towards the Palestinians, since they consider it to be biased 
towards Israel. It is interesting to note that, whilst this thesis has identified the role played by the U.S. 
(and trans-Atlantics among some EU member states) in shaping the context and dilemmas of EU 
policy-making towards the Palestinians and the MEPP, this factor was considered the primary 
determinant of EU policy – or specifically policy-weakness – for Palestinian interviewees.  
 
This privileging of the U.S. in the interpretations of Palestinian leadership figures can be accounted 
for in several ways. Firstly, the U.S. undoubtedly dominates the political peace process and, as the 
principal and most consistent supporter of Israel, is the power-broker in all Palestinian discourses. 
Secondly, when European member states talk to the Palestinian leadership, its is possible that they are 
more open about the importance of their own relations with the U.S. than they are with each other, 
caught up as they are in trying to develop a collective European position and discourse. Alternatively, 
it could be a way for member states to excuse or justify their own failures to comply with EU policy 
or its implementation. The U.S could then come to play a larger role in Palestinian leadership 
understandings of EU or member state policy than reality demands. Eitherway, Palestinian leadership 
perceptions of the primacy of U.S influence in everything that concerns their political fortunes, frames 
their perceptions of other actors and influences. 
 
Finally the chapter shows that there is a gap between the objectives and intended outputs of EU 
policy, as exemplified in their statements, and the way that these are actually perceived by their 
intended recipients, particularly when it comes to the EU‘s democracy discourse. There is a common 
perception of EU double standards, whereby the EU‘s short term interests - mainly security and 
regime stability – have become more important than creating a democratic Palestinian state. As a 
result, the EU has lost credibility in the region.  Regarding aid the chapter shows that despite the huge 
amount of aid the EU provides to Palestine, they are not perceived to have brought peace or to have 
contributed to the building of an independent Palestinian economy.  
The chapter highlights the importance of studies of EU policy-making towards external partners, 
taking into consideration not just intended outcomes, or the EU‘s own assessments of its performance, 
but also the manner in which its policies are perceived and received by the targets of that policy. The 
Palestinians have not been passive recipients of policy – the outcomes of EU policy-making have 
been in part dependent on how that policy is perceived and how the Palestinians have been 
proactively anticipating and manipulating them.  
In sum, if  realist best explains the European Union‘s foreign policy making and policies towards the  
OPTs and the MEPP  it  also very useful approach to understand  how the Palestinians responded to 
the European policies, albeit the PA not as a state entity. Playing on the differences between the EU 
members, selectivity in implementing the European democratisation programmes and aid are 
examples support the realist behaviour of the Palestinian leaders.   
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Public opinion polls conducted by the EU in the OPTs shows the European policy in the Palestinian 
Territories is a controversial issue for the Palestinians. Despite the fact that 43% of the Palestinians 
questioned say they feel ―unfamiliar‖ with the European policy, there is a general rise in the 
popularity of the EU amongst the general Palestinian public, with 46% attesting to this. 
The European survey shows that over ―four fifths (83%) describe relations with the EU as fairly or 
very good, while only 12% think the opposite.‖1503 It shows that nearly ―four out of five respondents 
(79%) think that their country has benefited from EU policies.‖ 83% of Palestinians show 
appreciation of the European aid and technical assistance to the Palestinians.  In addition, the research 
shows that the EU programs and policies have a direct impact on Palestinian society and political 
culture, where according to the polls the Palestinian adopted and embraced the values of the EU: ―The 
personal values of the Palestinians have become much closer to perceived values of the EU‖.1504   
 
The Economic prosperity, peace and security and absence of corruption are identified as both the top 
three perceived EU values and the top three personal values.
1505‖The polls show that sometimes there 
is correlation between the views of the Palestinian leaders and the opinions of the general Palestinian 
public.  However, the polls also show that there are also occasional contradictions.  For example, this 
chapter demonstrated how he EU‘s attraction is currently in stagnation or decline among the 
Palestinian leadership who thinks that the EU couldn‘t play role in the MEPP due to the U.S. 
domination power. In contrast, the public opinion polls suggested that ―three quarters (75 percent) of 
Palestinians think that the EU can help bring peace and stability in the region.‖77 percent of the 
Palestinians think the EU helps the promotion of democracy through its cooperation activity. 
Additionally, 70 percent of the Palestinians think that the EU should continue its role in promoting 
democracy.
1506
  
Finally, the polls show that the Economic development, the peace process and education have been 
ranked among the most important issues in which the EU should have a greater role.
1507
 The Public 
opinion polls echo the result of chapter five.   According to the result 59 percent and 57 percent of the 
Palestinians say that the EU has improve their education and contributed to develop their 
infrastructure.  But EU has not improved the productive sectors such as, the Palestinian agriculture 
sectors, employment, and trade
1508
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Conclusion  
This thesis set out to examine EU policy towards the Palestinians. Specifically, and as a consequence 
of an evaluation of the determinants of collective foreign policy made through a study of existing 
research on the EU, it sought to determine how the structure of the European foreign affairs 
mechanisms (the EPC/CFSP) determined policies towards the Palestinians, the OPTs and the Middle 
East Peace Process.  The study aims to answer the following fundamental questions: 
 
1- How does the EU ―make‖ its foreign policy, through what institutions and mechanisms and to 
what ends? 
2- How is EU policy towards the Middle East, its conflict, its Peace Process and towards the 
OPTs, in particular, formulated, with what objectives, under what constraints and with what 
impact? 
3- What does the making of EU policy towards the Middle East, its conflict, its Peace Process 
and towards the OPTs tell us about the mechanisms, instruments, and processes of EU foreign 
policy-making in general?       
In Chapter One, the researcher introduced the main theoretical understandings that currently exist to 
explain the international relations of and within the EU, its policies and political behaviour in general, 
and in the realm of foreign affairs in particular.  Since the inception of European cooperation in the 
field of international affairs in the end of 1960s, there has been significant competition between 
theories aiming to explain how and why the EEC/EU members coordinate and cooperate in this area. 
Through reviewing the contributions of the main international relation theories (realism, neo- realism, 
liberalism and neo-liberal institutionalism, and constructivism), it became evident that no single 
theory has complete explanatory power but that all of them ultimately identify the member states as 
key actors rather than the institutions of the EEC/EU itself.  
 
This suggested that realist assumptions held greatest weight, and that even when limited aspects of 
sovereignty were surrendered to EEC/EU institutions, this was a result of member states self-aware 
promotion of their own national interest, and was constantly subject to negotiation and renegotiation. 
Constructivism aided our understanding that member state interests are not static but can be redefined 
as a result of membership (including the processes of interaction and bargaining), and neo-liberalism 
contributed an understanding of the normative dimensions of European aspirations, both internally 
and externally. 
The second part of the chapter examined the integration theories which contribute to our 
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understanding of the institutions of the EEC/EU itself; and what determines their form and the 
processes by which they come into being.  The chapter discussed specifically functionalism, neo-
functionalism, intergovernmentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and the multi-level governance 
model. These approaches can help explain how what began as a functionalist economic collaboration 
has evolved over time into a complex, multi-dimensional regional organisation which has developed a 
coordinated foreign policy structure and mechanism. Again, no single approach seems sufficient in 
itself – the essentially realist approach suggests that liberal intergovernmentalism might best explain 
the EEC/EU as an entity and its foreign policy-making, although the literature supports to idea that at 
times there is functionalist over-spill which empowers the institutions of the organisation beyond the 
immediate self-interest of member states.  
 
The EEC/EU should then be understood as a complex, multi-layered organisation, but one in which 
the interests of the member states, the structures and mechanisms whereby they negotiate these 
interests, and the subsequent balance of powers and competences between member states (represented 
through intergovernmental components) and institutions (the more functionalist components) should 
all be examined in order to understand how and why foreign policy in general, and then towards the 
Palestinians specifically, is made. 
Chapter Two traces the evolution of EEC/EU external policy, from the EPC in 1969 until the EEAS in 
2009.  It demonstrated the complexity of the European foreign affairs mechanisms and decision 
making, whilst recognising the way in which different dynamics have been evident at different points 
in the trajectory. The chapter demonstrated the development of the institutional structure, the main 
actors and the decision-making processes. The chapter shows that, despite the European desire and 
efforts to build effective foreign affairs mechanisms and decision-making processes that enable 
Europe to speak with one unified voice, the EPC, CFSP and the newly adopted mechanism under the 
EEAS have all suffered from specific limitations which have prevented Europe from playing an 
active, coherent, and consistent role at the international level. 
This has been due to several reasons linked to the institutional architecture and the decision-making 
processes in foreign affairs. First, the European institutional structures of EPC/CFSP and EEAS have 
been designed by the member states in a way which ultimately protects their sovereignties in external 
policies (for example by inclusion of consensus conditions and national veto powers). It is clear that 
EU member states have built a mechanism that reflects their shared interests in the first place, but 
which can be obstructed when it moves policy beyond common denominators. Such deliberate defects 
can be said to prevent any major achievements that challenge existing policies from ever being 
accomplished, which thereby neither allow the contraption to exert enough force to survive of its own 
volition nor to overcome the inherent defects intentionally injected by its makers. This leads to a 
dominance of inter-governmental European institutions (the Council) over supranational ones (the 
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Commission and the EP) and creates an imbalance of power between the legislative authority and the 
executive authority. Ultimately, the chapter demonstrated that the history of decision-making in the 
EEC/EU suggests that there is a general desire to enhance Europe‘s foreign affairs mechanism but that 
efforts to do so are always constrained by  the member states‘ privileging of their own sovereignties. 
This evaluation of the institutional structure of European foreign affairs from the EPC to the EEAS 
therefore supports the realist understating of the EU, whereby the member states build institutions in 
order to promote and protect their own national self-interest. The requirement for a foreign policy has 
illustrated the political spill-overs of functionalist economic integration, but these are constantly 
stymied (albeit to different degrees at different points in time) by this preference for 
intergovernmentalism. 
The Pre- Maastricht Treaty period shows the members states insisted on keeping the EPC mechanism 
outside of the EEC itself. Thus it lacked the instruments and resources to implement its declarations 
and was unable to move beyond declaratory policy.  
The Maastricht Treaty (1992) raised expectations for a new collective foreign policy. However, once 
again the treaty did not significantly change the way that the Community conducted its foreign policy. 
The pillar structure of the treaty created a dualism in decision- making since it kept the CFSP outside 
the framework of the EEC in order to maintain and preserve respective sovereignties. The treaty gave 
a marginal role to the European institutions, mainly the European Commission, while at the same time 
the treaty empowered these institutions by keeping the intergovernmental approach towards the CFSP.  
Under the CFSP, the member states did not give up their sovereign rights to a supranational 
institution, such as the Commission, that could potentially act above and beyond their own national 
interests. Thus, the roles of the European Commission and the EP have been extremely limited.  In 
fact, the Maastricht Treaty made the CFSP mechanism a multifaceted process of convoluted 
interactions between many actors, including the member states and the European institutions, through 
a complex of hierarchical and horizontal institutional forms. The new structure may even have served 
to weaken the system rather than to enhance European assertiveness. In addition, the limited power 
given to the European institutions and personnel to implement the CFSP increased the tension 
between the interests of these institutions and the member states‘ desire to protect their own national 
interests. 
 The Lisbon Treaty represents the latest effort to improve the institutional coherence. Aiming to give 
greater consistency to the EU‘s external actions and enable the EU to speak with one voice abroad, 
the treaty created two new institutional positions, the High Representative for Foreign and Security 
Policy/Vice-president of the Commission, and an elected President of the European Council. But 
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while it gave new implementation competences to a new European institution (the European External 
Action Service) simultaneously the treaty has stripped the Commission of the right to propose directly 
to the European Council and instead forced it to go through the office of the newly created High 
Representative. Thus it gave with one hand, and took away with the other, retaining the overall 
balance in favour of intergovernmentalism at the expense of an ever more complex array of 
supranationalist institutions.  
The European foreign affairs mechanisms and decision-making process are therefore a product, or 
victim, of a fundamental dilemma of member states. On the one hand they are interested in supporting 
the integration process of Europe as a way to protect and promote their national interests; on the other 
hand, they are keen to maintain and retain their sovereignty and protect their own interests and ability 
to conduct their individual policy outside the European framework.  
This dilemma has led to the creation of a hybrid institutional structure with an ambiguous distribution 
of roles and instruments. However, despite the EEC/EU members‘ policy of curtailing the power of 
the EU and its influence over their national interests and foreign policies, the European institutions 
have managed to alter the member states‘ perceptions of what constitutes those interests.  Being 
members of the EEC/ EU, and participating in its structures, institutions and processes, has prompted 
the member states to modify their own policies and interests and in turn has created a collective 
identity and shared interests. Therefore, whilst neo-realist understandings of the EU foreign policy-
making explain its underlying intergovernmentalism, constructivist approaches to the impact of 
socialization and normative values upon regional arrangements also have merit.  
Chapter Three moves the focus to the geographic context of the subject of the thesis. The chapter 
provides a key contextual dimension of EEC/EU foreign policy towards the Palestinians through an 
assessment of the series of European initiatives towards the Mediterranean region (of which the OPTs 
is a key part).  In doing so, it demonstrates the generalised character and flaws of collective foreign 
policy-making outlined in the previous chapter. 
More specifically, the chapter supports the neo-realist proposition that the EEC/EU represents the 
self-interested, security-driven interests of member states and that these have been the main motives 
behind European regional initiatives towards the region. These concerns have varied and changed 
from time to time: while containing the Soviet Union and its influence in the Mediterranean, and 
securing energy were the main motives during the 1970s and 1980s, concerns have been more 
recently centred on instability and fears of violent spill-over into Europe, combating terrorism, 
securing energy and controlling illegal migration.  
The research shows that there has been a gradual increased awareness among European decision –
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makers that the problems in the Mediterranean region are not merely economic, but rather a 
combination of economic, social and political ones. Nonetheless, the EU has utilised its experience in 
economic integration, drawing on liberal principles and values such as trade, economic 
interdependencies, economic aid, regional cooperation, democratisation and respect for human rights 
in order to stabilise the region. Implanting theses programmes and policies on the ground has required 
the development and use of supranational institutions and instruments, mainly the European 
Commission, which in turn has increased the supra-nationalist elements in the CFSP through the 
extensive use of its resources and experience. This increased role was supported by the legal and 
institutional framework of the Maastricht treaty. This in turn strengthened the role of supranational 
actors not just in the field of implementation and monitoring but also in the right to submit proposals 
to the Council alongside the member states.  
The European Commission has successfully managed to force itself onto the European table and to 
develop and promote several initiatives which have been adopted by the member states. The European 
Commission participated in formulating the aims and objectives of the GMP, the EMP and was 
entirely behind the ENP. The EP as well has played a role in putting human rights onto the European 
agenda.  
These roles and activities show that, despite their limited power, the supranational actors in European 
foreign affairs have increased their influence on European foreign affairs decision-making. But these 
achievements shouldn‘t raise expectations unduly because the role of the supranational institutions 
remains limited by European treaties and the powers that have  been given to the member states over 
the EU institutions; by the veto power of the member states, the intergovernmental approach towards 
the CFSP, the lack of political will on the part of member-states to utilise the legal tools available to 
implement policy, and selectivity in implementing the EU programmes towards the region. This 
creates tension between the member states and the European institutions themselves.  
The policies of the EU members  towards the region and towards the European regional initiatives 
shows that they focus more on short-term priorities such as security cooperation with the non-member 
Mediterranean partners  against terrorism,  limiting the influence of Islamist parties which are seen as 
hostile towards the West and Israel,  and maintaining their  own economic interests (mainly oil and 
trade). In contrast, the European Commission acknowledges the importance of the strategic interests 
of Europe mentioned above, but has designed its regional initiatives not just to address short - term 
aims, but also to tackle the roots of the imbalance between both shores of the Mediterranean through 
adopting a comprehensive long-term developing policies and approach.  
The (im) balance of power in the EU in the favour of the member states affects the competence of the 
Commission to implement policy on the ground. There is a systemic selectivity in implementing 
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policy that goes with the European policy and strategic interests but neglecting what contradicts it or 
put its own security at risk. This has led to a gap between the European statements and its policy on 
the ground which undermines the credibility of the regional initiatives.  
Furthermore, the history of the EEC/EU policy towards the region shows that Europe utilises liberal 
values and policies to achieve political and security ends. Thus, EU policies towards the 
Mediterranean can be explained and understood principally within the realist framework where the 
security, stability and self -interest of the EU and its member states are the main factors determining 
its behaviour.  It shows that the EU is a realist actor in liberal clothes.  To be more precise, democracy 
and rule of law are not an ends of European policies, but rather a means to enhance European security. 
If liberal values and policies put European security at risk or lead to instability and conflict in the 
short run, they are abandoned (or at least relegated) in the EU‘s priorities. 
The chapter also shows how, while the regional initiatives towards the region have been victim to the 
basic inter-governmentalism, bargaining and divergent interests of the member states,  the member 
states nonetheless cooperate with and support each other in order to achieve their common and shared 
interests. The European regional initiatives are full of examples of alliances, pragmatic compromises, 
and a willingness to modify pre-determined interests that reflect their domestic preferences in order to 
meet the needs of other members.  The negotiations process shows that the member states have 
adopted a flexible approach towards these initiatives, since they bargain and compromise, and 
exchange favour for favour. The capable and strong states pay side payments to smaller ones in order 
to ensure the success of their projects in the EU. This also (again) shows how membership of the 
EEC/EU can itself effect how understandings of state interests are constructed at any given point in 
time. 
Finally, the chapter provides illustrations that the actors of the CFSP are not limited to the member 
states and the European institutions, but also include NGOs and pressure groups within the member 
states. In fact, these groups have managed to force their concerns and interests onto the EU-
Mediterranean agenda and change the negotiations outcomes, especially in the field of agricultural 
products. Thus the agenda-setting of the EEC/EU regional initiatives towards the Mediterranean 
shows that there are both top-down and bottom-up dimensions to European foreign policy toward the 
region, indicating the complexity and multi-level nature and environment of the EU.  
In sum, the member states‘ responses towards the regional initiatives shows that these members adopt 
a co-operative attitude towards these initiatives at times, but a conflictual attitude at others, when they 
believe that supporting a proposal might put their own interest at risk. Second, although the members 
have agreed on the general frameworks and principles of these initiatives, they differ among 
themselves on how to implement the initiatives, and the priorities to be given to 
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 those initiatives. Thirdly, they are not just differing among themselves but also with the EU 
institutions, and they challenge policy if they think the programmes of these institutions will 
jeopardise their own national interests.  
 
Finally the chapter demonstrated that, despite the European efforts to enhance regional cooperation 
between both shores of the Mediterranean and among the non-members in order to establish security 
guarantees between the conflicting parties of the region, their efforts always crash eventually on 
the rocks of the conflict the between the Arabs and the Israelis who have politicised the European 
initiatives and made them victim of their own conflict. 
In Chapter Four, the thesis narrows the research to explore the EU‘s political role in, and policy 
towards, the MEPP, extending the context of EU policy-making towards Palestine.  European 
involvements in the Middle East and the MEPP have gradually developed in parallel with the 
development of the European foreign affairs mechanisms. The chapter shows that it took almost thirty 
years for the Europe to develop a relatively coordinated foreign policy towards the conflict in the 
Middle East. The research shows that the early stage of the European involvement in the Middle East 
conflict under the EPC was characterised by the EEC‘s lack of political resources and instruments and 
an insufficient degree of coordination among its members.  
This meant its policy was limited to declarations only. Despite the institutional, internal and external 
limitations and the restrictions imposed on Europe‘s role and involvement in the region, especially the 
Cold War which limited the possibility of pursuing an autonomous European approach, it is fair to say 
that the declarations of the EEC toward the Arab-Israeli situation during the EPC era have remained 
the cornerstone of EU policies till today. In fact, the European declarations and statements would later 
become guiding documents of the international community and were adopted by the UN and the U.S. 
some 20 years later.  
The Europeans were the first to call for the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and 
the first players to call for an established Palestinian state side by side with Israel. Moving from the 
EPC to the CFSP has helped the EU to coordinate its foreign affair in a relatively better way and gain 
international recognition.  This has been mirrored in the Middle East conflict. The EU has been part of 
the MEPP since it‘s incepting in the 1990s.  It became the major donor for it and for the PA, involve 
on a daily basis in preparing the Palestinians to meet their obligations towards the Peace Process, 
including state-building, training the Palestinian police forces and reforming the PA and its 
institutions.  
The EU efforts on the ground have gained it international recognition and status as an equal partner in 
the Quartet since 2002. However, the chapter shows that, despite the Europeans having agreed on the 
main principles of the solutions to the conflict, they disagree and differ on the right way to implement 
these solutions. In addition, due to ill-structured decision-making in the foreign affairs mechanism, 
the divergent interests of the member states, and external elements (mainly the U.S. and Israel), the 
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EU role in the MEPP remains incomplete and fragmented. It has ultimately been limited to supporting 
the implementation of the MEPP on the ground rather than initiating the policies.  In other words, its 
role has been reactive rather than proactive, and ultimately subject to the will of the main players in 
the peace process, the U.S. and Israel, both of whom have sought to limit the European political role 
in the MEPP. This makes the EU just a payer for other's policies in the Middle East. Its role has been 
marginalized and becomes complementary and supportive to that of the U.S.  
 
The thesis shows that the CFSP doesn‘t aim to create any counter balance against Washington in the 
Middle East. The power of the alliance relationship in security, military, trade, economic and cultural 
affairs between EU and US is such that it cannot be sacrificed for the sake of the European interests in 
the MEPP. 
Tracing and assessing the development of European involvement in the MEPP shows that the 
conclusions of Chapter Three can be echoed here. First, European policies and The EU‘s involvement 
in theMEPP has been victim of the intergovernmental approach. Policy towards the MEPP tends 
towards the lowest common dominator which can be reached through bargaining.  However, as a 
result of the European involvement in the MEPP, and the desire of the member states to build a bridge 
between their divergent interests and as a result of the absence of collective agreement on strategies or 
implementation, the role of the European institutions and personnel on the ground have actually 
increased. There is therefore evidence of functionalist spill-over  from EU policy towards the MEPP, 
an example being the increased role of the  Commission after the establishment of the PA European 
developmental policy meant sending electoral observers, reforming the PA and its institutions, 
training the Palestinian police, and controlling  the Gaza-Egypt borders.  
The role and involvement of the former High Representative of the CFSP Solana, the EU special 
representatives to the region Miguel Moratinos and Mark Otte also. They were involved directly in 
the negotiations between the conflicting parties, and they have managed to make the European voice 
heard. Solana participated in several international working groups and committees regarding the 
MEPP, mainly the Quartet. In addition, Moratinos was involved in the agreement between Israel and 
the Palestinians for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Hebron. But despite the increased role of the 
EU institutions and personnel, their roles are still limited to coordination and implementations since 
their roles and what they can do on the ground is restricted by the European treaties and their 
mandates, which have been designed and formulated by the member states. Thus, their roles are still 
marginal and within the framework of the limited power authorised by the member states.  
This again supports a largely realist understanding of European Common Foreign policy-making. The 
aim of the pillar system of the EU and the reform of the decision-making of the European foreign 
affairs was to build a coherent, consistent and unified European policy, but the actual impact on the 
CFSP in general has been a negative effect on the ground. The EU policies towards the Middle East 
mirror all the deficits of the CFSP. Policy-making is diffused among several institutions and 
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multipliers who claim power over the CFSP. The multiple European actors have multiplied the 
European voices in the MEPP, with different institutions and actors giving different answers to the 
same questions. There is overlap in the responsibilities and roles. On the decision-making level, the 
process is complex, slow and full of bureaucratic procedures imposed by the member states on the 
European institutions to protect the member states‘ interests. 
 
The pillar system complicated the implementation process of European decisions due to the imbalance 
of power between the executive power, which is the European Commission, and the legislative power, 
which is the the Council of the European Union. Needless to say, the independent foreign policy of 
the member states outside the EU added more confusion to EU policies towards the region. This 
dualism slowed implementation further and weakened the overall negotiation position of the EU, 
especially vis-à-vis strong foreign policy actors like the U.S. and Israel.  Therefore, the division 
among the EU institutions and absence of a single authoritative voice makes it difficult for the EU to 
have a comprehensive and common policy towards the Middle East in general and the OPTs in 
particular. 
The decision-making process and its outcomes towards the Middle East and the MEPP show that 
these policies are not exactly consistent guiding principles. Despite that fact the EU members come to 
the negotiating table with pre-determined interests and political stances that reflect their identities and 
domestic preferences they have sometimes showed a pragmatism and flexibility, modifying their 
policy to the agreed and collective policy of the EU. For example, Germany has re-orientated its 
foreign policy and supported all the key European foreign policies and declarations that supported the 
Palestinian right to self-determination despite the fact that these declarations contradict German‘s own 
foreign policy, which totally supports Israel.  
Greece is another example where a state has altered its policy towards Israel after she joined the EEC, 
evidence of the Europeanisation effect identified in the last chapter. At other times, the EEC/EU 
members‘ behaviour in the EPC/CFSP shows rigidity. There are cases where the members insisted on 
their positions during the negotiations or preferred to go it alone outside the main framework of the 
EPC/CFSP. This in turn has weakened the EU policies towards the region. The individual initiatives 
that the member states propose from time to time outside the EU framework to put an end to the 
conflict, including the different European position toward the Israeli attack on Gaza in 2009 for 
example, and the individual connection and channels that member states open with Hamas despite the 
EU‘s political boycott of the Islamist Palestinian movement, are clear examples of this policy.  
Finally tracing the European policy towards the Middle East shows that, with the exception of the 
pressure that Italian farmers imposed on the EEC/EU to alter their trade and agricultural policy 
towards the non-Mediterranean members, European public opinion and civil society organizations 
have not influenced the direction of the CFSP. Many of these organisations have been supporting the 
Palestinians in terms of economic aid, educational support and democracy promotion, but there is no 
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evidence that they have impacted upon the EU agenda.  In fact, most of the CFSP policies contradict 
the policies of the EP which represents the European citizens. This absence can be explained by the 
weak role of the EP in the CFSP whose decisions are outside the EP‘s supervision. In addition, due to 
security reasons and interdependence relations with US, the political approaches of the EU are far 
away from their own societal realities.   
The CFSP decisions are made behind closed doors. Yet, the weak voice of European citizens in the 
CFSP might change soon since the Treaty of Lisbon created the so-called European citizens' initiative 
which will enable the European citizens to ―ask the Commission to bring forward legislative 
proposals if the supporters of an initiative number at least one million and come from a significant 
number of member states.‖1509  
Having discussed the regional contexts for EU foreign policy towards the Palestinians (the 
Mediterranean initiatives and the MEPP) Chapters Five and Six narrow the research more directly 
onto EU policy specific to the Palestinians.  Two case study arenas for policy are considered: the 
provision of technical and financial assistance, and support for democracy promotion, institutional 
reform and human rights. As the Introduction to the thesis discussed, these are the areas of most 
interest to analysts of EU-Palestinian policy and the areas where the EU has been most active. 
 
Chapter Five examine to what extent European aid and technical assistance to the Palestinians and the 
MEEP has served the EU‘s stated objectives in the development of the Palestinian economy and 
support for state-building. The research found that the EU and its members together contribute a third 
of the overall financial support to the PA. They are the largest financial donors to the PA and the 
MEPP.  In fact, without their aid and technical assistance the PA and the MEPP would probably 
collapse. Despite the existence of different interests among the member states towards the conflicting 
parties, a unified aid policy which aims to support the MEPP is agreed upon whilst retaining 
individual aid and assistance policies separate from the EU framework.  
The history of European aid and technical assistance, both generally and towards the Palestinians and 
the PA specifically, suggests that there are normative, liberal and moral motivations behind the EU‘s 
aid and technical assistance to the Palestinians and MEPP, but the chapter shows that the desire to 
stabilise the region through supporting the MEPP is the main reason that Europe spent more than half 
a billion Euros a year of European taxpayers money on supporting the Palestinian economy and the 
MEPP. True to realist analysis, the EU has used its financial assistance primarily to secure its own 
(and its members) security self-interests.  
In line with an international consensus that economic aid and improving economic conditions will 
create a constituency for peace, the EU have at the same time supported the MEPP financially as a 
                                                          
1509   Council of the European Union. (2011, February 14). Go-ahead given to the European citizens' initiative. 
PRESSE 24. 6469 (11) Retrieved from 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/119272.pdf Access date: February 
18, 2011.  
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window of opportunity for extending Europe‘s political role in the MEEP. Again, the EU has 
deployed liberal values and principles in order to achieve political and security ends, although there 
has been selectivity in implanting these values. The EU‘s direction and disbursement of aid shows 
that it abandons the norms when not doing so would put the interests of its member states at risk – the 
realist behaviour in liberal clothes identified in earlier chapters.   The thesis found this behaviour in all 
aspects of the EU aid and technical assistance policy towards the MEPP and the Palestinians.   
Also, as the previous chapter had shown, the progress in the MEPP and the increased European 
involvement in it, demanded more coordination among the CFSP actors and - as a result - the role of 
the supranational institutions also increased. For example, the role of the European Commission in 
implementing and distributing the EU‘s aid through the TIM and PEGAS, its role in coordinating and 
training the Palestinian police forces and finally its role in monitoring the Rafah border are examples 
of the new importance of supranational actors. But, despite this promising responsibility, the role of 
the supranational actors has still been limited by the intergovernmental underpinnings of the structure 
of the CFSP, mostly the artificial separation of policy areas between low politics and high politics, 
and the inherent imbalance in the distribution of power between the EU institutions themselves 
(between the legislative and the executive so to speak).  
 
This ill-structured decision making of the EU and the intergovernmental approach to the CFSP has 
lead to realist politics triumphing over liberal principles and values. Therefore, the EU aid and 
technical assistance to the OPTs became a victim of the dualism in the decision-making of Europe‘s 
CFSP. The tension between the interests of the two pillars of the EU means that policy becomes 
bogged down and fraught with contradictions. If this is true of the CFSP in general, nowhere is it 
more apparent than in the provision of financial aid to the Palestinians. The member states restrict the 
EU institutions from implementing their own policies and acting on, or reacting to, the policies of 
both conflicting parties. In other words, member states do not allow policies which may contradict 
their national interests to be passed or implemented, thereby preventing the European institutions 
from utilizing its legal and intended policy. The German negative response to the European 
Commission to impose economic sanctions against Israel or to use its economic leverage as Israel‘s 
main trading partner, as an instrument to enforce Israel to respect its agreements with the EU are a 
clear examples of this policy. 
On the Palestinian side, the EU member states continued to support Chairman Arafat, who was 
considered a peace partner despite allegations of misuse of aid and corruption. However, since the 
members wished to support the peace process and feared that cutting European aid would lead to the 
collapse of the PA and collapse of the MEEP, the EU were prompted to turn a blind eye to the PA‘s 
corruption and lack of accountability and transparency in its financial system. The European Union‘s 
stance towards a Hamas-led government is another example of how European aid is linked to the 
national security of member states. The EU has frozen European aid to Hamas since it refuses to 
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recognise Israel or to sign the peace agreement with it. 
As a result of member states‘ interest in supporting the MEPP, their historical relations, and desire to 
maintain close ties with Israel and avoid antagonising it, which might put the EU role in the MEEP at 
risk, the member states never allowed the European Commission to sanction Israel. In addition, the 
EU and its member states avoid funding development projects in the OPTs that might challenge 
Israeli policies on the ground, especially in the agricultural and industrial sectors, preferring to adapt 
the European developmental and aid policy for the OPTs to Israel‘s own policy.  
Finally, the member states never allowed the European Commission to ask for compensation for 
projects that have been destroyed by the Israeli army, a clear example of how intergovernmentalism 
failed to impose non-violent coercion. As a result of the outlined effects, EU aid policy has not coped 
with external threats in helping the Palestinians to build an independent economy or boost the peace 
process. In the light of lack of progress in the MEPP which is going nowhere, it is clear that the EU 
pays the expenses of keeping the PA alive and indirectly pays the cost of the Israeli occupation. The 
tolerant policy of the EU towards the systematic destruction of the Palestinian infrastructure supports 
the argument that EU financial assistance has come to reinforce the occupation rather than replace it.  
In fact, European aid policy has been forced into service of short-term humanitarian aid and the self-
interested security-driven policies of member states and has contributed to increasing Palestinian 
dependency on foreign aid rather than supporting sustainable development. 
 Despite the fact that the Palestinians are the ―largest per capita recipients of international 
development assistance in the world,‖1510 and although the aid has significantly contributed to the 
creation of a supportive environment of institutions and infrastructure (building schools, hospital and 
roads for example),  the Palestinian economy is in its  worst economic depression in modern 
history.
1511
 Clearly, with regard to the peace process, the EU has not managed to utilise its aid in an 
efficient way in order to influence the conflicting parties or to build an environment in which to 
achieve sustainable peace. The chapter showed, then, that this failure was due principally to the flaws 
identified in the structure of EU foreign-policy making identified in Chapter Two and illustrated 
through Chapters Three and Four.  
Chapter Six similarly assessed EU support for Palestinian democracy promotion, institutional reform 
and human rights.  The research found that that the stated goal of the EU has been to create a 
democratic, independent Palestinian state which will live side by side with Israel. The motivation for 
democratising and reforming the PA is built on the assumption that doing so would increase 
international and even Israeli confidence in the PA, and enhance its ability to negotiate authoritatively 
on behalf of the Palestinians.  In addition, the EU decision-makers believe that creating a democratic, 
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Lasensky, S., & Grace, R. (2006). Dollars and diplomacy; Foreign Aid and the Palestinian Question. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved from 
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS74906.P.290  Access date: February 18, 2011. 
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Nasser, N.(2006, September 6). Western Donors to Palestine: What Mission? Aid has Turned into a Tool 
which Supports Israeli Ambitions. Global Research.  
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viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State would be the best guarantee for Israel‘s security and 
acceptance as an equal partner in the region.  
These issues have become part of the official EU rhetoric in its relations with the Palestinians. 
However, the research has found that, although the European Union‘s programs to democratise and 
reform the PA have achieved some of its goals (including building new Palestinian institutions from 
scratch, supporting the principles of rule of law, transparency and modernisation of the judicial 
system), these achievements can be considered as effectively cosmetic measures, since the EU and its 
member states refuse to support any real democratic practice in the OPTs that might change the 
political system of the PA, challenge  the EU-Israeli relationship or represent European endorsement 
of an Islamist regime . First the EU continued its support of the current Palestinian leadership despite 
allegations of corruption, its lack of democratic principles, and its poor human rights record. Second, 
the EU and member states refused to recognize the democratically elected Hamas government and 
refused to deal with the Government of National Unity. Finally, the EU and its member states have 
hesitated to renounce the Israeli violation of Palestinian human rights, and their destruction of the 
Palestinian infrastructure. 
The research blames the contradiction between the stated intentions and the reality of what is being 
implemented on the ground on the same dynamics identified in the previous chapters. For a start, 
implementation falls to the mode ―idealistic‖ or norm-driven Commission, while decision-making is 
ultimately located in the intergovernmental Council. While the increased role of the EU, offered by 
the opportunity to support democratisation and reform, has created spill-over effect, empowering the 
Commission, its efforts are undermined by the security considerations of member states and their 
concerns regarding the stalling of the peace process or the implications of an Islamist government for 
terrorism at home. Therefore, it is deemed by the Council to be in the EU‘s interest to support the 
secular Palestinian leadership even if it is at the expense of Palestinian democracy.  
EU members not being interested in changing the current Palestinian leadership with a new leadership 
that refuses to support the Peace Process or recognise the right of Israel to exist. In other words, the 
stance of the Palestinian leadership towards the peace process and Israel is the main factor that 
determines the political stance of the EU towards any Palestinian leadership. Moreover, Hamas 
represents more than an alternative Palestinian leadership. Through the EU structures and institutions, 
member states have formed a collective identity which rejects Hamas as the representative of the 
―other‖, an Islamist religious political entity which is perceived of through the lens of terrorism and 
threats to the European identity via its transfer through migration. (The study in Chapter Seven raised 
the possibility that this goes further, into a European effort to ―engineer‖ the Palestinian society to 
conform with its own interests and norms).  
The chapter found that the EU sees reform and democratisation as a way of supporting the peace 
process and stability in OPTs by strengthening the PLO leadership and Fatah leaders against Hamas, 
who refuse to disarm their militant wing, and of being involved in the peace process. Finally the EU 
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member states‘ desire to maintain their limited political role in the MEPP and to maintain their 
interests with their alliance in the region was behind the inability of the European Commission to 
criticise or to utilize its sanctions policy against Israel and its human rights violations.  In summary, 
this chapter showed that the EU and its member states have attempted to seek a balance between 
promoting its values and principles as a soft normative power, and the security concerns and political 
and economic interests of its member states.  
This research has shown that the EU and its member states have failed to maintain this balance, which 
can in turn be attributed to the flawed and contradictory structures of foreign policy making. 
Specifically, this is not a result of a lack of programmes, initiatives, mechanisms or legal apparatus. It 
is because the member states lack the political will to enable the Commission to implement the 
policies it has signed up to, reflecting the conflict between normative, long-term priorities and realist 
short-term priorities, the latter usually winning out. 
Finally, Chapter Seven seeks to add an original dimension to the assessment of EU policies by 
looking at local perceptions of actual results on the ground. In other words, the main aim of this 
chapter was to examine whether there is a match between the thesis results thus far (that support 
realist understandings of the EU and its foreign policy) and local perceptions of that policy and its 
impact. The chapter gathered the opinions of Palestinian elites as recipients of European policies and 
found that the Palestinians fully recognise that the European Union‘s policies are contradictory, their 
implementation is weak and – to some extent - that this results from the dominance of 
intergovernmentalism in EU foreign-policy making processes. Thus we discover a gap between the 
way the EU thinks of its policies and how they are perceived by its intended recipients.   
 
The fieldwork demonstrated that the vast majority of Palestinians interviewed by the researcher were 
aware of the inherent flaws in the mechanism of the CFSP as has been clearly exemplified in the 
second chapter. Asking the Palestinian leadership how they assess the European policies towards 
three issues, the EU‘s role in the MEPP, the EU‘s promotion of democracy and reform and finally the 
EU‘s financial and technical assistance to the PA, the research found that the Palestinians believe that 
EU policies have not met the interests of either the Palestinians or the Europeans themselves, since 
they are ineffective and contradictory. The Palestinians showed dissatisfaction with the European 
position in the MEPP because of its lack of a policy which is independent from the U.S. and due to 
the divergent policies of its member states.  
Even though the Palestinians appreciate that the Europe was the first political actor to call for a 
Palestinian state and rights of self-determination as a basis to end the conflict in the Middle East, they 
perceive the EU as an economic giant but a political dwarf.  There is general consensus among the 
Palestinians that EU failure can be attributed to the secondary role that the EU plays to the U.S., 
making the former a payer not a player. The Palestinian leadership‘s views of EU‘s democratization, 
reform and human rights policies towards the Palestinians fall into two groups: those who totally 
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oppose and repudiate them, and those who welcome them but with reservations. However, there is a 
common perception of EU double standards, whereby its short term interests, mainly security and 
regime stability, have become more important than creating a Palestinian democratic state and that the 
EU is insincere in its efforts by indirectly supporting authoritarian and corrupt regimes in the PA and 
civil.  
Although the Palestinians are grateful for EU aid, interviews with prominent politicians raised 
questions about the nature of such aid, such as the political price, direction of the aid and the extent to 
which the Palestinians are actually benefiting from its implementation. They believe that the EU has a 
hidden political agenda or that it is using aid as a tool to ―blackmail the Palestinians‖ by keeping the 
Palestinian economy dependant on European aid.  There are also supporters who feel the aid does 
nothing but allow Israel to evade responsibility for the destruction of Palestinian civilian 
infrastructure.    
The weight of the evidence gathered from the interviews in this chapter shows that the Palestinians 
take advantage of the EU‘s lack of a centralized rule-making and enforcement authority by utilising 
the EU‘s philosophy rhetorically to put pressure on it to pursue policies that seemingly are in line with 
their policy. In other words, the Palestinians consequently play on the EU‘s divisions, developing 
their own strategies and policies which take EU policy-making flaws into account. Although the 
Palestinians are not fully satisfied with the European involvement, politically they act to maximize 
what they can get and take full advantage of the tension between the European member states, 
between the EU institutions and the member states and the EU institutions. 
In theory, the Palestinians want an increased involvement of the Europeans in the peace process. 
However, since they are aware of the limitations of European influence on the ground, they have 
evolved their thought process to acknowledge the role of the EU as that of a political moderator and 
financial guarantor. Therefore, although the Palestinian leadership does not constitute a nation-state 
actor in a realist international system, it behaves – as far as it can – much as if it were. The normative 
power of the EU, real or imagined, is largely irrelevant. 
We can now ask: what does all this tell us about EU foreign policy-making towards the Palestinians?  
First, it is clear that, for all its normative aspirations, EU foreign policy is ultimately about two related 
things: sustaining the peace process regardless of its weaknesses, and ensuring European security. 
What constitutes security in this instance is determined in part by ―hard‖ security concerns such as 
terrorism, in part by ―soft‖ concerns such as deterring illegal immigration, and in part by constructed 
notions of a shared and challenged European identity.  
Secondly, EU foreign-policy towards the Palestinians is the output of a mechanism dominated by 
intergovernmentalist processes, embodied in the Council. Since member states have differing 
interests, and since the processes allow for consensus-based decision-making and the exercise of 
vetoes, there is always a constraint on making progress beyond ―the lowest common denominator‖. 
Thus, while the member states largely agree on what the final outcome of the MEPP should look like, 
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what a consequent Palestinian state should look like, and what contribution the EU can make to 
achieving it, their differing relations with Israel, their unwillingness to use legal sanctioning 
instruments against it, and their varying positions on the role of, and relations with, the U.S., 
continually obstruct a more rounded and coherent policy from emerging. The processes of bargaining, 
and the effects of socialisation within the EU itself, allow for national interests to change, but they 
also result in a shallower and less committed end policy result.  
Despite the ultimate dominance of intergovernmentalism, policy towards the Palestinians has had its 
own supranationalist moments.  As the role allocated to the Commission has expanded, partly due to 
the formulations of the CFSP and partly as a result of new implementation tasks falling to it in the 
Palestinian Territories, so it has generated some policy momentum of its own. The Commission 
embodies the normative aspects of EU policy, which is good in so far as the main areas in which the 
EU can enact policy are areas where there is a normative consensus among states: economic 
assistance and democracy promotion. But the Commission is continually thwarted in its 
implementation by the lack of political will on the part of member states to jeopardise any part of their 
own self and collective interest in securing the peace process and wider security for the sake of these 
normative interventions.  
The resulting tension, and the power imbalance between the decision-making Council and the 
implementing Commission, and the willingness of member states to pursue their own policies 
independently, has led to contradictions between statements of objectives and actual achievements on 
the ground, leading to a loss of credibility for the EU in the OPTs.  
These impacts more broadly on the European role in the MEPP. While the MEPP offered a window of 
opportunity for the EU to develop a serious political role, its inability to match statements with 
outcomes or to link its policies with its instruments and resources, has diminished that role, and 
reduced the EU to being a payer, not a player (something which is not altogether unwelcome for some 
member states). Ironically, one could argue that the EU is now the financier of an American, rather 
than European, foreign policy! 
This failure impacts more widely still. The EU has put significant resources and energy into its efforts 
to establish a comprehensive Mediterranean regional policy, again based primarily on its own security 
needs but incorporating a liberal normative agenda. Time and again, the on-going Arab-Israeli conflict 
has obstructed efforts to develop a regionally-inclusive vision for co-operation. As the EU is seen to 
be unable to fully develop its own political role in the resolving the conflict, and as its unwillingness 
to match stated aims with implementation outputs becomes clearer, Europe becomes progressively 
less credible as a Mediterranean regional broker. This inevitably limits the potential for the UFM, just 
as it did the previous initiatives.  
Finally, the thesis has demonstrated that the flaws in the CFSP and the post-Lisbon structure of 
foreign policy-making are not a secret. The Palestinian leadership, the recipients of policy, understand 
and exploit those flaws, leading to further unintended outcomes. 
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The research supports a fundamentally realist understanding of the EU and of its foreign policy 
making. Member states remain the principal units in the international system, the EU is a collective 
security arrangement which enables member states to exchange and share mutual benefits. But 
classical or neo-realist explanations alone are insufficient. The EU does have a strong liberal and 
normative dimension. This is embedded in its own experiences and is reflected in its institutions 
which are progressively developing as a result of functionalist spill-overs. But when it comes to 
foreign policy- the real high politics - the member states have consistently rejected surrendering 
meaningful sovereignty and have reigned in the power and capabilities of the EU institutions through 
mechanisms which privilege intergovernmentalism. 
This acts as a brake on spill-over, although the extent of this can vary in response to objective and 
environmental circumstances (especially when there is a shared interest in those circumstances) and 
there are supranationalist ―moments‖ when the Commission in particular is able to exert an enhanced 
role. Governments (and their ideological predispositions towards Europe) change, the global balance 
of power alters, peace processes are initiated (or collapse), economies rise and fall. Thus, while a 
generalised resistance to surrendering sovereignty is likely to remain, the interests of states in the 
degree to which they resist, or the specific mode by which they might surrender it, is subject to 
alteration. 
Constructivist understandings of identity and its role in foreign-policy making also have something to 
contribute. The study has shown that member states‘ interests are not static, but rather constructed 
according to events, environment (internal and external)  and socialisation. The member states adapt 
their interests and behaviour perceptions according to membership, to the formation of new collective 
identities and interests, and to the possibilities to be won from bargaining and trading. In the long-
term, then, there remain prospects for greater alignment of interests in spite of, or even eroding, 
intergovernmentalism.  
Debates about whether EU foreign-policy is renationalising or not need to consider both the form of 
the structures and the underlying processes resulting from socialisation. On the one hand, the UFM 
might be seen as a step backwards from the Barcelona Process in terms of recognising the importance 
of nation states over collective regional ambitions. On the other, the Lisbon Treaty indicated the 
political will remains to formulate a more coherent and unified foreign policy mechanism. Both 
processes exist simultaneously, reflecting the very essence of the tension between national 
sovereignty and collective action, intergovernmentalism and supranationalism.  
If the EU is to develop a coherent and effective common foreign policy, it must resolve these tensions. 
Since (as realism tells us) it is unrealistic to expect member states to fully surrender sovereignty on 
matters of high politics, they can at least address some of the structural problems resulting from 
dualism and go-it-alone politics. If you can‘t agree on what should be done, you can at least agree on 
what should not be done.  Once a policy is agreed upon, the EU Institutions should be given fuller 
powers to implement it. If there is no political will to follow-through, don‘t make the policy. The 
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costs in terms of credibility and coherence of stating one thing and doing another are potentially 
higher than the gains of normative declarations and expose the EU to exploitation and manipulation 
by third parties. 
 
Areas for Further Research 
This study has found that there are several areas, which further research can shed light on. For 
example, it is crucial to study the role of the European NGOs, lobbying groups, and the public opinion 
in shaping the EU policy towards the MENA region. In addition, it is important to trace the impact of 
the ―Europeanisation‖ on the foreign policy of the EU members towards the conflicting parties and 
the MEPP post-Lisbon treaty.  Another significant area for further research is studying the European 
perception of the Palestinian and Israeli foreign policy towards the EU.  Finally, it is important to 
measure the impact of the Lisbon treaty on the European policy towards the region; or, in other words, 
to assess to what extent the treaty has managed to build a unified, coherent European policy towards 
the region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 336 
 
Appendix  
List of the Interviewees 
1) Saeb Erakat:  the former head of PLO negotiations department and PA minister. Became a 
member of Fatah and the PLO Council. Served as vice-chair of Palestinian delegation to 
Madrid, then head of interim negotiations with Israel. Served as minister for local government 
from 1994 to April 03 and PLC member (Fatah) for Jericho.  
2) Ghassan Khatib, the director of government media for the PA Minister of Labour from 9 June 
2002. Leading member of The Palestinian People's Party (PPP), director of Jerusalem Media 
& Communication Centre. Also works as a lecturer in cultural studies at Birzeit University; 
and is head of the non-profit United Agricultural Company, channelling foreign aid to West 
Bank farmers. He was a member of the Palestinian delegation to Madrid process, which he 
boycotted from April 93. Signatory of December 2001 gave a statement criticising PA's arrest 
of leftist activists. He is the Palestinian editor of Bitter Lemons.  
3) Ziad Abu Amr: member of the PLC, between 18th March 2007 to 17 June 2007, he was 
foreign minister of the PA. 
4) Nasser al-Shaer: former Education Minister of the Palestinian National Authority serving as a 
member of Hamas. He also served as Deputy Prime Minister in the PUNG cabinet. After the 
Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip, all Hamas ministers in the PA government were dismissed, 
including Shaer. 
5) Majdis Khaldi:  foreign policy advisor, in the office of the President Mahmoud Abbas Abu 
Mazen. 
6) Sheikh Hamed Al-Betawi: the leading Palestinian Islamist cleric and spiritual guide for 
Hamas. Moreover Al-Betawi is a Member of Palestinian Legislative Council for Hamas. 
7) Ali Sartawi: Palestinian professor and politician. He served as Minister of Justice in the 
national unity government of the Palestinian National Authority and active member of 
Hamas. 
8) Samir Hulileh: Former Cabinet Secretary General and Chief of Staff of the PA. 
9) Azzam al-Ahmad:  Heads of Fatah Parliamentary Bloc in the PLC, PA minister of 
telecommunications and IT from April 2003 (previously minister of public works, with 
housing portfolio added on 9 June 2002. He was the PLO ambassador to Iraq from 1979-
1994. Fatah-RC member from 1,989. 
10) Hanan Ashrawi: the former advisory council of the PLO, and spokeswoman for, Palestinian 
delegation at Madrid, member of the Palestinian PLC for Jerusalem. Became PA Minister for 
Higher Education (June 1996-1998); leaving to vote against the PA Cabinet in August 1998, 
despite being offered the tourism portfolio. Appointed as spokeswomen of the Arab League 
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on 11 July 2001, with special responsibility for Palestinians. The head Miftah, a pro-
democracy NGO. 
11) Nasser al-Qudwa: Palestinian ambassador to the UN. Appointed alternate Palestinian observer 
at UN from 1986; permanent observer from 1991 till 2004. Appointed as minister of foreign 
affairs 2005- 2006.  
12) Abdullah Abdullah: Chairman of the Political Committee of the PLC and recently appointed 
as the Palestinian ambassador to Lebanon.  
13) Mohammad I. Shtayyeh: the Minister of Public Works & Housing and is the President of the 
Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction "PECDAR". He has also 
been directly involved in other capacities, and participated in large number of initiatives, 
actions, orientations, and decisions. 
14)  Ahmed Soboh: Deputy Minister of Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
15) Ghada Arafat: The head of the European office in the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Interview Questions for Sampling Categories 
The people interviewed by the researcher can be categorised in four ways. The interviewees were 
asked predetermined questions covering mainly the economic and political role of the EU in Palestine. 
Some of these questions were general questions being directed to the vast majority of the 
interviewees, other were additionally questions, depending on the affiliation, position, background, 
and experience of the interviewees. This explains why the researcher favoured unstructured interviews 
which give him the flexibility during the interviews. The sample covers 20 people that have involved 
in the European policy or had connections with the European political role or aids through their 
career. In addition, for the reason that the thesis covers the European foreign policy towards the 
Palestinian National Union Government (PNUG), the interviewee samples included members of 
Hamas movement (Islamic Resistance Movement) who were members of the cabinet or members of 
the Palestinian Legislative Council. In addition, the sample included Palestinians leaders who were 
appointed in the PNUG as independents, technocrats and experts these four categories were: 
1. Members of Fatah and Hamas in the Palestinian Legislative Council. 
This category included members of major Palestinian political parties and movements which are Fatah 
(Palestinian National Liberation Movement), and Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement). The major 
aim of these interviews was to obtain a comprehensive understanding about how the both sides 
perceive the political role of the EU, its presence in Palestine, the European aids, and their 
expectations for the EU‘s role and its future in the MEPP of the area. In addition, the interviewees 
from both sides were asked to give their views and opinions about why Europe did not admit Hama‘s 
government and the PNUG. The vast majority of the interviewees from both parties in these 
categories have been involved in the PNUG; therefore, the author thought it useful to interview them. 
2. Members of the Executive Authority: Interviews with current ministers and previous 
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ministers of the PA who serve in the previous governments since the establishment of the PA in 1994. 
The sample focused on and targeted the ministers who serve in the PNUG in order to understand how 
the EU dealt with this subject. In addition, this category included advisors and consultancies of the 
presidential office and number of the employees in the Palestinian Foreign Ministry who are in charge 
of the EU affaires in the ministry. Moreover, the group contains Palestinian leaders who represent the 
OPTs in the International Organization and have dealt with the EU such as, the Permanent Observer 
of OPTs to the UN - Nasser al-Qudwa. The questioning of ministers of the PA revolves mainly 
around the relationship between the PA and the EU in the previous years and now. They were asked 
as well on the subject of their first hand experience dealing with the European policies, European 
Institutions and institutions such as the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, 
and the European Parliament. Additionally, there were questions concerning the European special 
envois, the MEPP, and European Commission delegation in Jerusalem. Furthermore, this group was 
asked about the European achievements and failures in OPTs, and challenges that they faced in 
dealing with these institutions. Ministers who dealt directly with the European aid and its 
developmental agenda the OPTs were interviewed  
3.  Member of the opposition groups mainly Hamas who were outside of the National 
Unity Government and represented merely Hamas Movement.  
These groups were asked about their views of the European policies in OPTs, their views 
about the European aid and why the EU boycotted their government. In addition, they were asked 
how they perceive the European role, and what the future role of Europe in the OPTs is.  
4. Experts in the European policies and its relations with the PA. 
  
The main questions for these categories are: 
 
1) What are Europe's priorities in the region? 
2)  What is the European agenda in OPTs? 
3)   In your opinion, why Europe refused to deal with Hamas and later the National Union 
Governments? 
4) How do you evaluate the European-Palestinian relations?  
5) How did the European-Israeli axis affect the European-Palestinian axis? 
6)  How the EU-U.S relation afact the European-Palestinian relations? 
7) In your opinion, can Europe follow a policy independent from the U.S in the Middle East? 
And if yes, what are the conditions of this role?  
8)  What do you think about the relationship between the EU and the U.S, regarding the Middle 
East and the OPTs specifically?  
9) What is your evaluation of the European role in the MEPP?  
10) How do you evaluate the European developmental role and policy in OPTs?  
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11) In your opinion, who make the decision in the EU? 
12) Do you think that Europe is able to play an effective role in the OPTs but it does not wish to 
do that or it wishes, but it is unable to do that?  
13) Which are the European institions you deal with?  
14) In your opinion, what is the aim behind the EU aid for Palestinians?  
15) How do you explain the discrepancy between the European Parliament's policy that calls to 
deal with Hamas, and the policy of the European Commission and Council that boycotted 
Hamas?  
16) What are the motives behind the EU democracy promotion?  
17) How do you evaluate the EU's role in the democratic process and human rights? 
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